The appropriation for the fiscal year 1915 referred to in the foregoing provision is found in the act of March 9, 1914 (38 Stat., 304), as follows:

"For pay of letter carriers, substitutes for carriers on annual leave, clerks in charge of substations, and tolls and ferriage, Rural Delivery Service, $53,000,000: Provided, That not to exceed $20,000 of the amount hereby appropriated may be used for compensation of clerks in charge of substations: Provided, That on and after July first, nineteen hundred and fourteen, letter carriers of the Rural Delivery Service shall receive a salary not exceeding $1,200 per annum."

The joint resolution of March 4, 1915 (38 Stat., 1227), to which reference is made in the foregoing act of July 28, 1916, contains the following provision:

"That on and after July first, nineteen hundred and fifteen, the compensation of each rural letter carrier for serving a rural route of twenty-four miles and over, six days in the week, shall be $1,200 per annum, payable monthly; on routes twenty miles and less than twenty-four miles, $1,152; on routes twenty miles and less than twenty-two miles, $1,080; on routes eighteen miles and less than twenty miles, $960; on routes sixteen miles and less than eighteen miles, $840; on routes fourteen miles and less than sixteen miles, $720; on routes twelve miles and less than fourteen miles, $672; on routes ten miles and less than twelve miles, $624; on routes eight miles and less than ten miles, $576; on routes six miles and less than eight miles, $528; on routes four miles and less than six miles, $480.

In a decision of this office dated January 6, 1916 (76 MS. Comp. Dec., 65), upon the application of one Cyrus C. Eaton for revision of the action of the Auditor for the Post Office Department, and wherein said Eaton claimed $76 as the difference between the sum received by him for service as rural letter carrier for the fiscal year 1915 and the maximum pay of $1,200, it was held that the act of March 9, 1914 (38 Stat., 304), providing that letter carriers of the Rural Delivery Service shall receive, after July 1, 1914, a salary not exceeding $1,200 per annum, authorized the Postmaster General to pay such amount, not exceeding the maximum stated, as he thought proper, and that the Postmaster General having exercised his discretion and fixed the pay of claimant, there was nothing further to be allowed by the accounting officers of the Treasury.

Prior to the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1914 (and at the time Congress passed the act of Mar. 9, 1914, providing that not exceeding $1,200 per annum should be paid during that fiscal year), the only factor considered by the Postmaster General in classifying and fixing the rates of compensation to be paid carriers was the length of the route served, but the Postmaster General's orders, effective July 1 and November 1, 1914, provided additional factors, the number of

pieces and weight of the mail, and time required to serve a route. The result was that some carriers received less than if the length of route only had been considered as in former years.

By the joint resolution of March 4, 1915, it was required that on and after July 1, 1915, the pay should be based only on the length of the route, the pay for routes of different lengths being specifically stated, thus fixing by law rates of pay that had been fixed in the discretion of the Postmaster General in former years.

In this state of the law; with knowledge of the orders of the Postmaster General adding additional factors in the computation of rates to be paid; and with knowledge of the decision of the Comptroller of the Treasury that after carriers had served during the fiscal year 1915, under rates fixed by the Postmaster General, they had no legal claim against the Government for anything in addition to the rates so fixed, Congress passed the provision in the act of July 28, 1916, the purpose and effect of which is the subject of this decision.

Said provision authorizes and directs payment to be made out of the appropriation for the fiscal year 1915. This involves the question you wish decided-whether the appropriation is made available therefor, the fiscal year to which it relates being past.

The reports of committees of Congress afford no aid in the interpretation of this provision. The discussions in the Senate and House of Representatives throw no light upon the subject, unless it be to indicate the desire of those urging the legislation, and of some other members, that the carriers should be paid. Under well-established rules, there is nothing in the proceedings that can be considered as an aid to interpretation. The opinions of individual Members of Congress as to the legal effect of the provision they proposed to enact could not be given weight even if those opinions agreed and the language of the provision was ambiguous.

While it seemed very clear to this office when rendering its decision of January 6, 1916, that the rural carriers then had no legal claim on the Government, and while they have none now by virtue only of the appropriation made for the fiscal year 1915, yet I think they have such a moral or equitable claim as would be within the power of Congress to recognize by directing payment from an appropriation. (United States v. Realty Co., 163 U. S. 427.)

It has been suggested that section 3690 of the Revised Statutes prohibits payment in this case.

That section provides:

"All balances of appropriations contained in the annual appropriation bills and made specifically for the service of any fiscal year, and remaining unexpended at the expiration of such fiscal year, shall only be applied to the payment of expenses properly incurred during that year, or to the fulfillment of contracts properly made within

that year; and balances not needed for such purposes shall be carried to the surplus fund. This section, however, shall not apply to appropriations known as permanent or indefinite appropriations."

Under this statute it is clear that the appropriation for the fiscai year 1915 has been unavailable since June 30, 1915, for use by executive officers in the payment of any expenses except those properly (legally) incurred during that year or in the fulfillment of contracts properly made within the year. The Postmaster General could not incur any obligations against that appropriation after June 30, 1915, and the accounting officers of the Treasury could not allow and pay any obligation if it were so incurred.

While section 3690 would thus limit the executive officers, it is not a limitation upon Congress, and the question we are now considering is whether Congress has indicated an intention which makes that statute inapplicable.

The Constitution prohibits money being drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law. Whether an appropriation is made by law is a matter for interpretation, and it is frequently necessary for the Comptroller to decide, before countersigning a warrant or taking action upon other cases officially before him, whether in fact an appropriation has been made.

The act of June 30, 1906 (34 Stat., 764), provides:

"No act of Congress hereafter passed shall be construed to make an appropriation out of the Treasury of the United States, or to authorize the execution of a contract involving the payment of money in excess of appropriations made by law, unless such act shall in specific terms declare an appropriation to be made or that a contract may be executed."

This is clearly a restriction on executive officers in their interpretation of the laws passed by Congress. Almost daily Congress passes some act requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to pay, "out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated," a certain amount to a named claimant. These have been construed to make an appropriation, although they do not " in specific terms declare an appropriation to be made" as required by the act of 1906. The reason for such construction no doubt has been that Congress can manifest a clear intention to make an appropriation in other language than that of the act of 1906 and to that extent take a case out of the rule established for executive officers by said act of 1906.

There is no question but that Congress has full power to direct that a current and available appropriation shall be used for purposes additional to or entirely foreign to those specified in the original appropriation. This authority is exercised frequently and is incidental to the power of Congress to appropriate the public money.

It is unnecessary that a current appropriation be reappropriated in order to be made available, under authority of a later law, for purposes other than those specified when the appropriation act was passed. This is a different question from the one involved in the present case. An appropriation for the service of the fiscal year ended June 30, 1915, was made by the act of March 9, 1914, and by the act of July 28, 1916, the Postmaster General is authorized and directed to make certain payments from it.

In the last analysis the question is: What was the purpose of Congress in passing the provision in the act of July 28, 1916? Statutory restrictions do not affect Congress; that body is restrained only by the Constitution. There is no question but that the appropriation for the fiscal year 1915 was made by law. A balance of more than $3,000,000 remains on the books of the Post Office Department unexpended. Congress by the last law has authorized and directed the Postmaster General to expend a part of this balance in making definite payments to a class of employees clearly described.

Whether the provision in the act of 1916 for these rural carriers be considered as a reappropriation of the 1915 appropriation, or as a suspension or modification for this purpose of the statutes restricting executive officers in the use of annual appropriations, the effect is the same. Congress having full power in the matter, its authorization and direction to use an appropriation theretofore legally made and still upon the books of the department is clearly within the power of the law-making body. Its authorization removes the bar of section 3690, Revised Statutes, and its direction is mandatory, relieving executive officers of responsibility and suspending their usual discretionary power in the use of appropriations.

A reappropriation in specific terms, unless limited to a particular purpose, would make the 1915 appropriation available generally. Congress might have specifically reappropriated such part of the 1915 appropriation as was necessary for the purpose of making these payments. Such language is not used, but there could be given no meaning to the word "authorized" unless its purpose be to remove the limitation on the Postmaster General and the accounting officers of the Treasury contained in section 3690.

The duties of the Comptroller and other accounting officers are statutory. This is true also of the duties of the Postmaster General. It can not be said, therefore, that when by law the Postmaster General is authorized and directed to make a certain payment from an appropriation theretofore made, either an accounting officer or the Postmaster General is justified in refusing to act in accordance with the direction of law merely because earlier statutes have limited their action and would prevent them from making the payments if the authorization and direction had not been made.

I have the honor to answer in the affirmative the inquiry whether you can now order paid to rural carriers from the appropriation made for the fiscal year 1915 an additional sum for services for that year, such sum being the difference between what they received for their said services and the amount that would have been paid to them in accordance with the proviso contained in the joint resolution of March 4, 1915, that is, at the rates therein fixed.

TRAVELING EXPENSES OF UNITED STATES MARSHALS IN RE VOID WARRANTS.

A United States marshal does not lose his right to reimbursement of traveling expenses incurred in an unsuccessful endeavor to serve a warrant, solely by reason of the fact that the commission as a United States commissioner of the person issuing the warrant had expired, provided that there was nothing on the face of the warrant to indicate that fact.

Comptroller Warwick to James S. Magee, United States marshal, Scranton, Pa., September 8, 1916:

I have your letter of August 23, 1916, requesting decision upon the matter submitted by you as follows:

"I am advised by the Attorney General to submit to you for decision the matter of the payment of the expenses of one of my deputies in the following case:

"On August 5th, 1916, warrants for the arrest of Philip Snowiss et al., charging them with conspiracy to defraud their creditors in bankruptcy proceedings, were placed in our hands for service. The warrants were forwarded to Deputy Marshal Harvey T. Smith at Harrisburg, and on the 7th inst. he went to Tioga County, were the defendants reside, for the purpose of making the arrests. When he arrived at Wellsboro, after having traveled a distance of 172 miles, he found awaiting him a telegram from A. R. Jackson, Esq., attorney in the case, at whose instance the warrants had been issued, directing him not to make the arrests as the warrants were illegal by reason of the fact that the commission of U. S. Commissioner W. Ď. Crocker, who had issued them, had previously expired. Deputy Smith accordingly returned to Williamsport, handed over the warrants unserved to Attorney Jackson, as directed, and then returned to his headquarters in Harrisburg. His expenses for the trip amount to $12.18.

"Please render a decision as to whether these expenses of Deputy Smith are properly payable by me out of United States funds, the same as in the case of an ordinary unsuccessful endeavor,' and if not so payable, who should be held responsible for same-the U. S. commissioner or Attorney Jackson?"

From the facts submitted, apparently there was nothing on the face of the warrants indicating that they were issued by a commissioner whose term of office had expired.

The term of the commissioner expired June 20, 1916, and he was reappointed August 8, 1916. As far as the deputy was concerned,