to the evaluation of intelligence could make an important contribution to a consensus on the contingencies for which the Alliance should be prepared. III. Military Posture The North Atlantic Treaty does not commit the allies to a particular strategy or its derivative, a particular set of force goals. The commitment is to regard and resist an armed attack on one as an attack on all. As a normal thing, therefore, the allies have regularly reviewed strategy and force requirements against current appraisals of the Soviet threat. Unfortunately, the very premises of allied policy have had to be reconsidered because of De Gaulle's eviction notice to U.S. and NATO military facilities in France, and his pull-out of French forces from NATO's unified commands and coordinated military forces. NATO has certainly not been strengthened by the French actions, but the resulting difficulties are not insurmountable, given a determination by the fourteen allies to make the necessary adjustments. The fourteen have found a new site for SHAPE in Belgium and for AFCENT (Allied Forces, Center) in the Netherlands, and have decided to move the NATO Council and the Military Committee to Brussels. They are busy adapting communications, infrastructure and defense agencies to the new situation. The fourteen now meet as a Defense Planning Committee under the Council to conduct the military affairs of the Alliance. Quite apart from the sabot France has thrown into the NATO works, British and American balance-of-payment problems together with German budgetary difficulties have compelled a thorough study of the level of British and American forces in West Germany and the financing of their foreign exchange costs. Nuclear problems, including allied nuclear planning arrangements, have led to intensive discussions and among other things to the formation in NATO of two permanent groups for nuclear planning a policy body called the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee open to any NATO nation willing to participate in its work, and a Nuclear Planning Group of seven Defense Ministers, drawn from the full committee, to handle detailed work. Underway also is a new NATO-wide effort at joint force planning. Out of this process may emerge a consensus on strategy and force requirements suited to present and foreseeable needs. There is, however, always a danger that what starts as a review may end in reverses and loss of mutual confidence and strength. These matters need to be handled with the care appropriate to decisions that could endanger the hard-won European balance. The American military presence in Europe is still the hard nub of the Western deterrent. The chief purpose of the American troop commitment is political: to leave no doubt in Western Europe or in Moscow that the United States would be completely involved from the outset of any move against Western Europe. We want no uncertainty in the Kremlin about our intentions. It needs to be clear to the adversary that any act of aggression would be opposed by an effective American combat force, one capable of making a determined stand, so that the engagement would be from the start a Soviet American crisis, with all that implies, not just a European one. It is a sign of NATO's success that the nations of Europe *** We may lack strength, we may lack unity, we may lack adequate command arrangements, we may even lack the territory to provide any defense in depth, but what we still have and must keep is the physical presence of American troops in Europe in sufficient numbers to make clear that they are a real force, not a token force, and that, in case of military action, they are there to fight and not merely to sound an alarm * ** * The American divisions that we have there, if they are flexible, adaptable, mobile, and properly located, can make a very enormous difference as to whether things get out of hand or, instead, can be controlled. As The American troops, along with the European troops, are not there as a kind of hostage whose destruction would trigger a nuclear response. The Soviet Government cannot suppose that a large-scale attack on Western Europe could be even briefly restricted to conventional forces, and therefore, if a massive attack is to be made, it will surely begin with a nuclear strike against Western Europe and North America, not a march of great armies across NATO's eastern boundaries. The primary function of NATO's conventional forces, with their vital American component, is to meet a local crisis as effectively as they can, posing the continuous threat that if the crisis continues and enlarges, the risks of escalation continue and enlarge with it-in particular the risks of nuclear war. To perform this function NATO forces capable of containing a sizable, though limited, attack are required. Anything less would be a standing temptation to Soviet probes of allied mettle, and such probes would force the allies to retreat or to engage in brinkmanship, with all the risks either course would involve. It is sometimes said that if most of the American divisions now in Europe were brought home, they could be moved back in a crisis. This course would involve serious risks. For example: it would be useless against a sizable surprise attack from the East if only because the required airfields would probably be unavailable; it would necessarily make a large crisis out of a small one; it would require a dramatic and perhaps difficult political decision to put American troops back into Europe; it runs the danger that returning too few troops would look irresolute, while returning too many would look belligerent; it might be too slow to prevent a crisis from getting out of control. The mishandling by the West of a single emergency could profoundly alter the prospects for stability in Europe. And in an emergency we must be able, without any delay, to put military forces into small confrontations to hold ground, not give it, and thus to improve our diplomatic position. The need is for forces on the ready which can act without unnecessarily difficult political preparations. The ability of SACEUR to move conventional forces, with a strong American component, in several crises in Berlin was important to the successful management of those crises. General Norstad told the subcommittee: I was It is argued in some places that conventional forces were Indeed, NATO's conventional power is needed not only to respond to emergencies that Moscow would deliberately contrive, but also to deal with the unforeseeable contingencies that history sometimes contrives-border incidents, upheavals in satellite nations that splash over the line, and so forth. It is, of course, the combat capability of conventional forces that counts. With the advance of technology it may be possible to make some redeployment of combat garrisons and their logistic and support elements now on the Continent without reducing the capability needed to meet the problems of deterrence and initial front-line defense. In time new developments in strategic mobility-both air and sea-and in tactical mobility and firepower may further add to conventional capabilities thereby allowing some reduction in land. forces, although the experience in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam is not altogether encouraging in this respect. A technological advance by one side has often been offset by an advance on the other side. Moreover, if numbers are reduced by piecemeal cuts in NATOassigned units, the problem of preserving the organizational integrity and effectiveness of these units becomes more difficult. At least for the time being, any sizable cutback of American and British troops in Europe almost surely implies a greater reliance on nuclear weapons and their incorporation in military operations at a very early phase of hostilities. It is not self-evident that this would best serve the interests of the United States and its allies. Futhermore, force requirements are designed not only to contribute to deterrence and defense but also to fortify the diplomatic bargaining position of the West vis-à-vis the East, in particular to contribute to a controlled program of arms reduction and to a genuine European settlement. A critical question is the effect of a one-sided reduction in allied combat capability on the chances for a reciprocal East-West reduction in forces and for winning eventual Soviet acceptance of a stable European settlement. It is hard to see how the West can improve the bargaining position it has worked so long and hard to construct by weakening it-unilaterally. As the allies continue their search for answers to these questions a number of guiding principles seem pertinent: One. These delicate and complex issues should be examined and decided by all the NATO allies who wish to cooperate. The destiny and commitment of all Alliance members are involved. To exclude any member from the making of decisions on these vital issues would be to invite it, in effect, to exclude itself from the taking of actions flowing therefrom. Two. These questions are at the heart of effective force planning under the Council and its Defense Planning Committee. The Alliance agencies should not be bypassed by self-appointed groups. Three. The allies need a force on the central European front to which no one nation contributes a disproportionate share. Too large a West German contribution, for example, might help the Russians to nourish East European fears of Germany, prejudice West Germany's chances of improving its relations with Eastern Europe, and thus delay the working out of the future role of a reunified Germany in Europe. Four. The problem of allocating defense burdens among the allies challenges the sincerity of each ally in living up to its obligation under Article 3 of the Treaty for "continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid." The words of that obligation were purposely placed in the order of their importance: "self-help and mutual aid." In the years since World War II Americans have provided over $120 billion for the strengthening of the free world. Contrary to the notion of some critics, we do not expect gratitude. Now that our European allies are back on their feet with an earning power growing at a rate exceeding ours, we might reasonably expect this change to be reflected in the sharing of the defense burden. It is true, of course, that a rich, powerful nation usually has to make the greater sacrifice and usually is in the weakest bargaining position within any alliance that rests upon the sharing of responsibilities and Yet our European allies should recognize that there is inevitably a relation between their willingness to draw on the resources their expanding economies are providing, and the willingness of the American people to give solid support to the principle of mutual aid. As things stand, most Americans and most West Europeans recognize the need for a strong American combat force in Europe, but this attitude may change unless the European allies are willing, as they grow more prosperous, to assume a growing share of the costs of the common defense. To be sure, all of the allies face balance-of-payment or budgetary difficulties, some greater than others. It is not easy for any of them to meet the costs of defense. One pitfall to be avoided is clearly marked: pentagonal pressuring of an ally to buy more military hardware than is really useful. Mutually beneficial offsetting systems and other joint arrangements are needed to support a fair allocation. of defense tasks among all the allies. Five. These wide-ranging issues require patient, thorough consideration. They cannot be settled in haste, and still be settled wisely. Abrupt or unilateral changes would be unsettling and risk demoralizing friends and allies. If changes in force posture are to be made, they should flow from decisions by the Council or its Defense Planning Committee and should be executed with a view to minimizing the danger that their significance will be misinterpreted by the Soviet Union or by allied governments and publics. This applies with special emphasis to any reduction of British and American forces on the Continent. IV. East-West Relations In the circumstances that are emerging in Europe and the world it may be possible to give increased emphasis to East-West adjustments. The basic objective of allied policy in Europe is not strength for strength's sake, or to freeze the status quo, but to create an environment for a genuine European settlement serving the legitimate security interests of all concerned. The hope has been that one day security could be achieved on terms which would put a safe end to Europe's unhappy division. That day is not, unfortunately, at hand. The only kind of a settlement worth talking about is one reached with the consent of all parties and, as things stand, the minimum terms demanded by each side exceed the maximum the other side is willing to concede. The problem is obviously most difficult for Germany, for it is the one country through which the line of division runs. The psychological burden of imposed disunity weighs heavily. Although no one inside or outside Germany can now see a way to reunite the nation that would be acceptable to both East and West, no one in Germany can repudiate the goal. Nor can Germany's allies. Dean Acheson's testimony to the subcommittee in April 1966 suggested how much must be accomplished in improving the EastWest environment as a foundation of German reunification. He said: I would not start by trying to write peace programs, but by having East European countries share more in the life and industry and commerce of Europe. Insofar as Eastern Europe can be brought into the general European picture share in the new prosperity-this is an advantage. This creates a situation where you can move more freely. If this brings the Russians along, good. *** given a position where people are coming together, economically and politically, where you could reduce the worry over the military situation, where you could begin to talk about boundaries without scaring everyone out of their wits, you get places. As far ahead as one can see, progress toward a European settlement means a steady and progressive erosion of the importance of the line dividing Europe and partitioning Germany, rather than its dramatic erasure by a formal agreement at the summit. Expanded trade relations, closer diplomatic_ties, and better cultural, tourist and scientific contacts between East and West are possible. The Wall may be removed someday. If the division through Europe loses some of its significance, the outlines of a genuine settlement permitting German reunification may become visible. President Johnson's major policy speech on Europe in October 1966 proposed a greater effort in the direction of East-West reconciliation as a basis for Germany's peaceful reunification. The new West German Government is obviously thinking along the same lines, and has begun a long and delicate effort to recast its relations with Eastern |