in Rome.

1

versy between the Stoics and the other two schools turning not on the determination of the particulars of Virtue and Duty, but on the question of the degree in which Virtue was sufficient for Wellbeing. In both cases this tendency to Eclecticism was favoured by the spread of Greek philosophy in cultivated circles at Rome; since the practical Roman mind could not easily be brought to a genuine and earnest acceptance either of scepticism or of the more paradoxical positions of the Stoics.

$ 19. In the history of Greco-Roman civilisation the introducPhilosophy tion of Hellenic philosophy into Rome-along with other elements of Hellenism-is a change of great moment; but in the development of ethical theory its importance is of a secondary kind, as the Romans never emerged from the state of discipleship to Greek teachers—at least as regards fundamental points of philosophical doctrine. Indeed a certain indisposition in the Roman intellect to philosophy appears in the efforts made at first to exclude the new thought. In 161 B.C. a decree of the Senate forbade "philosophers and rhetoricians" to reside in Rome ; and Plutarch (Cato Major, chap. xxii.) has described the aversion produced in the mind of the elder Cato by the philosophic embassy six years later-to which I before referred. But the invasion was found irresistible; first Epicureanism gained hearers and followers among Romans open to new ideas; not long after, Stoicism was represented in Rome by Panatius, who remained there for several years and was admitted to the intimacy of Scipio and Lælius;

1 The orthodox opponents of Stoicism-Academics or Peripatetics --do not seem to have ever disputed the absolute preferability of Virtue to all competing objects of desire, nor even its sufficiency for Wellbeing in some degree; but only its sufficiency for perfect Wellbeing.

4

B.C.)

early in the 1st century we find Philo there, teaching a semi-sceptical phase of Academic doctrine; nor were Peripatetics wanting. One of the greatest works of Roman. literature the poem of Lucretius-gives evidence of the genuine and intense enthusiasm with which Epicureanism was welcomed by a certain class of minds in Rome; it does not, however, seem to have been the hedonistic view of ultimate good which attracted Lucretius, but rather the efficacy of the atomistic explanation of the physical world to give tranquillity of soul by banishing superstitious fears. The Academy, in its sceptical or its eclectic phase,1 had a still more famous Roman advocate in Cicero; whose work, Cicero (106-43 if we were studying the history of ethical literature, would claim a large share of our attention,—since there is probably no ancient treatise which has done more than his De officiis to communicate a knowledge of ancient morality to medieval and modern Europe. But in the development of ethical doctrine the importance of Cicero is comparatively small, since he scarcely exhibits any real independence of philosophic thought; indeed his own claim-and he is not usually over-modest is that he has presented his fellow-countrymen with Greek philosophy in a Roman dress. He declares himself a disciple of the sceptical Academy; but the chief significance of this adhesion-in Ethics at least-seems to have been that he felt relieved from the necessity of making up his mind finally on the controversy between the limited and the unlimited advocacy of the claims of Virtue to constitute or confer happiness. At any rate the chief part of 1 Cicero declares himself to belong to the Academy regarded as maintaining Scepticism ; but his adhesion to the sceptical position seems to have been of a broad and unphilosophical kind and in ethics, with which we are here concerned, he is certainly rather eclectic than sceptical. "constitute or confer happiness,” because it seems to me

2 I say

2

the contents of the above-mentioned treatise on (external) duties, is simply taken from the Stoic Panatius, and may be regarded as a specimen of the practical teaching of Stoicism in its eclectic phase. We may note certain leading features of this doctrine, the framework of which is supplied by the old scheme of four cardinal virtues. In defining the sphere of Wisdom something is conceded to the Aristotelian advocacy of the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, though speculation is still subordinated to action. (2) Along with, but distinct from, the strict Justice that bids men mutually abstain from unprovoked harm, respect property, and fulfil contracts, is placed Beneficence or Liberality, manifested in rendering to all men such services as can be given without sacrifice, and aiding more largely those bound to us by closer tiesfellow-citizens, kinsmen in various degrees, friends, benefactors, and especially the Fatherland, which has the strongest claim of all. (3) Under the head of Fortitude or Greatness of Soul two different qualities are distinguished as praiseworthy, the philosopher's contempt of external things and events, and the spirit that impels the man of action to difficult and dangerous enterprises. Finally (4), the fourth virtue, Temperance, is conceived as the realisation in a special sphere of "propriety" or "becomingness,” which, in a wider sense, is an aspect or accompaniment of all virtue. It is further noteworthy that, in a popular treatment of ethics, Stoicism, as represented by Panatius, did not disdain to discus's the "expediency" (utile)—in a vulgar sense of

clear that Cicero-unlike (at least) the earlier Stoics-understands evdaiμovía or beata vita to be a result produced by virtuous action, not something of which virtuous action is the sole or main element. See De Finibus, V. viii. 23.

conduct, as distinct from its moral goodness (honestum);1 and especially to enforce the duties of mutual kindness by an exposition of the resulting worldly advantages to those who fulfil them. It seems even to have allowed that there were cases of apparent conflict between expediency and virtue, deserving of careful consideration: it was held, of course, that virtue was always truly expedient, but it was an open question how far the realisation of virtue involved the sacrifice of the agent's worldly interests to social duty-e.g. it was disputed how far a trader in bargaining was bound to disclose circumstances materially affecting the value of his

wares.

It is, however, in jurisprudence rather than philosophy that the independent contribution of Rome to the development of human thought is mainly to be found; accordingly, the most interesting manifestation of the Stoic influence on Cicero is given when he comes to treat of morality in its jural aspect. We have already noted, as a prominent feature of Stoicism, the conception of a law binding upon man as a rational being and a member of the great cosmic commonwealth of all rational beings,—a law divine and eternal, and so superior in dignity and validity to the laws of particular political societies. In giving prominence to this conception, Stoicism furnished the transition from the old Greek view of ethics, in which the notions of Good and Virtue were taken as fundamental, to the modern view in which ethics is conceived as primarily a study of the "moral code”; and in this transition the part taken by Cicero is of great historical importance. For this idea of an immutable law emanating

1 In this rendering of kaλóv the old generic meaning of "beautiful " is dropped and the more distinctly ethical signification "noble" or "honourable" alone expressed.

H

§ 20. Roman Stoicism.

from God, Reason, or Nature, was apprehended by Cicero with more real assimilation than most of the philosophical notions which he endeavoured to transfer from Greek to Roman thought; the most ethically impressive passages in his writings are those in which he speaks of this law,-conceived sometimes objectively as a code, valid for all at all times and places, superior in authority to any positive legislation that may conflict with it; sometimes subjectively as Supreme Reason, implanted in the mind of each man at birth, and, when duly developed, commanding him unmistakably what he is to do or forbear. Through Cicero primarily, aided by later writers more avowedly Stoical, this conception of Natural Law obtained currency among Roman jurists; and, blending with the already established notion of a law common to all nations, which the Roman genius for law-making had gradually developed to meet the actually felt needs of commercial intercourse with foreigners, it became the recognised source of what jurists call the "Equity" of Rome. Then, many centuries afterwards, when the study of Roman jurisprudence had revived in the later period of the Middle Ages, this conception received a fresh importance, and became, as we shall see, the leading or cardinal conception of modern ethical speculation in its first stage.

Stoicism then, among all the products of Greek speculation, was that with which the moral consciousness of Rome had most real affinity; and accordingly it is in this school that we seem to trace most distinctly a reaction of the Roman mind on the doctrine it received from Greece;1 the

1 I ought not here to overlook the one avowedly independent school of ethical thought which presents itself in Rome as of native originthe school of the Sextii; the founder of which, Quintus Sextius, was born about 70 B.C. It does not, however, appear to have had sufficient philosophic independence or importance to deserve more than a passing