board over 12 square feet in area in any block in which one half of the buildings on both sides of the street are used exclusively for residence purposes, without first of a majority of the frontage on both sides obtaining the written consent of the owners of the street in such block, may be prohibited in the exercise of the state's police power, and such prohibition works no denial to a corporation engaged in outdoor advertising of either the due process of law or equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 683, 693, 697, 698, 825-829; Dec. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Dig. 240(1), 293(2).1

[No. 126.]

not specially referred to in the pleadings, yet they were in such form that the trial court, either without objection or over objection which the supreme court of the state refused to sustain, admitted testimony making it necessary to apply the Federal act in deciding each case. This, of course, was equivalent to holding that the pleadings in the trial court were in a form to justify the introduction of testimony in support of the Federal claim, under the system of practice and pleading prevailing in the courts of the two states in which the cases were decided. This brings these decisions clearly within the principle of the conclusion we are announcing in this case. While it is true that a substantive Federal right or defense duly asserted cannot be lessened or destroyed by a state rule of Argued December 20 and 21, 1916. Decided practice, yet the claim of the plaintiff in error to a Federal right not having been asserted at a time and in a manner calling for the consideration of it by the state supreme court under its established system of prac-reversed, with directions to dismiss the bill, tice and pleading, the refusal of the trial a decree of the Superior Court of Cook court and of the supreme court to admit County, in that state, restraining the enthe testimony tendered in support of such forcement of a municipal ordinance regulat claim is not a denial of a Federal right ing the erection and maintenance of bill. which this court can review (Baldwin v. boards in residence districts. Affirmed. Kansas, 129 U. S. 52, 32 L. ed. 640, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 193; F. G. Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler County, 166 U. S. 648, 41 L. ed. 1149, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 709), and therefore, for want of jurisdiction, the writ of error is dis

missed.

January 15, 1917.

N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the

See same case below, 267 Ill. 344, 108 N. E. 340, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 488.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. John S. Hummer and James E. McGrath for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. Loring R. Hoover, Chester E. Cleveland, and Samuel A. Ettelson for de

(242 U. S. 526)
THOMAS CUSACK COMPANY, Plff. in fendants in error.

Err.,

V.

CITY OF CHICAGO et al.

COURTS 366(8)-ERROR TO STATE COURT
-SCOPE OF REVIEW-QUESTION OF LOCAL
LAW.

1. The decision of the highest court of a state that a certain municipal ordinance, challenged as repugnant to the Federal Constitution, is within the scope of the powers conferred by the state legislature upon a municipality, is conclusive upon the Federal Supreme Court on writ of error to the state court.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 962, 963; Dec. Dig. 366(8).]

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 602-POLICE
POWER-VALIDITY OF MUNICIPAL ORDI-
NANCE-BILLBOARDS.

2. A municipal ordinance passed under authority delegated by the state legislature to regulate or control the construction and maintenance of billboards is a valid exercise

of the police power unless it is clearly un

reasonable and arbitrary.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Dec. Dig. 602.] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 240(1), 296(2) DUE PROCESS OF LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS POLICE POWER REGULATING BILLBOARDS.

--

Mr. Justice Clarke delivered the opinion of the court:

In this proceeding the plaintiff in error, & corporation engaged in "outdoor advertising," claims that § 707 of article 23 of an ordinance of the city of Chicago, governing the erection and maintenance of billboards in that city, is unconstitutional. This section is as follows:

"707. Frontage consents required. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to erect or construct any billboard or signboard in any block on any public street in which one half of the buildings on both sides of the street are used exclusively for residence purposes without first obtaining the consent in writing of the owners or duly authorized agents of owners owning a majority of the frontage of the property on both sides of

said

the street in the block in which such billboard or signboard is to be erected, constructed or located. Such written consents shall be filed with the commissioner of buildings before a permit shall be issued for the erection, construction or location

3. The erection of any billboard or sign of such billboard or signboard."

For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes

The plaintiff in error expressly concedes | U. S. 171, 59 L. ed. 900, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. in this court that it is within the police 511. power of the city of Chicago to exercise Upon the question of the reasonableness within the city limits a reasonable regula- of the ordinance, much evidence was introtion and control over the construction and duced upon the trial of the case, from which maintenance of billboards and other similar the supreme court finds that fires had been structures. But it is contended that the started in the accumulation of combustible section quoted is in terms "an arbitrary, material which gathered about such billunrestrained" exercise of power, which, if boards; that offensive and insanitary given effect, could be used without any re- accumulations are habitually found about gard "to the safety, health, morals, comfort, them, and that they afford a convenient or welfare of the public," and that it there- concealment and shield for immoral prac fore offends against the 5th and 14th tices, and for loiterers and criminals. As Amendments to the Constitution of the bearing upon the limitation of the requireUnited States. ment of the section to blocks "used exclusively for residence purposes," the court finds that the trial court erroneously refused to allow testimony to be introduced tending to show that residence sections of the city did not have as full police or fire protection as other sections have, and that the streets of such sections are more frequented by unprotected women and children than, and are not so well lighted as, other sections of the city are, and that most of the crimes against women and children are offenses against their persons.

Obviously, claims made under the 5th Amendment need not be considered (Livingston v. Moore, 7 Pet. 469, 551, 8 L. ed. 751, 781; Lloyd v. Dollison, 194 U. S. 445, 48 L. ed. 1062, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 703), and there remains only the question whether the ordinance, if enforced, would work "a denial to the plaintiff in error of the equal protection of the laws," or would "deprive it of its property without due process of law."

The claimed infirmity in the ordinance consists in the requirement that before any Neglecting the testimony which was exbillboard or signboard of over 12 square cluded by the trial court, there remains feet in area may be erected in any block sufficient to convincingly show the proin which one half of the buildings are used priety of putting billboards, as distinexclusively for residence purposes, the own-guished from buildings and fences, in a class ers of a majority of the frontage of the property on both sides of the street in such block shall consent in writing thereto. This, it is claimed, is not an exercise by the city of power to regulate or control the construction and maintenance of billboards, but is a delegation of legislative power to the owners of a majority of the frontage of the property in the block "to subject the use to be made of their property by the minority owners of property in such block to the whims and caprices of their neigh

bors."

The supreme court of the state of Illinois sustained the validity of the ordinance in an opinion (267 Ill. 344, 108 N. E. 340, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 488) which declares that the act of the legislature of that state, passed in 1912 (Hurd's Stat. 1913, chap. 24, ¶ 696) is a clear legislative declaration that the subject of billboard advertising shall be subject to municipal control.

It is settled for this court by this decision that the ordinance assailed is within the scope of the power conferred on the city of Chicago by the legislature, that it is to be treated as proceeding from the lawmaking power of the state, and that, there fore, it is a valid ordinance unless the record shows it to be clearly unreasonable and arbitrary. Reinman v. Little Rock, 237

by themselves (St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S. W. 929), and to justify the prohibition against their erection in residence districts of a city in the interest of the safety, morality, health, and decency of the community.

The claim is palpably frivolous that the validity of the ordinance is impaired by the provision that such billboards may be erected in such districts as are described if the consent in writing is obtained of the owners of a majority of the frontage on both sides of the street in any block in which such billboard is to be erected. The plaintiff in error cannot be injured, but obviously may be benefited, by this provision, for without it the prohibition

of the erection of such billboards in such residence sections is absolute. He who is

not injured by the operation of a law or ordinance cannot be said to be deprived by it of either constitutional right or of property. Tyler v. Judges of Ct. of Registration, 179 U. S. 405, 45 L. ed. 252, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 206; Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 531, 58 L. ed. 713, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 359. To this we may add that such a reference to a neighborhood of the propriety of having carried on within it trades or occupations which are properly the subject of regulation in the exer

cise of the police power is not uncommon This is not a delegation of legislative power, in laws which have been sustained against but is, as we have seen, a familiar proevery possible claim of unconstitutionality, vision affecting the enforcement of laws and such as the right to maintain saloons ordinances. (Swift v. People, 162 Ill. 534, 33 L.R.A. 470, 44 N. E. 528), and as to the location of garages (People ex rel. Busching v. Ericsson, 263 Ill. 368, L.R.A.1915D, 607, 105 N. E. 315, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 183). Such treatment is plainly applicable to offensive structures.

It results that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois will be affirmed. Mr. Justice McKenna, dissents.

(242 U. S. 470)

F. DREW CAMINETTI, Petitioner,

V.

UNITED STATES. (No. 139.)

MAURY I. DIGGS, Petitioner,

V.

UNITED STATES. (No. 163.).

L. T. HAYS, Petitioner,

V.

UNITED STATES. (No. 464.) STATUTES 217, 220 CONSTRUCTIONNAME OF ACT-COMMITTEE REPORT. 1. The name given to a congressional enactment by way of designation or description in the act or the report of the committee accompanying the introduction of the not change the plain implication of the bill into the House of Representatives canwords of the statute.

The principles governing the exercise of the police power have received such frequent application and have been so elaborated upon in recent decisions of this court, concluding with Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U. S. 510, 514, 60 L. ed. 771, 775, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 440, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 548, that further discussion of them would not be profitable, especially in a case falling as clearly as this one does within their scope. We therefore content ourselves with saying that while this court has refrained from any attempt to define with precision the limits of the police power, yet its disposition is to favor the validity of laws relating to matters completely within the territory of the state enacting them, and it so reluctantly disagrees with the local legislative authority, primarily the judge of the public welfare, especially when its action is approved by the highest court of the state whose people are directly concerned, that it will interfere with the action state commerce in order that she may be 2. Transportation of a woman in interof such authority only when it is plain and debauched or become a mistress or conpalpable that it has no real or substantial cubine, although unaccompanied by the exrelation to the public health, safety, morals,pectation of pecuniary gain, is condemned or to the general welfare. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 30, 49 L. ed. 643, 651, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 358, 3 Ann. Cas. 765. And this, for the reasons stated,

cannot be said of the ordinance which we have here.

The plaintiff in error relies chiefly upon Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137, 57 L. ed. 156, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1123, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 76, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 192. A sufficient distinction between the ordinance there considered and the one at bar is plain. The former left the establishment of the building line untouched until the lot owners should act, and then made the street committee the mere automatic register of that action, and gave to it the effect of law. The ordinance in the case at bar absolutely prohibits the erection of any billboards in the blocks designated, but permits this prohibition to be modified with the consent of the persons who are to be most affected by such modification. The one ordinance permits two thirds of the lot owners to impose restrictions upon the other erty in the block, while the other permits

prop

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 293, 298; Dec. Dig. 217, 220.] PROSTITUTION 1-WHITE SLAVE TRAFFIC-NONMERCENARY TRANSPORTATION.

by the provisions of the White Slave Traffic
Act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. at L. 825,
chap. 395, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8813), mak-
ing it an offense knowingly to transport or
cause to be transported in interstate com-
merce any woman or girl for the purpose
of prostitution or debauchery, or for any
other immoral purpose, or with the intent
or purpose to induce such woman or girl
to become a prostitute, or to give herself
up to debauchery, or engage in any other
immoral practice.

Cent. Dig. §8 1, 2; Dec. Dig. 1.]
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Prostitution,
COMMERCE 16-POWER OF CONGRESS
WHITE SLAVE TRAFFIC.

3. Construing as applicable to transportation, unaccompanied by the expectation of pecuniary gain, the provisions of the White Slave Traffic Act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. at L. 825, chap. 395, Comp. Stat. portation or the causing to be transported, 1913, § 8813), making criminal the transor the obtaining, aiding, or assisting in the transportation in interstate commerce of women or girls for the purpose of prostitution, debauchery, or other immoral purposes, does not render the statute invalid as in excess of the constitutional power of Congress

over interstate commerce.

one half of the lot owners to remove a restriction from the other property owners. Cent. Dig. § 2; Dec. Dig. 16.] [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Commerce,

For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes

CRIMINAL LAW 787(1) ACCUSED AS Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of
WITNESS COMMENT ON OMISSIONS IN the court:
TESTIMONY-SELF-CRIMINATION.

WO WRITS of Certiorari to the United last two.

States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to review judgments which affirmed convictions in the District Court of the United States for the Northern Dis

trict of California of violations of the White Slave Traffic Act. Affirmed. Also ON WRIT of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to review a judgment which affirmed a conviction in the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma of a violation of the White Slave Traffic Act. Affirmed.

See same case below, in Nos. 139 and 163, 136 C. C. A. 147, 220 Fed. 545, in No. 464, 145 C. C. A. 294, 231 Fed. 106.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Joseph W. Bailey, Marshall B. Woodworth, and Robert T. Devlin for petitioners in Nos. 139 and 163. Mr. Harry O. Glasser for petitioner in Caminetti. Upon trial and verdict of No. 464. guilty on these four counts, he was senAssistant Attorney General Wallace for tenced to imprisonment for two years and the United States. to pay a fine of $2,000. As in the Cami

For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes 37 S.C.-13

netti case, that judgment was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. 136 C. C. A. 147, 220 Fed. 545.

case, the acts charged and proved, upon which conviction was had, do not come within the statute.

It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of the lawmaking body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms. Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 662, 670, 671, 32 L. ed. 1060, 1063, 1064, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 651; Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U. S. 1, 33, 39 L. ed. 601, 610, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 508; United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co. 232 U. S. 399, 409, 58 L. ed. 658, 661, L.R.A.1915B, 774, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 337; United States v. First Nat. Bank, 234 U. S. 245, 258, 58 L. ed. 1298, 1303,

In the Hays Case, upon June 26th, 1914, an indictment was returned in the United States district court for the western district of Oklahoma against Hays and another, charging violations of the act. The first count charged the said defendants with having, on March 17th, 1914, persuaded, induced, enticed, and coerced a certain woman, unmarried and under the age of eighteen years, from Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, to the city of Wichita, Kansas, in interstate commerce and travel, for the purpose and with intent then and there to induce and coerce the said woman, and intending that she should be induced and coerced to engage in prostitution, debauchery, and other immoral practices, and did then and there, in furtherance of such pur-34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 846. poses, procure and furnish a railway ticket Where the language is plain and admits entitling her to passage over the line of of no more than one meaning, the duty of railway, to wit, the Atchison, Topeka, & interpretation does not arise, and the rules Santa Fe Railway, and did then and there which are to aid doubtful meanings need and thereby, knowingly entice and cause no discussion. Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 the said woman to go and to be carried and U. S. 414, 421, 44 L. ed. 219, 222, 20 transported as a passenger in interstate Sup. Ct. Rep. 155. There is no ambiguity commerce upon said line of railway. The in the terms of this act. It is specifically second count charged that on the same date made an offense to knowingly transport or the defendants persuaded, induced, enticed, cause to be transported, etc., in interstate and coerced the same woman to be trans-commerce, any woman or girl for the purported from Oklahoma City to Wichita, Kansas, with the purpose and intent to induce and coerce her to engage in prostitution, debauchery, and other immoral practices at and within the state of Kan

sas,

and that they enticed her and caused her to go and be carried and transported as a passenger in interstate commerce from Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, to Wichita, Kansas, upon a line and route of a common carrier, to wit: The Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Railway. Defendants were found guilty by a jury upon both counts, and Hays was sentenced to imprisonment for eighteen months. Upon writ of error to the circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit, judgment was affirmed (145 C. C. A. 294, 231 Fed. 106).

It is contended that the act of Congress is intended to reach only "commercialized vice," or the traffic in women for gain, and that the conduct for which the several petitioners were indicted and convicted, however reprehensible in morals, is not within the purview of the statute when properly construed in the light of its history and the purposes intended to be accomplished by its enactment. In none of the cases was it charged or proved that the transportation was for gain or for the purpose of furnishing women for prostitution for hire, and it is insisted that, such being the

pose of prostitution or debauchery, or for "any other immoral purpose," or with the intent and purpose to induce any such woman or girl to become a prostitute or to give herself up to debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral practice.

Statutory words are uniformly presumed, unless the contrary appears, to be used in their ordinary and usual sense, and with the meaning commonly attributed to them. To cause a woman or girl to be transported for the purposes of debauchery, and for an immoral purpose, to wit, becoming a concubine or mistress, for which Caminetti and Diggs were convicted; or to transport an unmarried woman, under eighteen years of age, with the intent to induce her to engage in prostitution, debauchery, and other immoral practices, for which Hays was convicted, would seem by the very statement of the facts to embrace transportation for purposes denounced by the act, and therefore fairly within its meaning.

While such immoral purpose would be more culpable in morals and attributed to baser motives if accompanied with the expectation of pecuniary gain, such considerations do not prevent the lesser offense against morals of furnishing transportation in order that a woman may be debauched, or become a mistress or a concubine, from being the execution of purposes