to be increased. Of particular importance was the provision that when Congress authorized the use of the land forces, the President could draft all the members of the National Guard and its reserve to serve through the war.

CHAPTER XI

GARRISON RESIGNS

Correspondence Between Garrison and the President-Mobilization on the Border-Creation of Council of National Defence-War-time Revenues

W

HEN the President finally assented to the
Hay bill as a means of getting action, Secretary
Garrison resigned doubtless still being in gen-

eral out of sympathy with the Administration and conceiving that the President and he differed sharply at this time on fundamental principles of national defence. In view of the great advance in preparedness made in this compromise measure, I could not understand why he could not see his way clear to remain in his position. Which plan, as an abstract proposition, was preferable, I shall have to leave to military experts, but that the President was wise in acting as he did I do not doubt.

It is debatable, certainly, whether, all things considered, the plan adopted was not a better one than that proposed. It provided for a larger regular army and made available by draft a very large already organized force. At any rate, the Secretary's quarrel was more with the people and with Congress than with the President. The President evidently preferred the plan of the army staff. Otherwise, he would not have advocated before Congress and the people, but he was not so stubborn and cocksure as to be willing to say that he would take that or nothing. If

he had done so, he might have failed to secure any satisfactory legislation and have more widely split his party.

The correspondence which passed between Garrison and the President makes their positions very clear. One cannot fail to admire the President's patience and courtesy. These were the letters exchanged:

War Department, Washington.
January 12, 1916.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

In my judgment, we are facing a critical juncture with respect to the military part of the national defence pro

gramme.

I am convinced that unless the situation is dealt with promptly and effectively we can indulge in no reasonable expectation of any acceptable result.

So far as the military part of national defence is concerned, there can be no honest or worthy solution which does not result in national forces under the exclusive control and authority of the national government. Any other solution is illusory and not real, is apparent and not substantial.

There is a perfectly legitimate field of discussion and debate as to the means of obtaining these national forces. The proportion thereof that should be the regular standing army; that should be reserves of the regular standing army, or should be drawn from the body of citizens for shorter periods of national service than those in the regular standing army, are all legitimate and proper matters for consideration, analysis, and discussion.

But there is absolutely no dissent from the military standpoint from the conclusion that the only measure

of national defence that possesses any virtue is one which produces national forces. From the beginning of the government to this time, excepting during periods of actual war, the acknowledged weakness and defect of the situation arose out of the lack of any system producing these Federal forces. The situation was rendered worse by the presence of state troops, raised, officered, trained, and governed by the states, that were assumed to be a military reliance for the nation, when, in fact, they are not, and can never be made to be. Under the Constitution of the United States, these state troops must always be governed, officered, and trained by the respective

states.

The very first line of cleavage, therefore, which must be encountered and dealt with by the student of the situation is between reliance upon a system of state troops, for ever subject to constitutional limitations which render them absolutely insecure as a reliance for the nation, or reliance upon national forces raised, officered, trained, and controlled by the national authorities. Upon this subject there does not exist, and there cannot legitimately exist, any difference of opinion among those who are unbiassed and who believe in real national security and defence.

The policy recommended to you and adopted by you squarely placed the nation upon the sure foundation of national forces. If that policy is made effective by legislation, there will be secured to this country for the first time a real, stable foundation for the military part of its national defence. If, however, instead thereof a policy is adopted based upon the state troops as the main reliance of this country for its military arm, not only has no advance been made from the deplorable and inexcusable situ

ation in which we have so long been, but an effective block has been placed across the pathway toward a proper settlement.

The adoption of such a policy would serve to delude the people into believing that the subject had been settled, and therefore required no further consideration upon their part. It would, therefore, in my judgment, be infinitely worse than an entire failure of all legislative enactment upon the subject. The latter would at least leave it open for future settlement.

I of course am not advised as to the statements of intention made by Mr. Hay to you in the conversation held with you prior to your message to Congress at the opening of the present session. I have always felt, and have so expressed myself to you, that the situation in the Congress was such that unless you personally exerted the power of your leadership you would not obtain any worthy results in this matter.

Mr. Hay has not made the declaration of his intention. He announces that he does not intend to press for the enactment of the military policy advocated in your message. With respect to the regular army he does not purpose giving us the organizations asked for and imperatively necessary if the Federal volunteers (so-called continental army) are to be properly trained; he purposes adding a few thousand men to the enlisted strength of the army in its present organization, the adding of a few regiments of field artillery to the existing organizations of the regular army, the entire abandonment of the idea of a Federal force of national volunteers, and the passing of a bill granting direct Federal pay to the enlisted men and officers of the state troops.