Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

of T. A. McIntyre & Company filed a petition in bankruptcy in the United States district court for the southern district of New York, and were afterwards adjudicated bankrupts.

"That thereafter the plaintiff in this action proved his claim against the bankrupt estate without waiving any legal rights in this action or otherwise."

to limit the exception in any such way. It was an honest debtor, and not a malicious wrongdoer, that was to be discharged."

The circumstances disclosed suffice to show a wilful and malicious injury to property for which plaintiff in error became and remains liable to respond in damages. The judgment below is affirmed.

(242 U. S. 142)

CHESAPEAKE & OHIO RAILWAY COM-
PANY, Plff. in Err.,

V.

L. P. MCLAUGHLIN.

CARRIERS 218(10)-NOTICE OF CLAIM—
EXCUSE FOR NONCOMPLIANCE.

Failure to comply with the stipulation in a "uniform live-stock contract" under which an interstate shipment was made, that no claim for damages which may ac

To deprive another of his property forever by deliberately disposing of it without semblance of authority is certainly an injury thereto within common acceptation of the words. Bouvier's Law Dict., "Injury." And this we understand is not controverted; but the argument is that an examination of our several Bankruptcy Acts and consideration of purpose and history of the 1903 amendment will show Congress never intended the words in question to include conversion. We can find no sufficient reason for such a narrow construction. And in-crue to the shipper under such contract stead of subserving the fundamental pursued for in any court by the shipper, unshall be allowed or paid by the carrier, or poses of the statute, it would rather tend less claim for such loss or damage shall be to bring about unfortunate if not irrational made in writing, verified by the affidavit results. Why, for example, should a bank- of the shipper or his agent, and delivered rupt who had stolen a watch escape pay- to the carrier's general claim agent, defeats ment of damages, but remain obligated for any recovery from the carrier because of one maliciously broken? To exclude from injury to the shipment, where there are no discharge the liability arising from such circumstances rendering such stipulation invalid or excusing noncompliance.

transactions as those involved in Crawford v. Burke, 195 U. S. 176, 49 L. ed. 147, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 9, and here presented, not improbably was a special purpose of the amendment.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 674-696, 947; Dec. Dig. 218 (10).j

[No. 100.]

In Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473, 485, Argued November 14, 1916.

cember 4, 1916.

Decided De

IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of Poca

487, 48 L. ed. 754, 759, 760, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 505, we said of original § 17 (2): “In order to come within that meaning as a I hontas County in the state of West Virjudgment for a wilful and malicious injury ginia to review a judgment against a carrier to person or property, it is not necessary for injuries to an interstate live-stock shipthat the cause of action be based upon ment. Reversed and remanded for further special malice, so that without it the action proceedings. could not be maintained." And further: "A wilful disregard of what one knows to be his duty, an act which is against good

The facts are stated in the opinion.
Messrs. F. B. Enslow and Herbert Fitz-

patrick for plaintiff in error.

No appearance for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the court:

morals and wrongful in and of itself, and which necessarily causes injury and is done intentionally, may be said to be done wilfully and maliciously, so as to come within the exception. It is urged that the malice referred to in the exception is malice the railway company in the circuit court, McLaughlin recovered judgment against towards the individual personally, such as Pocahontas county, West Virginia, for inis meant, for instance, in a statute for ma-juries to a horse which it transported from liciously injuring or destroying property, Lexington, Kentucky, and delivered to him or for malicious mischief, where mere in- at Seebert, West Virginia, February 17, tentional injury without special malice towards the individual has been held by some courts not to be sufficient. Com. v. Williams, 110 Mass. 401. We are not inclined to place such a narrow construction upon the language of the exception. We do not think the language used was intended

1914.

The shipment was under a "uniform livestock contract" signed by both parties and introduced in evidence by defendant in error, which, among other things, provides:

"That no claim for damages which may accrue to the said shipper under this con

For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes

Dig. 10.1
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Death, Dec.
DEATH S2-DAMAGES-UNDER FEDERAL
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT PERSONAL
LOSS AND CONSCIOUS SUFFERING.

[ocr errors]

tract shall be allowed or paid by the said | beneficiaries in whose behalf the right of carrier or sued for in any court by the said action created by the original act is given, shipper, unless claim for such loss or dam- but that there shall be only one recovery for the same injury. age shall be made in writing, verified by the affidavit of the said shipper or his agent and delivered to the general claim agent of the said carrier at his office in Richmond, Virginia, within five days from the time said stock is removed from said car or cars; and that if any loss or damages occur upon the line of a connecting carrier then such carrier shall not be liable unless a claim shall be made in like manner and delivered in like time to some proper officer or agent of the carrier on whose line the loss or injury occurs."

It conclusively appears that McLaughlin did not present a verified claim to the car rier's agent as provided by the contract. Upon its face the agreement seems to be unobjectionable, and nothing in the record tends to establish circumstances rendering it invalid, or excuse failure to comply therewith. The court below erred in denying a seasonable request for a directed verdict; and its judgment must be reversed. Our recent opinions render unnecessary any further discussion of the reasons for this conclusion. Northern P. R. Co. v. Wall, 241

2. Damages recoverable under the Act of April 5, 1910 (36 Stat. at L. 291, chap. the Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 143, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8662), amending 1908 (35 Stat. at L. 65, chap. 149), by providing that any right of action given by that act to the person suffering injury shall survive to the personal representative for the benefit of the same beneficiaries in whose

behalf the right of action created by the be only one recovery for the same injury, original act is given, but that there shall should be confined to the personal loss and suffering of the injured employee during the time intervening between the injury and the resulting death.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Death, Cent. Dig. 106; Dec. Dig. 82.1

[No. 107.]

Submitted November 15, 1916. Decided
December 4, 1916.

[N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the

U. S. 87, 60 L. ed. 905, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. IN ER of Minnesota to review a judg

493; Georgia, F. & A. R. Co. v. Blish Mill. Co. 241 U. S. 190, 60 L. ed. 948, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 541; Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Rankin, 241 U. S. 319, 60 L. ed. 1022, L.R.A. 1917A, 265, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep.

555.

Reverse and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed.

(242 U. S. 144)

GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COM-
PANY, Plff. in Err.,

V.

CAPITAL TRUST COMPANY, as Administrator of the Estate of William M. Ward, Deceased.

DEATH 10-DAMAGES-UNDER FEDERAL
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT-CONSCIOUS
SUFFERING OF DECEASED.

ment which affirmed a judgment of the District Court of Ramsey County, in that state, in favor of plaintiff in an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

See same case below on appeal from order denying alternative for judgment or new trial, 127 Minn. 144, L.R.A.—, —, 149 N. W. 14, 7 N. C. C. A. 154; on appeal from judgment, 128 Minn. 537, 150 N. W. 1102. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. A. L. Janes and M. L. Countryman for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Samuel A. Anderson for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the court:

While employed by the railway company 1. The fact that a railway employee, as a switchman, William M. Ward was acthough wholly unconscious, continued to cidentally killed, December 13, 1912; and breathe for perhaps ten minutes after receiving a fatal injury, affords no basis for the administrator brought suit in a state an estimation or award of damages in addi- court under the Federal Employers' Liabiltion to the beneficiary's pecuniary loss, un-ity Act, as amended, for the benefit of his der the Act of April 5, 1910 (36 Stat. at father and mother, seeking to recover their L. 291, chap. 143, Comp. Stat. 1913, § pecuniary loss and also damages for the 8662), amending the Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908 (35 Stat. at L. 65, chap. 149), by providing that any right of action given by that act to the person suffering injury shall survive to the personal representative for the benefit of the same

injuries suffered by him prior to death. Some evidence tended to show that, after being run over by one or more cars, although wholly unconscious, the deceased continued to breathe for perhaps ten min

For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes

utes. Testimony of other witnesses sup- | health, his ability to work, his earning capacported a claim that there was no apprecia- ity, and the amount he usually earned at ble continuation of life. Judgment upon an unapportioned verdict, in favor of the administrator, was affirmed by the state supreme court, October, 1914. The railway company duly excepted to the following portions of the charge:

"Did Ward's injuries kill him instantly? If he was killed instantly, one rule of damages applies, while if he lived some time after he was injured, another rule of damages would apply. There is some evidence that he lived a few minutes after receiving his injuries; there is other evidence that he was dead when taken out from under the car. If you should find that Ward died from his injuries without living an appreciable length of time, then the plaintiff could only recover, if at all, what would have been the pecuniary value of Ward's life to his father and mother had he lived. And in that connection it would be proper for you to consider his health, his disposition to contribute to the support of his parents, the evidence of what he customarily earned, his earning capacity, the amount he was in the habit of giving to his parents, his age, his condition in life, the length of time he probably would have lived had not this accident happened, and the expectancy of the life of the father and mother, and the reasonable expectancy of the parents in respect to benefits, if any, from the services of their son;

[ocr errors]

"In case you find that Ward did not die instantly from his injuries, but that he lived some appreciable length of time after the accident, then you would come to another question in the case.

"Under the law of the United States it is provided that any right of action given by the act of Congress in reference to injuries of this kind under such circumstances, that the right of action shall survive to the personal representatives of the deceased for the benefit of his parents, if there is no surviving widow and children. And if you should find from the evidence that Ward did not die instantly from his injuries, but that he lived some little time after he was injured, then, under the law, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover damages in the same amount that Ward, the deceased, would have been entitled to recover had he brought the action in his lifetime. That is, you can award such damages as, in your judgment, would be a full, fair, and reasonable compensation for the loss sustained by Ward, the deceased, by reason of the injuries he received. And in that connection, it would be proper for you to consider his age, his habits of industry, his

[ocr errors]

the time he was injured, and the length of time he would probably have lived had he not been injured, using your best judgment under all the circumstances in arriving at what would be a fair compensation for his loss."

In St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Craft, 237 U. S. 648, 655, 658, 59 L. ed. 1160, 1162, 1163, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 704, 9 N. C. C. A. 754 (June 1, 1915) we held that, under the Employers' Liability Act, as amended in 1910, 36 Stat. at L. 291, chap. 143, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8662, the administrator of a fatally injured employee might recover the beneficiary's pecuniary loss and also for pain and suffering endured by deceased between the moment of injury and final dissolution. We were careful, however, to say

(655) "But to avoid any misapprehension it is well to observe that the case is close to the border line, for such pain and suffering as are substantially contemporaneous with death or mere incidents to it, as also the short periods of insensibility which sometimes intervene between fatal injuries and death, afford no basis for a separate estimation or award of damages under statutes like that which is controlling here.” And, referring to the two separate grounds of recovery-(658) "Although originating in the same wrongful act or neglect, the two claims are quite distinct, no part of either being embraced in the other. One is for the wrong to the injured person, and is confined to his personal loss and suffering before he died, while the other is for the wrong to the beneficiaries, and is confined to their pecuniary loss through his death. One begins where the other ends, and a recovery upon both in the same action is not a double recovery for a single wrong, but a single recovery for a double wrong."

The present record presents the very circumstances which we declared afforded no basis for an estimation or award of damages in addition to the beneficiary's pecuniary loss. And although apparently not challenged in the state supreme court, and therefore not now to be relied on as ground for reversal (Harding v. Illinois, 196 U. S. 78, 87, 88, 49 L. ed. 394, 397, 398, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 176), in view of a possible new trial, it seems proper to point out that the method approved by the trial court for estimating damages where the deceased's cause of action does survive conflicts with the rule sanctioned by us in the Craft Case.

The judgment below is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed.

(212 U. S. 148)
NEW YORK CENTRAL & HUDSON
RIVER RAILROAD COMPANY, Plff. in
Err.,

MARY EDNA BEAHAM.

CARRIERS 397%1⁄2-MEASURE OF RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES—INTERSTATE BAGGAGE. 1. The rights and liabilities of an interstate passenger and the carrier in case of a loss of baggage depend upon Federal legislation, the agreement between the parties, and common-law principles, as accepted and enforced in Federal tribunals.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1519-1528; Dec. Dig. 397%1⁄2.] EVIDENCE 69-PRESUMPTION CARRIER'S COMPLIANCE WITH LAW. 2. An interstate railway carrier is entitled to the presumption that it is conducting its business lawfully.

Evidence,

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see
Cent. Dig. § 90; Dec. Dig. 69.]
CARRIERS 405(3), 40S(4) EVIDENCE-
SUFFICIENCY-LIMITATION OF CARRIER'S

LIABILITY-LOSS OF BAGGAGE.

3. Acceptance and use by an interstate passenger of a railway ticket which purported to limit baggage liability to a specified sum unless a greater value should be declared and excess charges paid suffice to establish an agreement prima facie valid, limiting the carrier's liability in this respect, and the mere failure of the passenger to read the ticket could not overcome the presumption of assent.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 1548, 1549, 1562-1567; Dec. Dig.

405 (3), 408 (4).]

APPEAL AND Error 837(11)—Error to
STATE COURT DENIAL OF FEDERAL

RIGHT INTERSTATE CARRIER'S LIMITA

TION OF BAGGAGE LIABILITY.

Messrs. Albert S. Marley, John S. Marley, and Robert J. Cary for plaintiff in er

ror.

Messrs. Justin D. Bowersock and Robert B. Fizzell for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the court:

At its New York city station, in September, 1910, Miss Beaham purchased of plaintiff in error a first-class ticket over its own and connecting lines, on the face of which was printed: "Issued by the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad. Good for one passage of the class indicated on coupons attached to Kansas City, Missouri, when stamped and sold by an agent holding written authority as prescribed by law, and presented with coupons attached. Subject to the following contract: . . 5. Baggage liability is limited to wearing apparel not to exceed one hundred (100) dollars in value for a whole ticket and fifty (50) dollars for a half ticket unless a greater value is declared by the owner, and excess charge thereon paid at the time of taking passage."

On

Immediately after purchasing the ticket she presented it at the baggage department; her trunk was received for transportation; and she accepted a check or receipt therefor upon which were the words: "See conditions on back. Value not stated." the back this was printed: "Notice to passengers. Baggage consists of a passenger's personal wearing apparel and liability is limited to $100 (except a greater or less amount is provided in tariffs) on full fare ticket, unless a greater value is declared by owner at time of checking and payment is made therefor."

4. Insufficiency or defective certification of a carrier's applicable tariff schedules on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission, which were admitted in evidence by the trial court, could not justify a state appellate court in arbitrarily disregarding The trunk and contents having been lost, such schedules when passing upon the question whether or not the carrier had limited she sued plaintiff in error for their full its liability for the baggage of an inter-value in the circuit court, Jackson county, state passenger to a specified sum unless Missouri. Admitting responsibility for a greater value is, declared and excess $100, the company claimed exemption from charges paid. any larger recovery because of limitations [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3275, 3277; Dec. Dig. specified in the ticket and impliedly as837(11).] sented to when it was accepted and used; and also because of the same limitations

[No. 118.]

Argued November 16, 1916. Decided Decem- embodied in its tariff schedules filed with

I

ber 4, 1916.

'N ERROR to the Kansas City Court of Appeals of the State of Missouri to review a judgment affirming a judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, in that state, for the recovery from a carrier of the full value of lost interstate baggage, notwithstanding a limitation of such liability in the ticket and in the carrier's published tariffs to the declared value. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

the Interstate Commerce Commission.

A jury being waived, the cause was tried by the court. Acceptance and use of both ticket and check were shown, and nothing in the evidence indicated any purpose to deceive or mislead the purchaser, or inability on her part to appreciate the provisions in question; she disclaimed having read them, and denied their validity under general principles of law. Counsel for the railroad offered in evidence copies of its tariff schedules on file with the Interstate

For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes

263, 46 L. cd. 190, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 102; Fonseca v. Cunard S. S. Co. 153 Mass. 553, 12 L.R.A. 340, 25 Am. St. Rep. 660, 27 N. E. 665.

Commerce Commission, certified by the chairman of that body. These contained clauses limiting liability for baggage to $100 unless greater value was declared and paid for; and they were admitted not- In order to determine the liability aswithstanding an objection to mode of their | sumed for baggage it was proper to consider authentication.

applicable tariff schedules on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission; and the carrier had a Federal right not only to a fair opportunity to put these in evidence, but also that, when before the court, they should be given due consideration. Southern Exp. Co. v. Byers, 240 U. S. 614, 60 L. ed. 827, L.R.A.1917A, 197, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410; Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Jones, 241 U. S. 181, 60 L. ed. 943, 36 Sup.

The circuit court held no agreement limiting liability resulted from acceptance and use of ticket and check, and that, "even if the local and interstate tariffs of excess baggage rates introduced in evidence were filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission of the United States, and properly posted as required by the Interstate Commerce Act, still plaintiff would be entitled to recover the reasonable value of her trunk | Ct. Rep. 513. After their admission in eviand the reasonable value of the articles of dence by the trial court the schedules could baggage contained therein, unless she ex- not be disregarded arbitrarily without denypressly assented to the provisions of said ing the railroad's Federal right; and we tariffs limiting the liability of the defend- think they were so treated by the court of ant to $100 for loss of baggage unless a appeals. We are cited to no decision of greater value should be declared and paid the supreme court of Missouri recognizing for." A judgment for $1,771.52 was affirmed any settled rule of practice there which by the Kansas City court of appeals. It required such action, and the unjust conheld that Boston & M. R. Co. v. Hooker, 233 sequences of it are apparent. Assuming, U. S. 97, 58 L. ed. 868, L.R.A.1915B, 450, without deciding, the correctness of its 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526, Ann. Cas. 1915D, opinion that the schedules as certified were 593, would necessitate a reversal but for inadmissible and improperly received, neverthe fact that the record contained no com-theless the court should not have destroyed petent evidence to show a schedule on file the carrier's opportunity to protect itself with the Commission specifying liability by introducing other evidence upon a new for baggage; "the Federal statute provides that copies of tariff rates on file with that Commission shall be received in evidence, if certified by the secretary, under the seal of the Commission," and certification by the chairman is insufficient. It therefore wholly disregarded the copies in the record and treated the cause as though they had not been introduced.

trial.

Reverse and remand for further proceed. ings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed.

Mr. Justice Pitney dissents.

(242 U. S. 128) GEORGE W. STEWART, Plff. in Err.,

V.

CHARLES H. RAMSAY.

The transactions in question related to interstate commerce; consequent rights and liabilities depend upon acts of Congress, agreement between the parties, and commonlaw principles accepted and enforced in COURTS 385(4)-APPEAL Federal courts. And the carrier is entitled FROM DISTRICT COURT-JURISDICTION BELOW. to the presumption that its business is be1. The jurisdiction of a Federal dising conducted lawfully. Southern Exp. Co.trict court as a Federal Court is so involved v. Byers, 240 U. S. 612, 614, 60 L. ed. 825, 827, L.R.A.1917A, 197, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410; Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Rankin, 241 U. S. 319, 326, 60 L. ed. 1022, 1025, L.R.A.1917A, 265, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 555.

In the circumstances disclosed, acceptance and use of the ticket sufficed to establish an agreement prima facie valid, which limited the carrier's liability. Mere failure by the passenger to read matter plainly placed before her could not overcome the presumption of assent. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U. S. 24, 27, 25 L. ed. 531, 533; The Kensington, 183 U. S.

as to sustain a direct writ of error from the
Federal Supreme Court under the Judicial
Stat. 1157 (Comp. St. 1913, § 1215) in an
Code, 238, Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36
order quashing a summons issued out of that
court, directed to a nonresident, because it
was served while he was returning from the
which he was a party plaintiff.
court room after testifying in a case in

[ocr errors]

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 1022, 1031; Dec. Dig. 385(4); Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 3302.] PROCESS 119 WRIT AND PROCESS SERVICE ON NONRESIDENT-PRIVILEGE. 2. Suitors, as well as witnesses, coming from another state or jurisdiction, are exempt from the service of civil process while

For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes

« AnteriorContinuar »