lectual quality because of the intellectual isolation incident to specialization; and yet administration or generalization is not only the faculty upon which social stability rests, but is, possibly, the highest faculty of the human mind.*

Many scientists, especially those from universities, never feel the need for such a function. The purpose of organization and administration in a university is mainly to care for the material needs of a collection of independent disciplines. There have been some ambitious efforts to bring them together in the name of general education, but the going has been rough. On the other hand, in public affairs (including the great foundations as well as government) the administrator is not motivated by a merely philosophical purpose: he sees the need for stamping out hookworm or the boll weevil; he sees the need for an improved system of communications; he sees the need for an effective system of air defense. And it is his job to marshal the forces of science into an effective program and to keep them from going off into the entirely different directions of their several disciplines and specialties. Unless this essential job of the administrator is done, the whole program of government will not become coherent enough to be controlled by the political authorities who in turn are responsible to the people.

But if science, as such, cannot give us automatic answers to our great issues of public policy, that does not mean that scientists cannot play an important role in answering them. The administrator and the scientist are not two quite different categories of people. Indeed, it seems to me that the whole history of American government shows that the scientist and the engineer have often moved successfully into many of the most responsible and difficult administrative positions. In this respect American government has had an experience similar to that of American private business.

On the aspects of administration that are managerial in the narrow sense of the word, the scientist whose only experience has been the laboratory is often poorly prepared. Moreover, he is likely to dismiss as unimportant those aspects of an administrative job that have to do with keeping the organization and procedures in good repair and keeping the majority of the staff satisfied with their work. The reason may be that he is tempted by force of mental habit to concentrate on those aspects of his job that are most interesting to the individual student as intellectual problems-a temptation which the administrator usually cannot afford to yield to.

These considerations argue, it seems to me, for having a few men with quite general administrative background in the top ranks of even those agencies with heavily scientific programs. On the other hand, I would argue with equal emphasis that the administrative personnel of almost all agencies ought to have a fair proportion of men with some training and experience in science and engineering. If administration is to serve as a useful layer in the pyramid of policy between the peak of political power and the base of science and technology, it needs in its composition an appropriate mixture of general competence and special knowledge.

Many policy problems that cannot be solved precisely by scientific research can in practice be solved satisfactorily only by men with

Brooks Adams, The Theory of Social Revolutions (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1913), pp. 207-8.

scientific knowledge as well as administrative ability. In military affairs, for example, there are many issues on which it is not practical to look to operations research for the answers, but which cannot be handled properly without the kind of judgment that comes from scientific background. The Canadian government recognized this principle when it made its leading civilian scientist a member of its equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The scientist should take a part as a responsible administrator, right up to the highest levels, in making decisions that cannot be based entirely on objective research, and on which no irresponsible adviser can ever expect to be consulted.

In the administrative corps some mixture of general and special qualifications is desirable. In the long run, however, a mere mixture of unrelated skills is not what is needed. What is needed is a corps of men whose liberal education includes an appreciation of the role of science and technology in society and whose scientific education has not been a narrowly technical or vocational one, but has treated science as one of the highest intellectual endeavors of men who also have responsibility as free citizens. The humanities and the social sciences are too often taught in America as narrowly technical subjects. We can hardly found a new generation of administrative generalists on them as they are commonly taught today

It would be comforting to hope that in the long run the development of science, especially of the social sciences, will let us solve all human problems by the scientific method. But this is not a prospect that seems possible in theory, to say nothing of its being likely in practice.

We need not hang onto this hope in order to further the development of science. For there are plenty of worlds for the scientist to conquer. And he may have an even better chance to get on with his job if all of us realize that the major policy decisions on which society depends must be made only partly on the basis of the exact quantitative data that scientific research can provide. For then we can all understand the necessity of creating the kind of responsible political and administrative systems within which free science will have its fullest opportunity for public service.

[From Memorandum, Senate Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Cong., 1st sess., Hearing, September 18, 1963]

SPECIALIST VS. GENERALIST IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE

By Samuel D. Berger

This subject has been endlessly debated, but I have long felt that the argument was more theoretical than real. The great need in oversea work is for more people of the highest quality to fill senior officer positions: deputy chief of mission, political and economic counselors. consul general, and special assistant on aid matters. There are certain requirements at the senior level: great energy; passionate interest in the work; mature judgment in foreign affairs that comes only with

long and varied experience in the Foreign Service; the capacity to lead and inspire staff; insistence on precision in all parts of the work; a liking for working in foreign countries with all its interest as well as disadvantages; a capacity to adjust to change; and a capacity to win the respect, and, hopefully, the affection of his colleagues and the people of the countries in which he serves. These do not exhaust the list of requirements, but they are among the main ones. Officers who do not possess these qualities should be kept from appointment to senior positions, or weeded out, if they occupy them, in order to make room for topflight officers.

It is not whether a man is a generalist or specialist that brings him to the top, but whether he has capacity, breadth, interest, and initiative what we call "flair." I have known agricultural, commercial, labor, and treasury attachés who do a fine routine job in their special fields to which no one can take exception. But the specialist with "flair" can make a contribution to the work of an embassy that goes far beyond his field. For example, an agricultural attaché in the normal course of his work has the opportunity to meet farmers and peasants, develop contacts with agricultural leaders, civil servants working on agricultural matters, managers of agricultural banks and cooperatives, etc. If he sees his job in its widest context, he can in the course of his routine work on crops, prices, marketing, etc., develop invaluable information and reports on the economic and social conditions of farmers, peasants, and farm laborers; on their political attitudes and organizations; on the effect of general economic or finance policy on agriculture; on the relation of the farm community to the whole gamut of society. In short, he can use his specialty to illuminate for the benefit of the embassy all manner of political, economic, and social problems. The same is true of the commercial attachés, labor attachés, treasury attachés, and others.

The broader the interest of the specialist, the greater his capacity and initiative, the more he can contribute to the operations of an embassy and the higher he can aspire in the Foreign Service.

Conversely, the senior generalist who is familiar with all problems but has failed to develop a deep and critical grasp of any of the major fields will lack the self-confidence required to make independent judgments, evaluations, and decisions that he is called on to make week in and week out in a variety of fields. In these days the senior generalist working abroad must have a sufficiently extensive knowledge of economics, labor, agriculture, aid programs, and Communist history, doctrine, and methods-to cite some of the more important areas-or he will be at a great disadvantage in dealing with the complicated problems which confront most embassies.

Stated in another way, the great need in the Foreign Service is for more officers at the top-whether they are generalists or specialistswho have drive and the kind of experience that enables them to relate one field to another. The Foreign Service has many bright and hard working specialists and generalists: what it needs is to select, encourage, guide, and train the most promising for appointment to the senior positions.

[From Address at United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, May 2, 1964, upon receipt of the Sylvanus Thayer Award]

THE CHANGING MILITARY PROFESSION

By Robert A. Lovett

In this center of military education which, under Sylvanus Thayer, became the fountainhead of American technology, I would like to take note of the increasing tempo of the revolution now taking place in military professionalism and, with your indulgence, make a few observations on it. . . .

The military profession is currently experiencing so rapid a change it can fairly be called a revolution-particularly since it has some internecine characteristics. Some unsung modern Thayers have seen the wider horizons which must now concern the professional military officer with the result that the Army curriculum already reflects increased emphasis on non-military areas of study and on post-graduate work. This is, of course, a response to the dilemma which confronts all professional men; namely, that there is "much too much they need to know and too little time in which to learn it." Dr. Vannevar Bush, of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, says "the doctor, the architect, or the chemist cannot possibly know all he needs to know for his professional work. Hence, he needs to know how he can find out. More important, he needs to be able genuinely, honestly and generously-to collaborate with those who know more than he on diverse aspects of problems as they arise."

In the difficult professional career on which you have already embarked, you will never be finished with learning. Indeed, it seems clear that demands on you in the future will be more varied, responsibilities heavier and the need for breadth of training and experience greater because decision-making today involves the use of a wider diversity of special skills and knowledge than ever before. Much of the decisionmaking is in fields where there is no tested, actual experience. Much of it is a question of assessing economic, social, political and ideological considerations.

In the Cold War, the devising of proper action depends on the contribution of many types of experts not just one. The military professional is a most important contributor to the discussions of our problems for a reason not always recognized by the government and the public he serves. The professional career officer, owing to his skills and his commitments, accepts a higher degree of responsibility than other citizens and voluntarily gives up certain of the privileges of a private citizen. You serve in an ancient profession with special disciplines because, as Lieutenant General Sir John Hackett has said, "the function of the profession of arms is the ordered application of force to the resolution of a social problem."

This fact places you in a unique category of public servants and in a most select rank of profession. Because of the nature of your duties and responsibilities, you are, in effect, trustees and custodians of the armed power of the American people. You are, therefore, in a fiduciary relationship by reason of having this awesome power entrusted to you. No greater evidence of confidence and faith could be reposed in you. No greater compliment could be paid you.

Military advice is only one-although, on occasion, the most necessary-type of guidance needed today and the decision-making process involves a system of checks and balances in the Executive Branch

deliberately designed to keep any one economic or social group or any one governmental department from becoming dominant. Therefore, every judgment made at the decisive level requires a weighing of several often-conflicting and competing factors.

For these reasons, the ability of the military expert to give wise advice and to get it listened to by policy-making officials depends in great measure on his possessing knowledge in key nonmilitary fields and in seeing issues in broad perspective. For example, the military expert should be able to spot instantly the phony or slanted economic theory or financial policy advanced in arguments. He must, of course, be adequately prepared to look askance at any exaggerated claimswhether for a weapon or a course of action-even when made in the exalted name of "scientific methods." It might, in such cases, be useful to remember the rather sly question, attributed to some doubting disciples, as to whether scientific methods applied to horse breeding to improve transportation could ever have produced the modern automobile engine. After all, human will, creativeness and talent must be given credit for something by somebody.

Furthermore, the military officer should be ready to identify and evaluate the impact of the swings in politico-social emotions and fashions which are so frequently the affliction of our national security and foreign policy. It is these factors which so largely influence us and produce those weird reversals and grotesque lurches that give us a policy often referred to as "crisis oriented" but which can, I think, be more accurately described as the "Yo-yo system"-that is, you throw it away one minute and snatch it back the next.

In short, the military career officer must be highly skilled in his own profession, but he cannot afford to become trapped in narrow professionalism. Nor, indeed, can his country permit him to do so.

General Eisenhower-a most distinguished predecessor in the Thayer Award-in his farewell message as President made a statement strangely overlooked by most commentators-who pounced so eagerly on his reference to the dangers of a "military-industrial complex" yet neglected advice of equal or greater weight. He wisely-and also pointedly said "in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientifictechnological elite."

The noted British writer, C. P. Snow, himself an eminent scientist, similarly warned against the danger of a scientific overlord-against a scientist in a position of isolated power.

What is true of the scientist is true of the military expert. It is not the unwarranted power of the scientist or of the military officer or of any other expert that is now cause for our concern. Isolation is what creates the real problem-that is, power insulated from competing skills or the claims of other groups for recognition of possible alternative courses of action. Consequently, if "knowledge is power", as the old axiom tells us, then insulated knowledge fails to meet fully our needs in the making of public policy.

I believe the time has come for a new Thayer-like break-out from the relatively narrow concept of the military profession and rigid doc