Nevertheless, Rumania did not enter the war. In the first place it was unable to obtain necessary munitions. The Entente Powers had too little for themselves and consequently could not supply Rumania with any. The Central Powers, suspicious of Rumania's attitude, also failed to furnish any.

A second reason for Rumania's failure to enter the war was Russia's refusal to satisfy Rumania's territorial aspirations at that time. Our Government demanded the entire Hungarian region between the Carpathians and the Theiss, the greater part of Bukowina, including Czernowitz, and the major portion of the Banat, altogether a territory of 127,000 square kilometers. But Russia would not agree to this. It demanded for itself that part of Northern Transylvania populated by Hungarians, and moreover had the intention of giving the Banat to the Serbs, who claimed it for themselves. Russia evidently wished to control the Southern Carpathians and to come closer and closer to the border of Greater Serbia. I believe, however, that the main reason for the failure of the negotiations to result in a formal agreement regarding Rumanian intervention is to be found in the fact that Russia only attached a secondary importance to Rumania's military assistance, because it thought it could induce Bulgaria to line up on its side, and because at that time the question of persuading Italy to enter the war was the principal object of the policy of the Entente Powers.

The entrance of Italy was regarded as a decisive factor that would automatically entail the intervention of Rumania. It would seem as if the Italian diplomats knew how to strengthen this illusion of the Entente.

"Grant my demands," said Italy to its present allies, "and I promise as your reward the entrance of Rumania into the war as a natural result."

At any rate, one thing is certain. The conditions under which Italy entered the war caused a great disillusionment on our part. The official press adopted an ironical tone, but the statesmen were wild. There were cries of treason. Italy was said to have used the credit due to

its close relations with Rumania merely for its own advantage without paying any attention to Rumania's desires. This is the situation that explains why Rumania did not enter the war simultaneously with Italy. After the Russian front had been broken through at Gorlice and on the Dunajec, Russia was ready to grant all the demands of the Rumanian Government, but at that time even the most outspoken pro-Russian Rumanian could not approve participation in the war, as the danger was too great and too apparent. Since that time the action of the Rumanian interventionists has seemed more like a bluff than an effort with a serious object. But people have asked why Rumania has not entered the war on the side of Germany and Austria.

Such an intervention is not impossible in itself. The fact that in Rumania cooperation with the Germans and the Hungarians would not please the people is of little importance. We may safely say that the idea of war is in general unpopular throughout the entire country, not only with the workers, but also with the bourgeois, and that only the bureaucracy, the officers and the intellectuals want war. Indeed, this does not prevent the pro-Russian Rumanians from representing the Rumanian people as ready for war and in favor of the Entente. The King and the Government would not have any great difficulty in forcing the country into the war on the side of Germany, just as the Bulgarian Government did, despite the fact that the latter had to contend with a strong opposition on the part of the political parties and the people, and was not held back even by the provocation of revolts.

Other reasons prevented a war with Russia. First was the fear of Russian revenge. Once upon a time, after the Crimean War, Rumania held Bessarabia and Russia took it back by force twenty years later. And besides, the principal argument of the Russophile party in Rumania that wants to enter the war on the side of Russia against Austria-Hungary does not consist in the fact that the Rumanians living in Russia are perhaps better treated than those who have

settled in the Hapsburg monarchy, as just the opposite is true. It is a question of another motive that has nothing to do with the alleged sympathy of the Rumanian Boyars with French democracy, and that is that in the case of the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary Rumania would not be menaced by a war of revenge after it succeeded in annexing Transylvania. A Rumania that tried to conquer Bessarabia through a war would resemble a child who while walking with his governess one day was rude to an adult and consequently did not dare to go upon the street alone afterward.

In order to defend itself from Russia, Rumania would simply have to join hands with Germany and Austria, because a treaty guaranteeing its independence would not be sufficient nowadays. Such treaties have lost all their value through this war. There is another reason that explains the neutrality of Rumania: Germany no longer contemplates an offensive in Russia, espe

cially not in Bessarabia, and thus Rumania has as little military importance for Germany today as she had for Russia when the latter was winning victories. I do not believe in the probability of Rumania acting with Russia this Spring, as that would only be possible in the case of a complete change of the strategic situation in Macedonia. And such a change really has only a hypothetical value. For this reason I believe that in the course of further developments, which may be decisive for our Government, Rumania will remain neutral. Naturally, it would be going too far if we laid down this proposition as an absolute certainty. The logic that generally rules in the conduct of individuals is very frequently lacking in the decisions of Governments. But there is one thing I dare assert, and that is that the Socialist workers will do their duty in every case and will maintain their policy of neutrality under all circumstances.

A

S long as the Pope was the sovereign of the Papal States there could be no question that, as the head of an independent Commonwealth, he was fully qualified to exercise all the rights and privileges of his position among the family of nations. Nevertheless, the international status of the Pontificate in reality depended less on the fact that the Pope was sovereign over a rather unimportant section of Italy than that he was ruler over a religious organization stretching throughout the whole world. In many quarters this fact stamped the Papal Office as decidedly of an international character. Since the Catholic Church during the Middle Ages developed from a purely religious body into a powerful factor in world politics, this fact lent weight to the claim for international prerogatives.

Many things marked the acceptance of the Pope's international status in the past.

For instance, the Papal Nunciatures and Legations were always accorded the utmost consideration, although frequently the representatives of the head of the Church were concerned in matters dissociated from their actual missions. In the diplomatic corps they occupied foremost positions.

But a change came when the Pope lost his worldly rulership through the Italian Government's taking possession of the last of the Papal territories in September of 1870. To be sure, it was not intended to divest the Pope entirely of his international position. The international character of the Catholic Church itself was against any such procedure. Futhermore, in all countries with considerable numbers of people devoted to the Church there was a manifest desire that the Pope should become the subject of neither the Italian Nation nor any other Commonwealth, but should discharge his exalted office with the dignity of complete independence.

Shortly after Sardina in 1860 took possession of the greater part of the Papal States, and later, when in March, 1861, Cavour proclaimed Rome the capital of a united Italy, the question arose as to how the international status of the Pope was to be regulated under the changed conditions. The Italian Government, which hoped to effect an agreement with the head of the Church, worked out a plan which contained the fundamental points later incorporated in the law of guarantees. According to this draft the Pope was to be looked upon as a sovereign, even though without domain, and his person in consequence of this was to be inviolate and beyond any jurisdiction whatever. It was also the purpose to assign to the Pope such property and other means as by general agreement should be considered consonant with the dignity of the Holy Chair. These possessions were to be free of all taxation and exempt from all political influence of the Government.

In addition, ambassadorial privileges were assured the Pope, and among other clauses was the guarantee of inviolability of person, which likewise covered the representatives so long as they did not overstep their ecclesiastical missions. In all matters pertaining to his calling as head of the Church the Pope was to be free to consult with whomsoever he desired should come to him for that purpose. Legislation was contemplated with a view to obtaining the Pope's renunciation of any claim to worldly rulership. Diversity of opinion made it desirable that the plan should be placed before the Catholic powers for their mediation.

It was the task of Cardinal Santucci to lay the proposition before Pope Pius IX., who by no means placed himself in entire opposition to the matter. The tentative arrangement, however, went to pieces through the determined opposition of Cardinal Antonelli.

When the Italian Government saw

itself compelled to take possession of the rest of the Papal territory and the City of Rome, in 1870, one more effort was made to come to some agreement with the curia, or, at any rate, to obtain its silent consent to the occupation. But here again the effort met with failure, as the Papal Court declared that if it agreed to the plan proposed the authority of the Pope would be nil. The dignitaries of the Church were especially wrought up over the fact that not only had Rome been joined to the Italian States, but it had, furthermore, been chosen as the capital of the kingdom and the seat of Government. It is very doubtful, however, if, leaving Rome out of the question, this would have sufficed to bring about a reconciliation between the curia and the Italian Government, since the absorption of the Papal States without Rome already was considered a painful encroachment and a serious attack upon the status of the Pope.

Just as it was impossible for the curia and the Italian Government to come into an agreement, so also there was no chance to attain this result through the mediation of interested states that were to find a way to define the position of the Pope. Under these circumstances nothing was left for the Italian Government but to designate the independence of the Pope, as was subsequently done with the law of guaranty of May 13, 1871.

In those early days the idea of Italian nationalization centred in a political understanding, but, as shown by Machiavelli in his own time, Papal authority and secular rulership did not harmonize with the national aspirations of the Italian people.

That the Catholic Church in Italy is influenced by the currents affecting the Italian people has been shown in the most striking manner by the fact that at the outbreak of the present war with Austria the clergy in overwhelming numbers took the side of those favoring hostilities. And Pope Benedict XV. himself, while to all outward appearance maintaining the strictest neutrality, gave permission for the Roman clerical no

bility of the Papal Guard to enter the Italian Army.

war.

In view of the historical development in Italy there is slight reason to believe that the ecclesiastical power stands any chance of being restored to anything resembling its former status, no matter what may be the changes in store for the Italian people as a result of the present As a matter of fact, any attempt to revive the temporal authority of the Pontiff would be fraught with such serious consequences as to injure his position as it is today. Neither is it to be considered practical to assign to the head of the Church a territory outside Italy where the Papal rule would hold entire sway. The problem would remain unsolved in view of the fact that Rome for once and all is identified absolutely with the development and position of the Catholic Church. Its central importance in the affairs of the church following is such that to transplant the seat of the curia to another country would merely complicate the situation further.

Granted that this world war has brought up again the so-called Roman question, it is, nevertheless, entirely proper to look for its solution apart from what the one-time temporal rule of the Pope may have to do with the situation. Whatever inquiry is to be made regarding an independent, secure position of the Pontiff in the future must be conditioned on something like what obtains today.

It is correct to say that nations alone can exercise international prerogatives, and for that reason it seems a matter of course that since the Catholic Church is not a secular state it would be difficult to accord to the Pope an international status in the society of nations. In his capacity as head of the Church the Pontiff does not occupy a position analogous with what falls to the ruler of a nation. Nor is there any reason to claim such a position for the Pontiff. The most to be expected is that he be accorded such rights as will establish beyond peradventure his independence, liberty, and inviolability. The identical international status given to nuncios and Papal representatives in general natu