vessels, and her troops showed a menacing attitude in Florida and Texas. France, the ally of Spain, was demanding that the United States government prevent trade with the rebellious portions of San Domingo.11 No step was taken to continue negotiations with France until the meeting of Congress. Jefferson's message of December 3 described the situation; he expressed the hope that peace might be maintained, but recommended that preparation for war be made. This recommendation was intended to satisfy the public and warn the foreign powers. But the President had no intention of appealing to force except as a last resort. On December 6 he sent a special message which was received behind closed doors. He detailed the course of negotiations with Spain, explained the attitude of France, and advised that negotiations be reopened. He stated that war was improbable but that force, interposed to a certain degree, might contribute to advance the object of peace.115 Congress was thus placed in an ambiguous position. If war were declared, the President would get the credit, and war was popular with the public. If the policy of further negotiation were adopted, Congress would be blamed. Randolph, the Democratic leader of the House, proved factious. He proposed to humble Madison, and began a policy of obstruction. In spite of his powerful opposition, the administration rallied enough votes to obtain an appropriation of two million dollars to be used in the coming negotiations. Events both in America and Europe seemed to conspire to defeat the policy of Jefferson. A violent quarrel broke out between Yrujo and Madison. The adventurer Miranda was received by the Secretary of State to the great anoyance of the Spanish government. Burr's schemes were also known to Spain. The three incidents, following the Pinckney embroglio and the 114 Henry Adams, History of the United States, III, 91; McCaleb, The Aaron Burr Conspiracy, 105-106; State Papers, Foreign Relations, II, 726. 115 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I, 382-390. Map 13. I. Madison's first Neutral Ground proposal of March 13, 1806. II. Madison's second Neutral Ground proposal of March 13, 1806. European Situation in 1806-1807 43 Monroe mission, were most unpropitious for the reopening of negotiations. Furthermore, conditions on the border and the high seas were closely akin to war. On the continent the war against the third coalition had broken out. Ulm had capitulated and the battle of Austerlitz had been fought. But the French and Spanish fleets had been defeated at Trafalgar, leaving Napoleon helpless on the sea. In May, 1806, England declared the coast from the mouth of the Elbe to Brest in a state of blockade. In October Prussia was defeated at Jena, and immediately after Napoleon issued his Berlin Decree. In February, 1807, he was checked at Eylau, but in June the decisive victory of Friedland humbled Russia, resulting in the peace of Tilsit. England's Orders in Council were answered by the Milan Decree, by which Napoleon hoped to throttle his enemy.116 No assistance could be expected from France unless the United States complied with her commercial decrees, and this meant war with England. From this dilemma Jefferson saw but one way out, namely, a nonintercourse policy.117 A For over six months Armstrong was kept in suspense. Finally in March, 1806, Madison wrote to him and to Bowdoin that the government had determined to appeal to France. projet of a treaty was enclosed. The first article was to the effect that Spain was to acknowledge the American claim to West Florida and to cede East Florida and the adjacent islands; or, if Spain objected to the acknowledgment of this claim, both Floridas were to be ceded. The third article dealt with the western boundary. If possible, the Guadalupe was to be the line, but if unattainable, the Colorado to its source, thence a right line directly or indirectly to the Mississippi or Missouri, 116 Henry Adams, History of the United States, III, 132-139, 184-189; Robertson, in Am. Hist. Assoc., Ann. Rpt., 1907, I, 361-375; McCaleb, The Aaron Burr Conspiracy, 39-40; Fournier, Napoleon I, I, 340-465; Sloane, The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte, 11, 354-467; Cambridge Modern History, IX, 208-293, 360-368. 117 Henry Adams, History of the United States, IV, 152-177. and thence along the highlands as far as they bordered on the Spanish possessions. A neutral ground was to be established, thirty leagues on either side of the Guadalupe or Colorado, or thirty leagues on the American side only, or extending from one of those rivers to some river between the Colorado and the Sabine. If all these were rejected, the eastern boundary of the neutral zone might commence at the Sabine and run from the source of that river to the confluence of the Osage and Missouri rivers, thence parallel with the Mississippi to the latitude of its most northerly source, and thence following a meridian to the northern boundary of Louisiana.118 Jefferson contemplated sending Wilson C. Nicholas to assist in the negotiations, but Nicholas refused the appointment and affairs were left in the hands of Armstrong and Bowdoin.119 The The instructions reached Armstrong on May 1, and he immediately communicated their contents to Talleyrand. Unknown to his minister, the Emperor had been conducting a secret negotiation with Spain. Napoleon immediately informed Talleyrand that Charles IV would not dispose of the Floridas. minister communicated this to Armstrong, at the same time telling him that Godoy had informed him that Bowdoin had betrayed certain confidential proposals of the previous year. The result was a quarrel between the American negotiators which destroyed unity of action. A few weeks later Armstrong made a second attempt. Talleyrand assisted him by writing to the French representative at Madrid, "If Spain is not bent on preserving this colony, she may listen to the American propositions." For the time being, Armstrong believed that affairs had taken a favorable turn. On September 30 he wrote to Yzquierdo, a Spanish agent at Paris, that he understood that Charles IV had appointed him to treat with the Americans. But his fancied 118 State Papers, Foreign Relations, III, 539-541. 119 Jefferson, Writings (Ford, ed.), VIII, 434–435 note. 436-438. |