CHAPTER XV

THE CABINET'S VIEWS ON THE WAR

McAdoo Strong for Action-Burleson: "We Are at War"Baker for Universal Service-Letter of President Alderman of the University of Virginia

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right to allow

N TUESDAY, February 6th, at Cabinet meeting, the situation of our American merchantmen occupied attention. Of course, they had a right to go to sea, but would they exercise it, or would they tie up in our ports? Would it be them to take risks if they wished to do so? Should we require ships to observe their mail contracts? It was suggested that the Postmaster General tell such ships to use their discretion. I said that, if this was done, they should be told that they might arm for defence and that the government should advise them of their rights-that it was necessary that they be told the policy of the government. Some said that the government ought not to give any advice. Others insisted that the situation was highly abnormal and that to the shipowners should not be left the responsibility of deciding the course of action. It was decided that they be told that their rights were just the same as if Germany had said nothing, and that they could arm for defence.

At the meeting on Friday, the 9th, it was clear that the shipping situation had not been cleared up. The ships were not sailing. They were showing every sign of in

terning. They wanted further assurances and protection. They wanted the United States to furnish arms and gun crews. They could not otherwise get satisfactory guns or efficient marksmen. It was suggested that we had power to sell, lend, or give guns to them and to furnish crews. The question of convoy was raised. Baker said that inoffensive merchantmen should not be exposed to danger. It would be better to send naval vessels along and have a clear test. It was customary to convoy and to guarantee the safety of goods. We had to adjourn without arriving at a final decision.

On Tuesday, the 13th, the shipping matter was again immediately taken up. McAdoo was strong for action. It would be folly to play into Germany's hands by permitting our ships to tie up in ports. It was urgent that they sail, and therefore that they be armed and provided with trained gun crews without delay, and, if wise, be convoyed. The question was raised as to the adequacy of arming or convoying or both. It was asserted that speed and manœuvring would be the best protection, but it was recognized that guns and crews were also desirable. The President said that Governor McCall of Massachusetts had called and had advised that the government go slow. The people would approve delay for careful consideration. They did not wish precipitate action.

McAdoo was insistent. The President said that he could not act as suggested, using a government instrumentality, without going to Congress. Action might precipitate war, and he did not wish to force the hand of Congress. It was its province to determine the matter of peace and war. McAdoo contended that the President had power to take the course indicated, that delay would be

dangerous, and that if trouble came from exercising our plain rights in the face of Germany's illegal and offensive dictation, the people would gladly face the consequences. I agreed that action was necessary, and that the first step was for the President to go to Congress and to go as soon as possible. Several supported this view, and the President assented.

On Friday, the 16th, the question was once more discussed. The situation was more embarrassing and critical but no determination was reached.

The following day, at the meeting of the Council of National Defence, I had a talk with Lane. We agreed that it was necessary that the President do something. I discussed the situation with Baker. I said that the time for action had come. We could no longer play into Germany's hands. "It is obvious that the freedom of our nation and of the world is at stake. We should side with the Allies promptly and wholly. They are not unselfish, but their brand of selfishness is much better than that of Germany. I would rather see this nation side with the Allies, go down to destruction with them if necessary, and disappear from the map as a nation, than to see it exist and prosper subject in the slightest degree to the dictation of an arrogant mediæval tyrant and his supporters." Baker assented.

On the 23d, we again brought up the matter of arming ships and the necessity of the President's going to Congress. McAdoo was emphatic in expressing his opinion that ships ought to be armed. The President ought to go ahead, Congress or no Congress. Action, prompt action, was demanded. It was no time for hesitation and slow courses. The President seemed to be somewhat nettled by Mc

Adoo's insistence and emphatic manner and language. He said that things were being suggested which he had no right or power to do as a constitutional executive and some were apparently willing for him to assume the rôle of a dictator. He added that, no matter what happened, he would do nothing which savoured of dictatorship—that the government would continue to be one of law.

I supported the view that there should be no further delay, that the ships should be armed, and that the President should go immediately to Congress and ask its support.

The President inquired what I thought he should say to Congress and what form of support he should seek. I replied that he should lay the situation before that body, point out how, on account of the uncertainty and danger, our commerce was being destroyed, and say that since Germany had plainly warned us that she would sink our ships if they went about their business in lawful manner, it was not right that we should ask them to sail unprotected, and that Congress should authorize him to furnish them with guns and crews and any other necessary safeguards.

There was much discussion. I insisted that it was time to act. We had to face facts. We could not afford to let Germany dominate us or cut England off and then crush France. We would be next on her list. If she starved England, we alone would stand for law and order in the world. Germany would demand an abject surrender from England. She would demand her fleet and would take her colonies and a huge indemnity. She would be the mistress of the world, and her arrogance and ruthlessness would know no bounds.

The President, I felt, agreed with everything we said, but appeared to take an attitude of resistance to make us prove the case; and it was natural and wise that he should do so, seeing that the final responsibility was his and that it was a terrible thing to lead a great nation into such a war. I felt confident that he held the same views that we did.

Monday morning, the 26th, word was sent to me at my office that the President would address Congress and that it would be best to say little about it. After reviewing the situation, the President remarked that the tying up of our ships was complete so far as we were concerned and was what the Germans desired, but that no overt act had occurred. It was clear, however, that if our ships were spared it would be because of restraint unexpectedly exercised by German commanders and not because of their instructions. The situation was fraught with the gravest dangers. Necessity for action might come at any moment, if we were to defend our elementary rights. "It would be most imprudent to be unprepared."

The session and term of Congress were about to expire. He desired its "full and immediate assurance of the authority" which he might need at any moment to exercise. "No doubt," he said, "I already possess that authority without special warrant of law, by the plain implication of my constitutional duties and powers; but I prefer, in the present circumstances, not to act upon general implication. I wish to feel that the authority and the power of Congress are behind me in whatever it may be necessary for me to do. We are jointly the servants of the people and must act together and in their spirit, so far as we can divine and interpret it.