referred to, bearing the signatures of both parties, was filed with the Industrial Board and approved by it (setting out the agreement the substance of which heretofore appears); that said Stone or no one for him ever agreed to the pretended memorandum to accept $7.31 per week during total disability; that he did not know the memorandum so recited until a short time prior to the filing of his application; that he at no time intended to and did not agree to accept or receive compensation for the period of his total disability; that he is now informed that the brewing company did not at any time contemplate or intend to and did not agree to pay him compensation for any period extending beyond the period of his total disability, nor for any period of partial disability whether permanent or otherwise, and that it agreed and understood at the time said memorandum was signed that it was making an agreement to pay him weekly compensation for and during the period of total disability only; that he never at any time agreed or understood that he was agreeing to receive said compensation in settlement; that, in fact, he has never reached or made an agreement with said brewing company for the acceptance of any compensation pursuant to the Workmen's Compensation Act, but that there has been at all times and now is a mutual mistake by and between him and the said brewing company as to the terms of said pretended agreement and the amount of compensation payable thereunder; that such agreement is and has been at all times void and of no effect and that he wholly disavows the same; that the brewing company has not paid his necessary and reasonable surgical, medical, and hospital expenses for the first 30 days after his injury and prays that said pretended agreement be declared void and of no effect and found not to conform to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

[1] The question presented for determination under the foregoing facts is: "Does the Industrial Board of Indiana have the jurisdiction to consider the said application of said Stone and to either grant or refuse the prayer thereof?" The statute provides that the employer and injured employee, or his dependents in case of death, may agree upon the compensation as provided by the act, but to be enforceable a memorandum of such agreement must be filed with and approved by the board, and that such agreement shall be approved only when its terms conform to the act. Section 57, Workmen's Compensation Act (Acts 1915, p. 392). When such an agreement is made and approved by the board it will be given the same effect as an award of the board. Barry vs. Bay State, etc., R. Co., 222 Mass. 366, 110 N. E. 1031. It has also been held under acts very similar to ours that an agreement as to compensation, although approved by the Industrial Board will not deprive the board of further jurisdiction where it is apparent that the agreement is not complete. Foley vs. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 190 Mich. 507, 157 N. W. 45, 47.

[2] Assuming from the facts certified that the agreement between the employer and employee was made pursuant to section 57, supra, and that the parties were not seeking to and did not attempt to compromise any differences between them as to the amount of compensation, but rather that their purpose was simply to avoid the expense of a hearing before the board, the board undoubtedly had the right to approve it. It was in nowise contingent upon an uncertain event, and was sufficient in form so far as it went. The Legislature in enacting the statute has not seen fit to limit such agreements to the amount of compensation only, and there would seem no good reason why the parties might not agree upon matters leading up to the amount of compensation without more. Section 57, supra. We hold therefore that the agreement in this case was such as the parties were authorized to make and the board to approve.

[3] It is apparent from the agreement that it is incomplete, in that no compensation is agreed upon for and during partial disability. Under such circumstances the board not having relinquished its jurisdiction of the parties or the subject-matter has the right upon proper petition to hear the parties and make such further provision for compensation as the facts warrant not exceeding the maximum provided in the act (the same as though no agreement had been reached.)

[4] The petitioner in this case does not claim that this agreement was intended as a compromise or settlement of compensation. The language of his petition is "that he never at any time agreed or understood that he was agreeing to receive said compensation in settlement." But, assuming that it was intended by the employer as a compromise settlement, we are of the opinion still that the Industrial Board under its broad supervisory powers expressly conferred by the statute creating it would have the power to hear and determine the petition before it at any time before the case was finally disposed of. Its jurisdiction in such matters is not dependent upon the setting aside of the agreement. Such jurisdiction exists over the subject-matter and the parties. notwithstanding the agreement whether it be an agreement upon the acts giving the board jurisdiction only or whether it be a compromise settlement of all compensation due under the act, and is broad enough to include all disputes between the employer and the injured employee or his dependents with reference to the compensation to be paid or received under the act.

[5] In arriving at the conclusion above reached we do not hold that the Industrial Board is more than an administrative body or arm of the government, which in the course of its administration of the law is empowered to ascertain some questions of fact and apply the existing law thereto, and in so doing acts quasi judicially. It is not a court, and is not vested with judicial powers within the general acceptation of that term. Neither do we hold that the Industrial Board has the power to set aside its

own acts in the absence of fraud, duress, or mistake being averred in a petition filed for that purpose, and after such fact has been fully shown by the proof.

APPELLATE COURT OF INDIANA.
DIVISION No. 1.

IN RE LANMAN ET AL. (No. 10027.)*

1. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-RIGHT TO COMPENSATION-SISTERS AND NIECES.

In view of Workmen's Compensation Act § 38, specifying who shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent, but making no provision for sisters and nieces, the dependency of a sister or niece must, in accordance with the further specific provision of such section, be determined in accordance with the fact at the time of the injury.

2. WOPKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-RIGHT TO COMPENSATION "TOTALLY DEPENDENT."

Where the deceased employee had for a number of years supported his sister under an agreement by which she kept house for him and did no other work, though she was a competent stenographer, her health being such that she could not perform the work of a stenographer, she was "totally dependent" upon him. Sister of deceased employee, wholly supported by him, is not deprived of the right to compensation for his death by the mere fact that she was capable of supporting herself as a stenographer, when in fact she did depend on him for support.

Proceeding by Luella Grace Lanman for compensation for the death of her brother, William Lanman, opposed by the Indianapolis Light & Heat Company, employer. On questions certified by the Industrial Board under Workmen's Compensation Act (Laws 1915, c. 106) § 61, as amended by Laws 1917, c. 63.

BATMAN, J.

Under the provisions of section 61 of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1915, as amended by the act of 1917, the Industrial Board has certified to this court certain questions of law, based upon the facts presented by a proceeding pending before that body, seeking the opinion of this court for guidance in determining such proceedings. The statement of facts as submitted by the board is as follows:

"On the 13th day of December, 1916, one William Lanman was in the employment of the Indianapolis Light & Heat Company, as a lineman at an average weekly wage of $17.53; that on said date the said William Lanman received a personal injury by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, resulting in his death on said date; that said employer had actual * Decision rendered, Nov. 15, 1917. 117 N. E. Rep. 671.

knowledge of the injury of the said William Lanman at the time that it occurred and executed a report thereof to the Industrial Board on said date and filed the same with said Board on the 16th day of December, 1916; that the said William Lanman was unmarried at the time of his death; that he left no child or children surviving him, and no descendants of any child or children; that the said William Lanman, for approximately 15 years prior to his death had been a resident of the city of Indianapolis, Ind.; that he owned a residence property in which he, his mother, Luella Grace Lanman, a sister, and a sister, Alice Lanman, lived together until about six years before his death; that during said time the said William Lanman provided the home, furnished it, and provided the food and clothing for his said mother and two sisters; that his mother died some six years prior to the death of William Lanman; that for several years prior to her death his mother was blind; that the sister Alice Lanman was in very poor health and died approximately five years prior to the death of the said William Lanman; that during the time that the four lived together, and during the time that the three lived together, Luella Grace Lanman was the housekeeper and nursed her mother and invalid sister; that as a result of her confinement and arduous duties in nursing her mother and invalid sister, the health of Luella Grace Lanman failed, and for the last past five years she has been in an impaired condition of health; that upon the death of the mother of Luella Grace Lanman, Sarah Estella Lambert, a niece of William Lanman and of Luella Grace Lanman, took up her home with said William Lanman and the said Luella Grace Lanman and lived with them during the school term until the death of William Lanman; that during the time that she lived with Luella Grace Lanman and William Lanman, the said Sarah Estella Lambert was supported by the said William Lanman, who during said time provided her with a home, with food, some clothing and some of her school supplies; that during school terms it was the custom of Sarah Estella Lambert to return to the home of her mother and stepfather on Friday evenings and return to the home of William Lanman on Monday mornings and remain at said home, except during her attendance at school, on Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays of each week, and during the vacation between school terms she lived at the home of her stepfather and her mother; that the said Sarah Estella Lambert was not at any time emancipated by her parents; that her living with her uncle and aunt was a matter of convenience to the said Sarah Estella Lambert in attending school, and the provision made for her by William Lanman was purely gratituous; that upon the death of the mother the said William Lanman advised Luella Grace Lanman not to worry over her condition; that he would furnish her a home and provide for her so long as he was able; that at said time the said William Lanman and the said Luella Grace Lanman entered into an

understanding or arrangement whereby the said William Lanman was to furnish the home and provide for his said sister and in return therefor she was to act as housekeeper, and in consummation of said agreement or understanding the said Wm. Lanman from said. time until his death did furnish the home and turned over to his said sister his entire earnings, out of which the expenses of maintaining the home, including food and clothing for both himself and sister and other necessary and incidental expenses were paid; that during said time except for a period of about three weeks, as hereinafter stated, the said Luella Grace Lanman acted as housekeeper and did all the housework, including cooking, washing, etc.; that the said Luella Lanman is a stenographer by profession, and some three years before the death of William Lanman, by mutual arrangement between herself and her said brother, took up work in her profession, at which she continued for about three weeks, and, upon finding that her health would not permit her to continue said work, she and her brother resumed their former method of living together and so continued until the death of Willaim Lanman; that the said Sarah Estella Lambert was 16 years of age on the 24th day of April, 1917; that at the time of the death of William Lanman she was neither physically nor mentally incapacitated from earning."

Upon the foregoing facts the Industrial Board submits the following questions: (1) Was Luella Grace Lanman, a dependent of William Lanman at the time of his death within the meaning of the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act? (2) If a dependent, was she a total or a partial dependent? (3) Was Sarah Estella Lambert a dependent of William Lanman, at the time of his death, within the meaning of the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act? (4) If a dependent, was she a total or a partial dependent?

[1] The questions submitted for our determination involve the dependency of a sister and niece on the earnings of an employee. The Workmen's Compensation Act of this state makes certain provisions for dependents, but does not undertake to define dependency. Section 38 of such act specifies who shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee, and then provides as follows:

"In all other cases, questions of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with the act, as the fact may be at the time of the injury."

It will be found that sisters and nieces are not included in any of the classes in which dependency is conclusively presumed by the terms of the act. The fact of their dependency and the degree thereof must therefore be determined in accordance with the existing facts at the time of the death of the employee in

question.

[2] In considering the question submitted, there are certain facts not clearly appearing which we shall assume, viz., that the