[73]

[74]

was there any error prejudicial to the defend-
ant in any part of the charge, above quoted,
which the court gave to the jury upon the ques-
tions we have been considering.

With respect to the instructions requested by
the defendant upon these points, which the
court declined to give, except as embodied in
the general charge, very little need be said.
They are as follows:

(1) "The regulation of the defendant corpo-
ration, that the several conductors of its trains
shall require of each passenger a valid ticket
or pay the established fare, is a necessary and
proper regulation, and if the plaintiff in this
case having, as he says, taken defendant's train
at Olean for Salamanca, did not, when thereto
requested, present to the conductor a valid
and refused to pay his fare, then the conductor
had the lawful right to stop the train at an in-
termediate station or near to a dwelling house,
and put the plaintiff off the train, using only
such force as was necessary for that purpose.
(2) "The regulation of the defendant that a
passenger who desires to stop over at an inter-
mediate station, and resume his passage by a
later train, must, before leaving the first train,
require of the conductor a stop-over check, is
a reasonable regulation; and since in this case
it appears by the plaintiff's own testimony that
his ticket from Binghamton to Salamanca was
canceled before he left the train, and he did
stop over at Olean, an intermediate place, and
resumed his passage the next day and present-

journey to the west on another train; and that
the conductor told him he would fix him all
right. Even under the regulations of the road
with reference to stop-over checks (although
not brought to his knowledge), he had the
right to rely upon the statement of the conduct-
or that he would "fix him all right," and had
a right to suppose that nothing further was re-
quired to be done by him than was done to en-
title him to a stop-over privilege. The con-
ductor, after receiving "timely notice from the
passenger of his desire to stop over" at Olean |
and afterwards take another train for the re-
mainder of his journey (as he had the right to
do on an unlimited ticket), was thereupon
bound to furnish the passenger with a stop
over check without the passenger asking him,
in so many words, for one. Under the circum-ticket but only a ticket that had been canceled,
stances of the case, as testified to by the plain-
tiff, the conductor of the first train was derelict
in his duty in not providing the passenger with
a stop-over check when the latter stated to him
that he desired to stop off at Olean (as he had
the right to do), if such check was necessary
to enable the passenger to complete his journey
to Salamanca. If the jury believed the evi-
dence of the plaintiff in this matter, they were
justified in finding 'negligence on the part of
the first conductor. And, upon the case as
made by the defendant itself, with reference to
what took place between the plaintiff and the
conductor who ejected him from the train,
leaving out of sight the disputed facts in that
matter, it is very clear to our minds that the
action of that conductor was unwarranted un-ed no stop-over check, but only the canceled
der the law; and that the charge of the court
thereon was as favorable to the defendant as
it had the right to demand. The authorities
above cited abundantly sustain this view. The
reason of such rule is to be found in the prin-
ciple that where a party does all that he is re- What we have said above virtually disposes
quired to do, under the terms of a contract of these requests. In so far as they are cor-
into which he has entered, and is only prevent-rect, the substance of them had been given by
ed from reaping the benefit of such contract the court in its general charge, and there was
by the fault or wrongful act of the other party no error, therefore, in refusing to give them in
to it, the law gives him a remedy against the the language requested. Washington & G. R.
other party for such breach of contract.
Co. v. McDade, 135 U. S. 554 [34:235]; Etna
L. Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U. S. 76 [35:371]. In
fact, it is much the better practice to refuse to
give instructions to the jury, the substance of
which has already been stated in the general
charge, than to repeat the same charge in dif-
ferent language, although the charge requested
may be technically correct as an abstract prop-
osition of law; for a multitude of instructions,
all stated in different language and meaning
the same thing, tends rather to confuse than to
enlighten the minds of the jury.

ticket, and refused to pay his fare when re-
quested and persisted in that refusal, the con-
ductor had the lawful right to stop the train
at the intermediate station, as he did, and put
the plaintiff off the train."

These observations dispose of the questions
raised touching the conversation between the
plaintiff and the ticket agent, the rules and
regulations of the company in the matter of
stop-over checks, the acts of the several con-
ductors in charge of the trains upon which the
plaintiff traveled between Binghamton and
Salamanca, and the conduct of the plaintiff
himself in those transactions. If he was right-
fully on the train as a passenger, he had the
right to refuse to be ejected from it, and to
make a sufficient resistance to being put off to Whether the verdict was excessive, is not our
denote that be was being removed by compul- province to determine on this writ of error.
sion and against his will; and the fact that, The correction of that error, if there were any,
under such circumstances, he was put off the lay with the court below upon a motion for a
train, was of itself a good cause of action new trial, the granting or refusal of which is
against the company, irrespective of any phys- not assignable for error here. As stated by us
ical injury he may have received at that time, in Etna L. Ins. Co. v. Ward: "It may be that
or which was caused thereby. English v. if we were to usurp the functions of the jury
Delaware & H. Canal Co. 66 N. Y. 454; Brown and determine the weight to be given to the
v. Memphis & C. R. Co. 7 Fed. Rep. 51; Phila-evidence, we might arrive at a different con-
delphia W. & B. R. Co. v. Rice, 64 Md. 63.

It follows from what we have said that there was no error in the action of the court in refusing to direct the jury, in effect, to return a verdict in favor of the defendant. Neither

clusion. But that is not our province on a
writ of error. In such a case we are confined
to the consideration of exceptions, taken at the
trial, to the admission or rejection of evidence
and to the charge of the court and its refusals

[75]

76

to charge. We have no concern with questions
of fact, or the weight to be given to the evi-
dence which was properly admitted." 140 U.
S. 91 [35:339], citing numerous cases.

One breach alleged in the declaration, and
denied in the plea, was that at the date of
the bond Witten had on deposit in his distil-
lery warehouse ninety-three gallons of distilled
It would subserve no useful purpose to go spirits, in two barrels, deposited January 30,
more into detail as to the assignments of error 1884, and had failed to pay, within three years
presented. What we have already said vir- from the date of entry, the taxes due thereon.
tually disposes of all of them. We think the At the trial, the deposit of the spirits in the
evidence objected to was properly admitted; warehouse and the non-payment of the tax
that the charge of the court as given was cor- were admitted. The defendants offered evi-
rect, and embodied the entire law of the case; dence tending to show that the locks placed on
that its refusal to give the instructions request- the doors of the warehouse by the revenue
ed, under the circumstances, was not error; officers were at times not such as required by
and that in no other respect, so far as this rec-law, and at other times were insufficient and
ord discloses, was any error committed to the
injury of the railroad company.
Judgment affirmed.

THE UNITED STATES, Piff. in Err.,

C.

AUGUSTUS S. WITTEN ET AL.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 76-79.) Liability of distiller and sureties on negligence of U. S. officers, when no defense.

insecure, and the warehouse itself was not a
secure building; and that during such times
the warehouse was broken open and the spirits
stolen.

The district attorney requested the court to
instruct the jury that if these facts were proved,
vet the United States was entitled to recover
the amount of the taxes on these spirits. But
the court refused so to instruct the jury, and
instructed them that the United States was
entitled to recover that amount "unless the
bonds-jury shall believe from the evidence that,
through the negligence and default of the
officers of the government, the defendant lost
bonded warehouse, then as to the number of
a portion of the whiskey deposited in the
gallons so lost by the default or negligence of
the agents of the government, the defendants
are entitled to a reduction of the government's
demand at the rate of ninety cents on the
gallon."

1. A distiller and his sureties are liable on a bond

given by them for the payment of the tax on
spirits in the distillery warehouse, although such
spirits were stolen from the warehouse by reason
of the omission of the revenue officers to provide

sufficient locks on the doors.

2. The negligence of the officers of the United
States does not affect the liability of either the
principal or the surety in a bond to the United
States.

[No. 151.]
Argued Jan. 8, 1892. Decided Feb. 1, 1892.

N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United
Isates for the Western District of Virginia,
to review a judgment for defendants in an
action against the principal and sureties on
distiller's bond. Reversed.

The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and the United States excepted to the refusal to instruct and to the instruction given, and sued out this writ of error.

By section 3271 of the Revised Statutes, it is enacted that every distiller shall provide, at bis own expense, a warehouse, to be situated upon and to constitute a part of his distillery premises, and to be used only for the storage of distilled spirits of his own manufacture until the tax thereon shall be paid, and not to Mr. Wm. H. Taft, Solicitor-Gen., for plain- open into the distillery or into any other build

The facts are stated in the opinion.

tiff in error.

No counsel for defendant in error.

a

Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of

the court:

This was an action brought in May, 1887, on a bond dated January 31, 1884, given to the United States by the defendant Witten, as principal, and the other defendants as sureties, in the sum of $261.90, with condition that the principal should pay, or cause to be paid, to the collector of internal revenue for the fourth collection district of Virginia, the amount of taxes due and owing on certain distilled spirits (described) which were deposited during the month ended January 31st, 1884, and entered for deposit in the distillery warehouse No. 3, of A. S. Witten, at Plumb Creek, in the fourth collection district of Virginia, on the 31st of January, 1884, before such spirits shall be removed from such warehouse, and within three years from the date of such entry."

ing; and such warehouse, when approved by
the commissioner of internal revenue, on report
of the collector, is declared to be a bonded
warehouse of the United States, and is to be
under the direction and control of the collector
of the district, and in charge of an internal
revenue storekeeper. By section 3274, "every
distillery warehouse shall be in the joint cus-
tody of the storekeeper and the proprietor
thereof;" and shall be securely locked, and
shall be opened only in the presence of the
storekeeper. And by section 3275, no fence or
wall more than five feet high shall be built
around the premises of any distillery, and
every distiller shall furnish to the collector of
the district as many keys of the gates and doors
of the warehouse as the collector may require
for any revenue officers authorized to inspect
the premises, and the distillery shall be kept
always accessible to any officer or other person
having such a key.

By section 3293 of the Revised Statutes, as
NOTE.-A8 to liability of sureties on official bonds,mended by the joint resolution of March 28,

see note to United States v. Giles, 3: 7C9.

1878, No. 16, and by the Act of March 1, 1879,

As to liability of sureties on postmaster's bonds, see chap. 125, § 5, the distiller or owner of all spirits note to Postmaster-General v. Early, 6: 557.

removed to the distillery warehouse is required

[77]

[78]

[79]

to enter them for deposit in the warehouse,
and, at the time of making the entry, to give
bond, with sureties satisfactory to the col-
lector of the district, "conditioned that the
principal named in said bond shall pay the tax
on the spirits as specified in the entry, or
cause the same to be paid, before removal
from said distillery warehouse, and within
three years from the date of said entry." 20
Stat. at L. 249, 336.

when the objection that there is a remedy at
law comes too late-relief under prayer for
general relief-false representation-personal
liability for fraud.

1. A case in which there are, as ingredients. to
support the jurisdiction of equity, discovery, ac-
count, fraud, misrepresentation and conceal-
ment, is within the jurisdiction of equity.

2. Under sec. 723 of the Revised Statutes, the rem-
edy at law, in order to exclude equity, must be
as practical and as efficient to the ends of justice
and its prompt administration as the remedy in
equity.

3. If a plain defect of jurisdiction appears at the
hearing or on appeal, a court of equity will not
make a decree.

6.

7.

Where the subject-matter of a suit belongs to the class over which a court of equity has jurisdiction, and the objection that the complainant has an adequate remedy at law is not made until the hearing in the appellate tribunal, such objection is too late.

agreeable to the case made by, a bill in equity,
may be properly granted under the prayer of the
bill for general relief.

The suppression of a material fact, which a
party is bound in good faith to disclose, is equiv-
alent to a false representation.

Where the effect of a fraud committed by one who is president of a company inured directly to his personal advantage, he is liable personally therefor.

The bond sued on is in that form. By the
failure of the defendants to pay the taxes on
part of the spirits within three years from the
date of their entry for deposit, the condition
of the bond was forfeited. The stealing of
those spirits from the warehouse by reason of
the omission of the revenue officers to provide
sufficient locks on the doors affords no defense,
either to the principal or to the sureties on the
bond. Under the requirements of the internal
revenue laws, the warehouse was provided
by the owner of the distillery, at his own ex-
pense and on his premises, and, although de 5. Relief consonant with the facts set out in, and
clared to be a bonded warehouse of the United
States, and required to be under the direction
and control of the collector of the district and
in charge of a government storekeeper, was in
the joint custody of the storekeeper and the
owner. The deposit of the spirits in the ware-
house was solely for the benefit of the distiller,
and to enable him to give bond for the pay-
ment of the tax on the spirits, instead of paying
the tax at once. The government assumed no
responsibility to him for their safekeeping.
If he was not satisfied with the security of the Argued Jan. 18, 1892.
warehouse, he had only to take any measure,
consistent with the access and supervision of
the revenue officers, to make it more secure, or
else to pay the tax and remove the spirits.
The only duty which the revenue officers
owed in regard to the security of the ware-
house, and the safekeeping of the spirits therein,
was to the government, and not to the defend-
ants; and any negligence of those officers gave
the defendants no rights against the govern-
ment, and afforded them no excuse for not
performing their obligation according to its
terms. This is too well settled by previous de-
cisions of this court to require more extended
discussion. Hart v. United States, 95 U. S.
316 [24: 479], and cases cited; Minturn v.
United States, 106 U. S. 437 [27: 208].

The jury in this case having been instructed otherwise, the judgment must be reversed, and the case remanded with directions to set aside the verdict, and to order a new trial.

In No. 152, a similar case between the same parties, a like judgment was entered.

JOHN TYLER, Appt.,

v.

SARAH C. SAVAGE.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 79-99.)

Jurisdiction in equity-remedy at law-where

[No. 158.]

Decided Feb. 1, 1892.

PPEAL from a decree of the Circuit

ern District of Virginia, in favor of plaintiff
Sarah C. Savage, against the defendant John
Tyler, individually, and the remaining assets
of the Virginia Oil Company for moneys paid
by her in payment of stock of the company by
reason of the false representation of said Tyler,
its president. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. William A. Maury, for appellant: As the case stands in the record it is wholly destitute of equity, and therefore the court decreed on a case that was entirely beyond its jurisdiction.

Russell v. Clark, 11 U. S. 7 Cranch, 69, (3: 271); Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U. S. 487, 500 (27: 238, 243); Buzard v. Houston, 119 U. S. 347, 352 (30: 451, 453); Kramer v. Cohn, 119 U. S. 355, 357 (30: 439, 440).

An objection of this kind may be taken, for the first time, on appeal where there is a plain want of jurisdiction.

Thompson v. Central Ohio R. Co. 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 137 (18: 767); Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co.

v. Bailey, 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 616 (20:501).

Mr. W. W. Henry for appellee.

Mr. Justice Blatchford delivered the opin- [80] ion of the court:

This is a suit in equity, brought in the Cirdefect of jurisdiction appears on appeal-cuit Court of the United States for the Eastern

NOTE.-In what cases equity will relieve from mis- | of law, see notes to Hunt v. Rousmanier, 7: 27, and
take or ignorance of material fact see note to M'Fer- Same v. Same, 5: 589.
ran v. Taylor, 2: 436.
When awards will be set aside by a court of equity,

As to whether equity will relieve against a mistake | and when not, see note to Burchell v. Marsh, 15: 96.

[81]

District of Virginia, by Sarah C. Savage, a citizen of Pennsylvania, who sues for herself "and all others, creditors of the Virginia Oil Company, who will make themselves parties to this suit on the usual terms," against the Virginia Oil Company, a Virginia corporation; John Tyler, president of said company, and in his own right; John W. Otley, C. W. Tanner, Isaac Davenport, Jr., J. H. Montague, C. E. Belvin, late directors in said company, and citizens in Virginia; and Joseph D. Evans and J. F. Crane, citizens of New York.

The bill, which was filed December 11, 1885, so far as it is material to give its contents, set forth that the plaintiff, being anxious to secure a business position for her son, H. C. Savage, was referred by William E. Tanner, of Richmond, Virginia, with whom she had business transactions, to John Tyler, president of the Virginia Oil Company, of which company C. W. Tanner, a son of William E. Tanner, was a member; that through William E. Tanner, she opened negotiations with Tyler, and was informed that she could secure for her son a position equivalent to that of assistant secretary in the company, by the investment of $10,000; that she was willing to make that investment in the shape of a loan well secured, but Tyler declined to take the sum as a loan, and required that she should purchase of the company that amount of its capital stock at its par value; that, to induce her to purchase the stock, Tyler, as president of the company, sent to her the following letter:

As to cancellation of a deed or a contract, in equity, for fraud, concealment, or misrepresentation, see note to Neblett v. Macfarland, 23: 471.

As to deed avoided in equity, by fraud, insanity, drunkenness, duress, undue influence, fraud on marriage, from ward to guardian, from heir to executor, cestui que trust, to trustee, imbecility, see note to Harding v. Handy, 6: 429.

"VIRGINIA OIL COMPANY,

"RICHMOND, VA., April 10th, 1884.

"Mrs. S. C. Savage.

With re

"MY DEAR MADAM: Your favor of the 9th is rec'd. During the short interview I had with your son I concluded that he could easily undertake the duties that would be required of him in the employ of this company. gard to the nature of the investment conveyed in the proposition thro' Col. Tanner, I would say that we have no trouble in borrowing all the money necessary for the conduct of the business upon its present basis, but the proposition to you embraced the idea, (which we had been considering), of permanently enlarging the scope of our business by increasing our capital stock and getting additional office help. You will readily appreciate the difference to a man'f'g business between borrowing money, which may be called for at the pleasure of the lender, and having the same am❜t in the shape of a permanent investment, so we concluded that whatever arrangement was made in this direction must be upon a stock basis.

"As to the condition of our Co., the capital stock is at present $18,300, with authority from the stockholders to increase it to $30,000. The last dividend that was declared was a 7% semiannual. The fiscal year ends on the first of June.

"The prospects of our Co. I consider flattering. We have in the past few months decreased our expenses and the outlook for business is better than ever before.

| 105 N. Y. 658; Quinn's App. (Pa.) 10 Cent. Rep. 350; Travis v. Lowry (Pa.) 7 Cent. Rep. 553; Newman v. Westcott, 29 Fed. Rep. 49.

The remedy at law must be plain and adequate. Denny v. Denny, 12 West. Rep. 202, 113 Ind. 22. In order to defeat and oust equity jurisdiction, where "special circumstances," and other grounds for its interposition exist, it is not enough to show Account stated, bar to bill in equity; defenses must that it is not absolutely necessary to appeal to eqbe made in original action, see note to Chappede-uity, and that there is a legal remedy, but the remedy at law must be in all respects as satisfaclaine v. Dechenaux, 2: 629.

As to equity jurisdiction after trial at law see note tory and as ample as the relief furnished by a court to Smith v. M'Iver, 6: 152.

When a judgment at law will he enjoined by a bill in equity, see note to Davis v. Tileston, 12: 366.

As to jurisdiction of equity to restrain trespasses and wrongs, see note to Northern Indiana R. Co. v. Michigan Cent. R. Co. 14: 674.

When equity will restrain the collection of purchase money for failure of title, etc., see note to Patton v. Taylor, 12: 637.

of equity. Mann v. Appel, 31 Fed. Rep. 378.

Where a licensee fails to report manufactures and sales, and pay royalty, his license will not be annulled in equity, the remedy being at law. Densmore v. Tanite Co. 32 Fed. Rep. 544.

A licensee claiming damages for past infringement must bring his action at law. Ulman v. Chickering, 33 Fed. Rep. 582.

A bill to try title and obtain possession of propWhen court will decree conveyance of land situated erty held adversely will not be entertained in eqbeyond its territorial jurisdiction; specific perform-uity, although complainant also seeks relief in the ance, see note to Oakey v. Bennett, 13: 593.

What remedy at law will prevent remedy in equity.
An action to procure equitable relief cannot be
maintained when the relief sought has already
been awarded by a judgment in another action be-
tween the same parties. Porous Plaster Co. v. Sea-
bury, 43 Hun, 611.

He who is sued at law, and is cognizaut of a
defense to the action, cannot, if he neglect to in-
terpose it, obtain in equity redress based upon that
which, if pleaded in the former proceeding, would
bave afforded him ample and adequate protection.
Bobb v. Graham, 5 West. Rep. 464, 89 Mo. 200; Car-
son v. Sheldon, 74 Ga. 400.

Where the remedy at law is adequate, no ground exists for the interposition of equity. Oakville Co. v. Double Pointed Tack Co. 7 Cent. Rep. 720,

removal of a cloud from his title. Harland v. Bankers & M. Teleg. Co. 33 Fed. Rep. 199.

Where the right of possession to real estate depends upon a legal question, equity will make no decree. Lehigh Zinc & Iron Co. v. Trotter, 9 Cent. Rep. 131, 43 N. J. Eq. 185.

A court of equity has jurisdiction, in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits, of all questions affecting the legal title to lands of which partition is sought by suit in equity. Davis v. Tebbs,.81 Va. 600.

A suit in equity cannot be maintained by an executor to recover the value of trees cut from the realty belonging to the estate; the remedy is at law. Lippincott v. Barton, 7 Cent. Rep. 920, 42 N. J. Eq. 272.

The equitable jurisdiction to enforce a covenant 83 in restraint of trade is not excluded by a bond for

[82]

"Our products are sold north, south, &
west, and the field we are working is so wide
that we could without much risk double our
business by adding moderately to our capital.
Our manufactures pay a large profit and are fa-
vorably known throughout the territory we have
traveled. As to your changes of selling your
stock at par whenever you might wish, I can
only say that a gentleman of New York has
bought 20 shares at par within the last ten
days, but a sale of stock in any m'f'g Co. would
depend on its profitableness at the time the sale
was made. Should our negotiations result in
your son's coming with us, I shall personally
try to make his position a pleasant one.
"Very resp'y,

"JOHN TYLER, Pres't;"

- that the plaintiff relied upon the statements,
made in the letter, and had a right to rely on
them, as a basis for the investment of her
money; and that the important statements
made therein were as follows: (1) The then
capital stock of the company was $18,300, with
authority from the stockholders to increase it
to $30,000; (2) the last dividend declared was
seven per cent semi-annual, and the current

fiscal year would end June 1; (3) the manufactures of the company were paying a large profit, and were favorably known throughout a wide territory, north, south, and west; (4) there had been a late decrease of expenses, and the outlook for business was better than ever before; (5) by adding moderately to their capital, they could, without much risk, double their business; and (6) a gentleman of New York had bought thirty shares of the stock at par within the last ten days.

The bill further averred that, with those statements from the president of the company she concluded that its stock was a safe investment, and consented to take the stock instead of loaning the money, which was her preference, but which the letter assured her would not suit the company; that thereupon, on May 19, 1884, she paid into the treasury of the company $10,000, and received a certificate for one hundred shares of stock, which she still holds; that, in accordance with her understanding with Tyler, her son was given a position at a salary of $800 per annum, and performed the duties assigned to him until the suspension of the office work; that when the 1st of December, 1884, arrived, she was not informed of the

its performance, stipulating for liquidated dam- | law is incomplete and inadequate to give such re-
ages. Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 9 Cent. Rep.
181, 106 N. Y. 473.

A court of equity has jurisdiction of an action to set aside a deed alleged to have been fraudulently executed many years before, and to charge the grantees therein as trustees, though the complaint alleges that the deed was executed without consideration. In such a case the remedy by ejectment is not adequate. Duff v. Duff, 71 Cal. 513.

A mere question of damages is not within the jurisdiction of equity. Osborne v. O'Reilly, 8 Cent. Rep. 551, 42 N. J. Eq. 467.

A bill alleging that defendants are acting as officers of a pretended municipal corporation, and praying perpetual injunctions, is demurrable, for want of equitable jurisdiction. MacDonald v. Rehrer, 22 Fla. 198.

Equity never interferes in behalf of one whose legal remedies are adequate. McMillen v. Mason, 1 Wis. 405; Williams v. Haynes, 78 Ga. 133.

The jurisdiction in equity attaches unless the legal remedy, both in respect to the final relief and the mode of obtaining it, is as efficient as the remrily in equity. Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 130 U. S. 505 (32: 1005): Barrah v. Boyce, 62 Mich. 480.

lief as the nature of the case demands. Hames v. Hall, 3 L. R. A. 601, 17 Or. 165.

A court of equity has no power to entertain a suit at the instance of a personal representative against one or all of the distributees, to recover back an overpayment, but the representative has his action at law. Echols v. Almon, 77 Ga. 330.

Where one owes a debt by note to, and also for money collected by him for decedent's estate, the administrator has an adequate remedy at law; and a bill in equity will not lie simply to collect the money. Graveley v. Graveley, 84 Va. 145.

A remedy at law, to defeat a suit in equity must be as complete and beneficial as the latter. Hodges v. Kowing, 7 L. R. A. 87, 58 Conn. 12; Henderson v. Johns, 13 Colo. 250; Godfrey v. White, 60 Mich. 443; Warner v. McMullin, 131 Pa. 370.

Equity will not entertain jurisdiction of cases where there is an adequate remedy at law, or grant relief, unless for the purpose of preventing serious and irreparable injury. Thomas v. Musical Mut. Prot. Union, 8 L. R. A. 175, 121 N. Y. 45.

Where equity can alone afford the entire relief sought, the fact that legal questions are also involved cannot oust the court of jurisdiction. Gormley v. Clark, 134 U. S. 338 (33: 909).

There is a usual and adequate remedy at law by
which to recover the possession of land, together
with an accounting of rents or mesne profits; and
unless there are special circumstances requiring it,
equity will not entertain a suit begun for that pur-Hodges v. Kowing, 7 L. R. A. 87, 58 Conn. 12.
pose. Curry v. Peebles, 83 Ala. 225.

A suit by a vendor for specific performance of a fair contract for the sale of land cannot be defeated on the ground that there is a remedy at law.

A suit in equity by a woman to set aside a deed made by her former husband pending a divorce suit in which a decree was made giving her the land will not be defeated on the ground that she has a complete remedy at law. Powell v. Campbell, 2 L. R. A. 615, 20 Nev. 232.

Equity has no jurisdiction of a bill brought by a county against its tax collector and treasurer and their sureties, for the settlement of accounts between them, since the remedy at law is adequate. Sumter County v. Mitchell, 85 Ala. 313.

Where equity has jurisdiction it will not be ousted merely because jurisdiction of the subject-matter is conferred by statute on the courts of law. Latham v. McGinnis, 29 Ill. App. 152.

A party is not precluded from bringing a suit in equity for an account founded on a breach of a covenant in a sealed instrument, by the fact that he has a remedy at law upon such covenant. Lilliendahl v. Stegmair, 45 N. J. Eq. 648.

The remedies at law need not be first exhausted before a bill in equity to enforce a vendor's lien can be resorted to. Burgess v. Fairbanks, 83 Cal.

an adequate remedy at law for the judgment debtors or himself, there is no occasion to resort to equity. Prescott v. Pfeiffer, 57 Mich. 21.

Equity will not take cognizance of an ordinary | 215.
matter of trespass, or of the violation of any legal In case of suit brought by a receiver, if there is
right, unless the circumstances are of such a char-
acter as to bring the case under some recognized
head of equity jurisdiction. Equity will, however,
afford a remedy in such cases where the remedy at

To entitle a person to the aid of a court of equity,