Consequently, the High Contracting Parties agree not in any way to interfere with the free use of the Canal, in time of war as in time of peace.

"The Canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of blockade."

By Article IV, the canal is not to become the base of hostile action. The marine league is to be respected in the action of foreign vessels. The twenty-four hour period is to elapse between the sailing of hostile vessels.

By Article VII, the powers may keep two war vessels in the "ports of access of Port Said and Suez," though "this right shall not be exercised by belligerents."

By Article X, the territorial jurisdiction for general administrative purposes is affirmed, and likewise for sanitary measures in Article XV.1

This Suez Canal of such great international importance was by this convention within the jurisdiction of Egypt, but the powers have assumed to provide that this jurisdiction shall not be exercised in such a way as to prevent innocent passage. The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, setting aside the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, leaves to the United States large jurisdiction over such canal as it may determine to construct across the Central American Isthmus, and it is also provided that the canal shall be neutralized substantially as in the manner set forth in the Convention in regard to the Suez Canal.2

The Panama
Canal.

The canal at Corinth, shortening somewhat the route to the Black Sea and Asia Minor, was opened in 1893. This canal does not, like the Suez, greatly change the current of the world's intercourse, and is entirely within the jurisdiction of Greece.

Corinth and
Kiel Canals.

1 Parl. Papers, 1889, Commercial, No. 2; Holland, " Studies in International Law," p. 270.

2 For documents, see Diplomatic History of the Panama Canal, Sen. Doc. No. 474, 63d Cong. 2d Session.

Similarly the canal at Kiel, opened in 1896, was wholly within the jurisdiction of Germany, but by the Treaty of Versailles, 1919, it was to be open on terms of equality to all vessels.1

Statement and origin of the principle.

54. The Three-mile Limit

(a) One of the most generally recognized rules of international law is that the jurisdiction of a state extends upon the open sea to a distance of three miles from the low-water mark.2 In the words of the Act of Parliament passed in consequence of the case of the Franconia,3 1878 (41 and 42 Victoria, c. 73), "The territorial waters of Her Majesty's dominions, in reference to the sea, means such part of the sea adjacent to the coast of the United Kingdom, or the coast of some other part of Her Majesty's dominions, as is deemed by international law to be within the territorial sovereignty of Her Majesty; and for the purpose of any offense declared by this Act to be within the jurisdiction of the Admiral, any part of the open sea within one marine league of the coast measured from low-water mark shall be deemed to be open sea within the territorial waters of Her Majesty's dominions." The three-mile limit became more and more generally recognized after the publication of Bynkershoek's "De Dominio Maris," 1702, in which he enunciates the principle that the territorial jurisdiction ends where the effective force of arms ends, which being approximately three miles from shore at that time, has since been usually accepted. Italy by decree of August 6, 1914, claimed a six-mile limit, while Norway withdrew its ancient claim to a four-mile limit on June 18, 1918.

(b) For special purposes a wider limit of jurisdiction is maintained and sometimes accepted by courtesy, though it is doubtful whether any state would attempt to hold its position

1 Arts. 380-386.

2 Hershey, 215. See Regina v. Keyn, 2 L. R. (Exch. Div.), 63.

A wider limit sometimes claimed for special purposes.

against a protest from another state. The claims are based on the jurisdiction over fisheries, the enforcement of revenue laws, the maintenance of neutrality, etc.1 Such claims as the former English claims to the "King's Chambers," announced in 1604 to be bounded by a "straight line drawn from one point to another about the realm of England," as from the Lizard to Land's End, would not now receive serious support; and since the rejection of the claims of the United States by the Bering Sea Tribunal, it can be safely stated that the expansion of territorial jurisdiction upon the open sea will only come through the consensus of states. The desirability of some new regulations upon marine jurisdiction was well shown in the discussions of the Institute of International Law at its meeting in Paris in 1894 and later.2

Within the three-mile limit the jurisdiction extends to commercial regulations, rules for pilotage and anchorage, sanitary and quarantine regulations, landing of cables, control of fisheries, revenue, general police, and in time of war to the enforcement of neutrality.

55. Jurisdiction over Fisheries

The existence of fisheries has given rise to some special claims to extension of maritime jurisdiction.

Fishing on the

(a) As a general rule, the right of fishing on the high sea belongs to all states alike, but each must respect the rights of others. In order that these rights might be high sea a right defined, it has in many cases been necesssary to resort to conventions. One of the excellent examples of this may be seen in the convention in regard to the North Sea Fisheries, May 6, 1882, to which

belonging to

all states alike

1 As between the United States and Mexico, their jurisdiction on the boundary line in the Gulf of Mexico extends three leagues.

Annuaire XIII, 329; ibid., XXVI, 403.

Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Holland were parties. The cruisers of any of these states might present the case of the fishing vessel violating the regulations of the convention in the country to which the fishing vessel belonged, the trial and penalty belonging to the courts of that country.

(b) Special privileges granted by one state to another, or secured by custom, may be servitudes in the sense of limiting Special privithe right to exercise jurisdiction while not "deroleges in fishing. gating from sovereignty," and must depend, as in the case of the Canadian fisheries, upon the interpretation of the treaties by which they were granted.

By the treaty of 1783, the United States has the right of fishing on certain parts of the coast of the British Dominion in North America. Great Britain claimed that these rights were annulled by the Treaty of Ghent, 1814, which put an end to the War of 1812, as that treaty was silent upon the subject. The United States declared, "they were not annulled by the war as they were enjoyed by the colonists before the separation from England in 1783, and so existed perpetually independent of treaty." This claim was adjusted in the Treaty of 1818, by which inhabitants of the United States have liberty to fish on parts of the coast of Newfoundland and Labrador, to dry and cure fish in certain inlets, and to enter other inlets for shelter, repairs, and supplies. Disputes arising under this treaty were settled by the Treaty of 1854, which gave to Canadian fishermen certain rights of fishing along the eastern coast of the United States north of the thirtysixth parallel of latitude.

Case of the Canadian fisheries.

The United States took action to terminate this treaty in accord with its terms in 1866. The conditions of the Treaty of 1818 revived.

The Treaty of Washington, 1871, practically reëstablishes the provisions of the Treaty of 1854, specifying that the difference

in value between the rights granted by each state to the other should be determined by a commission. This commission awarded $5,500,000 to Great Britain in 1877. In accord with the provisions of the Treaty of 1871, it was terminated by the United States in 1886, the provisions of the Treaty of 1818 again. coming in force. A law of March 3, 1897,2 provided that the President may in certain contingencies deny vessels of the British Dominions of North America entry into the waters of the United States, and may also prohibit the importation of fish and other goods.3

These fisheries continued to be the subject of international negotiations, and modi vivendi were from time to time agreed upon between the United States and Great Britain, till at length under the provisions of the Arbitration Treaty of April 4, 1908, between the two states, the dispute was referred to the Hague tribunal, and an award was made September 7, 1910, by which the respective rights were more clearly defined through action upon seven specific questions.

(c) Another question which had given rise to much discussion was that of the seal-fishing in Bering Sea.

The disputed question of seal-fishing in Bering Sea.

In 1821 Russia claimed that the Pacific north of latitude 51° was mare clausum. The United States and Great Britain denied this claim. By conventions, 1824 and 1825, Russia conceded to these nations rights of navigation, fishing, etc. After the United States in 1867 acquired Russian America, seal-fishing assumed importance. As the Canadian fishermen were not restrained by the laws binding the United States fishermen, it was feared that the seal would become extinct. In 1886, three Canadian schooners were by decree of the district court at Sitka confiscated for the violation of the laws of the United States in regard to seal-fishing, the judge charging the jury

1 See Cushing's "Treaty of Washington." 1 Moore, 767-874.

2 24 U. S. Sts. at Large, 475. 4 Wilson, "Hague Arbitration Cases," 134.