show that the gift was the free and voluntary act of the donor. Whipple v. Barton, 63 N. H. 613; Parker v. Parker (N. J.), 16 Atl. 537. It is not necessary to show by absolute evidence that undue influence was exerted by donee at the time gift was made. Scars v. Shafer, 2 Selden (N. Y.) 268. And a donee before accepting a gift must satisfy himself that donor had no family ties or that he was determined to disregard them. Ford v. Hennessy, 70 Mo. 580. But some cases hold gifts by fraud or imposition are voidable only, and by one specially injured. Norris v. Norris, 3 Ind. App. 500.

HUSBAND AND WIFE-WIFE'S SERVICES-RIGHT OF HUSBAND TO RECOVER. GORMAN v. N. Y. C. & ST. L. R. Co., 113 N. Y. SUPP.-Held, that in an action for injury to his son, plaintiff can recover the value of his wife's services in nursing the son. Williams, J., dissenting.

The prevailing rule seems to be that where plaintiff is nursed by members of his own family no action will lie for recovery of damages for the value of the services thus rendered. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Holland, 122 Ill. 461; Morris v. Grand Ave. R. Co., 144 Mo. 500. A case upholding this rule is where services rendered plaintiff by her daughter who made no charge for such services, could not be brought in as ground for damages when said plaintiff was suing a railroad company for an injury to herself. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Johnson, 24 Ill. App. 468. It has been held, however, that in an action for damages resulting from personal injuries, a defendant is liable for the reasonable value of medical attendance, care and nursing made necessary by the accident, although not actually paid. Gries v. Zeck, 24 Ohio St. 329; and also though such services may, as between the plaintiff and the person rendering them have been gratuitous. Varnham v. City of Council Bluffs, 52 Ia. 698.

INFANTS-SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY-AVOIDANCE-RETURN OF CONSIDERATION.-HUGHES V. MURPHY, 63 S. E. 1248 (Ga.).—Held, that the rule which requires the restitution of the consideration in order to disaffirm an infant's contract applies only to the right of the infant himself after he becomes of age and elects to disaffirm a contract made by him during his minority, and that a guardian bringing a suit to recover the possession of personal property which his ward has sold, is not required to return the consideration received by the ward.

At common law to give effect to an infant's disaffirmance of his contract, it is not necessary that the other party should be placed in statu quo. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 45 Ind. 142; Ruchmzky v. DeHaven, 97 Pa. 202. But it has been held in a few cases, that an infant vendor to recover back his property must refund what he has received, and there can be no right of recovery so long as any part of the consideration is withheld. Stout v. Merrill, 35 Ia. 227; Chambers v. Jones, 72 Ill. 275. But the general rule of law is that when disaffirming a deed because of infancy when made, the party must return so much of the consideration received as remains in his possession at the time of election, but he is not required to return an equivalent for such part as may have been disposed of during minority. Bloomer v. Nolan, 36 Neb. 51; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 12 Ia. 195; Reynolds v. McCurry, 100 Ill. 356. In accord with the case at hand it is

held, that the guardian of an adult may avoid any conveyance of property executed by his ward while a minor, which might be avoided by the ward himself if capable of exercising the right, and if money paid to the minor as consideration for his conveyance of real estate has been wasted or spent by him during his minority, payment of the amount is not necessary to enable his guardian to avoid the conveyance. Chandler v. Simmons, 97 Mass. 508.

INDIANS-ACTIONS JURISDICTION OF STATE.-Deragon v. SERO, 118 N. W. 839 (WIS.).-Held, the laws of the state for the peace and good order of people within its boundaries extend over Indian reservations, and apply to infractions of such laws, whether by Indians or others.

The general rule is that the federal courts have jurisdiction over all Indians, for, regarding them as wards of the nation, the United States has full power to pass such laws as may be necessary to their full protection and may punish all offences committed against them or by them within the reservation. U. S. v. Thomas, 151 U. S. 577. And it is held that the state courts have no jurisdiction in such cases. State v. Kagarua, 23 Cent. L. J. 420; In re Cross, 20 Neb. 417; State v. McKenney, 18 Nev. 182. But when an Indian has severed his tribal relations he may be prosecuted in the courts of the state whether the crime is committed within or without the reservation. State v. Williams, 13 Wash. 335. And if the crime is not by an Indian against an Indian whether on or off the reservation, the state courts have jurisdiction. Marion v. State, 16 Neb. 349.

MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO THIRD PERSONS-MISCONDUCT OF SERVANT.-HOGLE V. H. H. FRANKLIN MFG. Co., 112 N. Y. SUPP. 881.Held, that the general rule that a master is not liable for a malicious act of his servant, not done within the scope of his employment, does not relieve the master from his own neglect to use reasonable means to prevent a dangerous practise carried on by workman under his control and on his premises. McLennan, P. J., dissenting.

The master is usually not liable for the wilful and malicious acts of his servant done outside of the course and scope of the employment. Collins v. Alabama Great Southern Ry. Co., 104 Ala. 390. The liability of the master is determined by the doctrine of respondeat superior, which is founded on the power of control and direction which the superior has a right to exercise and which for the safety of other persons he is bound to exercise over the acts of his subordinates. 1 Blackstone Comm., 431. A man can only use his property in such a manner as constitutes a reasonable exercise of dominion, having regard to all interests affected and having also in view public policy. Booth v. Rome, etc., Ry. Co., 140 N. Y. 267. But the mere fact that a wrongful act occurred upon his property will not make the doctrine of respondeat superior apply. Herbstritt v. Lacka. Lumber Co., 212 Pa. St. 495. Where, however, the master has notice of a dangerous practise being carried on by his employees and he does not take reasonable care to prevent it, he will be liable, regardless of whether it was malicious or in the scope of employment. Snow v. Fitchburg Railroad, 136 Mass. 552. Under such circumstances the master's permission is implied. Brannock v. Elmore, 114 Mo. 55.

MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO SERVant—AccidentAL OR IMPROBABLE INJURY.-NELSON-BETHEL CLOTHING Co. v. PITTS, 114 S. W. 331 (Ky.).—Held, that a manufacturing company operating a number of sewing machines, the belts of which were passed over a shaft, was not bound to anticipate that an operator of a machine would get her hair caught in the shaft while stooping down to connect the belt of her machine with the shaft.

The prevailing American doctrine is that, for an injury which results from pure accident, or from causes which could not reasonably be anticipated, unaccompanied by want or ordinary care on the part of the master, he is not liable. Earnshaw v. Western Stone Co., 200 Ill. 220; McKee v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 83 Ia. 616; Moncuso v. Cataract Constr. Co., 34 N. Y. Supp. 273. The master must use ordinary diligence in providing safe machinery and secure places of employment for his servants; Frank v. Otis, 15 N. Y. St. Rep. 681; Hallower v. Henley, 6 Cal. 209; but the duty resting upon the master does not go to the extent of requiring him to make accidental injuries impossible. Richards v. Rough, 53 Mich. 212; Siogren v. Hall, 53 Mich. 274. If a servant knows, or by the exercise of ordinary care, might know, of the danger, continuance in service without objection results in a waiver and assumption of the risk; Hoben v. Burlington & M. River R. Co., 20 Ia. 562; Muldowney v. Ill. Central R. Co., Ia. 615; and some courts have gone so far as to hold that a servant assumes the risk when he is under virtual compulsion. Mahoney v. Dore, 155 Mass. 513; Samson v. Am. Axe & Tool Co., 177 Mass. 144.

MURDER EVIDENCE. PEOPLE V. GOVERNALE, 86 N. E. 554 (N. Y.).— Where an officer was shot while attempting to arrest the accused, who had shot another person, held, that evidence of the latter shooting is inadmissible in a prosecution for the former, to prove the accused guilty of the crime charged.

Evidence tending to prove a similar but distinct offence from that for which the accused is being tried is not admissible for the purpose of raising an inference that he committed the crime of which he is accused. Bishop v. People, 194 Ill. 365. Evidence tending to prove other criminal acts, in order to support the probabilities of the evidence that the accused committed the particular act charged, is incompetent. People v. Wilson, 141 N. Y. 185; Boyd v. U. S., 142 U. S. 450. Evidence of a distinct, independent, substantive offence cannot be admitted at the trial for another and different offence. But whether the facts amount to proof of a crime other than that charged, and there is ground to believe that the crime charged grew out of it, such facts may be proved to show the quo animo of the accused. Farris v. People, 129 Ill. 521; Commonwealth v. Ferrigan, 44 Pa. St. 386; State v. Lapage, 57 N. H. 245; Mayer v. People, 80 N. Y. 364. And, evidence of other transactions, otherwise material and relevant, is not inadmissible merely because it tends to prove another crime. People v. Van Tassel, 156 N. Y. 561; Hope v. People, 83 N. Y. 418. Evidence tending to prove material facts is admissible, although it may also tend to prove the commission of another offence. Rice on Evidence, Vol. III, § 155; Starkie on Evidence, Vol. II, § 380.

NEGLIGENCE-IMPUTED NEgligence-GuEST OF AUTOMOBILE DRIVER.— CHADBOURNE V. SPRINGFIELD ST. RY. Co., 85 N. E. 737 (MASS.).—Held, where plaintiff, who was inexperienced in the operation of an automobile, was injured while riding as the guest of an experienced driver, in a collision between the automobile and a street car, there being no mutuality in a common enterprise between them, the driver's negligence, if any, was not imputable to plaintiff.

The negligence of the driver of a wagon wherein plaintiff was a passenger by invitation precluded plaintiff from recovering of a railroad company for injuries from a collision at a crossing. Payne v. C., R. I. & Pac. R. R. Co., 39 Ia. 52; Slater v. B. C. R. & B. Ry. Co., 71 Ia. 209; Whittaker v. City of Helena, 14 Mont. 124; Omaha & R. V. Ry. Co. v. Talbot, 48 Neb. 627. The weight of authority, however, holds that where the plaintiff rides in the vehicle of another, neither exercising nor assuming any control over the movements of the team, the driver does not become the agent of the plaintiff so that negligence contributing to an injury can be attributed. U. P. Co. v. Lapsley, 51 Fed. 174; Strauss v. Newburgh Ry., 39 N. Y. Supp. 998.

PARENT AND CHILD CUSTODY AND CONTROL OF CHILD RIGHT OF FATHER OF CHILD.-SUARENS ET AL. V. SUARENS, 97 PAC. 968.-Held, that where a father was a well-to-do farmer, and was an educated man, and had no immoral habits, and his second wife was well educated and of good character, the court properly awarded to him the custody of a child by his first wife, though the home furnished by the grand-parents of the child was in some respects better than the home of the father.

The old common law rule gave the custody of children to the father as against the mother, and especially as against third persons. Johnson v. Terry, 34 Conn. 395. Yet the father may deprive himself of this right by unfitness or voluntary transfer of his right to custody. Bently v. Terry, 59 Ga. 555. And unless a sufficient reason is shown, the transfer is irrevocable. James v. Cleghorn, 54 Ga. 9; State v. Barney, 14 R. I. 62. The child will never be restored unless for its own benefit. People v. Lohman, 17 Att. Prac. 395. And the state can take the child from the father, if he is an unfit person. Reynolds v. Howe, 51 Conn. 472; Cincinnati House of Refuge v. Ryan, 37 Ohio St. 197. But the father cannot be deprived of access to his child. Matter of Jacquest, 46 N. Y. Misc. 575. And always the welfare of the child is the principal factor in determining its custody. U. S. v. Green, 3 Mass. 482; Kelsey v. Green, 69 Conn. 291.

PAROL LICENSES-RevocatioN.-YEAGER V. TUNING, 86 N. E. 657 (OHIO). The plaintiff and the defendant agreed orally to construct a telephone line over and across their respective lands, to enable them to have telephonic communication with each other, and with persons on other lines. The line, as agreed upon, was built, was of a permanent nature, and of the value of $250.00. The defendant three years afterward, cut the wire and rendered the line useless. Held, that such an agreement created merely a parol license, revocable at will. Davis, J., dissenting.

Many of the authorities hold that a parol license cannot be revoked, after the licensee relying thereon has made expenditures. Smith v. Green, 109 Cal. 228. Even though there be no consideration given for the privilege. School Dist. v. Lindsey, 47 Mo. App. 134. Some of the courts hold that the doctrine of estoppel prevents the licensor from revoking in such instances. Campbell v. Indianapolis & V. R. Co., 110 Ind. 490. Others, however, hold that the license may be revoked after a reasonable opportunity has been given to remove improvements made. Kivett v. McKeittian, 90 N. C. 106. But in many instances, the question of expenditure, consideration and notice has been disregarded, and it is held that the licensor may revoke at will. Thoemke v. Fielder, 91 Wis. 386.

NEGLIGENCE.

RAILROADS-ACCIDENTS AT CROSSINGS-CONTRIBUTORY Kurt v. Lake SHORE & M. S. Ry. Co., 111 N. Y. SUPP. 859.—Held, that a person, going before daylight around a train obstructing a crossing, is not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in failing to see a train on another track, backing at great speed without signals or other warning and without lights except such as are usually placed at the back end of trains. McLennan, P. J. and Spring, J., dissenting.

To be innocent of contributory negligence in such cases, the injured must have exercised that degree of care which the danger of the particular crossing requires of an ordinarily prudent person. Fitzhugh v. Boston & Maine R. R. Co., 80 N. E. 792. The almost universal rule is that one must both look and listen vigilantly; Salter v. Utica & B. R. Co., 75 N. Y. 273; and continuously until out of danger. Thompson v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 33 Hun. 16. One is not bound, however, to see or hear the danger; Greany v. L. I. R. Co., 101 N. Y. 419, and a pedestrian who had looked and listened and who was struck in the night time by a train backing rapidly without lights or signals, was held not to be guilty of contributory negligence. Garran v. Mich. Cent. R. Co., 144 Mich. 26. Leaving a street crossing in order to pass a train which is blocking the same, does not constitute contributory negligence. Robinson v. Western Pac. R. Co., 48 Cal. 409.

RAILROADS-INJURIES TO A TRESPASSER.-MORRIS v. GEORGIA R. & BANKING Co., 62 S. E. 579 (GA.).-Plaintiff was riding on the engine of a passenger train by invitation of the conductor, engineer and fireman, and without paying or intending to pay any fare. It did not appear that there was any custom permitting persons to so ride. Held, that plaintiff was a trespasser, and that his widow had no cause of action against the company.

A master is liable for the acts of his servants, done in the course of their employment, although they are done in disobedience of the master's orders. Philadelphia & Reading R. R. Co. v. Derby, 55 U. S. 468; IVood on Railroads, p. 1382. But most of the authorities say that a conductor is not authorized to invite a person to ride without paying a fare. And it is not within the scope of his employment to invite a person to ride on the engine. Files v. Boston & Albany R. R., 149 Mass. 204. Accordingly, there is no liability on the company in such an instance. Railway Co. v. Cox, 66 Ohio St. 276. Especially, if defendant knew that the rules of the