pect for such a coalition as he proposed would be much brighter.

That is the way it looks now, but scenes shift swiftly in industrial America, and to-day's prospect is often

B

changed to-morrow. Such a union as Lewis proposes would outrank anything else of its kind in size and power throughout the world.

The membership of such a union

would approach the two and one-half million mark.

A super-union such as that would have power to put even the American Government to the supreme test.

ETWEEN the first and last sessions of the Armament Conference the man whose invitation brought it to Washington, and whose spirit and purpose it was designed to embody, remained in the background. Not once did President Harding appear at its deliberations; not once did he attempt to direct its proceedings. As it opened he expressed in two speeches the hope of the Nation for what it might serve to accomplish; but he specified no task for it, he made no effort to control it, he did not even undertake to expound before it his own will. As it closed, he came before it, as he said, "to make acknowledgment" for what it had done, to outline its achievements, and to express gratitude to the participants; but neither expressly nor by inference did he take any credit to himself.

Now he has brought the treaties which the Conference has framed to the Senate. He has appraised their value, he has indicated the effect that they will have if adopted, he has described the spirit which they will promote among nations, he has set forth the ill consequences that would follow the failure to put that spirit into practice; but here again he has left himself out as even a factor in originating the plan or the idea of which the treaties are the product. On the contrary, ignoring himself, he stated as the distinction of this Conference that "the Senate-indeed, the Congress has already advised in favor of one-and inferentially of two-of the treaties" and that "the naval pact negotiated and signed" is in accordance with the "expressed wish" of the Senate.

From not one word, from not a single act, of President Harding's is there any hint of the indisputable fact that the Conference stands apart from other Conferences because the philosophy which it has undertaken to apply to international affairs is what may properly be called the Harding philosophy-the philosophy which Warren Harding has put into practice through all his life. Some men seek for achievement by dominating others. They believe in putting things through. They believe in concentrating power and responsibility, and they are willing to accept the responsibility if they can have the power. There are other men, and they are rarer, who seek for achievement by securing the cooperation of others. They believe in getting things done; that things which are "put through" often really never

"get done." They want others to work with them, share their power, and feel

a

corresponding responsibility. And when their common task is finished they are ready to acknowledge the common share in the common credit. As editor of a newspaper, as Senator, and as President Mr. Harding has never sought to dominate his associates. He has made his way by renunciation.

This, it seems, is not merely with him a matter of temperament. It has been his philosophy of life. It is the theory on which he has deliberately and consciously acted. He has shared the ownership of his newspaper with his associates, and with the ownership its responsibility and its authority. Similarly, as a politician he has made a practice, not of giving orders, but of taking counsel. And now as President he has followed his theory not only in the conduct of his Administration as it affects domestic policy but also in foreign affairs.

It is the Harding philosophy, the Harding attitude toward all problems of conduct, that has led to the attempt to solve the vexatious and controversial international problems of this post bellum period by means, not of organizing power, but of summoning nations to conference. It is this philosophy that explains the President's willingness to leave the interests of the Nation at this Conference in the hands of the appointed delegates, and to repose such confidence in his Secretary of State as virtually to make him, and not the President, the chief figure of the Conference as well as its guiding officer. And it is this philosophy that has made of the Conference itself an unprecedented example of renunciation of power by the nations themselves.

This is not the imaginative interpretation of an American, naturally partial to the influence of his own country. It is the interpretation of the Nation's guests from other lands. In particular, it is the interpretation given by the authorized spokesman of the country which has, most unjustly, been widely accused of lacking in appreciation of the spirit of the Conference. "Gentlemen, when the list is drawn up," said M. Sarraut, the head of the French delegation, as he addressed the sixth plenary session, "when the inventory is being taken of what we have done here, I am sure that no sordid thought will enter the mind of any of us to estimate what he may

have gained on the one side or what he may have lost on the other. No one of us will want to measure his advantages by those that may have been gained by his neighbor, and the same may be said of the sacrifices which have been made

by us all." And possibly the tersest and most discerning expression of this common interpretation of the Conference was made at the same session by Count d'Alte, of Portugal, when he said: "Gentlemen, we owe to America much besides the generous hospitality that she has extended to our Conference. We owe to her the inspiration that has made it what it is. The Conference has been to a far greater extent than any other that I can recall a conference of renunciation. We have here seen great nations abandon long-established deeply cherished national policies and renounce advantages once thought essential to the welfare of their people, and this not for value received, but simply out of a decent respect to the opinions of mankind."

and

To ascribe motives for these acts of renunciation is as easy and as idle as to ascribe motives for any act. Those who believe that the motives were purely selfish and sordid cannot be persuaded by any argument or refuted by any facts. There never was any act, however good or useful, for which an evil motive might not be found. On the other hand, a good motive never made an unwise act wise, or a harmful act beneficent. Whatever the motives may have been, the fact remains that at this Conference the nations did renounce claims, advantages, ambitions, which they might have chosen to retain and did not.

America had the opportunity, and used it, to set the example. At the outset she renounced her power to win the race in naval armaments. Great Britain renounced her mastery of the sea. France renounced her right and her natural desire to remain a first-class naval Power. Italy renounced all possibility of attaining the place as a naval Power to which her maritime skill might well entitle her. Japan renounced a naval position in the Pacific corresponding to the importance of her merchant marine. America and Japa renounced the right to fortify certain portions of their own territory. The four chief naval Powers of the Pacific renounced all right to make, without consultation with all the others, an at

tack upon any of them. And all the Powers, except China, which had no privilege to sacrifice, renounced opportunities for commercial or political gain in the Far East, and most of them even existing rights and spheres of influence.

The treaties pledging these acts of renunciation are seven in number, and are thus described by President Harding in submitting them to the Senate:

The covenant of limitation to naval
armament between our Republic, the
British Empire, France, Italy, and
Japan.

The treaty between the same Pow-
ers in relation to the use of subma-
rines and noxious gases in warfare.

The treaty between the United States, the British Empire, France, and Japan, relating to their insular possessions and their insular dominions in the Pacific.

A declaration accompanying the Four-Power Treaty reserving American rights in mandated territory.

An agreement supplementary to the Four-Power Treaty defining the application of the term "insular possessions and insular dominions," as relating to Japan.

A treaty between the nine Powers in the Conference relating to principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China.

A treaty between the nine Powers relating to the Chinese customs tariff.

Accompanying the treaties were "the complete minutes of both plenary sessions and committee meetings and a copy of the official report" to the President "by the American delegation to the Conference." As the President pointed out, the transmission of such full accounts of the negotiation of treaties is unprecedented, but it is, to use the President's words, evidence of "that open and simpler diplomacy for which the world has asked and the practice of which contributed largely to the success of the Conference so recently adjourned." Such renunciation as is recorded in these treaties would not be possible except by agreement among nations which felt themselves warranted in exercising mutual trust. "It was," said the President, "a conference of friends, proceeding in deliberation and sympathy."

In renouncing elements of naval strength the nations were first assured of mutual renunciation in claims and ambitions. Without limitation in policies there would have been no limitation in battleships. Therefore, as the President declared, "the particular justification of this progressive and highly gratifying step was the settlement of the international problems of the Pacific, attended by new understandings in place of menacing disagreements and established sureties instead of uncertainties which easily might lead to conflict."

The President was stating only a fact, not an opinion, when he said that "the Powers in this Conference sought no concert to dispossess any Power of its rights or properties," and added:

All the signatories have given up certain rights which they had, as

It is not necessary to remind you that the Conference work was not directed against any Power or group of Powers. There were no punishments to inflict, no rewards to bestow. . . . The conclusions reached and the covenants written neither require nor contemplate compulsive measures against any power in the world, signatory or non-signatory. The offerings are free will; the conscience is that of world opinion; the observance is a matter of national honor.

The effect upon the nations assembled of this practice of mutual renunciation is described by the President as follows:

I can assure you the nine Powers have been brought more closely together, they are stancher neighbors and friends, they have clearer and better estimates of one another; they have seen suspicion challenged and selfishness made to retreat, they have keener and more sympathetic understandings, and they are more strongly willed for right and justice in international relations than ever before.

In particular, the effect of this Conference upon the policies of the United States was thus stated by the President:

I am not unmindful, nor was the
Conference, of the sentiment in this
chamber against Old World entangle-
ments.
I can bring you every
assurance that nothing in any of
these treaties commits the United
States, or any other Power, to any
kind of an alliance, entanglement, or
involvement. . . It has been said,
if this be true, these are mere mean-
ingless treaties, and therefore value-
less.

Let us accept no such doctrine
of despair as that. If nations may
not establish by mutual understand-
ing the rules and principles which
are to govern their relationship; if a
sovereign and solemn plight of faith
by leading nations of the earth is
valueless; if nations may not trust
one another, then, indeed, there is lit-
tle on which to hang our faith in ad-
vancing civilization or the further-
ance of peace.

Speaking in particular of the FourPower Treaty, which, as he said, "covenants the respect of each nation's rights in relation to its insular possessions," the President pointed out that there was no "war commitment;" for, as he said, "in case of controversy between the covenanting Powers it is agreed to confer and seek adjustment, and if said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any outside Power, these friendly Powers, respecting one another, are to communicate, perhaps confer, in order to understand what action may be

taken, jointly or separately, to meet a menacing situation."

In dealing with this specific treaty, as with the seven treaties jointly, the President emphasized the fact that there was no international force erected to which to appeal and not even any promise to use national forces in a joint enterprise of enforcement. Although he pointed out the moral warning implicit in a conference of the four Powers, he stated, with a repetition of phrase that seems still to be needed in order to make a simple thing plain, that ⚫

There is no commitment to armed force, no alliance, no written or moral obligation to join in defense, no expressed or implied commitment to arrive at any agreement except in accordance with our Constitutional methods.

Recognizing the fact that the United States is a part of the world and "can no more do without international negotiations and agreements in these modern days than we could maintain orderly neighborliness at home without the prescribed rules of conduct which are more the guaranties of freedom than the restraint thereof," the President strongly supported the doctrine that such international negotiations among friendly Powers are more soundly based upon trust than force. He did so by this declaration:

Frankly, Senators, if nations may not safely agree to respect each other's rights, and may not agree to confer if one party to the compact threatens trespass, or may not agree to advise if one party to the pact is threatened by an outside Power, then all concerted efforts to tranquilize the world and stabilize peace must be flung to the winds.

Briefly outlining the events which led in succession to our treaty relations with China, to our peculiar connection with Japan as the opener of her gates to the world, to our acquisition of Hawaii, and to the presence of our flag in Samoa, the Philippines, and Guam, the President showed how the Pacific and its menaces have deeply concerned us and asked, "Why should we not make reciprocal engagements to respect the territory of others and contract their respect of ours, and thus quiet apprehension and put an end to suspicion?" And he added: "I am ready to assume the sincerity and the dependability of the assurances of our neighbors of the Old World that they will respect our rights, just as I know we mean to respect theirs."

This is the Harding doctrine of achievement by renunciation. Whether it is a sound doctrine or not I do not undertake to discuss; I am simply concerned in pointing out what that doctrine is and indicating that it is different from the doctrine of achievement by force and is not to be confused with it. It is this doctrine of renunciation which explains the origin, the proceedings, and the product of the Armament Conference at Washington.

I

F you work for the Government, there are few things in the gamut of the objectionable that you can't do and brag about afterwards in print, if only you can persuade Congress to pass the right kind of a law on the subject. Nor is this as difficult as the average hundred percenter thinks it is. Every now and then Congress passes a law without knowing what it means, and I have helped enforce at least one of its statutes that nobody knew the meaning of.

You do your bragging in a pamphlet bearing the imprint of the Government Printing Office and the seal of your department. And nobody reads it. That is, nobody who understands it. Except of course those who helped you do the job. And so you are quite safe-unless one of them takes a notion to translate your official cant into plain English.

I'm going to do that to a few pages of the "Annual Report of the Commissioner of Naturalization to the Secretary of Labor. Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1921.

For ten years I worked for the Commissioner. For three years and a half I was one of his chief examiners, in charge of the naturalization work of five Western States. I happen to know what his neat gray annual report really

means.

He says in it that during that year his official force (given by him in 1919 as 2,772 persons) examined 393,888 documents, interviewed half a million people, and handled over a million pieces

of mail.

Why? To put it simply, for the purpose of separating the sheep from the goats among the foreign-born people who applied for citizenship. There were 182,637 such people in the fiscal year ended June 30, 1921, and, according to the Commissioner, ten out of every hundred of them were goats. In other words, 18,981 filed petitions for naturalization that were denied.

Nothing short of a trigonometry book could look duller than the table of tiny figures in the lower right-hand corner of which the gist of that information is contained. And yet, if you had stood where I stood for a decade, guarding 164 of the intakes through which these people come into citizenship, watching their faces, hearing their stories, seeing the difficulties that confront them, you'd find those little figures swelling themselves out into an army of 18,981 human beings, and you'd want to know why they were turned back from the Gates of Hope, and whether it was necessary.

The second of two articles by Mr. Ellerbe on the problem of naturalization. Last week we published "Treating 'Em Human."

Suppose, conservatively, that the fortunes of each are linked up with a family of four. That's 76,000 peopleenough to populate Jacksonville, Florida, say-disappointed by our Government in "the fiscal year ended June 30, 1921." And just for a rough approximation, suppose the figures were the same every year; the total for the last ten years would be 760,000, which is more people than there are in the State of North Dakota.

Now disappointed people are a nuisance, even when they are as voiceless and as patient and forgiving as the foreign-born population of America. They are a kind of slow poison. A standard of reasonable efficiency demands that we turn out no more of them than necessary. Was it necessary to disappoint these 760,000? If it was, we've got a good thing in our elaborate protective machinery, with its official force of 2,772, its 393,888 documents examined, its million pieces of mail handled, and half a million people interviewed per annum.

Well, it wasn't.

Of the fifteen reasons for denial enumerated by the Commissioner, two go unequivocally into the merits of the matter, "Immoral Character" and "Ignorance." "Immoral Character" speaks for itself. And "Ignorance" covers those who didn't appear to know enough to exercise the rights of citizenship intelligently. Those are real reasons why we need a naturalization service: to keep out the morally undesirable and those who don't care enough about us to understand our system of government. How many of them did that official force of 2,772 find during 1921? A little more than half a one apiece. One thousand eight hundred and thirty-nine, out of 182,637 who applied. A trifle more than one per cent.

What were the other 17,142 citizenship seekers denied for?

By far the largest number, 5,215, almost one-third, for-what would you suppose? "Want of Prosecution." That is, they paid their money, filed their petitions for naturalization, and then gave up. If there was any way to make Congress realize the poignancy and the volume of deferred hope hidden behind those figures (for one year alone!), things might be changed. It can only be suggested here.

Why did they give up, these 5,215 alien friends who spent their money and their time getting themselves legally on record to the effect that they wanted to be Americans? Out of an intimate and extended personal knowledge I give you the answer for nearly

all of them in two words: Red tape. If you had it wound about your neck as tightly as I used to have to help wind it about theirs, you'd give up too.

The whole of the naturalization routine is printable only in a neat gray pamphlet, but consider the simplest possible statement of the most important parts of it.

Leaving entirely out of consideration the great gaunt West, where some of the naturalization courts hold hearings only once a year, and where I have known homesteaders, too poor to own horses and waiting for citizenship in order to prove up on their land, walk twenty-five miles every time they were called to court-leaving all that out entirely, consider what you'd have to do if you were an alien and applied for citizenship anywhere in the United States.

The actual work of naturalization is done by the courts. The report before me says that there were 2,265 of them attending to it in 1921. The first thing would be to go before the clerk of one within whose jurisdiction you resided, pay a dollar, and file a declaration of intention, or first paper, declaring your intention to renounce your own country and, in due time, to join this one.

Then, not less than two nor more than seven years thereafter, you'd follow that up by paying four dollars and filing in the same or, in case you had moved, in another court a petition stating that you had been in the United States at least five years and in the State of filing at least one year, and that you were attached to the principles of the Constitution, and a good deal more. You'd have to have two witnesses, citizens of the United States, verify your petition by signing affidavits to the effect that they had known you five years in this country and had personal knowledge that you were a person of good moral character, etc.

That done, you and your witnesseswho might very possibly have stood in line for many hours to get to the clerk's desk-would have to go to the office of the Chief Naturalization Examiner and be thoroughly examined all over again. This might be the same or another day. Very frequently it's another day, and takes the whole of it, for you and your witnesses. And often you have to pay the wages your witnesses lose, and their traveling expenses if a journey is neces sary on filing day and then on examination day.

Yes, and then again on hearing day. and if your case happens to be continued, on two hearing days, or more. For the next step is the hearing of your cas in open court, before the judge, at least