Texas is more than one-half totally dry. If we add the 112 dry justice precincts to the 142 totally dry counties, Texas is actually more than 60 percent dry.

Dry areas are flooded with liquor and beer advertising through interstate commerce, as well as intrastate. Residents of dry counties are urged to break the law and go against the wishes of the majority of the people through these liquor advertisements.

State legislators constantly evade and ignore the demands of those seeking to protect dry areas from liquor advertising, their excuse or reason being, "We cannot regulate television, radio, and other advertising from without the State and, therefore, if we regulate it within the State, we would be discriminating against State industries."

The Federal Government should act in this situation and act promptly for the protection of the growing dry areas of the Nation.

Mr. HALE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make this observation: If the gentleman can show us any similar portrayal-which is very shocking to me-in any magazine or newspaper, I wish you would bring it to our attention. I would like to say that any magazine or newspaper publisher who permitted himself to publish a picture of that character would be condemned by public opinion everywhere. Mr. BоHMFALK. Two of these have crossed State lines from Louisiana into Texas.

Chairman PRIEST. Your statements have been placed in the record. Is Dr. Carl Sjulin present?

Bishop HAMMAKER. He is not here.

Chairman PRIEST. Is Mrs. Harvey Wiley here?

Mrs. SMART. Mrs. Wiley had to go this morning, but we will file a statement for her.

Chairman PRIEST. The next witness, then, will be Dr. Roy S. Holloman.

STATEMENT OF ROY S. HOLLOMON, SUPERINTENDENT, THE KANSAS UNITED DRY FORCES

Mr. HOLLOMON. Mr. Chairman, like the others, I will simply file a statement. I would like to read three brief paragraphs of it.

I am sorry Congressman Klein is not here because this would seem to answer the question he raised in the committee of how could you have a legal business and yet deny them the right to advertise.

We hold that the liquor traffic is not a legitimate business, and is only tolerated because the courts of America have held so.

First, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the famous Crowley v. Christianson case, the Court said:

There is no inherent right in a citizen to thus sell intoxicating liquors by retail; it is not a privilege of a citizen of the State or of a citizen of the United States. As it is a business attended with danger to the community, it may, as already said, be entirely prohibited, or be permitted under such conditions as will limit to the utmost its evils. The manner and extent of regulation rest in the discretion of the governing authority.

While I am not an attorney, the way I understand it, though these are old decisions, they have not been upset by any later decision by the Supreme Court.

And then over on page 3, I wish to read the following:

In the light of these things, gentlemen of the committee, it seems to us that it is the duty of the Congress of the United States to pass legislation that will at least keep the liquor traffic from trying to increase its devastating effects. This proposed legislation would not deny liquor to those who now have access to it, but it would keep the liquor traffic from enticing others, especially the youth of America, to become drinkers and drunkards.

If the Supreme Court of this United States has held repeatedly that no citizen of the United States has an inherent right to engage in the liquor business, certainly it then follows that they have no inherent right to advertise a business that is only tolerated.

Chairman PRIEST. Thank you very much for your statement.
Are there any questions?

Mr. HALE. The expression "to advertise a business that is only tolerated"; is that quite a fair characterization?

In States and counties where the sale of liquor is legal, it is as legal as any other business, is it not?

Mr. HOLLOMON. If I might answer the gentleman, I happen to be a poor Baptist preacher. I am not a lawyer, and I put into the record of the Senate hearing that only the Lord knows how a lawyer's mind works. But according to all the decisions of the Supreme Court, that statement is a fair statement, that it is a business that is only tolerated. It may be legal, but there is no inherent right that evolves in it. Mr. HALE. There are a lot of businesses which have to be licensed in one form or another, but once they are legal, they are legal for all purposes.

I think the gentleman is not altogether accurate in that respect. You are opposed, I take it, to the sale of liquor, are you not? Mr. HOLLOMON. That is right.

Mr. HALE. Of course, anybody opposed to the sale of liquor would necessarily be opposed to the advertising of the sale of liquor. But the problem which is presented to us is just the advertising problem, divorced from the question of the sale.

Mr. HOLLOMON. And this whole paper, sir, attempts to address itself to that point.

As I said in here, this bill, if passed, would not deny liquor to anybody who now has access to it. It does not enter into that fact. But it seems to me, just as a matter of cold, cold logic, that if the United States Supreme Court has held that this is a business which is only tolerated, only when it is legalized

Mr. HALE. I do not believe the gentleman is quite fair. That is not the way I read the opinion of the Court. The Court says, in the language quoted, that it is a business "attended with a danger to the community," that it may be prohibited entirely or it may be permitted under certain specified conditions, as in package stores and what not. But when it is conducted within the four corners of the law of the jurisdiction where the sale is made, then it is a legal business just like any other business.

Mr. HOLLOMON. Well, of course, I suppose we could go on-
Mr. HALE. It is an equally legal business.

Mr. HOLLOMON. Well, I am not sure I would grant you even that statement, that it is an equally legal business.

Mr. HALE. It may not be an equally moral or ethical business in your judgment or that of some other people, but I think it is either legal or illegal, and if it is legal, it is legal in every respect.

Mr. HOLLOMON. If the Congressman is satisfied to leave it there, I am satisfied to leave it there. If he wants any more on it, all right. Chairman PRIEST. Are there any further questions?

If not, thank you. Your statement will be made a part of the record at this point.

(The statement referred to is as follows:)

STATEMENT OF ROY S. HOLLOMON OF TOPEKA, KANS.

My name is Roy S. Hollomon. My address is Topeka, Kans. I am an ordained Baptist minister and superintendent of the Kansas united dry forces. This organization is the agency of the Evangelical Churches of Kansas to deal with the liquor question. I am appearing in support of the Siler bill (H. R. 4627).

We hold that such a bill is called for and ought to be passed because of the nature of the liquor traffic. We hold that the liquor traffic is not a legitimate

business, but is a traffic that is only tolerated in parts of these United States, and totally prohibited in others.

We hold that the liquor traffic is not a legitimate business, and is only tolerated because the courts of America have held so:

First, the Supreme Court of the United States in the famous Crowley v. Christianson case, the Court said: "There is no inherent right in a citizen to thus sell intoxicating liquors by retail; it is not a privilege of a citizen of the State or of a citizen of the United States. As it is a business attended with danger to the community, it may, as already said, be entirely prohibited, or be permitted under such conditions as will limit to the utmost its evils. The manner and extent of regulation rest in the discretion of the governing authority.

Second, in Samuels v. McCurdy (267 U. S. 188, 69 L. Ed. 572), the Court said, "The ultimate legislative object of prohibition is to prevent drinking of intoxicating liquor by anyone because of the demoralizing effect of drunkenness upon society. The State has the power to subject those members of society who might indulge in the use of such liquor without injury to themselves to a deprivation of access to liquor in order to remove temptation from those whom its use would demoralize, and to avoid the abuses which follow in its train. Accordingly, laws have been enacted by the States, and sustained by this Court, by which it has been made illegal to manufacture liquor for one's own use or for another's; to transport it, or to sell it, or to give it away to others. The legislature has this power, whether it affects liquor acquired before the prohibition or not. Without compensation it may thus seek to reduce the drinking of liquor. It is obvious that if men are permitted to maintain liquor in their possession, though only for their own consumption, there is danger of its becoming accessible to others. Legislation making possession unlawful is therefore within the police power of the States as a reasonable mode of reducing the evils of drunkenness as we have seen in the Crane and Barbour cases.

Third, also upon the same point see Mugler versus Kansas (123 U. S. 623, 31 L. Ed. 205, 210); "For we cannot shut out of view the fact that, within the knowledge of all, that the public health, the public morals, and the general safety, may be endangered by the general use of intoxicating drinks; nor the fact, established by statistics accessible to everyone, that the idleness, disorder, pauperism, and crime existing in the country are, in some degree at least, traceable to this evil. If, therefore, a State deems the absolute prohibition of the manufacture and sale, within her limits, of intoxicating liquors for other than medical, scientific and manufacturing purposes, to be necessary to the peace and security of society, the courts cannot, without usurping legislative functions, override the will of the people as thus expressed by their chosen representatives." Fourth, the same principle is set forth by the supreme courts of many States. We cite the following:

The Supreme Court of Indiana: "No one possesses an inalienable or constitutional right to keep a saloon for the sale of intoxicating liquor; to keep a saloon for the sale of intoxicating liquor is not a natural right to pursue an ordinary calling."

The Supreme Court of South Carolina: "The licensed saloonkeeper does not sell liquor by reason of an inalienable right, inherent in citizenship, but because the Government has delegated to him the exercise of such rights."

The Supreme Court of Nebraska: "So we say that the prohibition of the traffic is absolute, except upon certain specified conditions, and one of these conditions is the provision for its legalization by the procurement of a license."

The Supreme Court of Ohio in two different saloon license cases declared, "A license is a permission, granted by some competent authority, to do an act, which, without such permission, would be illegal."

Following are the reasons the courts give in support of these decisions, "The liquor business endangers the public morals, the public safety, it's a Pandora's Box, sending forth innumerable ills and woes, shame and disgrace. It's a prolific source of disease, pauperism, vice, and crime."

Said the Supreme Court of Iowa, "It is responsible for more want, pauperism, suffering, crime, and public expense than any other cause."

The Supreme Court of Kansas. "It weakens, corrupts, debauches, as well as slays human character and human life."

We hold that the expressed opinions of many great men on the subject contend that the liquor traffic is not a legitimate business. Abraham Lincoln, whose birthday we have just celebrated said:

"This legalized liquor traffic as carried on in the saloons and grogshops, is the tragedy of civilization. Good citizenship demands and requires that what is