APPENDIX 55. HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, Maj. Gen. H. W. LAWTON, Adjutant-General's Office, September 30, 1899. GENERAL: Before submitting your complete and final report upon the operations of a portion of your division under your immediate command in the province of Cavite June 10-15, 1899, I have the honor to submit the following report, which I feel should form part of the records of that expedition-as to the battle of Zapote. (See map of Zapote River and vicinity.) About noon an orderly from you reported to me, stating that you wanted a battalion to immediately relieve the two companies of the Twenty-first Infantry that had accompanied you up the beach on reconnoissance, and also to send another battalion to reenforce the outpost and artillery on the Las Pinas-Zapote road. A battalion (B, D, I, M) of the Ninth Infantry, Captain Palmer, was accordingly ordered for the former purpose, and a battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry for the latter. I reported to you on the Las Pinas road just below the trail that you had taken to the beach, accompanying you along the road to a point to the right of our outpost at the bend of the river represented on the map of the Zapote battlefied. You directed me to return and cross the Ninth Infantry battalion to the beach by the same trail you had taken in the morning, and to take them up the beach to relieve the two companies of the Twenty-first Infantry that had been engaged since this morning. You further directed that as soon as these companies were relieved I should extend my line to the left and try and make connections with your main advance on the enemy's Zapote River intrenchments. The map will show that should this connection be made this column would flank the strong insurgent trenches along the west bank of the river. As soon as the difficult crossing to the beach was accomplished I sent each company hurriedly forward along the beach to report to Major Starr. These companies took position on the beach as indicated on the map. On returning for the fourth company (L) of this battalion, and when near the red iron hulk shown on the map, the firing, which all along had been very heavy, now, at 2.45 p. m., became terrific to the southeast. I therefore ordered this company to move to the left to make a right-angle connection with the Fourteenth Infantry, and if possible to extend his right and try to gain connection with the rest of the battalion up the beach, which had been ordered to extend its left as soon as in position. The difficulties of the country can be imagined from the map, besides all of the overflowed rice fields, the streams, bayous, etc., the underbrush was very dense. In spite of all these difficulties, however, Lieut. Ira C. Welborn rushed his company, under a heavy fire, over all obstacles, made an effective junction with Captain Patten's battalion, and materially aided in the brilliant flanking movement that drove the enemy out of the trenches. The junction of this battalion with the Fourteenth still left a gap in line, and when Capt. F. De W. Ramsey, commanding K Company (the first of the other battalion), arrived, I ordered him in to fill the gap. The same intelligent leadership was shown in the execution of these orders. The path followed, with successive positions taken, are shown by the map. One-half Company B, of the Second Battalion, were the only other troops to arrive. This half company was sent up the beach to join the D, I, M companies of Capt. George Palmer's battalion. According to the then existing maps of this country, the mouth of the Zapote River was between Bacoor and Las Pinas, and one of the objectives of the troops on the beach was to gain a footing across the river at its mouth, besides holding the strong strategic position gained by the morning's fight. I visited this position and repeated your orders to rush the trenches across this river, but found that the river did not empty into the bay there. The line was therefore advanced as indicated on the map. A line of soldiers posted about every 150 yards from the place of crossing to the troops on the beach served as couriers to keep up communication along the various parts of the line and the division commander. Very respectfully, CLARENCE R. EDWARDS, Major, and Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. V. REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF SCHWAN'S EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE IN THE PROVINCES OF CAVITE, BATANGAS, LAGUNA, AND TAYABAS, JANUARY 4 TO FEBRUARY 8, 1900, BY BRIG. GEN. THEODORE SCHWAN, U. S. V., COMMANDING. JANUARY 4 TO FEBRUARY 8, 1900.-Expedition into the provinces of Cavite, Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas, P. I. REPORTS. Report of Brig. Gen. Theodore Schwan, U. S. V., commanding expedition 2. Report of Maj. Matthew F. Steele, Thirtieth Infantry Page. 387 508 510 512 513 514 516 522 524 526 527 528 529 529 530 531 532 533 533 535 539 540 541 542 545 546 547 547 550 558 560 HDQRS. SCHWAN'S EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE, The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, First Division Eighth Army Corps, Manila, P. I. SIR: In compliance with instructions of the corps and division commanders, I proceeded on January 3 last to San Pedro Macati, and assumed command of an expeditionary brigade created by orders from corps and division headquarters, and composed of the following organizations, already concentrated at or in the vicinity of that place, viz: Thirtieth Infantry, U. S. V., Col. Cornelius Gardener. Forty-sixth Infantry, U. S. V., Col. W. S. Schuyler. One squadron, Fourth Cavalry (five troops), Maj. J. A. Augur, Fourth Cavalry. One squadron Eleventh Cavalry (four troops), Maj. D. E. Nolan, Eleventh Cavalry. One battery mountain artillery (3 guns), Capt. C. W. Van Deusen. One company Engineer Battalion, Second Lieut. H. B. Ferguson. Detachment Signal Corps, First Lieut. W. L. Clarke. Detachment Hospital Corps. Two companies Macabebe scouts, First Lieut. W. C. Geiger, Fourteenth Infantry. The two squadrons were united under the command of Lieut. Col. E. M. Hayes, Fourth Cavalry, the senior cavalry officer present. The corps and division orders aforesaid, and the field orders of the brigade announcing the brigade commander's staff and enumerating its constituent parts, including its trains and other means of transportation, will be found in Exhibits A, B, and C. The object of the expedition was the destruction or dispersion of the insurrectionary forces in parts of the provinces of Cavite and Laguna and in the provinces of Tayabas and Batangas, and the occupation of this territory by my troops in such a manner as to control the country. The operations in northern Luzon had practically cleared that part of the island by January 1; but it was known that in the territory assigned to this brigade the insurgent forces were concentrated in organized bodies of considerable strength; that they were active and bold, even to the aggressive siege of positions held by our troops; that they were well armed, supplied, and equipped, and that they had received many accessions from the disintegrated forces of the north. Cavite Province was the birth place of Aguinaldo and the rebellion, and, with the other provinces named, had continued a hot-bed of insurrection; all territory south of the line Muntinlupa-Imus, except the towns of Calamba and Los Banos on the Iguna de Bay, was controlled by the insurgents, and it was into this section that they had taken many of the Spanish and American prisoners remaining in their hands. The country was practically unknown to our troops; the only maps available having been compiled from old Spanish maps, conspicuously unreliable in the character of roads and trails, and giving no information whatever as to the practicability of a route at the time of this expedition. The hostility of the territory as a whole, combined with the unreliable and treacherous character of the natives, precluded the formation of a scout and spy service, and made it necessary to rely entirely upon reconnoissances and such information as could be gathered as we went. The movements of both of the principal columns of the brigade and of detachments therefrom, as described herein, can be readily traced on the accompanying map, compiled from various sources under the direction of Captain Sibert, engineer officer of the brigade, and embodying all information collected by the engineer company as the brigade proceeded. This map, as well as the plans of towns herewith (Exhibit N), also prepared by the engineers, will, it is thought, be found of value hereafter for military and other purposes. At the time the expedition was set on foot the plan of the commanding general of the corps, as understood by me, contemplated (1) the establishment, by its troops, of a barrier from Binan to Naic (with either place as a base) against bodies of insurgents to be driven southward by General Wheaton's command from the positions they had long held in the vicinity of Cavite Viejo and Imus; (2) the sweeping clear of insurgents of the rich sections of country traversed by the roads connecting Calamba and Batangas. Incident to this operation was the liberation of Spanish and American prisoners known to be held at Lipa, situated nearly midway between the two towns mentioned; and (3) operations whose character and scope was to be determined by future events in Laguna and Tayabas provinces, in either or both, having for their object the expulsion of the enemy and the establishment of American rule. The execution of the operations as above outlined will, as far as practicable, be described in the order mentioned. OCCUPATION OF BINAN-NAIC LINE. FROM SAN PEDRO MACATI TO BINAN. The brigade having been concentrated at San Pedro Macati, its first duty was to march via Muntinlupa to Binan and establish a base at that point. The best map information indicated a good road along the shore of the Laguna de Bay, running south from Taguig to Muntinlupa. By my direction this route was investigated by the engineer officers on duty with the command on January 3 and 4, the result being that no road was found along the beach as indicated. In the meantime information was obtained indicating that the wagon train with light loads could with difficulty be taken over the trail running along the Guadalupe ridge to the intersection of the latter with the Paranaque-Muntinlupa road. Late in the afternoon of the 4th this route was decided upon. The loads on all wheeled vehicles were reduced to about onethird the ordinary load, and all surplus property and stores were ordered shipped by boat to Binan. The Forty-sixth Infantry, Colonel Schuyler commanding, camped on this trail on the night of the 4th. The entire brigade was ordered to concentrate thereon in column on the early morning of the 5th, and to commence immediately its march to Muntinlupa. The head of the column reached Muntinlupa at 4 p. m., the entire command at 6 p. m., without incident, the great difficulties of the road being promptly overcome. Distance marched, 20 miles. Soon after the arrival of the head of the column in Muntinlupa, a cavalry reconnoissance was sent out on each of the two roads indicated on the map as leading to Binan. No resistance was developed on the Beach road. On the road at the foot of the hills parallel to the Beach road fire from the enemy's outpost was developed 14 miles out from Muntinlupa. The Beach road was reported as one that could be made practicable for wagons, the other road as impracticable for wheels. On the morning of the 6th the command commenced its march to Binan in two olumns, one column consisting of the engineers, Fortysixth Infantry, two battalions of the Thirtieth Infantry, and the wagon train, Colonel Gardener, Thirtieth U. S. V., commanding, taking the Beach road; the other, consisting of brigade headquarters, the Macabebe scouts, the cavalry, the mountain artillery, and one battalion (Steele's) Thirtieth Infantry, taking the road at the foot of the hills. (See map; also field orders, No. 6, Exhibit C.) The last-mentioned |