CHAPTER I

GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE SUBJECT

THERE is some difficulty in defining the subject of Ethics in a manner which can fairly claim general acceptance; since its nature and relations are variously understood by writers of different schools, and are in consequence conceived somewhat indefinitely by educated persons in general. It has therefore seemed to me best, in this introductory chapter, first to develop gradually the different views which the human mind has been led to take of the objects of ethical inquiry, and its relations to cognate subjects such as Theology, Politics, and Psychology; and then to conclude with a statement on these points, and an account of the chief divisions of the subject, which I shall aim at making at once as neutral and as comprehensive as possible.

the Ulti

The derivation of the term is to some extent misleading; § 1. Ethics; for Ethics (Oká) originally meant what relates to character the study of as distinct from intellect; but the qualities of character vices constituted only one eletreatise of Aristotle which this

which we call virtues and
ment in the subject of the
term was used to denote. According to the Aristotelian
view-which is that of Greek philosophy generally, and has

B

mate Good

of man.

been widely taken in later times the primary subject of ethical investigation is all that is included under the notion of what is ultimately good or desirable for man; all that is reasonably chosen or sought by him, not as a means to some ulterior end, but for itself. The qualification "for man" distinguish is important to distinguish the subject-matter of Ethics from that Absolute Good or Good of the Universe, which may the study of be stated as the subject-matter of Theology—taking "Theo

ed from

Theology,

Absolute

Good.

§ 2. Ethics partially

ed from Politics.

logy" in a wide sense, as involving only the assumption of some ultimate end or Good, to the realisation of which the whole process of the world, as empirically known to us, is somehow a means, but not necessarily connecting Personality with this end or Good. This distinction between Ethics and Theology was not, however, reached at once and without effort in the development of Ethical reflection; indeed in Platonism, as we shall see, Ethics and Theology were indissolubly blended. Nor, again, must the distinction be taken to imply a complete separation of the two subjects; on the contrary, in almost every philosophical system in which the universe is contemplated as having an ultimate end or Good, the good of human beings is conceived as either identical with, or included in, this Universal Good— or at any rate closely related to it in the way of resemblance or derivation.

But further, in the definition above given, Ethics is not distinguish yet clearly distinguished from Politics; for Politics is also concerned with the Good or Welfare of men, so far as they are members of states. And in fact the term Ethics is sometimes used, even by modern writers, in a wide sense, so as to include at least a part of Politics-viz. the consideration of the ultimate end or Good of the state, and the general standard or criterion for determining the goodness

or badness of political institutions. It is, however, also current in a narrower sense-equivalent to the qualified term "Private Ethics," which is sometimes preferred—as a study of the Good or Wellbeing of man, so far as this is attainable by the rational activity of individuals as such. This latter is the meaning to which the term is, in the main, restricted in the historical sketch that follows; at the same time I have not tried to draw a sharp division between the two subjects, the connection of which, in many at least of the systems with which we have to deal, is conceived as very close and intimate. The difficulty of separating them is easily seen, whether we approach the boundary between them from the ethical or from the political side. On the one hand, individual men are almost universally members of some political or governed community; what we call their virtues are chiefly exhibited in their dealings with their fellows, and their most prominent pleasures and pains are derived in whole or in part from their relations to other human beings: thus most of those who consider either Virtue or Pleasure to be the sole or chief constituent of an individual's highest good would agree that this good is not to be sought in a life of monastic isolation, and without regard to the wellbeing of his community; they would admit that private ethics has a political department. On the other hand, it would be generally agreed that a statesman's main ultimate aim should be to promote the wellbeing of his fellowcitizens, present and to come, considered as individuals: so that the investigation of the particulars of this wellbeing must be an integral part of Politics. Still we may, to a great extent, study the elements and conditions of the good of individual men, so far as it is attainable by the rational activity of themselves or other individuals acting as private

§ 3. Ethics

and Psychology.

persons, without considering the manner in which the structure and functions of government should be determined with a view to the same end; it is, then, to the former of these subjects, as distinct from the latter, that attention will be primarily directed in the following pages.

When, however, we thus as far as possible isolate in thought the individual man for the purposes of ethical contemplation, a different relation of Ethics comes prominently into view its relation, namely, to Psychology, the study of the human soul or mind. Reflection soon makes it appear that the chief good of man cannot consist in anything external and material, such as wealth; nor even in mere bodily health, which experience shows to be compatible with extreme badness and wretchedness. It would seem, indeed, that we commonly judge men to be good or bad -courageous, just, temperate, or their opposites-from a consideration of the external effects of their actions; still, in the first place, reflective persons generally are agreed that such judgments are liable to be superficial and erroneous, and that a certain state of the agent's mind, a certain quality of intention, purpose, motive, or disposition, is required to constitute an act morally good; and secondly, when we analyse in their turn the external consequences above mentioned, we find that what are really judged to be ultimately good or bad are almost always either effects on the feelings of men or other sentient beings, or effects on human character and volition. Hence almost all ethical schools would agree that the main object of their investigation must belong to the psychical side of human life; whether (1) they hold that man's ultimate end is to be found in psychical existence regarded as merely sentient and emotional, identifying it with some species of desirable feeling or Pleasure,

or the genus or sum of such feelings; or whether (2) they rather maintain that the wellbeing of the mind must lie solely or chiefly in the quality of its activity-its Virtue. And when we attempt to work out either view into a clear and complete system, we are led inevitably to further psychological study, either (1) in order to examine different kinds and degrees of pleasure and pain, or (2) to determine the nature and mutual relations of the different virtues or good qualities of character, and their opposites. Again, I have spoken of man's good as being the object of rational choice or aim; meaning thereby to distinguish it from the objects of merely sensual and emotional impulses, which are liable to prompt to action opposed to the agent's true good, as he conceives it. But this conception of "Reason choosing" or "impelling" is found on reflection to be involved in difficulties; it appears to some that the ultimate impulse to action is always given, not by Intellect, but by Feeling; hence careful psychological analysis is found to be necessary to make clear the normal operation of Intellect in the action which we call reasonable, and especially its relation to the desires and aversions that arise at least in partindependently of reason, and appear to conflict with it. Further, in the course of the controversy that moralists have carried on as to what is truly good or desirable—the fundamental nature of which has already been indicated— appeal has continually been made to experience of men's ! actual desires; on the assumption that what is truly desirable for a man may be identified with what he desires naturally, or permanently, or on the whole. Thus in various ways ethical questions lead inevitably to psychological discussions; in fact, we may say that all important ethical notions are also psychological; except perhaps the fundamental anti