W

HEN the Teutonic powers announced to neutrals in February that they would order their submarines to sink armed merchant vessels without warning after March 1, 1916, they forced upon the United States the necessity of deciding what course to pursue for the protection of American citizens on such vessels.

There was a choice of four possible courses. We might protest against the German submarine policy as inhuman and contrary to existing international law; we might insist on the disarming of all merchant vessels coming to our shores, thus pursuing the policy that had been tentatively suggested in Mr. Lansing's circular note of Jan. 18 to the Entente Powers; again, we might warn all Americans to stay off armed vessels, foregoing our right as American citizens to travel on the high seas in any vessels we choose; or, finally, we might await a repetition of the Lusitania disaster.

SURVEY OF THE CASE

The problem was one involving our relations with Great Britain and likewise with Germany. The decision, if it had any backbone in it, would necessarily be in partial opposition to one or the other of the great warring groups of nations in Europe. Involuntarily the American Government had become a sort of world tribunal for the trial of this unprecedented case in international law. Both sides have presented evidence, and though a decision has not been reached at this writing, (March 20,) CURRENT HISTORY is able to present a broad survey of the case, with its latest official documents, and of the dramatic side issue which it forced upon President Wilson in

his relations with a hostile minority of his own party in Congress.

Secretary Lansing's circular note regarding the disarming of all Entente merchantmen (published in the March issue of CURRENT HISTORY) had already had the unfortunate effect of causing the Teutonic Powers to expect official American action along that line. But President Wilson had returned from his Western tour convinced that the nation, even though unprepared in a military sense, would support him in a firmer demand for our rights as a neutral power at sea under existing law. Thus one of the first effects of Germany's submarine order was an abrupt pause in the Lusitania negotiations.

GERMANY'S ATTITUDE

On Feb. 17 Secretary Lansing informed Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador at Washington, that the United States Government would not accept the proposal for settlement of the Lusitania affair until the Berlin Government gave definite guarantees for the future. He made it clear that the United States must have written assurances that submarine warfare would not be conducted in such a way as to imperil Americans traveling on the high seas. Great Britain stood firmly on the ancient law and usage which permits a defensive armament on merchant ships without altering their status.

Three days later at Berlin the German Foreign Minister, Herr von Jagow, gave out an interview in which he contended that under modern conditions there was no longer any such thing as a merchant ship armed defensively only; that modern guns and gunners aboard such a vessel made it an auxiliary war

ship for offensive purposes at will, and that there no longer existed any sound reason for arming merchant ships. He added:

"British merchantmen are armed with modern guns; they have trained gunners aboard. We have submitted proof that the English Admiralty have given minute and detailed instructions and orders to take the offensive against submarines at sight. We have submitted proof of the execution of these offensive instructions. Our standpoint is that the so-called defensive armament as it exists on British merchantmen in a practical sense is a fiction of the law; that the use repeat**has edly made of such armament * given such armed merchant ships the character of auxiliary warships, and Germany will consider and treat them as such after the expiration of the notice given to neutrals."

The strained relations between the United States and Germany over the Lusitania had apparently been on the eve of adjustment. The new issue threw the negotiations back again into the danger zone. A diplomatic break between the two nations again loomed near, with the possibility of war somewhere in the background.

CONGRESS TAKES A HAND

warn

Meanwhile, certain members of Congress were becoming alarmed over the President's new policy of dealing firmly with Germany's revival of submarine warfare, and rumors of divided counsels at Washington quickly reached Germany. On Feb. 23 the movement broke into open revolt. Leaders of the House of Représentatives virtually served notice on President Wilson that unless within forty-eight hours he agreed to American citizens that they must not take passage on armed ships, the House would issue such a warning in the form of a resolution. A resolution of the kind, already submitted by Representative McLemore of Texas, was in readiness. The entire Committee on Foreign Affairs, headed by Mr. Flood, was found to be against the President's policy, and Speaker Champ Clark and Representative Kitchin, Democratic floor leader, were in

favor of warning Americans to stay off armed liners, for fear of involving this country in war, though they advised against forcing the President's hand too summarily.

SENATOR GORE'S RESOLUTION

In the Senate, Mr. Stone, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, held a similar attitude, being supported by Senator Kern, Democratic leader of the upper house, and a stormy interview of these two with the President the night before had won no concessions from him. A concurrent resolution was offered by Senator Gore of Oklahoma, ending as follows:

Resolved, By the Senate, the House of Representatives concurring, That it is the sense of the Congress, vested as it is with the sole power to declare war, that all persons owing allegiance to the United States should in behalf of their own safety and the vital interest of the United States, forbear to exercise the right to travel as passengers on any armed vessel of any belligerent power, whether such vessel be armed for offensive or defensive purposes, and it is the further sense of the Congress that no passport should be issued or renewed by the Secretary of State, or any one acting under him, to be used by any person owing allegiance to the United States for purpose of travel upon any such armed vessel of a belligerent power.

At this juncture Senator Stone wrote a letter to the President on the subject and received a ringing reply which declared: "I cannot consent to any abridgment of the rights of American citizens in any respect. The honor and self-respect of the nation is involved. We court peace and shall preserve it at any cost but the cost of honor."

SENATOR STONE'S LETTER
"United States Senate,
"Washington, Feb. 24, 1916.

"Dear Mr. President:

"Since Senator Kern, Mr. Flood, and I talked with you on Monday evening I am more troubled than I have been for many a day. I have not felt authorized to repeat our conversation, but I have attempted, in response to numerous inquiries from my colleagues, to state to them, within the confidence that they should observe, my general understanding of your attitude. I have

stated my understanding of your attitude to be substantially as follows:

"That while you would deeply regret the rejection by Great Britain of Mr. Lansing's proposal for the disarmament of merchant vessels of the Allies, with the understanding that Germany and her allies would not fire upon a merchant ship if she hauled to when summoned, not attempting to escape, and that the German warships would only exercise the admitted right of visitation and capture, and would not destroy the captured ship except in circumstances that reasonably assured the safety of passengers and crew, you were of the opinion that if Great Britain and her allies rejected the proposal and insisted upon arming their merchant ships they would be within their right under international law.

"Also that you would feel disposed to allow armed vessels to be cleared from our ports. Also that you are not favorably disposed to the idea of this Government taking any definite steps toward preventing American citizens from embarking upon armed merchant vessels. Furthermore, that you would consider it your duty if a German warship should fire upon an armed merchant vessel of the enemy upon which American citizens were passengers to hold Germany to strict account.

Numerous members of the Senate and the House have called to discuss this subject with me. I have felt that the members of the two houses who are to deal with this grave question were entitled to know the situation we are confronting as I understand it to be.

"I think I should say to you that the members of both houses feel deeply concerned and disturbed by what they read and hear. I have heard of some talk to the effect that some are saying that after all it may be possible that the program of preparedness, so called, has some relation to just such a situation as we are now called upon to meet.

"I have counseled all who have talked with me to keep cool; that this whole business is still the subject of diplomacy, and that you are striving to the utmost

to bring about some peaceable adjustment, and that in the meantime Congress should be careful not to 'ball up' a diplomatic situation by any kind of hasty and ill-considered action. However, the situation in Congress is such as to excite a sense of deep concern in the minds of careful and thoughtful men.

I have felt that it is due to you to say this much. I think you understand my personal attitude with respect to this subject. As much and deeply as I would hate to radically disagree with you, I find it difficult from my sense of duty and responsibility to consent to plunge this nation into the vortex of this world war because of the unreasonable obstinacy of any of the powers upon the one hand, or, on the other hand, of foolhardiness, amounting to a sort of moral treason against the Republic, of our people recklessly risking their lives on armed belligerent ships. I cannot escape the conviction that such would be so monstrous as to be indefensible.

"I want to be with you and to stand by you, and I mean to do so up to the last limit; and I want to talk with you and Secretary Lansing with the utmost frankness-to confer with you and have your judgment and counsel and I want to be kept advised as to the course of events, as it seems to me I am entitled to be.

"In the meantime I am striving to prevent anything being done by any Senator or Member calculated to embarrass your diplomatic negotiations. Up to the last you should be left free to act diplomatically as you think for the best to settle the questions involved. I need hardly say that my wish is to help, not to hinder, you.

"With the highest regard and most sympathetic consideration, I have the honor, Mr. President, to be, very sincerely yours, W. J. STONE.

"The President."

THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY

"The White House,

"Washington, Feb. 24, 1916. "My Dear Senator: I very warmly appreciate your kind and frank letter