Institutions, Transaction Costs, and Environmental Policy: Institutional Reform for Water ResourcesEdward Elgar Pub., 2000 - 233 páginas Conventional economic analysis of property rights in natural resources is too narrow and restrictive to allow for effective comparisons between alternative institutional structures. In this book, a conceptual framework is developed for the analysis of these structures with illustrative application to the allocation of water resources. Ray Challen introduces and develops a model for the analysis of the problems involved in institutional choice that takes into account constraints in institutional change imposed by history and the value of maintaining options in an uncertain future. The emphasis of institutional analysis shifts from assessing the benefits of particular property rights regimes in isolation to considering the distribution of property rights between levels of governments, communities and individuals in an institutional hierarchy. Conceptual developments in institutional theory are illustrated by using a case study of institutional change in the regulation of water use in irrigated agriculture. |
Contenido
Introduction | 1 |
Institutions and Use of Natural Resources | 12 |
Institutions of Water Use for Irrigation in the MurrayDarling | 54 |
Derechos de autor | |
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Institutions, Transaction Costs, and Environmental Policy: Institutional ... Ray Challen Vista previa limitada - 2000 |
Términos y frases comunes
Administrative allocation Administrative agencies agents agreement allocation decisions allocation of water alternative institutional structures call option Chapter common property costs of institutional d₁ decision maker demand for institutions distribution dynamic transaction costs economic entitlement systems environmental estimated exercise price expected value expected welfare group irrigation schemes group schemes holders imperfect information individual irrigators infrastructure Input quota institutional change institutional choice institutional hierarchy institutional reform institutions of water irrigation farmers land minimising model of institutional Murray-Darling Basin Murrumbidgee organisations ownership parameters policy analysis political entrepreneurs price dispersion private property rights property-right regimes purchaser quasi-option value quota Administrative allocation re-allocation of water regulation regulatory Renmark resource allocation Resource Economics resource quotas riparian River Murray Riverina Riverland S₁ South Australia South Wales static transaction costs trading of water transaction costs associated transaction-cost transfer of water transition uncertainty value of learning variable vendors water allocation water entitlements water resources water users
Referencias a este libro
Economics for Collaborative Environmental Management: Renegotiating the Commons Graham R. Marshall Sin vista previa disponible - 2005 |
Australian Local Government Economics Brian Dollery,Lin Crase,Andrew Johnson Vista previa limitada - 2006 |