1. An action of tort may be maintained upon a count which alleges that the
plaintiff was a manufacturer of shoes, and for the prosecution of his business
it was necessary for him to employ many shoemakers; that the defendant,
well knowing this, did unlawfully and without justifiable cause molest him
in carrying on said business, with the unlawful purpose of preventing him
from carrying it on, and wilfully induced many shoemakers who were in his
employment, and others who were about to enter into it, to abandon it with
out his consent and against his will; and that thereby the plaintiff lost their
services, and profits and advantages which he would have derived therefrom,
and was put to great expense to procure other suitable workmen, and com-
pelled to pay larger prices for work than he would have had to pay but for
the said doings of the defendant, and otherwise injured in his business.
Walker v. Cronin, 555.
2. An action of tort may be maintained upon a count which alleges that the
plaintiff entered into contracts with certain shoemakers for them severally
to make stock, which he delivered to them, into shoes, and return the shoes
to his factory; that the defendant, well knowing this, with the unlawful pur-
pose of preventing him from carrying on his business, induced them to re-
turn the stock unfinished to the factory, and to neglect and refuse to make
it into shoes as they had agreed to do; and that the stock was thereby dam-
aged, and the plaintiff put to trouble and expense in reassorting it and pro-
curing it to be finished, and compelled to pay larger prices for the finishing
of it than he would have done under said contracts, and by reason of the
said unlawful doings of the defendant was hindered and put to expense and
otherwise injured in his business. Ib.
3. An action of tort may be maintained upon a count which alleges that a cer-
tain shoemaker was in the plaintiff's service and employment on a specified
day, and for a valuable consideration on that day agreed to make three
cases of shoes for the plaintiff within one month; that the defendant, well
knowing this, contriving to defraud the plaintiff of the profit and benefit
of said service and of the performance of said contract, did on another day,
specified as being before the expiration of the month, entice and procure the
shoemaker, then being in the plaintiff's service, and before he had performed
said contract, as the defendant well knew, to leave the plaintiff's service and
refuse to perform the contract, without the plaintiff's leave and against the
plaintiff's will, by means of which enticement the shoemaker on the last
named day did leave said service and neglect and refuse to perform said
contract, without the leave and against the will of the plaintiff; and that the
plaintiff thereby lost profits and benefits which would otherwise have ac-
crued to him from said service and by the performance of said contract. Ib.
4. One who knowingly delivered an apparently harmless package, containing
a dangerous and explosive substance, to a common carrier for transportation,
without giving him notice of its contents, is liable for damages caused by its
explosion while the carrier was transporting it in ignorance of its contents
and with care duly adapted to its apparent nature. Boston & Albany Rail-
road Co. & Carney v. Shanly, 568.
5. Two substances, manufactured by different manufacturers, were dangerously
explosive in combination with one another, and were ordinarily used to-
gether. A customer sent separate orders to the manufacturers for quantities
of the respective substances to be forwarded to him by a certain common
carrier; and directed one of them to make the substance which he was to
furnish of greater explosive power than usual. The orders were fulfilled,
and the substances delivered in apparently harmless packages to the car-
rier, by the manufacturers, each of whom acted independently of the other
and was ignorant of the other's proceedings; and no notice was given to
the carrier of the nature of the substances or either of them. He stowed
them together in his vehicle; and while he was transporting them with due
care they exploded, and injured his property and property of others in his
custody, and also property of a third person near which the vehicle was
standing. The explosion was practically a single one, and it was impos-
sible to distinguish how much of the damage was produced by either sub-
stance. Held, that the manufacturers, but not the customer, were jointly
liable to the carrier and the third person respectively, in actions of tort for
their injuries. Ib.
6. In an action of tort for injuries occasioned to the plaintiff by the explosion
in the vehicle of a common carrier of substances which the defendants had
negligently delivered to him for transportation without notice of their dan-
gerous nature, an allegation in the writ, that the action is brought for the
benefit of the carrier, raises no presumption that negligence of the carrier
contributed to the plaintiff's injuries, and may be rejected as surplusage;
and a description in the declaration of the injuries as consisting in the de-
struction of "a certain building and other property of great value, belong-
ing to the plaintiff " and situated near where the vehicle was standing at the
time of the explosion, is a sufficiently definite allegation of damage. Ib.
See BILL OF EXCHANGE, 1; CHECK; INTOXICATING LIQUORS, 20-22;
JUDGMENT, 1; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2; LORD'S DAY; LOST PROP-
ERTY; MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED; NEGLIGENCE; PAYMENT; PROM-
ISSORY NOTE, 1-4; RAILROAD, 3, 5; SET-OFF; TOWN, 24; TRUst, 1;
WAY, 3, 4.
See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
On the trial of an indictment for adultery with an unmarried woman, evidence
is inadmissible that she was delivered of a child which might have been be-
gotten about the time of the offence charged. Commonwealth v. O'Connor,
See DIVORCE, 1; EXCEPTIONS, 8; INDICTMENT, 3.
1. An attachment of estate of a husband upon a libel against him for a divorce
is security for all sums which the wife may recover, whether for alimony or
other allowance pending the suit or upon the final decree, or for costs and
expenses. Burrows v. Purple, 428.
2. Upon a final decree granting a divorce against a husband, the court may
award a gross sum to the wife in full of arrears of alimony and her costs
and expenses pending the suit, and of future alimony and all expenses of
maintaining children of whom she is given the custody. Ib.
8. A final decree, granting a divorce against a husband, and ordering that he
pay a gross sum in full of allowances which the court makes to the wife, and
that execution issue therefor after the expiration of forty-eight hours, author-
izes the issue to her of execution in common form, upon his default to make
payment within the forty-eight hours, and its levy upon any of his real es
tate in the manner in which like executions issued in actions at law may be
levied; notwithstanding a further provision of the decree that the sum shall
be paid into the hands of the clerk of the court and kept by him until the
qualification of a trustee whom the decree appoints to receive and apply it
for her benefit. Ib.
A bill in equity, to wind up a partnership of the parties under written articles,
was referred to a master to state an account. His report, by including cer-
tain transactions, showed a balance due to the plaintiff; and also showed
that, if they were erroneously included, a balance was due to the defendant.
The defendant alleged exceptions on the ground that the transactions were
not within the scope of the written articles of partnership. At the close of
39
the argument of the exceptions before the full court, between three and four
years after the commencement of the suit, the plaintiff gave notice that he
should move to amend his bill by adding allegations which would apply to
the transactions, if the exceptions were sustained. The decision sustained
the exceptions; and the plaintiff filed the motion. Held, that as, upon the
facts, it was unreasonable to doubt that the plaintiff, when he filed the bill,
intended that it should apply to the transactions in dispute, and the question
whether it did so was one upon which counsel might honestly differ, the
amendment should be allowed, although its effect was to introduce a substan-
tially new cause of action; but upon terms that he should pay the defend-
ant's costs to the time of the amendment, and take no costs himself to that
time if he should finally prevail; and that, as the defendant alleged that he
was taken by surprise, and compelled to meet the issue of those transactions
without due preparation, at the hearing before the master, the case should
be reopened for a new hearing thereon, at the defendant's election. Drew
v. Beard, 64.
See DIVORCE, 2; EQUITY, 5; TRUST, 2.
One on whose close hens are trespassing has no right to kill them, although,
in consequence of former like trespasses, he has asked their owner to shut
them up and threatened to kill them if he should not do so. Clark v. Keli-
her, 406.
Bee COMPLAINT; DOG; EVIDENCE, 19; FERRYMAN; LOST PROPERTY ;
MASTER AND SERVANT; RAILROAD, 5; WAY, 3, 4, 9, 10.
ANSWER.
See PLEADING, III.
poor to bind J. S. as an ap-
1. A parent with whose consent relief is furnished by a town to some of his
minor children, by reason of his having a lawful settlement in the town and
not being able to support them, is actually chargeable to the town so as to
enable the overseers of the poor to bind his minor children as apprentices
or servants, under the Gen. Sts. c. 111, § 4. Bardwell v. Purrington, 419.
2. An instrument executed by overseers of the
prentice under the Gen. Sts. c. 111, § 4, which purports to bind him from its
date until a day named, "when the said J. S. will arrive at the age of twenty-
one years, during which time the said J. S. shall faithfully serve," is not
wholly void because under the rule of law excluding fractions of a day in
computation of time J. S. will become of full age on the day next preceding
that so named, but binds him during his minority. ïo.
See EVIDENCE, 11; PAYMENT.
|