purposes of the trust, and if the time within which the warrants might be located was extended by Congress, it had the right to annex conditions to the extension.

Congress, in the exercise of these powers which, in the case just cited, it was subsequently decided it possessed, on March 23, 1804, passed an Act entitled "An Act to Ascertain the Boundary of the Lands Reserved by the State of Virginia, Northwest of the River Ohio, for the Satisfaction of her Officers and Soldiers on Continental Establishment, and to Limit the Period for Locating the Said Lands." 2 Stat. at L., 274. Section 1 of this Act defined the boundary of the Virginia Military District in Ohio. Section 2 provided:

that the period limited for returning the survey has been, from time to time, so prolonged that the entry and survey of Gordon are now valid and subsisting and vest in the plaintiff, as the sole heir of Gordon, an equitable estate in the lands covered by the survey.

This legislation will now be noticed. The Act which first followed the Law of 1804 was that approved March 2, 1807, 2 Stat. at L., 424. It allowed the officers and soldiers who were entitled to bounty lands in the Virginia Military District, a further time of three years from March 23, 1807, to complete their locations, and five years from the same date to return their surveys and warrants to the office of the Secre tary of War. The Act also contained the fol"That the officers and soldiers or their legal lowing proviso: "That no location, as aforesaid, representatives, who are entitled to bounty within the above mentioned tract shall, after the lands within the above mentioned reserved ter- passage of this Act, be made on tracts of land ritory, shall complete their locations within for which patents had previously been issued three years after the passing of this Act; and or which had been previously surveyed; and every such officer and soldier or his legal rep- any patent which may, nevertheless, be obresentatives, whose bounty land has or shall have tained for land located contrary to the provisbeen located within that part of the said terri-ions of this section, shall be considered as null tory to which the Indian title has been extin- and void." guished shall make return of his or their surveys The period of limitation prescribed by the Act to the Secretary of the Department of War with- of March 23, 1804, for making locations and rein five years after the passing of this Act, and turning surveys was subsequently from time to shall also exhibit and file, with the said Secre- time extended by successive Acts of Congress. tary and within the same time, the original war-Act of November 3, 1814, 3 Stat at L., 143; Act of rant or warrants under which he claims, or a certified copy thereof, under the seal of the office where the said warrants are legally kept, which warrant or certified copy thereof shall be sufficient evidence that the grantee therein named, or the person under whom such grantee claims, was originally entitled to such bounty land; and every person entitled to said lands, and thus applying, shall thereupon be entitled to receive a patent in the manner prescribed by law."

The 3d and last section provided: "That such part of the above mentioned reserved territory as shall not have been located, and those tracts of land within that part of said territory to which the Indian title has been extinguished, the surveys whereof shall not have been returned to the Secretary of War within the time and times prescribed by this Act, shall thenceforth be released from any claim or claims for such bounty lands."

The plain meaning of the Act is, that a failure within five years after its passage to make return to the Secretary of War of the survey of any tract of land located within said territory, made previous to the expiration of said five years, should discharge the land from any claim founded on such location and survey, and extinguish all right, title and estate previously acquired thereby; and that all lands within said district not located within the same period, should be released and discharged from the right of any person to locate a military warrant thereon. The survey of the entry of Archibald Gordon has, to this day, never been returned to the Secretary of War or, as provided by subsequent Acts, to the General Land-Office of the United States. His right to the lands covered by his entry and survey was therefore cut off by the Act of March 23, 1804, unless it has been saved by subsequent legislation of Congress. Counsel for plaintiff not denying that such was the effect of the Act of March 23, 1804, insists

February 22, 1815, 3 Stat. at L., 212; Act of April 11, 1818, 3 Stat. at L., 423; Act of February 9, 1821, 3 Stat. at L., 612; Act of March 1, 1823, 3 Stat. at L., 772; Act of May 20, 1826, 4 Stat. at L., 189. These Acts, except that of February 22, 1815, 3 Stat. at L., 212, all contained and repeated the proviso above recited of the Act of March 2, 1807.

Congress having established by the Act of April 25, 1812, 2 Stat. at L., 716, a General Land-Office, the Act of November 3, 1814, provided for the return of the surveys and warrants to that office instead of to the Secretary of War, and in this respect was followed by the subsequent statutes, except the Act of February 22, 1815, which contained no direction in respect to the return of surveys and warrants.

The Act of May 20, 1826, extended the time for making locations to June 1, 1829, for making surveys to June 1, 1832, and for returning surveys to June 1, 1833. After the expiration of the term limited by this Act, an interval of five years occurred, during which no authority existed for making locations, surveys or returns of surveys.

The Act of July 7, 1838, 5 Stat. at L., 262, extended the time for making locations and surveys, and the return of surveys to the General Land-Office, to August 10, 1840, and provided as follows: "That all entries and surveys which may have heretofore been made within the said reservation in satisfaction of any such warrants on lands not previously entered or surveyed or on lands not prohibited from entry and survey, shall be held to be good and valid; any omission heretofore to extend the time for making of such entries and surveys to the contrary notwithstanding." It also contained the proviso of the Act of March 2, 1807, above recited.

By an Act approved August 19, 1841, 5 Stat. at L., 449, the Act of July 7, 1838 was revived and continued in force until January 1, 1844,

1884.

FUSSELL V. GREGG.

and by an Act approved July 29, 1846, 9 Stat. | at L., 41, the Act of August 19, 1841, was revived and continued in force until the first day of January, 1848. On July 5, 1848, 9 Stat. at L., 244, a like Act was passed, by which the Act of August 19, 1841, was revived and continued in force until January 1, 1850. And by an Act passed February 20, 1850, 9 Stat. at L., 421, the same Act of July 5, 1848, was revived and continued in force until January 1, 1852.

The effect of the series of Acts, beginning with the Act approved August 19, 1841, and ending with the Act of February 20, 1850, was to continue in force the Act of July 7, 1838, till January 1, 1852. The whole series, beginning with the Act of March 23, 1804, and ending with the Act of July 7, 1838, as revived and continued in force by the later Acts just referred to, relates to the same subject and is to U. 8. v. Freeman, 3 be construed together. How., 556; Rex v. Loxdale, 1 Burr., 447. It appears, even from a cursory reading, that section 3 of the Act of March 23, 1804, was not repealed or modified, either directly or indirectly, by any of the subsequent Acts above mentioned. There was no direct repeal of the section. Neither was there any repeal by implication. McCool v. Smith, 1 Black, 459 [68 U. S., XVII., 218]; U. S. v. Tynen, 11 Wall., 88 [78 U. S., XX., 153]; Henderson's Tobacco, Id., 652 [78 U. S., XX., 235]; Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall., 590 [87 U. S., XXII., 429]; Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U. S., 596 [XXVII., 251]. It was allowed to remain unaltered on the statute book; the effect of the subsequent legislation being only to suspend its operation until the first day of January, 1852. The interpretation must, therefore, be the same as if the 3d section of the Act of March 23, 1804, had been repeated in every subsequent statute of the series. As neither Archibald Gordon nor any of his heirs or representatives ever made a return of the survey of the land in dispute, either to the Secretary of War or the Commissioner of the General Land-Office, either before or after the first day of January, 1852, the 3d section of the Act of March 23, 1804, cuts up by the roots all the right and title derived from the location and survey of Archibald Gordon.

Under the Acts of Congress, Gordon, by his entry and survey, acquired title depending on his performance of certain prescribed conditions. His failure to perform the conditions stripped him of all interest or estate in the lands covered by his entry and survey.

That such is the effect of the 3d section of the Act of March 23, 1804, is made manifest by the proviso above quoted of the Act of July 7, 1838, which declared all entries and surveys theretofore made to be good and valid, notwithstanding any omission by Congress to extend the time for making such entries and surveys. This is equivalent to a declaration by Congress that section 3 of the Act of 1804 was still in force, and legislation was necessary to relieve from its operation entries and surveys not made within the time limited by that or the subsequent enactments.

Since the Act of February 20, 1850, Congress has passed two Acts, on both of which the plaintiff relies as making good his title. The first of these is the Act of March 3, 1855, 10 Stat. at L., 701, entitled "An Act Allowing the

Further Time of Two Years to Those Holding Land by Entries in the Virginia Military District in Ohio Which Were Made Prior to the First of January, 1852, to Have the Same Surveyed and Patented." This Act provided "that the officers and soldiers of the Virginia line of Continental establishment, their heirs or assigns, entitled to bounty lands which have prior to the first day of January, 1852, been entered within the tract reserved by Virginia between the Little Miami and Scioto Rivers for satisfying the legal bounties to her officers and soldiers upon Continental establishment, should be allowed the further time of two years from and after the passage of this Act to make and return their surveys and warrants, or certified copies of warrants, to the General Land-Office.'

This Act is by its terms confined to lands entered and not surveyed prior to January 1, 1852. The policy of the Act is clear. The Acts passed prior to the Act of July 7, 1838, fixed one period for locating entries and a longer time for making and returning surveys, plainly because the surveys could not be made until the entries were made. But the Act of July 7, 1838, as revived and continued in force by subsequent statutes fixed the first day of January, 1852, as the limit allowed both for making entries and making and returning surveys. It, therefore, doubtless happened that laggard war rant holders procrastinated the making of their entries until it was too late to make and return their surveys before the first of January, 1852. Therefore the Act of March 3, 1855, was passed allowing the holders of warrants, who had made their entries before January 1, 1852, two Those who years' further time after the passage of the Act to make and return their surveys. before January 1, 1852, had made both their entries and surveys were not within the words or spirit of the Act.

The next Act on which the plaintiff relies is the Act of May 27, 1880, 21 Stat. at L., 142. This Act is entitled "An Act to Construe and Define 'An Act to Cede to the State of Ohio the Unsold Lands in the Virginia Military District in Said State,' Approved February 18, 1871, and for Other Purposes." The Act which was to be construed and defined provided "that lands remaining unsurveyed and unsold in the Virginia Military District in the State of Ohio be and the same are hereby ceded to the State of Ohio," and saved to any bona fide settler not exceeding 160 acres by him occupied by his preempting the same in such manner as the State of Ohio might direct. 16 Stat. at L., 416.

The plaintiff relies on the first three sections of the Act of May 27, 1880. The 1st section declares that the true intent and meaning of the Act of February 18, 1871, just mentioned, was to cede to the State of Ohio only such lands as were unappropriated and not included in any entry or survey within said district founded on military warrants upon Continental establishment.

The 2d section is as follows: "That all legal surveys returned to the land-office on or before March 3, 1857, on entries made on or before January 1, 1852, and founded on unsatisfied Virginia Military Continental warrants, are hereby declared valid."

The 3d section provided that the officers and 997 soldiers of the Virginia line on Continental es

1884.

THORNLEY V. UNITED STATES.

from what was said in that case, that this suit is not | ity for further service at sea, but that for some
within the jurisdiction of a court of equity, and
that the plaintiff has no right whatever to the lands

to which she seeks to establish title.

and performed active duty; that by section 3 of years after said retirement he was assigned to the Act of Congress approved July 15, 1870, Argued Jan. 8, 9, 1885. Decided Feb. 2, 1885. the sea pay of an officer on the active list of the

[No. 148.]

navy of the grade or rank held by the appel

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United lant at the time of his retirement was fixed: for

States for the Northern District of Ohio. In connection with this case see the precedGregg. ing and related case of Fussell v. Messrs. Jeremiah Hall and P. C. Smith, for appellant.

Messrs. Wm. Lawrence and West, Walker & West, for appellees.

The bill in this case was also filed November 20, 1879. It was based on the same alleged title as that in case No. 147, and was brought for a part of the lands covered by the same entry and survey, and prayed for the same relief. It follows, The same defenses were pleaded. from what has been said in case No. 147, that this suit is not within the jurisdiction of a court of equity, and that the plaintiff has no right whatever to the lands to which she seeks to establish title, and of which she prays to be put in possession. The decree of the Circuit Court by which the bill was dismissed was, therefore, right.

Decree affirmed. True copy. Test:

the first five years from date of commission, at
$2,800 per annum; for the second five years
from the date of commission, at $3,200 per an-
num; for the third five years from the date of
commission, at $3,500 per annum; for the
fourth five years from the date of commission
at $3,700 per annum; and after twenty years
from the date of commission, at $4,200 per an-
num.

The petition further alleged that section 1 of the Act of Congress, approved March 3, 1873, 17 Stat. at L., 547, fixed the pay of officers of the navy, who were then or might thereafter be retired on account of incapacity, resulting from sickness or exposure in the line of duty, at seventy-five per cent of the sea pay of the grade or rank which they held at the time of their retirement; that the Act of Congress approved April 7, 1882, 22 Stat. at L., 41, entitled "An Act for the Relief of Medical Director John Thornley, United States Navy," the appellant, directed that he be considered as having been retired from active service as a surgeon and

James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. placed on the retired list of officers of the navy,

JOHN THORNLEY, Appt.,

v.

UNITED STATES.

(See S. C., Reporter's ed., 310-315.)

June 1, 1861, on account of physical incapacity originating in the line of duty, and that he be paid accordingly.

The petition also referred to section 1 of the Act, approved August 5, 1882, which provided that all officers of the navy should "Be credited with the actual time they may have served as officers or enlisted men in the regular or volunteer army or navy, or both, and receive all

Longevity pay to naval officers-construction of the benefits of such actual service, in all re

statute.

1. Longevity pay is only given to officers on the active list of the navy, and not to retired officers. 2. Where the meaning of a statute is plain, it is the duty of the courts to enforce it according to its obvious terms. In such a case there is no necessity for construction.

spects, in the same manner as if said service had been continuous in the regular navy.'

The petition further alleged that the appellant, under a proper construction of said Acts, should have received pay since March 3, 1873, at the following rates, to wit: from March 3, 1873, to September 1, 1875, $2,775 per annum, or seventy-five per centum of the sea pay of a Decided Feb. 2, 1885. surgeon on his fourth lustrum from the date of

[No. 1215.] Argued Jan. 13, 1885.

APPEAL from the Court of Claims.

The history and facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court.

his commission; and, from September 1, 1875, to the time of filing his petition, $3,150 per annum, or seventy-five per centum of the sea pay of a surgeon after twenty years from the date of his commission; that such pay had been wrongfully withheld from him, and he had ap-only been paid since March 3, 1873, at the rate The petitioner, thereof $2,400 per annum. fore, demanded judgment for $6,343.67.

Messrs. Robert B. Lines and John Paul Jones, for appellant.

Mr S. F. Phillips, Solicitor-Gen., for pellee.

Mr. Justice Woods delivered the opinion of the court:

The appellant brought this suit against the United States to recover a balance due him, as he contended, on his pay as an officer of the navy. His petition alleged that, on September 1, 1855, he was commissioned a surgeon in the navy; that on June 1, 1861, while he still held the grade or rank of surgeon, he was, by order of the Secretary of the Navy, issued by direction of the President, placed on the retired list, in accordance with the provisions of section 3 of the Act of Congress approved February 21, 1861, 12 Stat. at L., 150, by reason of incapac

The findings of fact made by the Court of Claims, January 29, 1883, were as follows: "On the 3d of September, 1855, the petitioner was commissioned a surgeon in the navy. On the first of June, 1861, on account of physical incapacity to perform further service at sea, he was placed on the retired list as a surgeon, under the 3d section of the Act of February 21, 1861, 12 Stat. at L., 147, 150. From March 3, 1873, to November 16, 1882, he was paid at the rate of $2,400 per annum, but the accounting officers of the Treasury have refused to allow him any more than that amount."

From these facts the court deduced the con999

clusion of law, that the petitioner was not entitled to recover, and dismissed his petition. From this judgment the petitioner appealed.

It is not seriously contended that section 1 of the Act of August 5, 1882, referred to in this petition, has any application to the case. The controversy arises upon the 3d section of the Act of July 15, 1870, 16 Stat. at L., 321, entitled "An Act Making Appropriations for the Naval Service for the Year Ending June 30, 1871, and for Other Purposes," and the second clause of the 1st section of the Act of March 3, 1873, entitled "An Act Making Appropriations for the Naval Service for the Year Ending June 30, 1874, and for Other Purposes," 17 Stat. at L., 547. These sections have been reproduced in the Revised Statutes, and read as follows, respectively.

*

*

Where the meaning of a statute is plain, it is the duty of the courts to enforce it according to its obvious terms. In such a case there is no necessity for construction. Benton v. Wickwire, 54 N. Y., 226; Woodbury v. Berry, 18 Ohio St., 456; Bosley v. Mattingly, 14 B. Mon., 89; Ezekiel v. Dixon, 3 Ga., 146; Farrel Foundry v. Dart, 26 Conn., 376; Sussex Peerage Case, 11 Cl. & F., 85, 143; Bishop on the Written Laws, sec. 72. Applying this rule, we are of opinion that the case of the appellant finds no support in any Act of Congress.

The effect of the Act for the relief of the appellant referred to in his petition was simply to allow him the rate of pay of the grade in which he was retired, prescribed by section 1588 of the Revised Statutes, for officers retired on account of incapacity resulting from long and faithful service, from wounds or injuries received in the line of duty, or from sickness or exposure therein. It placed him on the same footing in respect of his pay, and no other, as section 1588 placed the retired officers therein mentioned.

"Sec. 1556. The commissioned officers and warrant officers on the active list of the Navy of the United States, and the petty officers, seamen, ordinary seamen, firemen, coal heavers and employés in the navy shall be entitled to receive annual pay at the rates hereinafter stated, after their respective designations: the admiral, $13,000; * surgeons, paymasters and chief engineers, who have the same rank with paymasters during the first five years after date of commission, when at sea, $2,800; on shore duty, $2,400; on leave or waiting orders, $2,000; during the second five years after such date, when at sea, $3,200; on shore duty, $2,800; on leave or waiting orders, $2,400; during the third five years after such date, when at sea, $3,500; on shore duty, $3,200; on leave or waiting orders, $2,600; during the fourth five years after such date, when at sea, $3,700; on shore duty, By no Act, therefore, since the foundation of $3,600; on leave or waiting orders, $2,800; aft- the Government, has Congress ever given loner twenty years from such date, when at sea, gevity pay to officers of the navy, except those $4,200; on shore duty, $4,000; on leave or wait-on duty at sea, or on the active list of the navy; ing orders, $3,000."

There have been but three Acts of Congress giving longevity pay to officers of the navy. The first was the Act of March 3, 1835, 4 Stat. at L., 755, by which longevity pay was given to surgeons only. At that time retired officers were unknown to the navy. The second was the Act of June 1, 1860, 12 Stat. at L.,23, which gave it to commanders, lieutenants, surgeons, engineers, pursers, boatswains, gunners, carpenters and sailmakers, when on duty at sea; and the third was the Act of July 15, 1870, which gave it generally to officers on the active list of the navy, including surgeons.

and the statute-book is now bare of any enactment which awards to any officer of the navy, not on the active list, any increase of pay for length of service.

"Sec. 1588. The pay of all officers of the navy who have been retired after forty-five years' service after reaching the age of sixteen years, or who have been or may be retired after The appellant seeks to find a reversal of this forty years' service, upon their own application persistent policy of Congress, in respect to the to the President, or on attaining the age of six-pay of naval officers, in the expression found ty-two years, or on account of incapacity re- in section 1588 of the Revised Statutes, to wit: sulting from long and faithful service, from that "The pay of all officers of the navy, who wounds or injuries received in the line of duty, have been retired * * * shall, when not or from sickness or exposure therein, shall, on active duty, be equal to seventy-five per when not on active duty, be equal to seventy- centum of the sea pay provided by this chapter five per centum of the sea pay provided by this for the grade or rank which they held respectchapter for the grade or rank which they held, ively at the time of their retirement." The conrespectively, at the time of their retirement. tention is that by these words Congress intendThe pay of all other officers on the retired listed to give, in this roundabout and indirect manshall, when not on active duty, be equal to one half the sea pay provided by this chapter for the grade or rank held by them, respectively, at the time of their retirement."

Section 1 of the Act of March 3, 1873, upon which section 1588 is based, also provided that no officer on the retired list of the navy should be employed on active duty except in time of war. This provision is now reproduced in section 1462, Revised Statutes.

Its

ner, longevity pay to the retired officers, which, when dealing directly with the subject, it had uniformly refused to give them. To our minds the section will bear no such construction. plain meaning is that the pay of a retired officer shall be three fourths of the sea pay to which he was entitled when he was retired. It is contended that, because Congress graduated the pay of officers on the active list, by the length of their time of service, officers not on the actThe contention of the appellant is that upon ive list are entitled to the same increase. But these enactments he is entitled to what is known the contrary is the true construction. By omitas longevity pay. The contention of the United ting retired officers from the class entitled to States is that longevity pay is only given to of- longevity pay, Congress expressed its purpose ficers on the active list of the navy and not to not to allow them longevity pay. No other conretired officers, to which latter class the appel-struction can be put upon the law without imlant belongs. porting into it words which Congress has left