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to be of a mixed character, presenting at least as many federal ás national features.

The difference between a federal and national government, as it relates to the operation of the government, is, by the adversaries of the plan of the convention, supposed to consist in this, that in the former, the powers operate on the political bodies composing the confederacy, in their political capacities; in the latter, on the individual citizens composing the nation, in their individual capacities. On trying the constitution by this criterion, it falls under the national, not the federal character; though perhaps not so completely as has been understood. In several cases, and particularly in the trial of controversies to which states may be parties, they must be viewed and proceeded against in their collective and political capacities only. But the operation of the government on the people in their individual capacities, in its ordinary and most essential proceedings, will, on the whole, in the sense of its opponents, designate it in this relation, a national government.

But if the government be national, with regard to the operation of its powers, it changes its aspect again, when we contemplate it in relation to the extent of its powers. The idea of a national government involves in it, not only an authority over the individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are objects of lawful government. Among a people consolidated into one nation, this supremacy is completely vested in the national legislature. Among communities united for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the general, and partly in the municipal legislatures. In the former case, all local authorities are subordinate to the supreme; and may be controlled, directed, or abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter, the local or municipal authorities, form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority, than the general authority is subject to them within its own sphere. In this relation, then, the proposed government cannot be deemed a national one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several states, a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is true, that in controversies relating to boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general government. But this does not change the principle of the case.

"The decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules. of the constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword, and a dissolution of the compact; and that it ought to be established under the general, rather than under the local governments; or, to speak more properly, that it could be safely established under the first alone, is a position not likely to be combated.

If we try the constitution by its last relation to the authority by which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly national, nor wholly federal, Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the majority of the people of the union; and this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority of every national society, to alter or abolish its established government. Were it wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each state in the union, would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by the plan of the convention, is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and particularly, in computing the proportion by states, not by citizens, it departs from the national, and advances towards the federal character: In rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of states sufficient, it loses again the federal, and partakes of the national character.

The proposed constitution, therefore, even when tested by the rules laid down by its antagonists, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal constitution; but a composition of both, In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal, and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them again, it is federal not national; and finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal, nor wholly national.

PUBLIUS,

NUMBER XL.

BY MR. MADISON.

The same objection further examined.

THE second point to be examined is, whether the convention were authorized to frame, and propose this mixed constitution. The powers of the convention ought, in strictness, to be determined, by an inspection of the commissions given to the members by their respective constituents. As all of these, however, had reference, either to the recommendation from the meeting at Annapolis in September, 1786, or to that from congress in February, 1787, it will be sufficient to recur to these particular acts.

The act from Annapolis recommends, the "appointment of "commissioners to take into consideration the situation of the "United States, to devise such further provisions, as shall ap66 pear to them necessary to render the constitution of the fe"deral government, adequate to the exigences of the union; "and to report such an act for that purpose, to the United "States in congress assembled, as, when agreed to by them, "and afterwards confirmed by, the legislature of every state, "will effectually provide for the same."

The recommendatory act of congress is in the words following: "Whereas, there is provision in the articles of confedera ❝tion and perpetual union, for making alterations therein, by "the assent of a congress of the United States, and of the le"gislatures of the several states: And whereas experience "hath evinced, that there are defects in the present confedera❝tion; as a mean to remedy which, several of the states, and "particularly the state of New York, by express instructions "to their delegates in congress, have suggested a convention "for the purposes expressed in the following resolution; and"such convention appearing to be the most probable mean of "establishing in these states, a firm national government."

"Resolved, That in the opinion of congress, it is expedient, "that on the 2d Monday in May next, a convention of delegates, "who shall have been appointed by the several states, be held at

"Philadelphia, for the sole and express purpose of revising the "articles of confederation, and reporting to congress and the "several legislatures, such alterations and provisions therein, "as shall, when agreed to in congress, and confirmed by the "states, render the federal constitution adequate to the exigen"cies of government, and the preservation of the union."

From these two acts, it appears, 1st, that the object of the convention, was to establish, in these states, a firm national government; 2d, that this government was to be such as would be adequate to the exigencies of government, and the preservation of the union; 3d, that these purposes were to be effected by alterations and provisions in the articles of confederation, as it is expressed in the act of congress-or by such further provisions as should appear necessary, as it stands in the recommendatory act from Annapolis; 4th, that the alterations and provisions were to be reported to congress, and to the states, in order to be agreed to by the former, and confirmed by the latter.

From a comparison and fair construction of these several modes of expression, is to be deduced the authority under which the convention acted. They were to frame a national government, adequate to the exigencies of government and of the union; and to reduce the articles of confederation into such form, as to accomplish these purposes.

There are two rules of construction, dictated by plain reason, as well as founded on legal axioms. The one is, that every part of the expression ought, if possible, to be allowed some meaning, and be made to conspire to some common end, The other is, that where the several parts cannot be made to coincide, the less important should give way to the more important part; the means should be sacrificed to the end, rather than the end to the means,

Suppose, then, that the expressions defining the authority of the convention, were irreconcileably at variance with each other; that a natural and adequate government could not possibly, in the judgment of the convention, be affected by alterations and provisions in the articles of confederation; which part of the definition ought to have been embraced, and which rejected? Which was the more important, and which the less important part? Which the end, which the means? Let the most scrupulous expositors of delegated powers; let the most inveterate objectors against those exercised by the convention, answer these questions. Let them declare, whether it was of most impor. tance to the happiness of the people of America, that the articles

of confederation should be disregarded, and an adequate government be provided, and the union preserved; or that an adequate government should be omitted, and the articles of confederation preserved. Let them declare, whether the preservation of these articles was the end, for securing which a reform of the government was to be introduced as the means; or whether the establishment of a government, adequate to the national happiness, was the end at which these articles themselves originally aimed, and to which they ought, as insufficient means, to have been sacrificed.

But is it necessary to suppose, that these expressions are absolutely irreconcileable to each other; that no alterations or provisions in the articles of the confederation, could possibly mould them into a national and adequate government; into such a government as has been proposed by the convention?

No stress, it is presumed, will in this case, be laid on the title; a change of that could never be deemed an exercise of ungranted power. Alterations in the body of the instrument, are expressly authorized. New provisions therein, are also expressly authorized. Here then is a power to change the title; to insert new articles; to alter old ones. Must it of necessity be admitted, that this power is infringed, so long as a part of the old articles remain? Those who maintain the affirmative, ought at least to mark the boundary between authorized and usurped innovations; between that degree of change which lies within the compass of alterations and further provisions, and that which amounts to a transmutation of the government. Will it be said that the alterations ought not to have touched the substance of the confederation? The states would never have appointed a convention with so much solemnity, nor described its objects with so much latitude, if some substantial reform had not been in contemplation. Will it be said, that the fundamental principles of the confederation were not within the purview of the convention, and ought not to have been varied? I ask, what are these principles ? Do they require, that in the establishment of the constitution, the states should be regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns? They are so regarded by the constitution proposed. Do they require, that the members of the government should derive their appointment from the legislatures, not from the people of the states? One branch of the new government is to be appointed by these legislatures; and under the confederation, the delegates to congress may all be appointed immediately by the peo

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