comes to have the essentially ethical character that especial interests us in Platonism. For though Plato's philosop is concerned with the whole universe of being, the ultima object of his philosophic contemplation is still “the good conceived as the ultimate ground of all being and know ledge. That is, the essence of the universe is identifie with its end, the "formal" with the "final" cause things, to use the later Aristotelian phraseology. He comes this about?

Perhaps we may best explain this by recurring to th original application of the Socratic method to human affair Since all rational activity is for some end, the different ar or functions into which human industry is divided a naturally defined by a statement of their ends or uses; an similarly, in giving an account of the different artists an functionaries, we necessarily state their end, "what they a good for." It is only so far as they realise this end th they are what we call them. A painter who cannot pai is, as we say, "no painter"; or, to take a favourite Socrat illustration, a ruler is essentially one who realises the we being of the ruled; if he fails to do this, he is not, proper speaking, a ruler at all. And in a society well-ordered © Socratic principles, every human being would be put : some use; the essence of his life would consist in doi what he was good for. But again, it is easy to extend th view throughout the whole region of organised life; an e that does not attain its end by seeing is without the essen of an eye. In short, we may say of all organs and instr ments that they are what we think them in proportion they fulfil their function and attain their end: if, then, conceive the whole universe organically, as a compl adaptation of means to ends, we shall understand how Pla

might hold that all things really were, or (as we say) "realsed their idea," in proportion as they accomplished the pecial end or good for which they were adapted. But this pecial end, again, can only be really good so far as it is reated to the ultimate end or good of the whole, as one of the means or particulars by or in which this is partially realised. If, then, the essence or reality of each part of the organised world is to be found in its particular end or good, the ultimate ground of all reality must be found in the ultimate end or good of the universe. And if this is the ground of all reality, the knowledge of it must also be the source of all guidance for human life; for man, as part and miniature of the Cosmos, can have no good, as he can have no being, which is not derived from the good and being of the universe. Thus Plato, without definitely abandoning the Socratic limitaion of philosophy to the study of human good, has deepened he conception of human good until the quest of it takes n the earlier inquiry into the essential nature of the external world, from which Socrates turned away. Even Socrates, n spite of his aversion to physics, was led by pious reflecion to expound a teleological view of the physical universe, s ordered in all its parts by Divine Wisdom for the realisaion of some divine end; what Plato did was to identify this Divine End—conceived as the very Divine Being itself—with he Good that Socrates sought, of which the knowledge would i olve all problems of human life. In this fusion of Socratic thics with Socratic theology, he was probably anticipated ›y Euclides of Megara, who held that the one real being s"that which we call by many names, Good, Wisdom, Reason, or God”; to which Plato, raising to a loftier signifiance the Socratic identification of the beautiful with the iseful, added the further name of Absolute Beauty; explain

ing how man's love of the beautiful, elevated gradually from flesh to spirit, from the individual to the general, ultimate reveals itself as the yearning of the soul for the end an essence of all life and being.

Let us conceive, then, that Plato has taken this vas stride of thought, and identified the ultimate notions ethics and ontology. We have now to see what attitud this will lead him to adopt towards the practical inquiri from which he started. What will now be his view c wisdom, virtue, pleasure, and their relation to human we being?

It!

The answer to this question is inevitably somewh complicated. In the first place we have to observe the philosophy has now passed from the market-place in the study or lecture-room. The quest of Socrates was it the true art of conduct for an ordinary member of t human society, a man living a practical life among h fellows. But if the objects of abstract thought constitu the real world, of which this world of individual things but a shadow, it is plain that the highest, most real li must lie in the former region and not in the latter. in contemplating the abstract reality which concrete thin obscurely exhibit, the type or ideal which they imperfect imitate, that the true life of the Mind in man must consist and, as man is most truly man in proportion as he is min that desire of one's own good, which Plato, following Socrate held to be permanent and essential in every living thir becomes in its highest form the philosophic yearning_fr knowledge. This yearning, he held, springs—like mo sensual impulses-from a sense of want of somethin formerly possessed, of which there remains a latent memor in the soul, strong in proportion to its philosophic capacity.

thence it is that in learning any abstract truth by scientific demonstration we merely make explicit what we already implicitly know; we bring into clear consciousness hidden memories of a state in which the soul looked upon Reality and Good face to face, before the lapse that imprisoned her in an alien body and mingled her true nature with fleshly feelings and impulses. We thus reach the paradox that Plato enforced in more than one of his most impressive dialogues, that the true art of living is really an "art of dying" as far as possible to mere sense, in order more fully to exist in intimate union with absolute goodness and beauty. On the other hand, in so far as this philosophic abstraction from ordinary human interests can never be complete-since the philosopher must still live and act in the concrete sensible world-the Socratic identification of wisdom and virtue is fully maintained by Plato. Only he who apprehends good in its abstract reality can imitate it in such transient and imperfect good as admits of being realised in human life; and it is impossible, having this knowledge, that he should not act on it, whether in private or public affairs; true knowledge of Good necessarily carries with it\ a preference for the Best, whenever alternatives are presented for rational choice. Thus, in the true philosopher, we shall necessarily find the practically good man, he who being "likest of men to the gods is best loved by them"; and also the perfect statesman, if only the conditions of his society allow him a sphere for exercising his statesmanship.

The general characteristics of this practical goodness, in Plato's matured philosophy, are determined by the fundamental conceptions in his view of the universe. The soul of man, in its good or normal condition, must be ordered and harmonised under the government of Reason.

The

§ 6. Plato's

theory of

Virtue.

question then arises, "Wherein does this order or harmer precisely consist?" In explaining how Plato was led answer this question, it will be well to notice that, whi faithfully maintaining the Socratic doctrine that the high virtue was inseparable from knowledge of the good, he h come, as his conception of this knowledge deepened a expanded, to recognise an inferior kind of virtue, possess: by men who were not philosophers. It is plain that if ± good that is to be known is the ultimate ground of whole of things, so that the knowledge of it includes other knowledge, it is only attainable by a select and car fully trained few, and we can hardly restrict all virtue these alone. What account, then, was to be given of ordi ary "civic" bravery, temperance, and justice? It seem clear that men who did their duty, resisting the seduction of fear and desire, must have right opinions, if not kno ledge, as to the good and evil in human life; but wher comes this right "opinion"? Partly, Plato said, it com by nature and "divine allotment"; but for its adequa development "custom and practice" are required. Here the paramount importance of education and discipline, which physical and æsthetic training must co-operate, civic virtue of the best kind. But such moral culture not only required for those minds who cannot rise abo

1 Plato seems to have distinguished different kinds of unphilosoph virtue, having very different moral values, though he nowhere gives systematic view of their differences; the lowest is that of the vul prudence which abstains from sensual vice, not from moral aversion but from a calculation that abstinence will bring a balance of pleasure the highest is that exhibited by an unphilosophic mind whose “spirit element" has been duly trained under the guidance of Philosophy. interesting discussion of these differences will be found in Mr. Arche Hind's edition of the Phado, Appendix I.