released from liability for other articles unless they were accepted by the railroad as baggage. Wilson v. R. R. Co., 56 Me. 62; K. C., P. & G. R. Co. v. State, 65 Ark. 363; R. R. Co. v. Swift, 12 Wall. 252. In Saleeby v. R. R., supra, articles from their nature to be classified as merchandise were held to be baggage through their having been accepted as such by the railroad with knowledge of their character.

LIABILITIES ARISING OUT OF CONTRACTS BETWEEN LABOR UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS.

With the growth of antagonism between labor and capital, and between union and non-union labor, the courts have been increasingly called upon to pass upon the validity of contracts between labor unions and employers. Where the employers have bound themselves to discharge non-union laborers and hire none but union men, the question has generally arisen as a collateral issue in suits brought by the discharged non-union men against the union men who procured their discharge. But few cases are recorded wherein the validity of these contracts has been tested as between the parties themselves. Such was, however, the question in Jacobs v. Cohen, 90 N. Y. Supp. 854. The defendants, Cohen & Sons, were sued by Jacobs, president of a labor union, on a promissory note given by them. The consideration was a contract by which the defendants bound themselves to hire none but members of the plaintiff's union who were in good standing and who produced a pass card from the union, and agreed to discharge any person whenever the plaintiff should notify them that such person was not in good standing. The defense was lack of consideration, maintaining that the contract relied upon was unlawful as against public policy.

In Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33. cited by the defense, the plaintiff sought damages from the defendants for having joined in a conspiracy to take away his means of earning a livelihood and prevent him from obtaining employment. The defendants set up a contract to justify their action in causing the plaintiff to be discharged. The judge in his decision said: "Public policy and the interests of society favor the utmost freedom in the citizen to pursue his lawful trade or calling, and if the purpose of an organization or combination of workingmen is to hamper or to restrict that freedom, and, through contracts or agreements with employers, to coerce other workingmen to become members of the organization, and to come under its rules and conditions, under the penalty of the loss of their positions and of deprivation of employment, then that purpose seems clearly unlawful, and militates against the spirit of our government and the nature of our institutions "' It was also held that the fact that the contract was entered into for the purpose of preventing friction between the workingmen's organization and the employer would not legalize a plan of compelling workingmen not in affiliation with the organization to join it at the peril of being deprived of their employment.

In Nat. Protective Ass'n v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, it was decided that a labor union may refuse to permit its members to work with fellow servants who are members of a rival organization and may notify the employer that a strike will be ordered unless such servants are discharged, when its action is based upon a proper motive. Such would be a purpose to secure only the employment of efficient and approved workmen, or to secure an exclusive preference of employment to members of the union on their own terms and conditions. If under such circumstances the employees objected to are discharged, neither they nor the organization of which they are members have a right of action against the former union or its members. From the above case it would be inferred that a contract might not be enforced, but that if the employer saw fit to carry it out he could not be enjoined nor could any right of action arise therefrom.

The above conclusion is upheld by a decision rendered in the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court in December, 1904, Mills v. U. S. Printing Co., 91 N. Y. Supp. 185, where it was held that an employer could not be enjoined from discharging non-union men in compliance with an agreement to that effect with a union. The theory underlying this proposition is that the employer has the legal right to discharge his men unless hired for a definite period, whenever he sees fit, no matter what his motive for so doing may be. This theory is followed in England, though the rule there is couched in much stronger and more comprehensive language. "No action for conspiracy lies against persons who act in concert to damage another, and do damage him, but who at the same time merely exercise their own rights and who infringe no right of other people." Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 23 Q. B. 598; Allen v. Flood, L. R. 1898, A. C. 1; Quinn v. Leathem, L. R. 1901, A. C. 495.

In Jacobs v. Cohen, supra, two of the five judges dissented, Bartlett, J., stating that he could see no reason why a man should not be allowed to contract to hire only a certain class of workingmen if he thought it was to his best interest. If by restricting his right to hire he could procure what he considered a better class of workingmen and other similar advantages, especially when no malicious motive is shown, there seems to be no sound reason why such a contract should not be held valid, provided its object is primarily the betterment of the contracting parties. Beach on Monopolies and Ind. Trusts, Sec. 113. The mere act of discharging non-union employees under agreement with a labor union is not an actionable wrong, as shown by the cases cited. No case has been found holding that the voluntary carrying out of such a contract was in any way unlawful; hence there seems to be no reason why the parties could not bind themselves by contract to do that which they might do of their own volition.

RECENT CASES.

ADMIRALTY-Jurisdiction-BEACON.-UNITED STATES V. EVAns, 25 Sup. CT. 46.-Held, that admiralty jurisdiction extends to a libel in rem against a vessel for negligently injuring a beacon standing fifteen or twenty feet from the channel of a bay, in water twelve or fifteen feet deep, though it is built upon piles driven firmly into the bottom.

Formerly admiralty jurisdiction was limited to the high seas. New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchant's Bank, 6 How. 344. Later it was held to extend to all public navigable water. The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U. S. 443. But not to an injury done by a vessel to an object on land. The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20. Courts of admiralty have also declined to assume jurisdiction where a fire is set to a house by a passing boat. Ex parte Phoenix Ins. Co., 118 U. S. 610; where the injury is to a bridge, swinging on a pier, constructed on the bed of a river, Curtis v. City of Milwaukee, 37 Fed. 705; John C. Sweeney, 55 Fed. 540; where the injury is to a boom, though it extends into navigable water, Brig "City of Erie" v. Canfield, 27 Mich. 479; also where a vessel collides with and injures a derrick, attached to the bottom. The Maud Webster, Fed. Cas. No. 9,302. The present case is apparently in conflict with former decisions, and is illustrative of the tendency to enlarge admiralty jurisdiction.

ADVERSE POSSESSION-AGAInst Whom.-Maas v. BurdeZKE, IOI N. W. 182 (MINN.).-Held, that one may acquire title to land by adverse possession as against the true owner, though he erroneously believed it to be public land and intended to hold and claim it under the federal homestead law.

In some states to gain title by adverse possession it must be against the whole world; Beate v. Hite, 35 Ore. 176; thus it was held in Flewellen v. Randall, 74 S. W. 49, that where a man enters upon land supposing it to belong to the state and with the intention of acquiring it from the state he does not gain title by adverse possession against the true owner. But on the other hand, and, it seems, by weight of authority, it is held that the plaintiff must recover, if at all, on the strength of his own title, Mather v. Walsh, 107 Mo. 121; and that possession need not be adverse to the whole world but only to the one who is asserting title in himself. Skipwith v. Martin, 50 Ark. 141; and though one admit title in the state, he may gain title by holding continuously and adversely to the real owner for the statutory period. Franceur v. Newhouse, 14 Sawy. 601.

BANKRUPTCY-MANUFACTURING CORPORATION-LAUNDRY.-IN RE TROY STEAM LAUNDERING Co., 13 Am. B.R. 97.-Held, that a corporation organized for general laundry business, but whose principal business is the laundering of collars and cuffs, etc., for manufacturers of those articles, prior to their being put on the market, is engaged in manufacturing and subject to be adjudged a bankrupt.

To be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt, the corporation must be one clearly within the provisions of the act. Wilson v. City Bank, 17 Wall. 473. The process of manufacture is supposed to produce some new article, and does not consist in a mere change of form of the original article. Hartranft

v. Wiegman, 121 U. S. 609; People v. Roberts, 145 N. Y. 377. A manufacturing corporation may be one that merely performs work and labor, the materials being furnished by other parties. In re Niagara Contracting Co., 127 Fed. 782. It is clear that a laundry company, doing only domestic work, is not a manufacturer. In re White Star Laundry Co., 117 Fed. 570.

BANKS-LIABILITY TO THE LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES OF A DECEASED DEPOSITOR.-KELLEY V. BUFFALO SAV. BANK, 72 N. E. 995 (N. Y.).—Where, after the death of a depositor in a saving's bank, of which fact the bank was ignorant, his bank book was produced, and a draft presented, purporting to bear his signature, which was paid by the bank, held, that failure to make a physical comparison of such signature to the draft with the signature of the depositor on file in the bank, renders the bank liable for such payment, for failure to exercise due care and ordinary caution.

The officers of a savings bank are to be held to the exercise of reasonable care and diligence. Eaves v. Peoples' S. Bank, 27 Conn. 229; Boone v. Citizens' S. Bank, 84 N. Y. 83. The exercise of mere diligence will not protect the bank where it knows of the depositor's death. Farmer v. Manhattan S. Inst., 60 Hun 462; Fowler v. B. S. Bank, 113 N. Y. 450. A rule or clause in the deposit book is part of the contract between the bank and its depositor. White v. Bank, 22 Pick. 183; Wallace v. Bank, 7 Gray 134; Eaves v. Peoples' S. Bank, supra. The common rule, authorizing payment on the death of a depositor to his legal representatives, is designed to protect the depositor when he no longer can protect himself, and requires the bank to employ special care to see that payment is made to the proper person. Farmer v. M. S. Inst., Supra.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONSTRUCTION OF VIADUCT-LIABILITY OF MUNICIPALITY TO AButting Owner.-Sauer v. CITY OF NEW York, 72 N. E. 579 (N. Y.). When a statute authorizes the construction of a viaduct above the surface of a street and such construction diminishes the value of an abutting owner's property, occasioning dust and noise, impairing ingress and egress, and interrupting light and air, held, that the statute is not unconstitutional, the damages sustained being damnum absque injuria. Vann and Bartlett, J J., dissenting.

This decision is distinguishable from Story v. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 122, where damages were allowed, on the ground that the obstructions were incompatible with, and destructive of, the use of the street as such. Under a constitutional provision prohibiting the taking of private property for public use without compensation, it is held that abutting property owners who sustain special damages from the construction of street improvements are entitled to compensation. Pause v. Atlanta, 98 Ga. 92; Barrows v. Sycamore, 150 Ill. 588. In Rening v. R. Co., 128 N. Y. 157, it was said that the owner is entitled to the benefit of the street for egress and other purposes and cannot be deprived thereof without compensation. Indirect injuries, however, suffered in common with the general public, are not recoverable. Rigney v. Chicago, 102 Ill. 64. A diversion of public traffic from the street in front of the property is not ground for compensation, Hobson v. Philadelphia, 155 Pa. 131; and the construction of an elevated approach to a viaduct occupying the entire width of the street is damnum absque injuria. Coldough v. Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 182.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INSPECTION LAWS.-TERRITORY EX REL. E. J. MCLEAN & Co. v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 79 Pac. 74 (NEW MEXICO.).—

Held, that an inspection law for the sole purpose of aiding in the detection and punishment of crime or fraud against an industry is valid. Baker, J., dissenting.

A state may make rules for the conduct of the most necessary and common occupations when from their nature they afford peculiar opportunities for imposition and fraud. Cooley, Cons. Lim., 7th Ed., 886; Hawthorn v. People, 109 Ill. 308. Also when the business affords peculiar opportunities for the commission of crime. Comm. v. Ducey, 126 Mass. 269. But a state cannot make a law designed to detect or prevent crime an inspection law, within the constitutional meaning of that word, by calling it so in the title. People v. Compagnie Générale, 107 U. S. 59; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 710. Such inspection law to be valid must not substantially hamper or burden either foreign or interstate commerce. Railroad v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465. Yet although such state regulations may affect interstate commerce in some measure, if the regulations are local in their nature and adapted to the locality they will not be considered void unless they run counter to legislation that Congress has enacted. Cooley, Prin. of Cons. Law, 71.

CRIMINAL LAW-Evidence-Refreshing MEMORY.-STATE V. ASPARA, 37 So. 883 (LA.).-Held, that a witness in a criminal trial may refresh his memory by referring to testimony previously given by him on the preliminary hearing of the accused.

In most jurisdictions a witness cannot have recourse to his previous testimony before the grand jury. Putnam v. U. S., 162 U. S. 687; Comm. v. Phelps, 77 Mass. 73; contra, State v. Miller, 53 Iowa 154. But when a witness for the prosecution manifests a disposition to favor the defendant, the prosecution may call his attention to such previous testimony. Hurley v. State, 46 O. St. 320. It is generally held that the attention of a witness may be called to the testimony given by him in a previous trial of the same case. People v. Palmer, 105 Mich. 568. But the testimony of a witness on the trial of another defendant in the same indictment cannot be read to him for any purpose. Brown v. State, 28 Ga. 199. The ruling in the present case regarding testimony given at a prior preliminary examination seems to follow the weight of authority. Harvey v. State, 40 Ind. 516; White v. State, 18 Tex. App. 57.

Dead Bodies-Action for Mutilation—Damages.—Koerber v. Patek, 102 N. W. 40 (WIS.).-Held, that the sense of outrage and mental suffering resulting directly from the wilful mutilation by defendant of the body of plaintiff's deceased mother are proper independent elements of compensatory damages. Damages will be allowed for mental suffering, without physical injury, where the suffering was caused by a wanton act. Gillespie v. Brooklyn H. R. R., 178 N. Y. 347. For an authorized autopsy damages will not lie where it was shown to be conducted in the ordinary way. Winkler v. Hawkes et al., 102 N. W. 418 (Iowa); Cook v. Walley, 1 Colo. App. 163. As to authorized autopsies see the leading case of Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307; also a discussion in the N. Y. Law Journal, Vol. 32, p. 1954; Hockenhammer v. L. & E. Ry. Co., 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2383.

DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT-PASSENGER ON CONSTRUCTION TRAIN-LIABILITY OF COMPany.-PennsylvANIA Co. v. CoYER, 72 N. W. 875 (ILL.).— Decedent, an employee of a construction company, received notice from the railroad company of a rule forbidding the employees of the construction company to ride on a work train. Held, that habitual violation of such rule by