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REVIE W.

An Attempt to Demonstrate, from Reason and Revelation, the necessary Existence, essential Perfections, and superintending Providence, of an Eternal Being, who is the Creator, the Supporter, and the Governor, of all things. By Samuel Drew. 2 vols. 8vo. St. Austle, 1820. Blanshard, Baynes and Son, Paternoster-row; and Dowding, Newgate-street. pp. 367, 383.

THE author before us was an unsuccessful competitor for the Burnet prize; and though we think that he has done wisely in submitting his essay to the public, the high approbation which we are disposed to bestow upon it, must not be construed even into an approximation to an impeachment, or questioning of the propriety of the decision, which has left Mr. Drew without any farther recompense for his labours, than the sale and public approbation of his work, will, we trust, abundantly afford him. Palmam qui meruit ferat, is, on the contrary, the motto which we apply both to Principal Brown and Mr. Sumner, the first and second prizemen on the occasion; and notwithstanding the carpings and cavillings of certain of our brethren, for which we could easily account, we apply it relatively, as well as respectively; denying the position which they have invidiously laboured to establish, that the first should here have been second, and the second first. Had Mr. Drew, however, bestowed more time upon his composition, we question whether the Principal of Marischal, or the Tutor of Eton, might not have yielded their well-earned honours to the extraordinary self-taught metaphysician, of whom we may, we are satisfied, say, without offence,-and those who know his history will see the correctness of the allusion,

• Sutor ultra crepidam felictèr ausus.'

The work to which we would now direct the attention of our readers, is divided into four parts. In order to form a notion of the vast penetration, and profound capacity, of the author, we need only read the table of contents; but an attentive perusal of the work itself will reward the intelligent reader with an expansion of his ideas, to an extent not usually derivable from books on similarly abstract subjects. A new direction will be given to his meditations; and, pleased with a strength of thought, and variety of

topics altogether new, it cannot fail, we should think, to rouse his energies, stimulate his efforts, and awaken his ardour in the pursuit of knowledge. The first part sets out with the argument à priori, to prove the necessary existence of one, and of only one uncreated, underived, and selfexistent Being. Philosophers in general suppose its demonstration à posteriori the plainest, and therefore set out upon that plan; but our author's mind, original and intuitive, found no inconvenience in entering upon the most difficult mode of arguing first. What costs other men many efforts, often seems, indeed, scarcely to cost him a single thought.

The topics of his argument are all of them either interesting, new, or handled in a new method. Entity and nonentity; motion, space, number, and duration; body, darkness, and the like, are the materials which he uses with as much facility as the mechanic does his tools, to adorn and to embellish a subject in itself abstract, subtle, and illusory. But the pen, which his native and energetic genius guides with bold and masterly strokes, makes all plain, luminous and perspicuous, even to ordinary capacities. An illustration of this will be found in his very satisfactory and pleasing mode of treating of entity and nonentity.

Perhaps all men who reason will readily allow, that between entity and nonentity there can be no medium: for the instant in which we attempt to form in our minds any conception of a middle object, that instant we introduce the idea of entity into our thoughts, even while we are endeavouring to exclude it. Entity and nonentity must, therefore, in the most enlarged and absolute signification of the terms, include, or else exclude, existence, in all its modes and relations. For, as the former will include existence, in all its possible varieties, so the latter, being purely negative, must be exclusively confined to absolute nonexistence. Every thing, therefore, that either exists, or does not exist; every thing of which we can, or cannot, form any rational idea; must, by existing, or not existing, be either an entity or a nonentity. Now, as entity is positive, we exercise our belief of it so early as reason begins to dawn; but nonentity being negative, our idea of it seems to be acquired in the progress of reasoning. But the ideas themselves are positive and negative, in the strictest acceptation of the terms." [p. 6.]

Our author proceeds, in the same acute, original, and masterly manner, to prove that the material world cannot exist in an absolute nonentity.' We say, this section is original and masterly, because, as far as we know, the arguVOL. V. No 9.

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ment has never before been stated in its present clear and convincing form. It is then proved, that motion cannot exist in an absolute nonentity, and we might safely appeal to the readers of the work, whether any of the philosophers who have defined the laws of motion, ever discussed those laws, in their bearing on the present proposition, in the manner in which Mr. Drew has stated them. This alone would prove his claim to originality.

The subject of space is touched with an equal ability; the thoughts are all the author's own, and he presents this proposition in various lights to the reader, arguing with a degree of penetration, which justly claims for his work a very high place among the treatises on abstract science. We will suffer him, however, to speak for himself.

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Space, it has been argued, is nothing more than an abstract idea; and this inference is drawn from a previous conclusion, that space is not a substance, nor a mode of one. If space be supposed to be nothing more than an abstract idea, I would ask, Is this idea which we have of space derived from any thing really existing, or not? If it be derived from something actually existing, then the positive existence of space is admitted. If it be not, then the world, with all its inhabitants, together with all the solar system, must exist and move in an abstract idea, which is derived from nothing that has any real existence. If this should be admitted, the notions of Berkeley must cease to appear extravagant.--If space-which has the power of forcing itself upon our minds as an existing reality, with an evidence that is irresistible-were nothing more than an abstract idea, the foundations of human knowledge would be shaken, and most of our evidences and grounds of certainty would be banished from the world. For, if those clear ideas which we have of the reality of space, have actually arisen from the simple negation of existence, we can have no assurance, either from our senses or ideas, that we are encircled with any thing more than a complication of nonentities. These conclusions are too absurd to be admitted." [pp. 15, 16.]

Neither Newton nor Clarke have, as we conceive, argued more clearly or correctly on this subject. Our author's views of number are acute, and yet accurate, though or ginal. Every view he takes of this intricate subject is luminous, and his own; nor do we find it so philosophically handled in any of the treatises published by arithmeticians, Stated in his own way, his definitions and deductions carry the reader along with him, both convinced and pleased.

He affirms that the universe may move; and in discuss

ing this proposition rises, we think, in sublimity above vulgar capacities. His own views are, in as far as we can apply that term to a human intellect in its present state of developement, unlimited. His rapid glance flies from past to future, from time to eternity; and his gaze is, as it were, through immensity. We would particularly entreat the reader's attention to pages 38 and 39 of the first volume of the work, in the full expectation, that he will be highly gratified by his mode of proving the proposition, that "Body, by being introduced cannot destroy space:" and if he read on to the end of page 48 he will be well rewarded for his trouble, and increasingly satisfied of the sagacity, penetration, and powers of mind, of this extraordinary man. His notions on darkness, page 41-46, will also, we are satisfied, be admitted by all to be new, striking, and instructive.

But when our author comes to the second chapter of his work, which he intitles, "Space, being an infinite perfection, proves the existence of an Infinite Substance," we discover the argument à priori brought to bear upon the subject with striking conclusion and force.. The reader will be highly pleased with the acuteness and subtilty with which this chapter is managed. Sections II. and III. especially are constructed with great skill, and discover the vast extent of the writer's capacity; every word, every sentence, is as it ought to be; and the mind of the reader is pleasingly conducted to subjects deep in themselves, and before unexplored, with a readiness and ease which at the same time imparts delight and information. In Section IV. "On space as an infinite perfection, affording proof of an infinite substance," our author draws his conclusions with an accuracy and conviction with which the reader will be abundantly satisfied. Section V. proving that space can have no positive existence which is not included in the substance of which it is a perfection, is neat, correct, and conclusive, and leads by a short way to inferences the most important; it comprehends, indeed, in a very narrow space, more sound argument than many volumes. Section VI. brings this chapter to a conclusion; and in that conclusion sums up the argument with an energy and strength which may safely defy contradiction. The reader is conducted by arguments so plain, powerful, and convincing, that at every sentence he feels himself going along with the author in heart and sentiment, to the discovery of that Infinite Substance of which space is a perfection, and which he finds to

be immaterial, infinite, immutable, eternal, omnipresent, independent, and necessarily existent.

Chapter III. takes up the subject upon new grounds, and traces the being of God from the abstract idea of duration. The analogy between space and duration is well handled, and the proof that duration is a natural perfection is among the finest efforts of the work. Without dwelling minutely upon every thing that demands approbation, we refer our readers more particularly to Section V. p. 77, which ably maintains the proposition, that duration being an eternal perfection, necessarily implies some eternal substance. The remaining sections of this chapter are equally well executed, equally interesting, equally entertaining.

Chapter IV. intitled "Eternal existence being possible, an eternal Being must be possible; and, if an eternal Being be possible, he must really exist," exhibits all the talents of the author; the arguments are refined and subtle, yet stated in a clear and perspicuous manner. We do not hesitate to say, that, excepting the scriptures, some of its sections supply the best cure of infidelity, which an age abounding in antidotes to this moral disease has provided.

In Chapter V. the author approaches nearer to the arguments which have been advanced by preceding writers on the subject; yet still he preserves his own originality, and peculiarity of thinking. In this chapter his thoughts become more philosophical; and matter, motion, gravitation, and figure, enter into the discussion. These the author handles in a manner entirely new, but at the same time dignified and comprehensive. To shew his originality in treating those subjects which have passed through the hands of the greatest men that have ever lived, we shall present the reader with one section of this portion of his work.

"That form or figure, in the abstract, is inseparable from matter, is too evident to require proof, or to admit of denial. Figure, in some manner or other, must, therefore, coexist with matter, amidst all the varied mutations which it is capable of undergoing. It always bounds the extremities of its surface, and marks the limits of its existence; and is as applicable to a particle of light as to the orb of Saturn. But, if matter were infinite, it could not possibly have any extremities; because that which is infinite must be unbounded; and therefore, both extremities and figure must be alike inapplicable to it. But, since no matter can exist without figure, and since nothing that is infinite can possibly have figure, it is demonstrable, that matter cannot be an infinite substance. But,