RECENT CASES

ALIEN-PERSONS WHO MAY BECOME CITIZENS BY NATURALIZATIONALIEN WIFE OF FOREIGNER.-IN RE RIONDA, 164 FED. 368.-Held, an alien woman, married to an alien, although residing in this country and otherwise qualified, cannot become a citizen of the United States by naturalization.

The wife of an alien becomes a citizen upon the naturalization of her husband. People v. Newell, 38 Hum. 78. And it makes no difference whether the husband's naturalization takes place before or after the marriage. Kane v. McCarthy, 63 N. C. 299. The political status of the wife is the same as that of her husband. Pequignot v. Detroit, 16 Fed. 211; Comitis v. Parkerson, 22 L. R. A. 148. But in Priest v. Cummings, 16 Wend. 617, it was held that an alien wife may be naturalized without the concurrence of her husband. The relation of husband and wife is not inconsistent with one being an alien and the other a citizen. Comitis v. Parkerson, 22 L. R. A. 148.

ANIMALS-MAD DOGS-OWNER'S LIABILITY FOR INJURY.-VAN Etten v. NOYES, 112 N. Y. SUPP. 888.-Held, that while the owner of domestic animals, such as cattle, is generally liable for the unwarrantable entry by his animal upon another's land, one who owns or harbors a dog is not liable in trespass every time it goes upon another's land, the general rule being that the owner is not liable for harm done by his dog, unless it was of a mischievous disposition or vicious propensity, and the owner previously knew thereof, or was chargeable with notice that the dog was harmfully disposed; and hence, an owner is not liable for injury inflicted by a mad dog, where she did not know or have any reason to believe that the dog was mad, or had a vicious nature or harmful disposition. McLennan, P. J., dissenting in part.

The above ruling follows the weight of authority. Dolph v. Ferris, 7 W. and S. (Pa.) 317; Van Leuven v. Lyke, 1 N. Y. 515. There is, however, no absolute liability for trespasses of dogs, because their trespasses are not usually injurious to property. Brown v. Giles, 1 C. & P. 118. Contra: Beckwith v. Shordike, 4 Burrows 2092. To hold the owner liable he must know of the dog's vicious propensities. Koney v. Ward, 2 Daly 295; Vrooman v. Lawyer, 13 Johns 339. Scienter is the gist of the action. Fairchild v. Bently, 30 Barb. 147. And the fact that the injury is the first actually inflicted by dog is not a good defense. Rider v. White, 65 N. Y. 54.

BILLS AND NOTES-NEGOTIABLE NOTE-EXTENSION OF TIME OF PAYMENT. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF POMEROY, IA. v. BUTTERY, 116 N. W. 341 (N. D.).-A note by its terms was payable on or before a date named and contained a clause, "the maker's and indorser's consent that the time of its payment may be extended without notice," held, to be negotiable. Morgan, C. J., dissenting.

According to the Law Merchant, a note in order to be negotiable

must be payable unconditionally and at some fixed period of time. Walker v. Woolen, 54 Ind. 164. And the writers say, that if a note contains a provision that the payee or his assigns may extend the time of payment, its negotiability is destroyed. Daniel on Negotiable Inst. 5th Ed. p. 49. Nearly all the courts hold that such a provision in a note destroys its negotiability. Second National Bank v. Wheeler, 75 Mich. 546; Woodbury v. Roberts, 59 Ia. 348. But contrary to the weight of authority, it has been held in one jurisdiction, that such a provision does not destroy the negotiability of a note. City National Bank v. Goodloe-McClelland Com. Co., 93 Mo. App. 123.

BILLS AND NOTES-PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT-PRESENTMENT BY TELEPHONE.-Gilpin v. Savage, 112 N. Y. SUPP. 802.-Where a note was made payable at the home of the maker on a certain street, and at maturity he was called up there by telephone and asked what he was going to do about it, and replied that he could not pay it, and was informed that the note would be protested, held, that the demand over the telephone was a sufficient presentation for payment, the statutory right of the maker to the exhibition of the note being waived by his failure to insist thereon.

It is well settled that the right to an actual presentment of the note when payment is demanded is waived by failure to ask for it, and declining to pay the note on other grounds than its non-presentment. Waring v. Betts, 90 Va. 46. And it has always been the rule that where a bill or note is made payable at a particular place, it is necessary that the demand of payment should be made at the place specified. Smith v. McLean, 4 N. C. 509. That a demand over the telephone connected with the place specified is a proper demand, is the subject of judicial decision for the first time in the case at hand. But though there is no previous direct authority for this decision, it is quite consistent with decisions in other cases in which the courts have recognized the telephone as a business necessity. Wolfe v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 97 Mo. 473; Nat. Bank v. Smith, 21 Pa. Co. Ct. 1.

- INJURIES PERSON

ACCOMPANYING

CARRIERS PASSENGER.- Cole's ADMINISTRATOR V. CHESAPEAKE & O. RY. Co., 113 S. W. (Ky.) 822.-Held, a carrier is not liable for the death of one who falls from a moving train after accompanying a passenger into the car, in the absence of evidence that its servants had either actual or constructive notice that deceased intended to leave the train and did not intend to take passage thereon.

One who goes to a train in charge of a lady and child, is entitled to sufficient time to enable him to escort her to a seat and to then leave the train, and the railway company is liable for injuries sustained by him where the employees failed to notify him to get off. Doss v. Mo. K., 59 Mo. 270. A person who boarded a train merely to assist another to a seat, must give notice of his intention to get off in order to hold the company liable for not giving him time to get off. Dillingham v. Pierce, 31 S. W. 203 (Tex.); Yarnell v. K., C., Ft. S. & M. Ry. Co., 113 Mo. 520.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.-Corrigan v. KANSAS CITY, III S. W. 115.-The charter of the city of Kansas City

authorized the imposing of a special tax for park purposes on all the real estate exclusive of improvements; and under such provision of the charter an ordinance was passed which imposed a tax only on so much of the real estate as was taxable for general city purposes; the result being the omission of church, city and railroad properties. Held, that such ordinance did not deny the property owners taxed thereunder the equal protection of the law within the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Burgess, Graves and Woodsen, J. J., dissenting.

This decision is apparently a departure from the doctrine laid down by the courts of this country, that an ordinance which involves official discretion as to whom rights and liabilities shall vest, is void, offending as it does the Fourteenth Amendment. St. Louis v. Heitzberg Packing Co., 141 Mo. 375; In re Wo Lee, 26 Fed. 471. Legislation discriminating against some and favoring others, is prohibited. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27. A law which exempts all property of like nature or condition, falling naturally into a particular class does not necessarily offend constitutional provisions. Pacific Express Co. v. Siebert, 142 U. S. 351. But an arbitrary classification of property or persons for the purpose of taxation is not permitted. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 33 Fed. 121.

LAW-TAXATION-FAILURE

CONSTITUTIONAL ΤΟ LIST PROPERTY.— TRAVELER'S INS. Co. v. BOARD OF ASSESSORS ET AL., 47 So. 439 (La.).— Held, that the state may subject to the doom of the assessors a taxpayer who has failed to furnish a list of his property to the assessor as required by law, but not where the failure to make such return was without fraudulent intent and from an honest belief that what property he had was not taxable.

Statutes requiring taxpayers to furnish a list of their taxable property to the assessor, and subjecting them to the doom of the assessor for a failure or refusal to do so, have in the past been regarded as valid. Lincoln v. City of Worcester, 8 Cush. 55; State v. Apgar, 31 N. J. L. 358. Even statutes imposing penalties other than estoppel from questioning the valuation of the assessor, have been upheld by some courts. Fox's Appeal, 112 Pa. St. 337. The principal case, however, follows the rule recently laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States, which is that, where one acts in good faith, such statutes do not afford due process of the law within the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Central of Georgia Ry. v. Wright, 207 U. S. 127. The principles upon which that decision is based, are that the assessment of a tax is a judicial act, and therefore, before the assessment on omitted property can be made, notice to the taxpayer, with opportunity to be heard somewhere in the process is essential. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; Security Trust & Safety VaultCo. v. City of Lexington, 203 U. S. 323.

Deeds Delivery-Necessity.-FORTUNE V. HUNT, 63 S. E. (N. C.) 82.-Where the grantor gave the deed to a third person with a direction to take and keep it, and, if the grantor never called for it, to deliver it to the grantee, and the grantor died without more being done, held, that there was no delivery of the deed and that the intention of the grantor that the instrument should be good as a deed would not take the place

of delivery, and make it operative. Delivery is to a large extent, a question of intention. Crain v. Wright, 114 N. Y. 307. If the grantor intended to divest himself of the title the delivery is good. Miller v. Lullman, 81 Mo. 311. But delivery of a deed to be valid must be such as deprives the grantor of all control of the instrument. Porter v. Woodhouse, 59 Conn. 568. Accordingly, it is generally held that regardless of intention, there is no delivery when a deed is given to a third party to deliver to the grantee unless called for by the grantor in the meantime. Harman v. Harman, 70 Fed. 894. Further, since delivery is the act of the grantor by which he expresses his intention to divest himself of title, it must be made during his life. Richardson v. Woodstock Iron Co., 90 Ala. 266.

DEEDS EXECUTION IN BLANK-INSERTIONS OF NAME AFTER DELIVERY. -EMSTEIN V. HOLLADAY-KLOTZ LAND AND LUMBER Co., II S. W. 859 (Mo.).—Held, that the delivery of the deed with the name of the grantee left blank, with parol authority to the purchaser to fill in the blank, passes title to the land, even though the name of the subsequent grantee is inserted after delivery.

The general rule is that a deed for land is invalid when it is acknowledged and delivered without the name of the grantee appearing therein. Whitaker v. Miller, 83 Ill. 381. But the grantor may authorize some one by parol to fill in the grantee's name before delivery. Cribben v. Deal, 21 Or. 211; Devlin on Deeds, Sect. 456. And some jurisdictions require this authority to be in writing. Upton v. Archer, 41 Cal. 85. In either case when not inserted before delivery, the deed passes no interest. Allen v. Withrow, 110 U. S. 119. Analogous to the case at hand, one jurisdiction held, that if a party delivers a deed duly executed with parol authority to fill blanks, he is estopped from denying its validity against a subsequent purchaser for value without notice. Ragsdale v. Robinson, 48 Tex. 379.

DISCOVERY-PHYSICAL EXAMINATION-POWER OF COURT.-LARSON V. SALT LAKE CITY ET AL., 97 Pac. 483 (Utah).—Held, that in the absence of a statute authorizing it, a court of law has no power to compel one suing for a personal injury to submit to a physical examination by a physician appointed by the court.

The decisions are not uniform, but there is a weight of authority in favor of the power of the trial courts to issue such an order, under proper restrictions. Graves v. Battle Creek, 95 Mich. 266; Miami & Montgomery Turnpike Co. v. Baily, 37 Ohio St. 104. Some of the foremost tribunals in this country, however, including the Supreme Court of the United States, have held that the court has no such inherent power, and in the absence of statutes cannot compel a physical examination. Camden & Suburban R. Co. v. Stetson, 177 U. S. 172; McQuigan v. D., L. & W. R. Co., 129 N. Y. 50; Stack v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 177 Mass. 155. Even where the power is asserted, no one has an absolute right to have it exercised, but it lies in the discretion of the court. O'Brien v. La Crosse, 99 Wis. 421. Statutes now exist in several of the states, conferring this power upon the trial courts. McGovern v. Hope, 63 N. J. L. 76; Lyon v. Manhattan R. Co., 142 N. Y. 298.

DIVORCE ALIMONY-JUDGMENT IN PERSONAM-Non-RESIDENT DEFENDANT.-HOOD V. HOOD, 61 S. E., 471 (Ga.).—Held, that a judgment in personam for temoprary alimony and attorney's fees cannot be lawfully rendered in a divorce suit brought against a non-resident husband, who is not served with process within this state and does not appear in the case, but is only constructively served by publication.

A decree for temporary alimony is a judgment in personam. Rigney v. Rigney, 127 N. Y. 408. As a general proposition, service of process by publication in actions in personam is insufficient, as it creates no personal liability in the person so served. Cook v. Cook, 56 Wis. 1. The legislature may authorize constructive service by the court within its jurisdiction, but has no authority to authorize such notice upon non-residents. Darcy v. Ketchum et al., 11 Howe 165. And a decree rendered against a non-resident under constructive notice may be held void in a foreign state as not constituting "due process of law" under the Fourteenth Amendment. Eliot v. McCormick, 144 Mass. 10.

FRAUDS, STATUTES OF-SALES OF PERSONALITY-CorporATE STOCK.SPRAGUE V. HOSIE, 118 N. W. 497 (MICH.).-Held, that shares of corporate stock which have been issued, are "goods" within the Statute of Frauds.

Although shares of stock are personal property, it has been held that they are not goods within the Statute of Frauds. I Thomp. Corp., Sect. 1068. In England, the weight of authority is that they are not goods. Humble v. Michell, 11 A. & E. 205; Heseltine v. Siggers, 1 Exch. 856; Watson v. Spratley, 10 Exch. 222. And Georgia follows this authority. Rogers v. Burr, 105 Ga. 432. But the United States courts as a whole, favor the other view. North v. Forest, 15 Conn. 400; Gooch v. Holmes, 41 Me. 523; Baltzen v. Nicolay, 53 N. Y. 467; Fine v. Hornsky, 2 Mo. App. 61; Ely v. Ormsby, 14 Barb. 570.

HUSBAND AND WIFE-ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS-RIGHT OF ACTION BY WIFE.-WORKMAN V. WORKMAN, 85 S. E. 997 (IND.).—Held, that a wife may maintain an action for damages for the malicious alienation of her husband's affections.

The modern tendency is to hold that the loss of her husband's consortium, gives to the wife a right of action within the meaning of the statutes enabling her to sue alone for an injury to her person, property or personal rights. Nolan v. Pearson, 191 Mass. 283; Wolf v. Frank, 92 Md. 138. Some decisions hold that also she possesses this right at common law, even to the extent of suing alone. Foot v. Card, 58 Conn. I. But in other cases where the right at common law was claimed, the necessity of joining the husband in the action was acknowledged as a disability, which the statutes have now removed. Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584. Some courts deny altogether the existence of this right of action, either at common law or under such statutes. Duffies v Duffies, 76 Wis. 374; Morgan v. Martin, 92 Me. 190; Hodge v. Wetzler, 69 N. J. L. 490.

INSURANCE-ACCIDENT INSURANCE-ACCIDENTAL MEANS.-SCHMIDT V. INDIANA TRAVELERS' ACC. Ass'n., 85 N. E. 1032.-Where one who carried accident insurance died of circulatory failure and paralysis of the heart