CONTRACTS-LEGALITY-VIOLATION OF STATUTE.-SUNFLOWER LUMBER Co. v. TURNER SUPPLY CO., 48 So. 510 (Ala.).—Held, that when statutory conditions for the conduct of business are not complied with, agreements made in the course of the business are void if the conditions are made for the benefit of the public, but valid if the conditions are for revenue purposes, even though a specific penalty is imposed.

In determining whether contracts made in the course of a business in which statutory conditions have not been fulfilled are valid, the intent of the Legislature is to be found in the language of the statute or in the purpose sought to be accomplished. Miller v. Ammon, 145 U. S. 421. Many cases hold that, if the language of the statute simply imposes a penalty without a direct prohibition to enter upon the contract, the mere penalty does not invalidate the contract. Johnson v. Hudson, 11 East 180; Rahter v. Nat. Bank of Lancaster, 92 Pa. St. 393. But many other courts hold that the imposition of a penalty implies a prohibition. Miller v. Post, 83 Mass. 434; Aiken v. Blaisdell, 41 Vt. 655. The purpose of the statute, therefore, is the better criterion. It is generally held that, if the object of the statute is to facilitate the collection of revenue, contracts made in variance with it are nevertheless valid; but, if the purpose is to protect public health or morals or to prevent fraud, such contracts are void. Lindsey v. Rutherford, 56 Ky. 245; Mandebaum v. Gregovitch, 17 Nev. 87.

CRIMINAL LAW-HEARSAY EVIDENCE-CONFESSION THROUGH INTERPRETER. PEOPLE V. RANDAZZIO, 87 N. E. 112 (N. Y.).—Held, that the transcript of stenographic notes of an alleged confession claimed to have been made by the accused in the district attorney's office through an interpreter who swore that he had correctly interpreted was not inadmissible as hearsay because the interpreter was not selected by the defendant, but by the district attorney.

When an interpreter has been selected by one person to make a communication to another, the interpreter is regarded as the agent of the first, and accordingly the statements of. the interpreter are admissible as original evidence and are not hearsay. Camerlin v. Palmer Co., 10 Allen (Mass.) 539; McCormick v. Fuller, 56 Iowa 43. Where the interpreter has been employed by the party other than the one making the communication, both parties are presumed to have constituted the interpreter their joint agent. Commonwealth v. Vose, 157 Mass. 393. In the case of Commonwealth v. Storti, 177 Mass. 339, a confession was admitted in evidence under conditions analogous to those in the present case on the ground that it was the best evidence. It is to be noted, however, that it is always necessary that the interpreter, unless he is dead, insane or out of reach of process, be present at the trial and testify to the correctness of the translation. State v. Noyes, 36 Conn. 80; State v. Abbatto, 64 N. J. L. 658.

CRIMINAL LAW-NEW TRIAL-MISCONDUCT OF JURORS-USE OF LIQUOR. -BILTON V. TERRITORY, 99 PAC. 163 (Okla.).—Held, that the use of intoxi

cating liquor as a beverage by a juror during the trial and consideration of a capital case will vitiate a verdict of guilty, and entitle the accused to a new trial.

The general rule of law on this point seems to be that the use of intoxicating liquors by the jury, or a juror, is not ground for a new trial in the absence of any showing that injurious consequences resulted therefrom. Jones v. People, 6 Colo. 452. The fact that some of the jurors drank intoxicating liquor during the trial raises a presumption against the validity of the verdict which may be rebutted by proof that the jurors were not intoxicated. State v. Madigan, 57 Minn. 425. But many cases hold that secret drinking of intoxicating liquor by the jury in the jury room is such misconduct as throws the burden on the state of proving, on a motion by the prisoner for a new trial, that he was not injured thereby. State v. Greer, 22 W. Va. 800. And the modern tendency seems to be that the courts will not inquire whether the juror was affected by what he drank, for the only safeguard to purity and correctness of the verdict is that no drinking shall be allowed. Davis v. State, 35 Ind. 496; Pelham v. Page, 6 Ark. 535. And this is especially true in capital cases. People v. Douglass, 4 Cow. 26 (S. C.). In Texas and Iowa no drinking at all is allowed. Jones v. State, 13 Tex., 168; State v. Baldy, 17 Iowa 39.

DOWER-ESTATES AND INTERESTS SUBJECT-ASSIGNMENT.-BAKER V. BAGG, ET AL., 114 N. Y. SUPP. 660.-Held, that where a son, prior to his father's death, had assigned all of the interest in the estate of the father which he might acquire after his death, the wife of the son had no dower in the real estate of the father which descended to the son, subject to the right of the assignee.

To entitle a wife to dower, the husband must, during coverture, have been seised, either in fact or in law of an estate of inheritance. Phelps v. Phelps, 143 N. Y. 197. This seisin also must be a beneficial seisin. Maybury v. Brien, 15 Pet. (U. S.) 21; Gully v. Ray, 57 Ky. 107. And, where the husband serves merely as a conduit, through which title passes to a third party, it is held that he is not beneficially seised. I Washburn, Real Prop., 188, 6th ed.; Fontaine v. Boatmen's Sav. Inst., 57 Mo. 552.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-COMPENSATION-SERVICES AS ATTORNEY.-ORDINARY V. CONNOLLY, et al., 72 ÅtL. 363 (N. J.).—Held, that an administrator, who is an attorney, and who prosecutes a suit at law upon the bond of a former administrator, is entitled to a counsel fee as well as taxed costs to be included in the assessment of damages upon a judgment recovered on the bond against the derelict administrator and his surety.

One line of decisions holds that where a proper administration of an estate requires professional services the executors or administrators may themselves perform such necessary services as attorneys, and be entitled to resonable compensation therefor. Teague v. Corbitt, 57 Ala. 607. On the other hand, many courts have adopted the doctrine that no allowance can be made to an attorney for professional services rendered an estate

of which he is administrator. Willard v. Bassett, 27 Ill. 37. A trustee can make no profit out of his office, for the reason that he shall not be placed in any position where his interest may be opposed to duty. Hough v. Harvay, 71 Ill. 72. Nor can he recover for professional services even when the costs are not payable out of the trust funds. In re Reed, 12 N. Y. St. Rep. 139. When counsel fees are allowed to an administrator they are not the usual professional charges, but a fair and reasonable allowance in view of all the facts of the particular case. Clark v. Knox, 70 Ala. 529.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-TRANSFERS INVALID-INSOLVENCY.-TRANSFER AS SECURITY.-GODFREY FRANK & Co., ET al., v. Doughty, 47 So. 643 (Miss.).—Held, that though a grantor was financially embarrassed and was indebted to others when he executed a deed of trust on land to his wife, who was also a creditor, the trust deed being for the grantee's sole benefit to secure a valid debt without any benefit being reserved to the grantor, was not in fraud of the other creditors.

The general rule is that no debtor can legally make any conveyance which will place his property beyond the reach of his creditors without their consent. De Wolf v. Sprague Manufacturing Co., 49 Conn, 282. However, a failing or insolvent debtor may select one or more of his creditors and pay them in full to the exclusion of any others, provided he retains no benefit himself beyond what the law allows or secures to him. McDowell v. Steele, 29 Fed. 738. But should the preferred creditor be the wife of the debtor, the courts will scrutinize the transaction very closely and any conveyance under such circumstances must clearly appear to be made in good faith and for valuable consideration. First Nat. Bank v. Bartlett, 8 Neb. 319. The burden of proof in such a case rests on the grantee to show a consideration not materially disproportionate to the value of the land conveyed. McTeers v. Perkins, 106 Ala. 411. Contra: Grant v. Ward, 64 Me. 239.

HIGHWAYS-FRIGHTENING HORSes-Negligence.-JOHN F. DAVIS & SON V. THORNBURG, 62 S. W. 1088 (N. C.).—Held, that the defendants were not liable for leaving a broken-down traction engine on the side of the highway unless they had unreasonably delayed in repairing and removing it.

Most of the courts hold that such objects left within the limits of the highway, but outside the traveled way, are defects merely from their tendency to frighten horses, Cooley on Torts, Students' Edition, Sec. 372; Morse v. Richmond, 41 Vt. 435; but it is immaterial whether the object is within or without the limits of the highway. House v. Metcalf, 27 Conn. 631. The following objects have been held to constitute such defects: A load of machinery left by the roadside, Bennett v. Lovel, 12 R. I. 166; a white cloth used as a hay cap near the road, Lynn v. Hooper, 93 Me. 46; and a hollow log, blackened by fire, on the side of the highway, Foshay v. Glen Haven, 25 Wis. 288. Some courts, however, hold that an object in the highway is not to be deemed a defect for the sole reason that it is of a nature to frighten horses, Kingsbury v. Dedham, 95 Mass. 186; but it

must be calculated to frighten ordinarily gentle and well trained horses. Poilet v. Simmons, 106 Pa. St. 95. Still other courts hold that it is not an actionable defect unless the traveler actually comes into contact with the object. Cook v. Charlestown, 98 Mass. 80; contra: Bartlett v. Hoockett, 48 N. H. 18.

HOMICIDE-DUTY TO RETREAT.-MILLER V. STATE, 119 N. W. 850 (WIS.).-Held, that the common law rule as to the duty of one attacked to "retreat to the wall" or so far as he can, or so far that to go further would rather increase than decrease the danger, is no longer the law.

The doctrine of "retreat to the wall" had its origin before the general introduction of fire-arms and to-day seems to be considered obsolete or loosely construed in the majority of states. The idea of retreat is lost in the greater question, did the defendant, when assaulted, believe or have reason to believe that the use of a deadly weapon was necessary to his own safety. Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80; Philips v. Commonwealth, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 328. Even where the courts are more strict in their application of this rule, the suddenness of the attack, the peril of exposing the person during flight, of endangering a third party, and the fact that those in a position of peril are not called upon to weigh with a nicety the question of what is the proper line of action, is taken into consideration. People v. Fiori, 108 N. Y. S. 416; People v. Macard, 73 Mich. 15; People v. Harper, 2 Wheeler Cr. Cas. 347. At variance with the more general modern tendency is the old common law rule that no one is excused for taking human life if with safety to his own person he I could have retired from the combat. This more peaceable view is still held in many jurisdictions. State v. Honey, 65 Atl. 764 (Del.); People v. Mallon, 189 N. Y. 520; State v. Kennedy, 91 N. C. 572.

HOMICIDE UNLAWFUL ARREST-RIGHT TO RESIST.-PERDUE V. STATE, 63 S. E. 922 (GA.).—Held, that a citizen whom it is attempted unlawfully to arrest has a right to resist force with force proportionate to that being used to arrest him; and if, in the exercise of such right of resistance, he kills an officer who is unlawfully attempting to arrest him he is guilty of no offense. Powell, J., dissenting.

A large number of jurisdictions hold with the above case, that no crime is committed in the killing of an officer while resisting unlawful arrest. Simmerman v. State, 14 Nebr. 568; State v. Oliver, 2 Houst. (Del.) 585; Starr v. U. S., 153 U. S. 614. Other courts hold that there must be danger of bodily harm to the defendant before the killing of a person attempting to make an illegal arrest becomes justifiable. State v. Row, 81 Iowa 138; Bowling v. Commonwaelth, 7 Ky. L. Rep. 821; State v. Cantieny, 34 Minn. 1. In Williams v. State, 44 Ala. 41, it is held that it is the duty of a person to submit to the illegal arrest and seek redress at law. On the other hand the English courts and those in some American jurisdictions hold that when a police officer is slain while attempting to make an unlawful arrest, the offense is reduced from murder to man

slaughter. Reg. v. Lockley, 4 Fost. & F. 155; Rex. v. Thompson, I Moody C. C. 80; State v. Scheele, 57 Conn. 307.

INSURANCE LIFE INSURANCE-EXECUTION OF INSURED FOR CRIME. MCCUE v. N. W. MUT. LIFE INS. Co., 167 FED. 435-Held, that as the laws of Wisconsin govern in this case the rule laid down by the Wisconsin courts must be followed and so the fact that the insured was executed for a crime did not bar a recovery on the policy by his heirs, where it contained no provision excluding such risk. Waddill, Dist. J., dissenting.

The courts are about evenly divided on this point. Some hold that the legal execution of the insured for a crime committed by him is no defense to a suit for his policy in the absence of any provision of the policy exempting the company from liability in that event. Collins v. Metro. Ins. Co., 232 Ill. 37. While others hold that where the insured has been convicted and executed for his crime the beneficiaries cannot recover on the insurance policy. Burt v. Union Cent. Ins. Co., 187 U. S. 362. Public policy will not permit a recovery by heirs through wrong of insured. Schreiner v. High Court, 35 Ill. App. 576. But it is stated that the liability of the insurer is not avoided on the ground of public policy by the fact, that the insured is executed for a crime. Greenhood on Public Policy, pp. 1, 2.

MASTER AND SERVANT-IDENTITY OF EMPLOYER-INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.-BOWIE V. COFFIN VALVE Co., 86 N. E. 914 (MASS.).—Held, that unless an employee knew he was working for an independent contractor no relation of employer and employee existed between the employee and the contractor, since he could not be transferred from one employer to another without his consent, expressly given or implied.

The general rule in these cases seems to be that he who agrees to furnish the completed work through servants over whom he retains control is responsible for their negligence in the conduct of it. Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 81 C. C. A. 399; Higgins v. Western U. T. Co., 156 N. Y. 75. And the mere fact that a contractor's servant is sent to do work pointed out to him by the owner will not make him a servant of the owner. Driscoll v. Towle, 181 Mass. 416; neither will the owner's right to inspect the work, Pack v. N. Y., 4 Seld. 222 (N. Y.); nor payment of wages by the owner, The Harold, 21 Fed. Rep. 428; nor the fact that the contractor's servants and the master's servants are engaged in a common employment, Morgan v. Smith, 159 Mass. 570. But a general servant of one person may, for a particular occasion, become the servant of another, Delaware L. & W. Ry Co. v. Hardy, 59 N. J. L. 35; and for the particular employment he is the servant of the other, Hasty v. Sears, 157 Mass. 123. Though in all cases it seems the servant must consent to the transfer and accept the other person as his master. Ward v. New England Fibre Co., 154 Mass. 419.

MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO THIRD PARTIES-INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR-LIABILITY OF EMPloyer-Blasting.-KENDALL V. JOHNSON,