APPENDIX

1. OUR OBSOLETE CONCEPTS ABOUT NATO-1949 SOLUTIONS FOR 1966 FACTS

(Speech by Senator Ernest Gruening before the Senate, August 23, 1966; Congressional Record, vol. 112, No. 140, pp. 19446-19455)

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, President Charles de Gaulle's request to the United States that its NATO-committed troops stationed in France be removed may prove to be a blessing in disguise. It may be just the therapeutic shock the United States has long needed to force it to take a hard look at the concepts underlying the coming into being of NATO in 1949 to see whether those facts fit the realities of 1966.

The world of 1966-for better or worse is a far different place than the world as it existed on April 4, 1949, when the NATO Treaty was signed.

Let us take a quick, overall look at the state of the world on that day to get some idea of the situations which the NATO Treaty was intended to meet, at least in part.

First. On April 4, 1949, the United Nations was less than 3 years old and whether it would succeed or fall, as did its predecessor the League of Nations, was an unanswered and unanswerable question. Already the Soviet Union had cast 28 votes vetoing various questions before the United Nations Security Council.

Second. On April 4, 1949, Soviet Russia's Cominform had already been functioning for 2 years as an agency of international revolutionary communism reviving the theme of the capitalist menace. At the founding of the Cominform in 1947, Communist Party leader Zhdanov had declared a permanent "cold war" against the West saying:

"A new alignment of political forces has arisen . . . a division of political forces operating on the international arena into two major camps; the imperalist and antidemocratic camp on one hand; and the anti-imperalist and democratic camp on the other."

Third. On April 4, 1949, the blockade of Berlin and the U.S. airlift were still on and were destined to continue for over 5 months;

Fourth. On April 4, 1949, Communist Parties in France and Italy had already been told to foment strikes-which they did-against the Marshall plan;

Fifth. On April 4, 1949, the Soviet Union had already set upon peoples republics in all East European countries and sought to curb all East European contact with the non-Communist world, even to the extent of excluding United Nations personnel;

Sixth. On April 4, 1949, the deadlock in the United Nations over the control of atomic devices still continued even while Werner Heisenberg, 1932 Nobel Prize winner, was announcing that he was almost certain that the Soviet Union was making atomic bombs at two remote Siberian industrial centers;

Seventh. On April 4, 1949, the attempted coup by the Communists in the Kreuzberg sector of U.S.-occupied Berlin 2 months earlier was still fresh in the minds of the people of the United States;

Eighth. On April 4, 1949, the Communist inspired-and-aided civil war in Greece was still waging;

Ninth. On April 4, 1949, Joseph Cardinal Mindzenty, Roman Catholic primate of Hungary, had just been arrested and tried on charges of treason, espionage, and black-market dealings and sentenced to life imprisonment, arousing protests throughout the free world;

Tenth. On April 4, 1949, the Russian-dominated army in Hungary had 5,000 more men than was permitted by the peace treaty.

Eleventh. On April 4, 1949, even though the armistice provided for tripartite control of Bulgaria under an Allied commission, with the Communists in control

of the government, the treatment of members of the American legation continued to worsen and was to lead, in the next year, to a break in diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and the United States.

Twelfth. On April 4, 1949, Austria, contrary to the provisions of the armistice, was still occupied by the Russians.

Thirteenth. On April 4, 1949, the Nationalists in China had already agreed to turn over Peking to the Communists.

Fourteenth. On April 4, 1949, Nehru in India had told Parliament 2 months before that a Communist plot to seize power had been prevented by the roundup of 3.000 Communists.

Fifteenth. On April 4, 1949, South Korea had reported repeated raids by North Korean forces into South Korean territory.

Sixteenth. On April 4, 1949, it was reported that Communists had actively infiltrated the Indonesian Army.

Seventeenth. On April 4, 1949, two protests had already been sent to the Soviet Union by the United States concerning the continued Soviet occupation of Iran. This then is a quick, incomplete overview of the state of the world on April 4, 1949, when the NATO Treaty was signed.

It was a world in which international communism was on the march seeking world domination.

To counteract its moves, President Truman during the preceding year had asked Congress for the enactment of the European recovery plan the Marshall plan-pointing out that it was needed to "forestall Russia's clear design to swallow up the remaining free nations of Europe." citing the "tragic death of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, pressure on Finland," the military attacks on Greece by non-Greek Communists, and the many violations of peace treaties. It was in the light of these events that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was brought into being a year later under the leadership of the United States, uniting the United States, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom in a pact which declared that an armed attack against one country is to be considered an attack against all.

But the world-especially the European world-is in every way a far different place in 1966 than it was 17 years earlier in 1949. And yet we continue in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization using the same concepts that we did when NATO was first formed.

The time has come indeed, it has long since passed-for the United States to rethink those concepts in the light of present-day facts.

Canada and our European allies in NATO were never more stable both politically and economically than they are today.

Italy is not today racked by Communist-led strikes-neither is France.

In 1949, the fastest plane available took 221⁄2 hours from New York to Berlin. In 1966, the flight can be made in 10 hours. By 1966, we had proven our ability to airlift an entire armored division of 15,000 fighting men and their equipment from Texas to Europe in 63 hours.

And, still, the United States, acting in 1966 without any apparent consideration of the vastly changed circumstances of our European allies, continues to maintain 1 million fighting men and their dependents in the European theater. In 1949, U.S. gold reserves were 24.5 billion; on August 12, 1966, U.S. gold reserves had shrunk to 13.3 billion, down 400 million since the first of the year. The unnecessary stationing of a million American troops and their dependents in Europe undoubtedly contributed to this outflow of gold.

I returned recently from a trip to Europe where I visited a number of military facilities and discussed the pending move of our bases out of France. While this trip was concerned primarily with the disposal of surplus property, a matter which is of concern to the Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures, of which I am chairman, and which the chairman of the Government Operations Committee, Senator John McClellan asked me to analyze, my meetings with top officials of the Departments of State and Defense provided the opportunity to inquire into the broader aspects of our relationship with the NATO countries and the premises underlying our current military policies in Europe.

This trip left me thoroughly dismayed at the lack of imaginative and creative thinking on the part of the top echelons of U.S. policymakers involved in Europe. It is no secret that the basic premises of NATO which were thoroughly valid at the time NATO came into being, are being increasingly questioned by our NATO

allies. The most fallacious reasoning of our State and Defense planners is that Gaullism will disappear with the passing from the political scene of President Charles de Gaulle. If U.S. policy is to be broken out of its mold and freed from its present immobility, it must recognize that the circumstances surrounding the establishment of NATO are no longer a valid justification for the continuation of an outmoded strategy, and that France does not stand alone in questioning the basic premises on which NATO has been operating since its inception.

No evidence was found that any rethinking was in process on the part of U.S. officials. On the contrary, the major efforts of our policymakers appear to be directed toward the preservation of NATO in its present form without France and with developing the justifications for the continuation of its present strategic doctrines.

The men with whom I discussed these matters are dedicated and sincere in seeking what they deem the best course of action for the United States. They are concerned with the possibility that the Soviet Union may again embark on a course of "adventurism" as it did when it precipitated the Cuban missile crisis. These officials, involved as they are with the entire spectrum of the possible threats confronting our country and charged with the responsibility for assuring the security of our country against all possibilities of aggression, are justified in their concern that the withdrawal of France from the NATO organization may be the beginning of the erosion of our military strength in Europe. They are apprehensive that the diminution of our military presence in Europe might well be taken by the Soviets as a signal that the United States would not react to overt aggression and that pressure on Berlin or on West Germany would find a militarily weakened and divided Europe unprepared to meet such action.

There is no pretense on my part to have any special insight into the intentions of the Soviet Union. That country remains as much as ever "the mys tery wrapped within an enigma" that Winston Churchill described many years ago. It is apparent to me, however, that many of our top policy officials have spent their formative careers in efforts to bring NATO into being and in unrelenting efforts to establish it as an effective political as well as military force. They now find it difficult to depart from their role as salesmen to take the really hard look at NATO that changing circumstances require. It is, of course, perfectly obvious that the Europe of 1966 is far different from the Europe of 1949. The economic strength of the continent has grown to proportions scarcely imagined when the Marshall plan was launched and when weak currencies, stagnant industries, and chronic balance-of-payments difficulties seemed to be Western Europe's inescapable destiny. Concomitant with the economic growth has come an increasing dissatisfaction with unquestioning reliance on the United States to provide leadership for the alliance. President deGaulle's insistence that subordination of military forces to a NATO supranational command is inconsistent with the basic requirements that the decisions affecting a country's national interests, and the means for protecting such interests, must remain the unfettered responsibility of a sovereign country, has met widespread support outside of France.

The simple fact of the matter is that the United States is the only really effective supporter of NATO and that the other NATO countries pay only lip service to the Organization and to its underlying strategic concepts—a truly anomalous situation in light of the fact that the primary purpose of NATO is the defense of Western Europe.

One of the countries in which I was interested during my trip to Europe was Belgium, because of the likelihood that some bases and materiel would be moved there from France. That country is considered as one of the two or three strongest advocates of NATO. Yet data obtained from U.S. officials in that country clearly show that its support is forthcoming only as long as it does not have to put up the resources to make a truly effective contribution to the military effectiveness of NATO.

Belgium has been devoting a decreasing percentage of its resources to its defense budget. In 1953 it allocated 5.3 percent of its gross national product to defense; by 1963 it had gone down to 3.7 percent; and additional declines have occurred since 1963.

The Belgian Air Force is still equipped with obsolete F-84 aircraft which are no match for even the older models of Soviet jet fighters. Funds for procurement of modern fighter aircraft have not been allocated and it is obvious, there

fore, that the Belgians do not consider it important to have an up-to-date air force.

Belgian resources devoted to logistics—to the supply and maintenance of its army forces-are considered inadequate and the total number of personnel in the army falls short of the number required to form the divisions originally planned by NATO.

No more illuminating illustration of the Belgian lack of conviction in NATO can be found than in the recent discussions which have taken place as to where SHAPE headquarters are to be located. France's withdrawal from the NATO organization has been accompanied by the demand that NATO forces and headquarters be removed from French soil. This has necessitated finding a new home for SHAPE headquarters which is now located a short distance outside of Paris.

After considerable discussion the Belgian Government agreed to offer SHAPE a new home. Top officials with whom I discussed this matter in Europe told me that it was imperative that NATO headquarters be located in a large metropolitan center for reasons of communications and transportation. The Belgians, however, after much internal discussion of the impact on the Belgian economy of the relocation of SHAPE headquarters involving the transfer of several thousand NATO employees to Belgium, agreed finally to offer NATO a site 40 miles southwest of Brussels. The selection of this site was determined by domestic economic considerations rather than by the urgent requirements of NATO that its headquarters be located in a major metropolitan area. The headquarters site selected is in one of the distressed areas in Belgium where unemployment is a problem and where the funds brought in by NATO personnel could be expected to help the local economy. In addition, the site offered by the Belgian Government involved a minimum expenditure of its own funds; the site offered involved land already owned by the Belgian Government which is largely unutilized at present.

Understandably General Lemnitzer has expressed dissatisfaction with the Belgian offer but it appears at the moment that NATO has little choice but to accept since no other country is rushing forward with more satisfactory proposals. Unfortunately, Belgium is not an isolated case insofar as it involves halfhearted support for NATO in the area where such support counts most—that is, in the amount of resources, of money and men, that a country is ready and willing to devote to NATO.

Canada has reduced its defense budget by more than half since 1953, as measured by defense outlays in relation to gross national product. Greece, still a recipient of substantial military assistance from the United States despite its booming economy, has cut its defense expenditures by one-third in terms of its gross national product. Similarly with Norway and the Netherlands. Great Britain's expenditures as related to gross national product have declined by about 40 percent since 1953; only in the case of West Germany do we find an increase in defense expenditures which exceeds the rate of growth of that country's economy.

With the withdrawal of France from NATO, and the imminent likelihood that Great Britain will find it necessary to withdraw a large number of forces from those committed to NATO and now stationed in West Germany, the Soviet Union would be justified in concluding that the real strength of the alliance which confronts her is to be found not in the NATO organization but in the forces of the United States and Germany which are drawing together ever more closely. In this connection, I want to call attention to the impending move of the headquarters of the U.S. European Command, or EUCOM as it is called by my military friends. For many years this headquarters, which operates directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff in directing the operations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in Europe, has been located just outside of Paris at Camp des Loges. This location, in close proximity to General Lemnitzer's NATO headquarters at SHAPE, made eminent sense since the Commander in Chief of EUCOM was also Deputy Commander in Chief of SHAPE.

But now it has been announced that EUCOM is to be transferred to Germany, with Stuttgart as the most likely location. How can this be taken other than a downgrading of NATO status and an increase in the cohesion between the United States and Germany? If there is one single specter haunting the dreams of Europeans these days, it is the one of a militarily revitalized Germany bent on exerting its growing strength to satisfy its own nationalistic aspirations as

it has done repeatedly in the past and acting in concert with the United States to do so under the guise of an anticommunism stance.

I am fully appreciative of the fact that U.S. policy in the postwar period has been to avoid precisely this development by seeking means of binding Germany more closely into a European community and integrating its military forces into a European command. Nonetheless, the danger has now become apparent that in the disarray that follows on the heels of the French withdrawal from NATO, the U.S. military leaders will seek to maintain a position of strength by alining themselves closely with the military forces of Germany— the only country that has shown itself willing to embark on the expanded military effort considered necessary under prevalent strategic doctrines.

Perhaps this makes sense from strictly the military viewpoint. If we are required to maintain large land armies on the European Continent, which I seriously question, then the United States must look to Germany for its principal support since only that country has shown its willingness to levy the kind of forces required under the outmoded concepts of conventional warfare on which our strategy is predicated. But what of the political consequences of a United States-German alliance? Will not the other European countries view the move of EUCOM to Germany as further evidence that Germany has become the principal ally of the United States?

I believe that it is not too late for the President to reconsider the transfer of EUCOM and earnestly urge that he have our Embassies in Europe canvass popular sentiment on this issue before he makes his decision final in this matter.

Returning to the matter of the effectiveness of NATO, my trip to Europe and the discussions I had with our top military leaders have reaffirmed the doubts I have had in accepting the administration playing down the significance of the French withdrawal from NATO. Contrary to what is being put out by our State Department, the loss of French forces and French soil to NATO is a major emasculation of that organization. Our military leaders in Europe can hardly imagine fighting a conventional war against the Soviet Union under circumstances in which they are deprived of the logistics base which France has provided in the past.

Let me cite two examples to indicate the seriousness of the French withdrawal from NATO and the consequent necessity for the United States to move its forces out of France by April 1, 1967. Oil and gasoline are the very lifeblood of modern military forces. Unless a steady supply of petroleum is assured, our forces cannot move in the air or on the ground. This vital requirement is now being met by a pipeline running from the French channel ports through France to NATO forces in West Germany. The pipeline also feeds, at a number of points, pipelines which run to the Benelux countries. On April 1, 1967, this pipeline, which was built entirely with U.S. funds, will come under the control of the French.

France, and particularly the Paris area, is the heart of our communications network in Europe and on to the Middle East. The impending loss of the heart of this network to the French threatens our entire command communication system from the United States all the way through to Pakistan. Numerous studies are now underway to find stopgap means of overcoming this loss.

The fact was mentioned earlier that the petroleum pipeline running through France was built entirely with U.S. funds despite the fact that it was designed to support NATO forces, and thus should have been funded jointly by NATO. Here is further evidence of the failure of the NATO countries to support effectively their organization. Data I obtained in Europe showed that the United States has had to spend out of its own pocket hundreds of millions of dollars if it wanted to construct all of the military bases and facilities it considered essential. The European NATO countries limited their contributions mainly to airfield, though in the case of the largest airfield constructed in France, the large complex at Chateauroux, construction costs were borne mainly by the United States.

The reason for the lack of European support for NATO, in terms of the resources the European countries are willing to contribute to that organization, is fairly obvious. As long as the United States is prepared to take on the lion's share of the burden of providing for the defense of Europe, there is little reason for Europe to do more than is absolutely necessary. But the consequences are to vitiate the purposes and objectives of the NATO alliance. With the United