It must be admitted, however, even in the face of the above facts, that the habit of describing styles in interior decoration by using the name of a certain ruler is an extremely convenient method of classification and one which is bound to contain some amount of truth. It has as well become a recognized method, which is used by many authorities, and one which, erroneous as it may be, and particularly so in the case of the eighteenth century, would be found difficult to replace by some more accurate denomination.

It would be an interesting question, though one attended by many difficulties, to ascertain how many "ébénistes" and decorators (in the

epoch in reality belongs to an earlier one.

Even a cursory examination reveals the significant fact that the applied or super

latter case invariably architects as well) continue through the years 1715-1799 to design during one reign in a style exactly similar to that which had prevailed

Mahogany commode. First half of the epoch of Louis XV.

in a former one, and also to observe how, as is evident in numerous cases, a piece of furniture which may exhibit all the characteristics supposed to denote a later

ficial ornament used on furniture was, at a given moment, invariably a herald of structural tendencies to come. The bronzes on the commodes of Cressent, the numerous

designs for various details pertaining to objects of domestic use by Caffieri, as well as the treatment of interiors by Oppenordt in the last year of Louis XIV, are as fantastic and extravagant almost as the later chairs and tables of Meissonier themselves became. And, in this same period, it will be found that the most overdecorated and turbulent commodes of Cressent date, not from the years when the Regent was actually in power, but from the time when the serious Maintenon still gave the "ton" to the court of France. Already the Palladian-Rococo compromise, which marked the decoration of the middle period of the reign, had grown into the freer arabesques and curves which, somewhat later, becoming practically independent of an underlying order of construction, as formerly understood, developed into the intricate, fascinating, and illogical "style

rocaille." Although this last fashion was greatly appreciated during the Regency, it was only natural that many forms which had obtained during the preceding reign still remained in favor, and this is to be particularly noticed in the case of the writingtables or bureaux which continued to be designed in almost precisely the same manner as under Louis XIV. The most usual form of bronze decoration in this case was the use of human heads supporting the four corners on the table-top, the shoulders emerging from a rococo motif, a treatment distinctive of Louis XIV decoration in its later period and equally popular during the Regen

seems, without the slightest comprehension of the meaning of this word, and it was only after society had expanded into all the brilliancy of a carefully deliberate display that a natural reaction took place and,

cy, but which fell into disfavor shortly after Louis XV had assumed the reins of govern

ment.

We have said that at the death of the creator of Versailles France did not, in breathing a sigh of relief, at once change the aspect of her salons and bedrooms, that a change in the ideas of men did not become suddenly apparent and reflected in the appearance of the inanimate objects within their houses. There was one factor, however, which had been slowly developing, which gradually showed itself in the interior surroundings of those who constituted French society. This was the desire for privacy, the heretofore uncomprehended charm of intimacy.

For centuries the world had progressed, it

tired of a fatiguing splendor, it looked toward new retreats in an awakened vision of things. It at last realized the charm of intimacy. Throughout the greater part of the seventeenth century France had witnessed a series of theatrical tableaux, most perfectly arranged, and most of the civilized world had acted as audience to the carefully thought-out entries and exits of its privileged personages. Even the throes of love

and its attendant desires and passions seem to have been regulated for the benefit of an admiring populace, and the most customary actions of every-day life had perforce to be performed with noble gestures and pompous amplitude.

So as not to be dwarfed by the splendid decorations of their surroundings, by the gods and goddesses who had found a last Olympus upon the walls and ceilings of French palaces and châteaux, the perhaps less human inhabitants of these sumptuous abodes decked themselves out with the attributes of semi-divinity and walked through life and into death with much more deliberate staginess than was visible in their painted, transplanted deities.

HENRY COLEMAN MAY.

WHEN

/HEN the extravagant speculation for the rise-which had prevailed last autumn on almost every stock market and commodity market of the country-was suddenly halted, and was replaced in the closing weeks of the year by a series of extremely violent declines, there were at least four explanations offered. Germany's sudden appeal for peace was the explanation most in vogue. Its reminder to the markets, that reliance on indefinite continuance of "war profits" was precarious, had undoubtedly much to do with the change of attitude. The Federal Reserve Board's much-misunderstood

remarks about loans to Europe whose

warning was directed, though too obscurely, to one or two minor operations in which circumstances were peculiar, and not to the more important loans to the powerful Allies-may have had its influence.

Reduced Cash Reserves

But long before either of these occurrences, American bank reserves, on whose plethoric condition the speculative markets had relied for indefinite supplies of credit, were rapidly and heavily reduced. On December 2, the amount of cash reserve, held by the New York banks in excess of the required percentage to deposits, was reported as only $41,000,000. It contrasted with $125,000,000 barely three months before and with $224,000,000 in the autumn of 1915. This December surplus was by far the smallest reported at any time since our markets emerged from the "war panic" of 1914. As a result, the Wall Street rate for loans repayable on demand (the form in which Stock Exchange borrowings are largely placed) rose on December 4 to 15 per cent, a rate not only nearly double the highest previous figure of war time, but actually above any Wall Street rate since November, 1912, when the Balkan war began.

This action of the money market, it will be observed, involved not only a fundamental influence on the speculative markets, but it introduced wholly new considerations. However much the Stock Exchange may have been taken off its guard by the German peace proposal of December 12, the certainty of eventual termination of the war and the possibility of its early termination had never been absent from the financial mind. But "tight money" and heavily depleted bank reserves had been possibilities so remote as hardly to engage attention.

YET this phase of the situation passed

as suddenly as it had arrived. Three weeks of the new year had not elapsed before New York's surplus bank reserve had once more risen above $200,000,000; that excess being larger than any in 1916, and having been itself surpassed in only four weeks (all during 1915) in the whole of our banking history.

Tight Money Soon Passes

Never before had any such violent alternation occurred in the New York bank position as the decrease in surplus reserves, from $124,000,000 on November 4 to $41,000,000 on December 2, and their subsequent increase to $202,400,000 on January 20. There was scarcely more than half as wide a swing, even when our people hid away upward of $200,000,000 cash in the panic of 1907. and then threw it back into bank at the moment when Europe was sending gold to relieve the situation. There had been no "panic" in the autumn of 1916; yet the actual reserve money in the New York bank vaults decreased $86,000,000 between the November and December dates, increasing $176,000,000 in the next seven weeks. To many even of our experienced observers, the thing was a mystery. Yet

the general principles which dominated the movement can be easily stated.

What Caused the Rapid Changes

T is true that during the first eleven months of 1916-the period of decreasing New York reserves-import of gold by the United States had reached the enormous sum of $527,000,000. It is also true that during 1915 the New York banks retained a large part of these gold arrivals. But in 1916 came the immensely rapid industrial expansion of the Middle States, the West, and the South. Such expansion has always, even in ordinary times, drawn actual money in great amounts from Eastern institutions. That would happen for three reasons. Active interior trade means rapidly expanding interior bank loans, with larger cash reserves in bank a consequent necessity. Such active trade calls also for very much larger sums of actual cash for hand-to-hand cir

culation, to provide for the daily purchases of prosperous communities and for the increased weekly or monthly pay-rolls. If, in addition, as was notably the case last year, prices of merchandise rise to a much higher level, then a proportionately greater amount of credit (and therefore of local bank reserves) is required to conduct a business. New York being the banking centre of the nation, where inland banks keep large balances of their own continually on deposit, it is from New York that the cash for all these purposes is drawn. It was drawn all the more easily, during 1916, because the grain and manufactures sold in such quantity to Europe were in the main produced by inland communities, were largely paid for from the proceeds of European government loans floated in Eastern cities, and therefore gave to the Western markets an exceptionally large New York credit on which to draw.

The reasons why the decrease in New York bank reserves was so particularly heavy in November were, first, that demands on interior bank resources for the "holiday trade" are always the largest of the year, and, second, that gold shipments to New York, on English account, had slackened. The reasons why the subsequent increase in reserves progressed so rapidly were, first, that England sent

to our ports through Canada, during December, $157,000,000 gold-by far the largest importation of any month on record-and, second, that with December ended and trade activity relaxing, Western banks began to pour back their reserve money to New York.

The Flood

of Gold

THE incident, taken as a whole, throws much-discussed question of what the mara somewhat confusing light on the kets call the "incoming flood of gold.” That movement has certainly been remarkable enough to disturb the financial brain. During the two years since the flow of European gold to our markets began, at metal at American ports reached the prothe end of 1914, receipts of the precious digious sum of $1,138,000,000. In 1915 we imported $452,000,000 gold; in 1916, of some $160,000,000, sent by us to South $686,000,000. Even the moderate offset American and other markets in the period, production of $200,000,000 new gold from was counterbalanced by the two-year

American mines.

The result of this movement, as shown by the government reports, was to increase the stock of gold in the United States by $1,039,000,000 between the end

of 1914 and the end of 1916. What these additions meant to the country's money supply may be judged from the fact that the largest gains in that supply during any previous two-year periods were the $205,000,000 increase of 1879 and 1880, when resumption of specie payments drew back great sums of gold which the country had previously lost to Europe, and the $246,borrowing heavily in Europe to support at 000,000 of 1905 and 1906, when we were home an enormous trade and speculation. Even if all kinds of currency are included, the increase in our total money supply, since 1914, has been three times as great as in any former period of equal length.

NOTHING exactly like this episode has

No Precedent in Economic

ever before occurred in the economic history of the world. There is precedent enough, to be sure, for large export of gold by a nation at war, especially when its currency had become depreciated. The United States sent $220,000,000 in gold to Europe during the three-year period from the middle of

History