tendencies and national affinities into a fixed system of society. Everything favors the proposition. The great obstructions that would have opposed it a year ago have been removed. Nations are gravitating into union; not giving up any essential qualities of independence or individuality, but confederating with each other under the attraction of mutual affinities. Then why may we not link these large circles of humanity into one grand system of Society, by creating for it a common centre and source of attraction in the establishment of a HIGH COURT OF NATIONS?

II. ADDRESS AT PARIS.

A CONGRESS OF NATIONS.

To-day are fulfilled the aspirations of that man of courageous faith and extended philanthropy, William Penn. More than 200 years have elapsed since he penned his parting words of peace to a distant posterity. Assembled from both sides of the Atlantic, speaking different languages, and living under different governments, we are here to honor with our remembrance that early friend of peace and humanity. The project which he elaborated we now bring back almost in its original integrity. It has been subjected to the changing opinions and conditions of society. Able writers in different countries have made it the theme of learned dissertations; yet it has not incurred any fundamental change. The friends of peace in America have concentrated their efforts upon its development and adoption. More than fifty essays have been written upon it; and hundreds of public meetings have been held for the purpose of interesting the public mind in its favor. Petitions, numerously signed, have been addressed to the legislative assemblies of different states, asking them to induce the federal government at Washington to propose to the other governments of the civilized world the convocation of a Congress of Nations, for the purpose of establishing a welldefined code of international law, and a high court of adjudication, to interpret and apply it, in the settlement of all international disputes, which cannot be satisfactorily arranged by negotiation. A similar form of proposition emanated from this metropolis more than two centuries ago. Its author had no works on international law to consult. Neither Grotius, nor Puffendorf, nor Vattel had published anything on the subject. The great tribunal which he proposed was a perpetual court of equity, composed

of a representative from every recognized kingdom or government in the world. The only material difference between the original and the present form of the project is not a change, but an addition. The friends of peace in America, who, perhaps, have devoted more attention to this particular measure than their brethren on this side of the Atlantic, have believed it indispensable for the order and peace of nations that there should not only be established a court of equity or arbitration, but also a well-defined authoritative code of international law, which should govern the decisions of that tribunal, in settling the disputes referred to it. And, indeed, they have deemed the establishment of such a code as the first and most important step to be taken in organizing permanent and universal peace. In this conviction they are sustained by the testimony of profound writers, and by evidence derived from the painful experience of nations, still suffering from the murderous wars and animosities of the past. "The law of nations," says Vattel, "is as much above the civil law in its importance as the proceedings of nations and sovereigns surpass in their consequences those of private persons." How plain, how explicit, then, ought the law of nations to be! How guarded at every point! How fixed and acknowledged its principles! And yet, strange to say, this law, all-important as it is, has never been put into the form of a code, and many of its principles remain matters of dispute, and have been the frequent occasion of war. To adopt the language of an able writer on this subject, "We have no such law, and what passes under that name is the unauthorized work of irresponsible individuals, at different periods, who frequently disagree among themselves. Neither Grotius nor his commentators have furnished an international code. They possessed not the requisite authority; and they have given us only a compilation of precedents, opinions, and arguments. It is the work, not of legislators, but of scholars; no law-making power was ever concerned in enacting any of its statutes; and all its authority has resulted from the deference spontaneously paid to the genius, condition, and wisdom of its compilers. It is not law, but argument; not decrees, but rules; not a code, but a treatise: and the nations are at liberty, except from the force of custom and public opinion, to adopt and reject it, as they please." The first work prescribed for a Congress of Nations would be to revise and reconstruct the present code of international law, as it has been called, and then to present it for the ratification to the different national assemblies repre

sented in the Congress. To effect an object of this vast importance, we might assume that each nation would send to the Congress its most profound statesmen, or juris-consuls, so that all the legal wisdom and experience of the age would be brought to bear upon its deliberations. The basis of representation and the mode by which the different national delegates should be elected are matters of detail, which, it has been thought, might be referred to a more advanced stage of the project. But, merely to supply the proposition with all its requisite elements, let us suppose that one delegate should be apportioned to every million of the population of a country. If all the nations of the civilized world should come into this arrangement, then we should have an assembly of about 300 members, of whom, perhaps, thirtysix would represent France, thirty Great Britain, thirty Germany, twenty the United States. If this basis were adopted, such a representation would be sufficiently popular, if appointed by the legislatures of the different constitutional governments. Even if a few absolute monarchies should send delegates to the Congress, their votes and voices would not modify the popular character and constitution of the assembly. For such a Congress would represent the principle of universal suffrage applied to nations, in the same manner as it is applied to individuals under a republican or constitutional form of government. The votes that Prussia might be entitled to give would be subject to the rigid condition of the democratic principle. They would be of no more avail upon the decision of a question than the same number of votes cast by the United States or the smallest republic. Therefore, a people possessing universal or limited suffrage could have nothing to fear even from the association of one or two despotic powers in such an assembly, for they would inevitably constitute a small minority in it, and be unable to modify its conclusions. Besides, the task prescribed to the Congress would be so specific, and the materials so natural and abundant, that there would be little danger of the introduction and discussion of extraneous topics. They would not be obliged to launch into a new and unexplored field of speculations. Their first great work would be merely to revise a system of principles, precedents, practices and opinions, which had already acquired the name, and even a part of the authority, of an international code. All that Grotius, Puffendorf, Vattel, and other men of great erudition have produced, would be in their hands. The experience of past ages, the present and future necessities of international

society, would be available to guide their deliberations. Nor would this be all. Every step they took would be directed by the wisdom of the nations which they represented. For instance, the Congress might be in session at the same time as the different national assemblies by which it had been constituted, in order that its proceedings might be ratified step by step. Let us suppose, then, that it should meet at some convenient town in Switzerland, or in some other central territory, which should be considered neutral ground, or free from any local influence which might affect its conclusions. They would immediately proceed to revise and adopt the international code, clause by clause. And clause by clause it might be transmitted to the national legislatures in session at Paris, London, Frankfort, Washington, and other capitals. At the end of six months, perhaps, the last paragraph has been elaborated and adopted by the Congress, and ratified by all the national assemblies represented in it. We have now a welldigested code, created, sanctioned, and solemnized by all the moral prestige and authority that can be acquired from human legislation. The august senate which constructed it was composed of delegates chosen by the representatives of the peoples. The most sublime legislative assembly that ever met on earth, they gave the result of the deliberations to their respective national assemblies for revision, amendment, and adoption. Here, again, the people took part in the enactment of this code. Here, again, they affixed to its statutes the seal of their suffrage, and it became the common law of nations, invested with all the moral authority that human legislation can give to law. On arriving at this result, we have taken the first great step in organizing peace in the society of nations. We have established a basis upon which their intercourse may be regulated by clearly defined and solemnly recognized principles of justice and equity. The next step, and of equal importance, is to constitute a permanent international tribunal, which shall interpret and apply this code in the adjudication of questions submitted to its decision. The illustrious assembly, therefore, enters upon the second department of its labors, and projects a plan for the establishment of this High Court of Nations. And this plan is adopted, also, in the same manner as the code itself. Let us suppose that it prescribes the appointment of two judges, for life or otherwise, by the government or legislature of each nation represented in the Congress. This number is suggested by the constitution of the Senate of the United States, which is composed of two delegates,

elected by the legislature of every state, great or small. If it is deemed necessary that this tribunal shall immediately replace the Congress, then the latter, we will suppose, continues its sessions until the judges are appointed. Having accomplished the two great objects for which it was convoked, it is instructed to apply its attention to matters of minor international interest, until the judges arrive, to open the High Court. For instance, they digest a plan for establishing throughout the civilized world a uniformity of weights, measures, moneys, rates of postage, and for creating other facilities for the social and commercial intercourse of nations, thus preparing them for that relation to each other which should exist between the members of a vast and peaceful commonwealth. We now reach the grand consummation of our system. The High Court of Nations is opened with all the imposing solemnities befitting the occasion. Each nation, we may believe, has selected two of its most profound and eminent men to fill the seats allotted to it in this grand tribunal. Occupying the sublimest position to which the suffrage of mankind could raise them, they will act, we may presume, under a proper sense of the dignity and responsibility of their high vocation. Constituting the highest court of appeal this side of the bar of Eternal Justice, they will endeavour to assimilate their decisions, as nearly as possible, to those of unerring wisdom. Here, then, we complete the chain of universal law and order. Here we organize a system which is to connect the great circles of humanity, and regulate the mutual deportment of nations by the same principles of justice and equity as govern the intercourse of the smallest communities of men. We establish an order of society by which great nations, without deposing a single prerogative of their legitimate sovereignty, accept the condition of individuals who are amenable to law. For our system, if adopted, would not trench upon the complete independence of the different states. Neither the Congress nor the High Court of Nations would pretend to exercise any jurisdiction over the internal affairs of a country, or exert any direct political influence upon its institutions. Neither would they be designed to confederate the different states of the civilized world in a political union, like the United States of America. The great international tribunal which we propose would not be like the Supreme Court of the United States, to which not only the thirty little republics, but every inhabitant of the Union, may appeal for its decision in any case which cannot be settled by inferior authorities. The