Presided over by President Briand of France, who is No. 25 in the photograph. The others are (1) Premier Asquith of England; (Underwood & Underwood) ingly and on April 2 launched a strong attack against them. We had transferred our defense to the right bank of the Forges rivulet, where bare slopes, forming a glacis, gave us a superb shooting range. From these slopes our guns, aided by the guns of Béthincourt, which took the assailants obliquely, mowed the enemy down without their finding a man in front of them. The bombardment from Avocourt to Béthincourt was resumed, but the expected infantry attacks did not develop, with the exception of an assault against Haucourt on the afternoon of April 4. It was repulsed. SUMMARY OF LATER EVENTS To bring the account of this terrible and unprecedented battle up to date, it is necessary only to enumerate the oftrepeated and as often-repelled attacks at three points: First, in the Woevre region, the plain which lies to the east of the ridges of the Meuse on the east of Verdun, between the great intrenched camp and Metz; secondly, on the right (east) bank of the Meuse, in the region between Douaumont and Vaux, and, third, on the left (west) bank of the Meuse, against the Mort Homme Hill, 304-Meter Hill, and 287-Meter Hill, all of which have been described again and again in the foregoing narrative. The attacks, beginning with April 5, are as follows: 1. In the Woevre, April and May, almost incessant bombardment; few infantry attacks. 2. East of the Meuse, April 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 17, and 27, and May 8. 3. West of the Meuse, April 5, 7, 9, 10, and 22, and May 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10. In each of the three battle sectors practically the same ground was fought over, week after week; where the Ger mans made small gains French counterattacks invariably drove them out. From a consideration of these facts two conclusions follow: First, that during the last week of February the French were not retreating from a strong position, but were retreating to a strong position; and, having reached their definitive line of defense, they have been able to hold it against the greatest and most furious assaults ever made in the history of war, prepared by the most tremendous artillery forces that have ever been brought together. This successful defense forms one of the finest military achievements ever recorded, and brings higher glory to the soldiers of France, from General Joffre, General Castelnau, and General Petain to the privates in the trenches, than did even the great and decisive victory of the Marne. Secondly, it is quite evident that, after the first two weeks of the battle-when the original plan miscarried-the German Great General Staff has had no plan at all, no strategic, no tactical, conception; it has simply been a case of blindly, obstinately hammering away; and the rotation of the attacks, against the three sectors we have indicated, might just as well have been settled by the rattling of the dicebox. On this point a military writer recently said: In short, with ever-ebbing vigor, the German Army is smashing its head against the walls of Verdun. The weight and vigor of the blows decrease, but the suicidal mania continues. Two months have passed since the early success of the German attack ended with the capture of Vaux village. Each resumption of the attempt to take Verdun since that time has been a cause for increasing wonder. What is there about this enterprise that has turned it into a fatal obsession, from which the German high command cannot escape, however great the cost of continuance? V A BERLIN ARTIST'S VIEW OF GERMAN WAR TRIUMPHS [A GERMAN INTERPRETATION] Verdun: The Epic of the War WRITTEN FOR CURRENT HISTORY By H. H. von Mellenthin ERDUN has brought war back into honor, the sort of war in which the individual man and personal courage are given their full chances and values. At Verdun the bearing-down strategy, the open battle, comes back into honor. Trench warfare is that form of wearing-down strategy which plays the bloody game with the least possible risk, and which has no great fondness for battle. This war, like all others, will be won not in the trenches, but on the battlefield. The wearing-down strategy, which aims at tiring the opponent to the point of utter exhaustion, at winning the war by a gradual wearing-out, is false. The view that trench warfare means the last word of strategy has long since been The last word is still the disproved. same today that it was in the days of the great bearing-down strategists, Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Caesar, Napoleon, Gneisenau, Sheridan, Moltke. The strategy which aims at defeating the enemy in open battle becomes folly only when it becomes recklessness-the kind of recklessness which "puts all on one throw." But Verdun is not a 66 throw." The results that can be expected from the wearing-out strategy are definitely limited; the effects of the bearing-down strategy, however, are decisive. That is the lesson of the history of world wars, the great teacher and admonisher. The decisive effects whereof we speak embody victory. Verdun will bring the decision. And the victory will be fought for with legitimate weapons and with open visor. At Verdun bombardments are carried on neither with "silver bullets" nor with "paper notes." The battle is fought neither with the intrigues of back-stairways nor from ambush. At Verdun there are no "hymns of hate," no "boches," and no "degenerates." The sole commander upon that battlefield is military genius. The fight is fought, breast to breast, by man's courage, the sort of courage that does not deny even to the enemy the recognition that is due him. In the midst of the tragedy, after the various satires and farces of this war of nations, Verdun is an epic, a song of heroism. Let Thersites return! Patroclus lies in his grave of honor before Verdun, too; Verdun is the Epopeus, the Iliad of this war. Priam's fortress fell. will fall. Verdun, too, The German General Staff figured the duration of the Verdun campaign at five months. The Imperial German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg, declared in the Reichstag that the operations against the fortress of Verdun were developing in accordance with an accurately pre-determined plan which provided for all possibilities. The Prussian War Minister, General Wild von Hohenborn, made the following statement in the Reichstag session of April 11, last: "These are not, as our enemies are pretending to believe, the last exertions of an exhausted nation, but the hammer blows of a strong, invincible people. which commands sufficient reserves in men and all other means for the continuation of the hammer blows." course. With the accuracy of clock-work and with the force of hammer blows the German campaign against Verdun takes its Like a giant glacier, slowly but irresistibly, the solid mass of German warriors sweeps down Verdun. upon That is the German view of the events which have taken place since February 21 on the fronts of Verdun, and of the military situation as it has developed. The French view is reflected in the announcement that the Verdun campaign as such is already a closed incident, and in the decree which bestowed upon General Petain, the defender of Verdun— who, in the meantime, has been hurled upon the Tarpeian rock-the highest dignity of the Honor Legion: "It is due to his calm firmness and to the wisdom and foresight of his orders that he succeeded in improving a precarious situation and in inspiring all with confidence." The ultimate goal of every war consists in beating the enemy army, in putting it out of action. As against this ultimate aim, which means victory, fortresses are, in themselves, without significance. Their military importance for the development and often for the decision, is based solely upon the question as to whether and in what respect they are suitable to the army as bases in an offensive and as points of refuge in a defensive, and whether and how they are suitable as the "starting points" for a great drive. Antwerp, which was regarded as the strongest and most modern fortress, had lost its military importance from the moment it was divested, by the rapid and victorious march of the German troops through Belgium, of its suitability as a base for an allied march into Germany. The fortress could not even serve as a refuge point. The whole powerful fortress chain on the eastern frontier of Russia was important for the development of the war only by virtue of the fact that it covered the retreat of the Russian armies and created for them the possibility to escape the threatened envelopment. Verdun, however, is not at all a fortress in the accepted sense of the term. Verdun represents an entirely novel and modern strategic factor. As a link of the French chain of fortresses which extends down to Belfort, Verdun had been constructed and built out first, as a point of concentration of the military forces for an offensive; second, as the gate from which these forces were to be put into motion against the enemy; third, as a point of refuge for the event of the failure of an offensive, and fourth, as a battlefield upon which a possible invasion was to be resisted. A starting point for an offensive against the enemy is at the same time a point of incidence for the enemy. Verdun represents the "Anti-Metz." But the German frontier stronghold also represents the "Anti-Verdun." With Metz as their base, the Germans are driving against Verdun, which blocks the advance into the interior of France. To open the door for this advance-that is the task the German General Staff has set itself in the campaign against Verdun. The fall of Verdun would bring the purpose and aim of every war, the disabling of the hostile army, very considerably nearer its realization. The events up to date before the fortress have given the military situation the following aspect: Verdun, intended as a starting point, has completely lost its value as such and as a base for an offensive. It no longer forms a refuge point for the army, but must be defended by the army in open battle. The defense already has devoured such huge masses of troops that in these circumstances there can scarcely be any question of an offensive at any other point of the front. 1. Verdun is no longer a starting point for an offensive, but has become the point of incidence for the enemy. 2. A large part of the French army has been completely withdrawn from active part in the war and is partly tied up" on a very small part of the front. 3. The successes of German arms won thus far create all the pre-conditions for the systematic extension of that which has already been achieved. This means that they are driving further and further toward the ultimate goal of all wars: the disabling of the enemy's army. As for the discussions in the allied countries, the Verdun campaign, as a military undertaking with a definite aim in view, has already been relegated to the "closed incidents" and is merely considered an offensive operation on a larger scale, comparable to the French drive in Artois and Champagne last September. Again, on the German side, the wishes were so "well winged," and the marching gait of expectations was so rapid, that the German troops and the successes have not always been able to keep an even pace. A closer understanding of the tactics employed in the fighting against Verdun teaches one to realize the reasons for this slow and systematic pushing forward. The rate of the forward movement is determined, first, by the strength of the resistance it meets, and, second, by the careful sparing of human material. The The operations at Verdun since Feb. 21 can be divided into three sections. Each new phase forms the continuation of that which preceded it on the militarily logical line of development. first phase, the shortest, consisted of the advance against the northern outer fortifications in the terrain lying in front of the fortress, and in the capture of the area necessary for a concentrated attack and for the bringing up of the heavy guns. It culminated in the storming of Fort Douaumont, Feb. 25.) The second phase was initiated by the extension of the attacking front to the east, from the Woevre plain against the Côte Lorraine. This advance brought the attackers as far as the foot of the Meuse Heights. The northernmost point of this line south of the railway leading from Verdun to Metz is the village and railway station of Eix; to the north of the railway this line stretches as far as Dieppe. From Eix two roads lead in a westerly direction against Verdun, through the two valleys of the Meuse Heights; the old army road and the railway. North of the railway the advance started out from the line DamloupDieppe. In that area the contact was established between the German northern army and the Woevre army. Both armies were participating in the fighting against Vaux, which aims at the possession of the whole plateau between Douaumont, Hardaumont, and Vaux-fighting which is still in progress. The third stage of the Verdun battle carried the extension of the German front of attack to the west, to the left bank of the Meuse, from the line ForgesMalancourt to within the firing range against Le Mort Homme and the Côte de L'Oie. This new offensive is directed against the northwestern outer fortifications of Verdun, as well as against the railway which leads from Verdun to Paris and which is today the only great line of supply-and the logical line of escape. The first move in this offensive was the advance (March 14) against Le Mort Homme (Dead Man Hill) on the sector Béthincourt-Cumières and then (March 20 to 22) through the large wooded area between Malancourt and Avocourt. As a consequence, the French front had assumed the form of a salient whose head, extending beyond Haucourt to Malancourt, reached far into the German positions. This head was crushed in by the Germans through the capture of Malancourt. The loss of the northern slopes of Termiten Hill (Hill 287) on April 7 forced the French to evacuate their positions south of the Forges Brook between Haucourt and Béthincourt, as well as to abandon the latter village itself, all these positions being exposed to the German flanking fire. The new French line now ran from the southern slopes of Bois d'Avocourt over Hill 304 to the southern slopes of Le |