Military posts, garrisoned towns, with provinces, islands, and distribution of troops-Cont'd. Troops. Detachment K, 3d Infantry. Detachment L, 41st Infantry. Detachment I, 44th Infantry. Detachments L, M, 6th Infantry. Detachment K, 16th Infantry. Detachment G, 3d Artillery; head quarters, K, M, 47th Infantry. Detachment C, 36th Infantry. A, B, C, 28th Infantry. Detachment G, 3d Artillery; E, G, 47th Infantry. Headquarters first district Visa- Detachment B 44th Infantry. M, 21st Infantry. Detachment G, 19th Infantry. I, K, 39th Infantry. Detachment A, 43d Infantry. Detachments F, I, 6th Infantry. Headquarters, L, M, 30th Infantry. Headquarters, E, F, 24th Infantry. Detachment I, 26th Infantry. Detachments B, C, 44th Infantry. Detachment F, 49th Infantry. G, 13th Infantry. try. ANNUAL REPORT OF MAJ. GEN. ARTHUR MACARTHUR, U. S. V., COMMANDING DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES, MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. HDQRS. DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE ARMY, IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Washington, D. C. SIR: The last report of the army in the Philippines was dated August 31, 1899. The undersigned came into the command and military governorship on May 5, 1900. The interval between the two dates will, it is understood, be discussed in a concluding report by Major-General Otis. The accompanying report, therefore, covers the time from May 5, 1900, to date; all subreports, however, appended hereto include the entire period subsequent to the report by General Otis, dated August 31, 1899. The current of events passing through and issuing from the division headquarters and the office of the military governor are so blended that one report only is respectfully submitted, embracing the work of the two administrations. At a council of war held at Bayambang, Pangasinan, about November 12, 1899, which was attended by General Aguinaldo and many of the Filipino military leaders, a resolution was adopted to the effect that the insurgent forces were incapable of further resistance in the field, and as a consequence it was decided to disband the army, the generals and the men to return to their own provinces, with a view to organizing the people for general resistance by means of guerrilla warfare. As affording an interesting, suggestive, and authentic glimpse of the proceedings of the council, a copy of an order bearing the autograph signature of Aguinaldo, found in possession of Gen. Pantaleone Garcia, who was captured May 6, 1900, is respectfully inserted immediately below: In accordance with the present politico-military status in this, the center of Luzon, and using the powers I possess, in accordance with my council of government, I decree the following: 1. The politico-military command of the center of Luzon is hereby established, comprising the provinces of Bataan, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac, Zambales, and Pangasinan. 2. The superior commander in question will have full and extraordinary powers to issue orders by proclamation, impose contributions of war, and to adopt all such measures as may seem for the good service of the country. 3. The troops which will operate in all of the described district will maneuver in flying columns and in guerrilla bands; these will be under the orders of the aforesaid superior commander, to whose orders all the other leaders and generals will be subject, reporting to him and receiving from him the orders and instructions of the government; nevertheless, all orders received direct from the government will be obeyed and advice of same will be given to the superior commander aforesaid. 59 4. Sr. Don Pantaleone Garcia, general of division, is appointed politico-military commander of the center of Luzon, and he will assume, in addition, the judicial powers which belong to me as Captain-General. Given at Bayambang, November 12, 1899. The President. EMILIO AGUINALDO.. Systematized regulations for the government of guerrillas have been compiled and published by the Filipino revolutionary committee in Madrid, Spain, a copy of which, translated into English, is respectfully appended hereto, marked Appendix 1. In war relative situations frequently count as much as positive strength, a principle which, consciously or otherwise, the insurgent leaders possibly had in view in making such a change of methods, as the country affords great advantages for the practical development of such a policy. The practice of discarding the uniform enables the insurgents to appear and disappear almost at their convenience. At one time they are in the ranks as soldiers, and immediately thereafter are within the American lines in the attitude of peaceful natives, absorbed in a dense mass of sympathetic people, speaking a dialect of which few white men, and no Americans, have any knowledge. A widely scattered formation of the Filipinos quickly followed the adoption of the guerrilla policy above referred to, which led to a corresponding dissemination of American troops, the rapidity and extent of which may be appreciated by reference to the fact that the fiftythree stations occupied in the archipelago on November 1, 1899, had, on September 1, 1900, expanded to 413. Of course, under the conditions described, all regular and systematic tactical operations ceased; but as hostile contact was established throughout the entire zone of activity an infinite number of minor affairs resulted, some of which reached the dignity of combats. As the actions themselves were isolated a connected narrative thereof is impracticable, and in view of the record of events which has been regularly transmitted by semimonthly instalments, it is not necessary for information of the Department. It may be stated, however, that the casualties arising from this irregular warfare in the American army between November 1, 1899, and September 1, 1900, were 268 killed, 750 wounded, 55 captured. The Filipino losses for the same time, as far as of record, 3,227 killed, 694 wounded, 2,864 captured. It also may be stated in conclusion of this paragraph that the extensive distribution of troops has strained the soldiers of the army to the full limit of endurance. Each little command has had to provide its own service of security and information by never ceasing patrols, explorations, escorts, outposts, and regular guards. An idea seems to have been established in the public mind to the effect that the field work of the army is in the nature of police, in regulating a few bands of guerrillas, and involving none of the vicissitudes of war. Such a narrow statement of the case is unfair to the service, as in all things requiring endurance, fortitude, and patient diligence the guerrilla period has been preeminent. It is difficult for the nonprofessional observer to understand that apparently desultory work, such as has prevailed in the Philippines during the past ten months, has demanded more of discipline and as much of valor as was required during the period of regular operations against the concentrated field forces of the insurrection. It is therefore a great privilege to speak warmly in respect of the importance of the service rendered day by day, with unremitting vigilance, by the splendid men who have upheld the interests of the Republic, without adequate appreciation of the labors, hardships, and dangers thereby incurred. The Filipinos are not a warlike or ferocious people. Left to themselves a large number (perhaps a considerable majority) would gladly accept American supremacy, which they are gradually coming to understand means individual liberty and absolute security in their lives and property. The people of the islands, however, during the past five years have been maddened by rhetorical sophistry and stimulants applied to national pride, until the power of discriminating in behalf of matters of public concern or private interest (never very strongly established among them), has for the time being been almost entirely suspended. As a substitute for all other considerations, the people seem to be actuated by the idea that in all doubtful matters of politics or war, men are never nearer right than when going with their own kith and kin, regardless of the nature of the action, or of its remote consequences. This peculiar psychological condition has raised practical difficulties in obstruction of pacification. For example, most of the towns throughout the archipelago, under the advice and control of military authority, have organized municipal governments, for which kind of local administration the people have evinced such intelligent capacity, as to encourage the expectation of rapid progress in the art of selfgovernment, when the larger political administrations are organized. The institution of municipal government under American auspices, of course, carried the idea of exclusive fidelity to the sovereign power of the United States. All the necessary moral obligations to that end were readily assumed by municipal bodies, and all outward forms of decorum and loyalty carefully preserved. But precisely at this point the psychological conditions referred to above began to work with great energy, in assistance of insurgent field operations. For this purpose most of the towns secretly organized complete insurgent municipal governments, to proceed simultaneously and in the same sphere as the American governments, and in many instances through the same personnel that is to say, the presidentes and town officials acted openly in behalf of the Americans and secretly in behalf of the insurgents, and, paradoxical as it may seem, with considerable apparent solicitude for the interests of both. In all matters touching the peace of the town, the regulation of markets, the primitive work possible on roads, streets, and bridges, and the institution of schools, their open activity was commendable; at the same time they were exacting and collecting contributions and supplies and recruiting men for the Filipino forces, and sending all obtainable military information to the Filipino leaders. Wherever, throughout the archipelago, there is a group of the insurgent army, it is a fact, beyond dispute, that all contiguous towns contribute to the maintenance thereof. In other words, the towns, regardless of the fact of American occupation and town organization, are the actual bases for all insurgent military activities; and not only so in the sense of furnishing supplies for the so-called flying columns of guerrillas, but as affording secure places of refuge. Indeed it is now the most important maxim of Filipino tactics to disband when closely pressed and seek safety in the nearest barrio; a maneuver quickly accomplished by reason of the assistance of the people and the ease with which the Filipino soldier is transformed into |