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October 30, 1916. Per Curiam: Dismissed Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, 110-113, 58 L. ed. for want of jurisdiction upon the authority | 868, 875, 876, L.R.A.1915B, 450, 34 Sup. of: (1) Deming v. Carlisle Packing Co. 226 Ct. Rep. 526, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 593; LouisU. S. 102, 105, 57 L. ed. 140, 142, 33 Sup. ville & N. R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U. S. 94, Ct. Rep. 80; Consolidated Turnp. Co. v. 97, 98, 59 L. ed. 853, 855, L.R.A.1915E, 665, Norfolk & O. V. R. Co. 228 U. S. 596, 600, P.U.R.1915C, 300, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 494. 57 L. ed. 982, 983, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 609; Ennis Waterworks v. Ennis, 233 U. S. 652, 658, 58 L. ed. 1139, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. MARTIN H. FREE, Plaintiff in Error, v. 767; Parker v. McLain, 237 U. S. 469, 471, 472, 59 L. ed. 1051, 1053, 1054, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 632; (2) Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 282, 321, 37 L. ed. 170, 188, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 361; Prosser v. Northern P. R. Co. 152 U. S. 59, 38 L. ed. 352, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 528; Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 596, 42 L. ed. 270, 290, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 966; Ramapo Water Co. v. New York, 236 U. S. 579, 59 L. ed. 731, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 442.

RIGHT REVEREND LIBERT HUBERT BOEY-
NAEMS, Bishop of Zeugma, Vicar Apos-
tolic of Hawaii, Trustee, Plaintiff in
Error, v. L. AH LEONG. [No. 28.]

WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY. [No. 36.]

In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin.

Mr. Benjamin I. Salinger for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Rush Taggart for defendant in error.

October 30, 1916. Per Curiam: Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of: (1) Deming v. Carlisle Packing Co. 226 U. S. 102, 105, 57 L. ed. 140, 142, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 80; Consolidated Turnp. Co. v. Norfolk & O. V. R. Co. 228 U. S. 596, 600, 57 L. ed. 982, 983, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 609; Ennis Waterworks v. Ennis, 233 U. S. 652, 658, 58 L. ed. 1139, 1141, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 767; Parker v. McLain, 237 U. S. 469,

In Error to the Supreme Court of the 471, 472, 59 L. ed. 1051, 1053, 1054, 35 Territory of Hawaii.

Mr. Lorrin Andrews for plaintiff in error. Mr. David L. Withington for defendant in error.

October 30, 1916. Per Curiam: Judgment affirmed with costs upon the authority of Lewers & Cooke v. Atcherly, 222 U. S. 285, 294, 56 L. ed. 202, 205, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 94; John Ii Estate v. Brown, 235 U. S. 342, 349, 59 L. ed. 259, 265, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 106; Kapiolani Estate v. Atcherley, 238 U. S. 119, 136, 59 L. ed. 1229, 1237, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 832; Cardona v. Quiñones, 240 U. S. 83, 88, 60 L. ed. 538, 540, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 346.

SOUTHERN RAILWAY, CAROLINA DIVISION, Plaintiff in Error, v. FANNIE G. DRIGGS and her Husband, H. D. Driggs [No. 31]; and SOUTHERN RAILWAY, CAROLINA DIVISION, Plaintiff in Error, v. HUBERT DRIGGS, by His Guardian ad Litem, H. D. Driggs [No. 32].

Sup. Ct. Rep. 632; (2) John v. Paullin, 231 U. S. 583, 585, 586, 58 L. ed. 381-383, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 178; McDonald v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co. 233 U. S. 665, 669, 670, 58 L. ed. 1145, 1148, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 772; (3) Simon v. Craft, 182 U. S. 427, 437, 45 L. ed. 1165, 1171, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 836; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U. S. 230, 44 L. ed. 747, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 620.

CITY OF MONTGOMERY, Plaintiff in Error, v.
R. H. GREENE et al. [No. 41]; and
CITY OF MONTGOMERY, Plaintiff in Error,
v. W. R. McDADE et al. [No. 42].
In Error to the Supreme Court of the
State of Alabama.

Mr. W. A. Gunter for plaintiff in error. No counsel appeared for defendants in error.

October 30, 1916. Per Curiam: Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of: (1) Deming v. Carlisle Packing Co. 226 U. S. 102, 105, 57 L. ed. 140, 142, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 80; Consolidated Turnp. Co. v. In Error to the Supreme Court of the Norfolk & O. V. R. Co. 228 U. S. 596, 600, State of South Carolina.

Messrs. John K. Graves and Benjamin
Lindsey Abney for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Stanwix G. Mayfield for defendants
in error.

October 30, 1916. Per Curiam: Judgments reversed with costs upon the authority of Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 653, 57 L. ed. 683, 688, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 391; Boston & M. R. Co. v.

57 L. ed. 982, 983, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 609; Ennis Waterworks v. Ennis, 233 U. S. 652, 658, 58 L. ed. 1139, 1141, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 767; Parker v. McLain, 237 U. S. 469, 471, 472, 59 L. ed. 1051, 1053, 1054, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 632; (2) Stewart v. Kansas City, 239 U. S. 14, 16, 60 L. ed. 120, 121, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 15; Sioux County v. Rule, 241 U. S. 640, 60 L. ed. 1216, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 285.

TRAL PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY. [No. 728.]

MOTION PICTURE PATENTS COMPANY, Peti- | ENNIS-BROWN COMPANY, Petitioner, v. CENtioner, v. UNIVERSAL FILM MANUFACTURING COMPANY et al. [No. 715.] Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

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Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Mr. Burrell G. White for petitioner. Messrs. W. H. Devlin, Robert T. Devlin, William R. Harr, and Charles H. Bates for respondent.

October 30, 1916. Denied.

NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY,
Plaintiff in Error, v. WILFRED L. GIF-
FORD. [No. 307.]

In Error to the Supreme Court of the
State of Idaho.

Messrs. C. W. Bunn, James E. Babb, and
Alexander Britton for plaintiff in error.
No counsel appeared for defendant in er-

ror.

October 30, 1916. Dismissed with costs, on motion of counsel for the plaintiff in

error.

(242 U. S. 190)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Peti-, the government, which was reversed by the circuit court of appeals for the eighth cir cuit (L.R.A. 1917A, 1198, 129 C. C. A. 514,

tioner,

V.

NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COM- 213 Fed. 162). The case is here for decision

PANY, Respondent.

MASTER AND SERVANT 13 GOVERN-
MENTAL CONTROL-REPORTS
MISTAKE PENALTIES.

HONEST

The penalty of $100 per day prescribed by the Act of February 4, 1887 (24 Stat. at L. 386, chap. 104), § 20, as amended by the Act of June 18, 1910 (36 Stat. at L. 556, chap. 309, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8592), for the failure of a carrier to file such reports as may be required by the Interstate Commerce Commission, will not be exacted because the names of several employees were omitted by the carrier from its sworn report of violations of the Hours-of-Service Act of March 4, 1907 (34 Stat. at L. 1415, chap. 2939, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8677), which was required by an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, where such omission was caused by an honest mistake in a genuinely doubtful case. [Ed. Note.-For other cases. Servant, Cent. Dig. § 14; Dec. Dig. 13.]

[No. 44.]

see Master and

Argued October 27, 1916. Decided Decem

ber 4, 1916.

on writ of certiorari.

Statement by Mr. Justice Clarke: The judgment of the district court was rendered on the pleadings, the admitted facts of the case being as follows:

Five employees of the defendant were called to take charge of a wrecking train at 8:10 o'clock P. M., October 29, 1911, but, before they reported at the place of duty, it was ascertained that such train would not be needed, and when they arrived they were notified that their services would not

then be required, but that they should report for duty at 10:35 o'clock P. M. the same evening. From 8:10 to 10:35 o'clock they did not render any service "save that they kept alive the fire in the engine during said period." At 10:35 o'clock the five men entered upon a freight train run, which, because of hot boxes, was delayed so that it did not arrive at destination until 1:15 o'clock P. M. the next day.

If the service of the men were considered as beginning at 8:10 o'clock, the hour for which they were called, they were on duty V WRIT of Certiorari to the United for seventeen hours and five minutes; but

O`States Circuit Court of Appeals for the if the time were reckoned from 10:35 P. M.,

Eighth Circuit to review a judgment which reversed a judgment of the District Court for the District of North Dakota in favor of the United States in an action to recover a penalty from a carrier for its failure to file a report of violations of the Hours-ofService Act. Affirmed.

See same case below, L.R.A. 1917A, 1198, 129 C. C. A. 514. 213 Fed. 162.

This is a civil proceeding brought by the United States in the United States district court for the district of North Dakota, to recover $500 from the Northern Pacific Railway Company for the claimed failure to file, for five successive days, with the Interstate Commerce Commission, a report of violations of the Hours-of-Service Act, as required by an order of the Commission issued June 28, 1911. The order was made under authority of § 20 of the Act to Regulate Commerce [24 Stat. at L. 386, chap. 104], as amended June 18th, 1910 (36 Stat. at L. 539, 556, chap. 309, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8592), and has the force of statute law. It requires the carrier to report "under oath" within thirty days after the end of each month, all instances where employees have been on duty for a longer period than that provided in said act, which in this case was sixteen hours.

when the men actually took charge of the freight train, they were on duty less than sixteen hours. It is admitted that the officials of the railway company believed in good faith that the time of the men should be reckoned from 10:35 P. M., and not from 8:10 P. M., and that, for that reason, when next after October 30th, 1911, they filed their report of employees subject to the act who had been kept on duty for a longer period than sixteen hours, the names of the members of this crew were omitted, although the names of many other employees who had been kept on duty longer than the statutory limit were stated in that report. It was conceded at the hearing in the circuit court of appeals that the United States had sued the company for the "forfeitures" prescribed for these excessive services under discussion in this case, and had secured a judgment which had been paid, and that thereby it was determined, for the purposes of this suit, that these employees were on duty from 8:10 o'clock P. M., and therefore for more than sixteen hours.

The government's claim in the case is for the omission for five days to file the report, and it prays judgment for "forfeitures" ag. gregating $500, although when the com plaint was filed the report claimed to be The district court rendered judgment for defective had been on file from November For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes

30th, 1911, to September 14th, 1912, and | The defendant in error contends that judg if the "forfeitures" of $100 per day prescribed by the law for each day of failure to file a proper report were allowed, the amount of recovery by the government would be $28,900, and it is only by grace of the public officials that the claim in the suit was not for this amount instead of for $500.

ment is asked for an omission caused by an honest mistake with respect to a genuinely doubtful case in a report which was properly filed, and this, it is claimed, is not a violation of the law. The statute is a penal one and should be applied only to cases coming plainly within its terms. Providence Steam-Engine Co. v. Hubbard, 101 U. S. 188, 25 L. ed. 786. While the reports Assistant Attorney General Underwood filed must be truthful reports (Yates v. for petitioner.

Jones Nat. Bank, 206 U. S. 158, 51 L. ed.

Messrs. Emerson Hadley and Charles 1002, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638), yet, since they W. Bunn for respondent.

Mr. Justice Clarke, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court:

It will be seen from the foregoing statement of facts that the question presented by the record in this case for decision is: Assuming that the law required that, in the report of the company filed on November 30th, 1911, the names of these five employees of the defendant should have been included as having been on duty for more than sixteen hours, and that their names were omitted from that report because it was in good faith believed that their hours of service should be computed from 10:35 o'clock P. M., | and that, therefore, they had not been on duty in excess of sixteen hours, is the company liable for the "forfeitures" prescribed by the statute, judgment for which was prayed for in the complaint?

must be made under oath, the penalties for perjury would seem to be the direct and sufficient sanction relied upon by the lawmak ing power to secure their correctness.

We are confirmed in this conclusion by the fact that the annual report required of carriers by this same § 20 of the act calls for so great an amount of detailed information that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for anyone to prepare such a report without making some unintentional omission or mistake, and we cannot bring ourselves to think that Congress intended to punish such an innocent mistake or omis sion with a penalty of $100 a day.

There are, to be sure, many statutes which punish violations of their requirements regardless of the intent of the persons violating them; but innocent mistakes, made in reporting facts, where the circumstances are such that candid-minded men may well differ in their conclusions with respect to them, should not be punished by exacting penalties, except where the express letter of the statute so requires; and we conclude that the section under discussion contains no such requirement. In reports in which a mistake is much more likely to prove harmful than in such a report as we have here, the national banking laws punish mistakes only where "knowingly" made.

Section 20 of the Act to Regulate Interstate Commerce of February 4, 1887, as amended June 18, 1910 (36 Stat. at L. 556, chap. 309, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8592), requires the filing of elaborate annual reports by carriers and also the filing of such special reports as the Commission may, by general or special order, require. On the 28th day of June, 1911, the Commission ordered that all carriers subject to the provisions of the act should report "under It is argued that if good faith will exoath" within thirty days after the end of cuse an omission or a mistaken statement each month all instances of employees who in this report, it will be widely taken adhad been on duty for a longer time than vantage of as a cover for making false and that required by the act. It is for viola-fraudulent statements in such reports in tion of this order, which has the effect of the future. Such a prospect seems quite statute law, that this suit was instituted, it being admitted by the government that the failure to mention these five men in the report by the defendant, filed at the proper time, and which contained a report of many men kept on duty for a period longer than the time allowed by law, was due to the fact that it in good faith believed that these The fact that the government sues for men commenced their time of service at only one-fifty-seventh part of the forfeitures 10:35 instead of at 8:10 o'clock, and that which had accrued under the construction therefore they were not on duty more than of the rule and statute contended for by it the sixteen hours prescribed by the statute.should make us slow to attribute to Con

groundless, since many, if not most, criminal laws imposing penalties are made applicable only in cases where corrupt intent or purpose is established to the satisfaction of a court or jury; yet such requirement has not been found in practice to be an encouragement to wrongdoing.

gress a purpose to exact what is thus ad- sion relieving the carrier in certain remitted to be a punishment greatly dispro- spects from the operation of the long-andportionate to the offense. Statutes should short-haul clause of the act of February be construed, as far as possible, so that 4, 1887 (24 Stat. at L. 380, chap. 104), those subject to their control may, by refer- $4, as amended by the act of June 18, 1910 ence to their terms, ascertain the measure 1913, § 8566), are afforded ample remedy (36 Stat. at L. 547, chap. 309, Comp. Stat. of their duty and obligation, rather than by the provisions of §§ 13, 15, for comthat such measure should be dependent upon plaints to the Commission and action by the discretion of executive officers, to the such Commission on complaints or on its end that ours may continue to be a govern- own initiative, and they may not seek rement of written laws rather than one of dress in the courts by way of injunction official grace. after having been refused a rehearing by carriers' applications, to which the comthe Commission in the proceedings upon the munities and shippers were not parties.

It being very clear that it is not the purpose of the law under discussion to punish honest mistakes, made in a genuinely doubtful case, the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals is affirmed.

(242 U. S. 178)

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Commerce,
Cent. Dig. § 146; Dec. Dig. 96.]
COMMERCE 85 INTERSTATE COMMERCE
COMMISSION-RATE REGULATION — - LONG
AND SHORT HAULS.

3. The Interstate Commerce CommisUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Inter-west-bound transcontinental freight to cersion, in permitting carriers to charge on state Commerce Commission, Atchison, tain ports of call a lesser rate than to cerTopeka, & Santa Fe Railway Company, tain interior coast cities, did not violate et al., Appts.,

V.

MERCHANTS' & MANUFACTURERS'
TRAFFIC ASSOCIATION OF SACRA-
MENTO et al.

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the clause added to the act of February 4, 1887 (24 Stat. at L. 380, chap. 104), § 4, 547, chap. 309, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8566), by the act of June 18, 1910 (36 Stat. at L which provides that "whenever a carrier by railroad shall, in competition with a water route or routes, reduce the rates on the carriage of any species of freight to or permitted to increase such rates unless from competitive points, it shall not be after hearing by the Interstate Commerce Commission it shall be found that such proposed increase rests upon changed conditions other than the elimination of water competition," where it was the increased effectiveness of water competition, due to the opening of the Panama canal, which compelled the rate readjustment of which the interior coast cities complain, and the higher rates to such cities, made under authority of the Commission, were granted after prolonged hearings, as part of the general readjustment of transcontinental

COMMERCE 88- INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION POWERS RATE REGULATION-LONG AND SHORT HAULS. 1. An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission relieving carriers in certain respects from the operation of the long-and-short-haul clause of the Act of February 4, 1887 (24 Stat. at L. 380, chap. 104), § 4, as amended by the Act of June 18, 1910 (36 Stat. at L. 547, chap. 309, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8566), need not be based upon an application asking only the precise relief granted; and such an order is, therefore, not invalid because the carriers asked leave to charge on west-bound transcontinental freight to a number of coast and interior points much less than to intermountain territory, and the Commission, while permitting them to charge [Ed. Note.-For other cases, to ports of call as much less as the applica- Cent. Dig. § 138; Dec. Dig. 85.] tion requested, as to the other points, which were interior cities, permitted the carriers to charge only somewhat less, since such amended section not only empowers the Argued October 19, 1916. Decided DecemCommission "upon application" to authorize a carrier "to charge" less for longer than for shorter distances, but empowers the Commission to prescribe from time to time the extent to which the designated car: riers may be relieved from the operation of such section.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Commerce,

Cent. Dig. §§ 139, 141; Dec. Dig. 88.]
COMMERCE 96 - INTERSTATE COMMERCE
COMMISSION SUSPENDING LONG-AND-
SHORT-HAUL CLAUSE REMEDY OF AG-
GRIEVED COMMUNITY OR SHIPPER.

2. Communities or shippers aggrieved by tariff schedules filed conformably to an order of the Interstate Commerce Commis

rates.

A

[No. 452.]

ber 4, 1916.

see Commerce,

PPEAL from the District Court of the

trict of California to review a decree en-
United States for the Northern Dis-
joining the enforcement of an order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission, relieving
certain carriers in certain respects from the
operation of the long-and-short-haul clause
of the Interstate Commerce Act. Reversed
and remanded, with directions to dismiss
the bill.

See same case below, 231 Fed. 292.
The facts are stated in the opinion.

For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes

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