comes critical. Through glasses we can see men maddened, men covered with earth and blood, falling one upon the other. When the first wave of the assault is decimated, the ground is dotted with heaps of corpses, but the second wave is already pressing on. Once more our shells carve awful gaps in their ranks. Nevertheless, like an army of rats the Boches continue to advance in spite of our 'marmites.' Then our heavy artillery bursts forth in fury. The whole valley is turned into a volcano, and its exit is stopped by the barrier of the slain."

The Germans took Fort Douaumont, though at a ghastly cost. The same evening, however, a French counterattack by the famous Iron Division wrested from them all but the bare fort, within which the Brandenburgers still held their own. A French soldier who took part in that charge said afterward:

"At last our turn came. I had taken part in the Champagne charge, but it was nothing like this. We were mad. Nothing could have stopped us. Despite the German fire, which perhaps was hampered by the fear of hitting their own men on the spur, we hurled ourselves at them with the bayonet among the shell holes and ruined emplacements.

It

"This was real war as I had never seen it. For a moment it was furious and equal. Then came another blue-clad wave, and another. We hurled them back, screaming, over the hillside. was a battle without quarter. We captured only corpses. Douaumont Ridge was French once more. As we lay there, panting and too exhausted to cheer, I suddenly found that my thigh was bleeding from a deep stab. My boot was already full of blood, but I had not noticed it."

In the fighting for Vaux similar scenes were enacted. As late as March 17 both the fort and the village at that point were still bitterly disputed, and the Germans were reported to be attacking at last with their reserve guard. A French Captain thus describes the drive against the Vaux-Douaumont ridge on March 14 and 15:

"Heavy shell fire is not as deadly as one imagines, especially if one keeps

cool, holds his shelter in a shell hole, or under a tree stump, and jumps out of the way when he hears a big shell coming. That was where the Boches made their mistake. They thought we could not stand the hammering.

"Soon after midnight the lookout gave the alarm. Our searchlights pierced the darkness and we saw a dark mass slowly approaching up the hillside. When the light hit them they began shouting loudly. Then our guns and mitrailleuses began, and that took the song out of them.

"The first lot never got within striking distance of us, though a few bullets whizzed over our heads, fired mostly from the hip as they ran forward.

"A second rush followed immediately without further gun preparation. These got right up to our barbed wire, where a lot of them stayed. We could hear them shouting, despite the bursting shells, but my men fired coolly. They would have preferred to charge, but knew it was unnecessary.

"There was one group bunched up against our wire so close that they continued to stand after they were dead, supporting each other. Some were headless and others had half their bodies torn away. It was horrible-but we don't regard the Germans as human beings.

"They looked fine and healthy, and from the buttons which many of our men cut off to set in rings, they were evidently guards, as the buttons bore the Imperial Eagle or guard numbers. There will be no shortage of guard-button rings in France when my poilus have leisure to work.

"The worst part was the moaning of the wounded after the attack failed. We could not help hearing it when the cannonade ceased."

At this writing (March 20) the energy of the German attacks at Verdun, both north and south, has perceptibly lessened, and the military critics are convinced that the battle is practically ended. If so, it must go down in history as a German defeat, notwithstanding the ground won.

NE of the fiercest of the many sanguinary struggles which this war has witnessed is now being fought in the neighborhood of one of the most ancient and yet perhaps the most modern of all fortresses, Verdun.

At the least expected moment, in the midst of Winter, and in the very section of their lines where, to the mind of most military experts and, as events have since proved, even to Gen. Joffre's mind, an attack against the tremendously strong French positions seemed utterly out of the question, the Germans have launched an offensive on a scale unparalleled ever since the first Teuton onslaught on the allied lines, in August, 1914.

What definite aims the German General Staff has in view with the mighty drive against the strongest of all French strongholds, nobody but a few chosen men, outside of that exclusive body, positively knows. Unmatured as events are, there is even still doubt among military experts, whether the Germans really intend to capture Verdun. One thing, however, is certain, as has been proved many a time in this war: If the Kaiser's General Staff is bent on taking the fortress, it will fall. It is, in fact, still possible, though not very probable, that operations around Verdun will be broken off in an apparently undecided stage, in full accordance with prearranged plans. The success achieved in this case, for being merely tactical, would nevertheless be well worth the sacrifices made. Up to

the middle of March the Germans have shortened their lines around Verdun by more than six miles. Figuring on an average of four men to the yard, or 7,000 men to the mile of the front, (an average justified by the importance of the section, this would mean that about 42,000 German soldiers, formerly needed for the only purpose of guarding the surplus lines, have been freed since for other duties. Furthermore, the French, according to German estimates, have up to March 10 lost between 70,000 and 80,000 men; supposing, for argument's sake, the equivalence of the French and the German soldier, the total gross profit in fighting forces gained by the Germans up to the present amounts to about 120,000 men. This is more than three times as much as the Kaiser's troops have lost in the same period.

Moreover, the vast semicircular salient which the battle line from the northwest to the southeast of Verdun formed before the present offensive, having the fortress as the centre, was pre-eminently suited for the massing of huge French forces for a drive against Metz, only thirty miles distant from Verdun. Now, with the shrinking of that half circle to a radius of scarcely five miles and with all the roads leading from the French fortress to the north, east, and southeast in range of the German big guns, a massing of troops in that sector is wholly out of the question.

With their present offensive, however, the Teutons have already scored a third

success, the importance of which, it is true, cannot be expressed by figures. As the writer pointed out in the last issue of this review, there exists in the German lines in France a vulnerable spot, namely, the section between Arras and Lens, known as the Vimy heights. The much-talked-of Anglo-French offensive planned for the coming Spring was, as a matter of course, to be launched against that weak spot. Now, with their unexpected drive against Verdun the Germans have utterly foiled whatever plans the Entente may have made for warmer days and forced the French to shift most of their troops from the Artois to the Meuse and to give battle in midwinter and on grounds chosen by their enemies.

The amazingly rapid advance of the Kaiser's gray-clad hosts during the first two weeks of their offensive and the enormous number of prisoners and booty taken from the French are significant for the prodigious fighting spirit of the

Teutons, and this may be said to the credit of Joffre's fighters, for the unexpectedness of the German attack. Berlin official bulletins up to March 10 reported the capture of 414 officers and 27,000 soldiers, most of them unwounded, as well as of 190 guns, including 40 heavy pieces, 230 machine guns, and a proportionate quantity of other war supplies.

Inspired dispatches from London and Paris now endeavor with all means to minimize the importance of Verdun, known hitherto on both sides of the Rhine as the "key to France." This may be taken as a symptom for the impending fall of the fortress. In the presence of those misleading statements, it may not be amiss to consider beforehand the possible consequences of Verdun's surrender.

The first and immediate consequence would be of a tactical nature, inasmuch as the Germans would shorten their lines between St. Mihiel and Varennes

by some ten miles more and, according to what we have seen above, save about 70,000 soldiers for other parts of their various battle fronts.

The second result would be a strategical one. The fall of Verdun would bring the Germans into the flank of the French armies south of the Verdun-Metz line and their left wing, now resting on the French fortress, would be in peril of being rolled up and routed. (That the German General Staff should plan another march on Paris from Verdun seems out of the question to the writer. It may be taken for granted that every yard of the 150 miles separating the capital from the important stronghold has long ago been fortified.)

The third and most far-reaching effect of Verdun's downfall, though, would be the political one. When the Germans, nineteen months ago, surrounded as they were by enemies, and in order to save their country from ruin, decided to strike the first blow and invaded France, they chose the gate offering the least resistance, namely, Belgium, the front door being too strongly guarded by the formidable belt of fortresses Verdun, Toul, Epinal, and Belfort. With Verdun captured, the remaining links of that chain would become as valueless as the stones of an arch after the keystone has been removed, which has been clearly demonstrated in the case of Ivangorod in Russia. Germany once in control of the fortified positions on the Meuse and the Moselle, could afford to offer concrete peace proposals to France, pledging herself to restore Belgium to liberty, but, in compensation, reserving to herself the cession by France of French Lorraine as far as that belt of fortifications.

The different stages of the battle of Verdun, characterized by the clocklike co-operation of heaviest artillery fire and immediately following infantry attacks in overwhelming masses, can be easily followed with the aid of the annexed map.

Feb. 21. After a continuous shell fire lasting nine hours, the Germans made their first infantry attack against the Haumont Woods, which they captured.

22. Village of Haumont and Caures Woods taken.

23. Brabant, Samogneux and Herbebois (one mile northeast of Beaumont) fall.

24. Beaumont captured.

25. Fort Douaumont stormed during a blizzard. (Note the distance between Beaumont and Fort Douaumont.) French resistance in the Woevre breaks down all along the line from Maucourt to Fresnes.

26. Mormont (one mile northwest of Louvemont), Beaumont Chambrettes (one mile northeast of Louvemont) and Ornes taken.

27. Champneuville and Côte de Talou captured. Fortifications of Hardaumont stormed.

28. Meuse peninsula cleared of the French.

29. Great drive in the Woevre, where Dieppe, Abaucourt, Blanzee, Manheules, and Champlon are taken.

After a comparative lull of a week, the Germans, in order to bring their lines west of the Meuse in accordance with those to the east of the river, shifted the attack to the section between Bethincourt and Forges.

upon to claim noncombatant privileges for what are virtually ships of war.

This method would go as far as anything could to prevent Americans from going on board any belligerent vessels except those which are outside the scope of the German complaints. At the same time it would suspend the sailing of the ressels which were most likely to get into trouble. It is true that Americans have a prima facie right to travel where they will upon the sea, even in belligerent merchantmen; but we have never denied the right to capture and sink such merchantmen, and we cannot claim even the right of escape from any ressel on either side which is participating in wie

Such a course as is here suggested would not lead to war. No zatim

Exrope wishes to get into war with the United States. Germany has mach stated from her oral cams on this general sudet, and will undebtedly share stil further if we require the Engist we make the proper distinctions between defensive བཱཏྟཱནྟི། མོནས、དྡྷཡཾ ༔ཆོས། ཟིང་བྱེ་ཟེང United States up satu se vid

YONA The Amenar extreme cutMi sw car and ons te sexwit te ind