the water she made. The water and grease washed upon the casks, and they became damaged in the manner above stated.

It is said that this was an injury by perils of the sea, for which the vessel should not be charged. So far as the sea-water stained the casks we think the ship should not answer for it. But there was another co-operating cause of damage. The lard in the ship's hold, being washed up with the water, attached itself to the casks, and put them in the greasy condition described by the witnesses. The injury of the casks was directly promoted by the greasy condition of the ship. If the ship had been clean, the injury would have been different in its character, and as we may fairly infer from the evidence, less in its pecuniary amount. We are forbidden therefore to attribute the whole damage to perils of the sea; on the contrary, we must set a portion of it down to the defective condition of the vessel, and the vessel must answer for such damage as was occasioned by that defect.

Let us take a parallel case by way of illustration. The vessel is undoubtedly answerable for the damage attributable to bad stowage. Suppose a vessel so stored, that the goods would be safe in ordinary weather, but for want of proper dunnage would suffer in a gale of wind. A gale occurs causing the vessel, which before was tight and strong, to spring a leak, and the goods are injured by contact with salt water. But in addition thereto, they get knocked about in the vessel's hold, and broken, and this damage under the evidence is clearly attributable to bad storage, and would not have occurred if the storage had been good. The ship would not be liable for the damage by salt-water; but it would be clearly unjust to exempt her from the damage arising from bad stowage. We consider an allowance of two dollars per cask as sufficient to cover the proportion of damage occasioned by grease, which, deducted from the freight, will leave a balance of $22,07 cents in favor of the ship.

It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the judgment of the Court below be reversed; and that the said Horatio Eagle, Wm. N. Hazard, and Albert Cook, receive from the defendants, J. and J. Tardos, the sum of twentytwo dollars and seven cents, ($22,07,) the plaintiff to pay the costs of the appeal, the costs of the proceedings in the Court below, hitherto incurred, to be borne equally by the parties, and the costs of executing this decree to be paid by the defendants.

Clerk's office, New Orleans, January 23d, 1852. A true copy.

(Signed)

J. MCCULLOCH.

Messrs. Miles Taylor and Nephew, for Tardos. Wheelock S. Upton, for Eagle & Hazard.

owners.

We give above the decree in a case which is of no little moment to our ship If "stains and discolorations" upon the outside of a cask of claret, are to be held as making such property unmerchantable, and the carrier is to lose his freightage, and answer in damage, it is time that our ship owners should change the terms of their bills of lading at once.

It is well known that a new ship, the timbers of which are green, will in "sweating" or "blowing" make stains or discolorations to the outside of packages. So will a ship that has carried sugar-molasses which has leaked, or coal, or tar, or many like cargoes, for it is next to impossible, with all care, to make a ship's hold at once, and for the return voyage, so clean from the leakage and impurities attending such freight, that the "dangers of the sea" may not cause them to make "stains."

The owners of the "Tennessee" reside in this city, and the ship is said to be of a high class; and the captain, we are told, is skillful in his vocation.

We see by the record of the cause, that the Chief Justice was absent at the time the case was tried, and that the Judge of the District Court gave a contrary judgment. Perhaps the case will not be regarded as a precedent; but it is well that ship owners should know the risks they run in taking a cargo of lard from New Orleans.

We are told that the insurance companies in France, where the cargo of claret was insured, paid the damage to the plaintiffs, as soon as they were aware of the

judgment in the lower Court, and before the judgment above had been rendered. If this be so, of course the plaintiffs will return it, greatly to the astonishment of the French insurers at the decree of a Louisiana Court.

BANKRUPTCY-DECISION IN THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

In the Liverpool (England) Court of Bankruptcy, Jan., 1852. Re Battersby and Telford.

A petition was presented by the assignees, praying the Court to declare whether certain assets inserted by the bankrupts in their respective separate balance-sheets belonged to the joint estate, or to the respective separate estates. It was heard on a former day before Mr. Commissioner Stevenson. Mr. Bell, solicitor, appeared for the assignees, and, after stating the facts, submitted to the judgment of the Court. Mr. Hull, solicitor, appeared and argued the case on behalf of the creditors on the joint estate.

His Honor having taken time to consider the case, now delivered the following judgment:-The questions raised by the petition presented by the assignees under this bankruptcy apply to the following assets, viz., two sets of goods referred to, in the separate balance-sheet of Battersby as part of his separate estate, and valued at the respective sums of £90 12s. and £36 2s. 9d.; also a sum of £109 15s. 6d. referred to in the separate balance-sheet of Telford as part of his separate estate, and stated to be the produce of goods consigned to Messrs. Booker, of Demerara, and a sum of £104 14s. 8d., also referred to in Telford's separate balance-sheet as other part of his separate estate, and stated to be the proceeds of stock sold by Messrs. Tonge, Curry, & Co.

To all these assets the joint creditors claim to be entitled, as being goods and proceeds of goods belonging to the joint estate of the two bankrupts, but to which a counter claim is set up on the part of the respective separate creditors of the bankrupts in whose respective separate balance-sheets these assets are referred to, upon grounds hereafter adverted to; and the petitioners seek the direction of the Court as to the class of creditors amongst which these assets ought to be distributed.

As to the goods referred to in Battersby's separate balance-sheet, and valued at the sums of £90 12s. and £36 2s. 9d., it is admitted they were clearly part of the partnership property at the time of the dissolution of the partnership; and as to the goods consigned to Messrs. Booker, the produce whereof was £109 15s. 6d., and the stock sold by Messrs. Tonge, Curry, & Co., of which the sum of £104 148. 8d. was part of the net proceeds, it is doubtful what portions of these goods and stock belonged to the partnership at the time of the bankruptcy, though I understand it to be clear that some portions did so belong to the partnership; and, in order to ascertain what these portions are, some further inquiry is yet necessary to be made. But, for the present, I propose to consider the questions raised as applicable to some portions of these goods and stock, as well as the other assets before referred to, leaving the assignees to apply the principle of my decision to these portions when ascertained.

The claims of the respective separate creditors to these assets are founded upon two grounds: 1st. That, although they were orginally partnership property, yet, under the arrangement made in respect of them by the terms of the dissolution of the partnership, these properties, which were in the possession of the respective bankrupts at the time of, and subsequent to, the dissolution, became converted into the separate estate of each such bankrupt. 2d. That supposing such conversion did not take place, yet that such of these properties as were in the possession of such bankrupt at the time of their bankruptcy, were subject to be disposed of for the benefit of their respective separate creditors, as having been at that time in their respective orders and dispositions, within the meaning of the 125th section of the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act. As to the first ground upon which the claims of the separate creditors are founded, it appears, by the agreement made on the dissolution of partnership, that the terms in reference to this subject were as follows:-That the stock and fixtures of the partnership were to be valued by two disinterested parties mutually chosen; the

book debts to be collected by Battersby, and applied by him in payment of the debts owing by the firm; that the property which had been removed by Battersby, (and which I understand to be the same as that referred to in his separate balance-sheet, and valued at the sums of £90 12s. and £36 2s. 9d.,) should be taken by him at the market price of the day, (valued as before), the purchase money to form funds in his hands for payment of the debts, and Telford was to pay Battersby the value of the property removed by him at a like price, and which I presume formed part either of the goods sold by Messrs. Tonge, Curry, & Co., or of those consigned to Messrs. Booker. That Battersby was to assign his interest in the fixtures and stock to Telford on having a mortgage over them, and an assignment of a policy of insurance on Telford's life for £1,100, or whatever might be due, and a judgment for the amount of Battersby's interest, (deducting a sum of £300, which Battersby was to sacrifice.) On the dissolution, it would seem that all their joint properties, with the exception of that part which had been removed by Battersby, was in the possession of Telford, and all which, with the exception of such parts as had been sold or disposed of by Telford, continued in his possession until the sale thereof by Messrs. Tonge, Curry, & Co., or as to such of them as were comprised in the consignment to Messrs. Booker, until such consignment thereof. The valuation of the stock and fixtures seems to have been made according to the agreement on the dissolution, and Battersby has received part of the partnership debt, but no assignment of the stock by Battersby, or mortgage thereof, or assignment of life policy by Telford, or judgment, appear to have been made or given according to the terms of the dissolution. Now, although under agreement of this nature by which the joint assets of a partnership firm are proposed to be made over to the respective partners, it has been held that such assets have become converted into the separate estates of each partner, and the joint creditors have no control over the property so as to prevent such conversion from taking place to their prejudice; yet where such agreements are executory, and all the material terms of the contract have not been satisfied, such conversion has not been considered to have been effected. (See exparte Wheeler, Buck 25, and see exparte Rowlandson, 1 Rose 416, and exparte Barrow, 2 Rose 252.) Now, it appears to me that until the secu rities agreed to be given to Battersby were completed as legal securities, and not merely resting upon equitable construction, the agreement in this case must be deemed to be executory, and that such securities were of sufficient importance to prevent the absolute conversion of the properties in question into sepa rate estate from taking place until they were thus completed; and, consequently, as these securities were given up to the time of the bankruptcy, no such conversion was effected, notwithstanding any dealings with them by the bankrupts since the dissolution.

With respect to the second ground upon which the claims of the separate creditors are founded, I have felt some difficulty in determining whether the general doctrine in bankruptcy as to reputed ownership with consent can be applied to such a case as the present, which appears to be attendant with some doubt; but considering that the possession, by each bankrupt, of the separate chattels was part of an arrangement, upon the faith of which such possession was taken and retained, after the dissolution, but which arrangement failed in being carried out up to the time of the bankruptey, I do not think such a possession can be deemed to be attendant with the necessary consent and other circumstances requisite to bringing this case within the operation of the 125th section referred to in this subject; and with respect to the stock sold by Messrs. Tonge, Curry, & Co., the prohibition against the sale given by Battersby in July, 1850, before Telford's bankruptcy, and the withdrawal of such prohibition only upon the understanding given by Mr. Booker, on behalf of Telford, and which is referred to in this petition, must, I apprehend, be considered to have had the effect of withdrawing any consent or permission which might be deemed to have been previously given to these goods remaining in the order and disposition of Telford.

For these reasons, I think that the properties in question referred to in Battersby's separate balance-sheet, and such parts of the sums of £109 15s. 6d.

and £104 148. 8d. referred to in the separate balance-sheet of Telford, as shall be ascertained to have proceeded from property which belonged to the partnership between the bankrupts at the time of its dissolution, must be considered to be joint assets, and distributed accordingly amongst the joint creditors of the bankrupts.

With regard to the question of costs, I think that under the peculiar circumstances of this case the costs of the assignees of, and incident to, this petition should be borne by the joint estate; and that the costs in this matter of Messrs. Finch, to whom with some separate creditors, it was thought expedient to give notice of this petition, but who alone appeared, and were heard by their solici tor, Mr. Hull, on behalf of the joint estate, these also, I think, should be borne by the joint estate.

CONCERNING PLEDGES OF PROMISSORY NOTES, STOCKS, MOVEABLE PROPERTY, ETC., IN LOUISIANA.

The following act passed at the last session of the Legislature of Louisiana has become a law of that State.

SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Louisiana, in General Assembly convened. That when a debtor wishes to pawn promissory notes, bills of exchange, stocks, obligations, or claims upon other persons, he shall deliver to the creditor, the notes, bills of exchange, certificates of stock, or other evidences of the claims or rights so pawned, and such pawn so made, without further formalities, shall be valid, as well against third persons as against the pledgors, if made in good faith.

SEC. 2. Be it further enacted, etc., That all pledges of moveable property may be made by private writing, accompanied by actual delivery; and the delivery of property on deposit in a warehouse, shall pass by the private assignment of the warehouse receipt, so as to authorize the owner to pledge such property, and such pledges so made, without further formalities, shall be valid, as well against third persons as against the pledgors thereof, if made in good faith.

SEC. 3. Be it further enacted, etc., That if a credit not negotiable be given in pledge, notice of the same must be given to the debtor.

SEC. 4. Be it further enacted, etc., That in all pledges of moveable property, it shall be lawful for the pledgor to authorize the sale, or other disposition of the property pledged, in such manner as may be agreed upon by the parties, without the intervention of courts of justice.

INFORMALITY IN A PROMISSORY NOTE.

In the District Court, (Philadelphia.) Before JUDGE SHARSWOOD. (Sept. 27, 1851.) Higerty vs. Higerty.

Rule for Judgment. The note sued on is in the singular number, "I promise," but signed by two persons. Such an obligation is joint and several, as has been held in Kinsely vs, Shenberger, 7 Watts, 193. The defendant one of the promissors, alleges that he signed the note only as security for the other, and he adds, "that it was fully and distinctly understood at the time of the said signing, by all the parties, including the plaintiff, that he so signed not as maker, but as security." He then proceeds to aver that no legal steps had been taken against the principal. The distinction between a surety and a guarantor, is well settled. The latter assumes but a collateral contingent liability. The engagement of the former is an absolute, direct one, though in his character of surety, he has cer tain equities which distinguish him from a principal debtor, in favor of whom the consideration moves. Rudy vs. Wolf, 10, S. & R. 79; Johnson vs. Chapman, 3 P. R. 48. The only mode to be pursued by a surety, is a distinct positive call upon the creditor to pursue the principal, with notice that unless he does so, the surety will consider himself discharged. Cope vs. Smith, 8 S. & R. 116; Gurdiner vs. Ferns, 15 S. & R. 117; Greenawalt vs. Kreider, 3 Barr 267. All that the defendant alleges, therefore, would not alter the case. He has certainly become a party to a direct engagement to pay the money, and admitting that he was a mere surety, and that it was so understood by plaintiff, that cannot operate to

change his positive, direct promise into a collateral one. In Craddock vs. Armer, 10 Watts 258, it was decided by the Supreme Court, that the marginal annexation of the words "security for the fulfillment of the above" to the name of a joint promissor in a note, will not change his character of promissor to that of guarantor. And the Court there expressly put it on the ground, that these words are not inconsistent with a direct engagement. "They serve to note that he had signed not as a guarantor, but as a security. They are not technical words in a contract of guaranty, and the juxtaposition of the signature as well as the absence of apt words to indicate a contingent responsibility, shows that the parties intended to be jointly bound." Rule absolute.

COMMERCIAL CHRONICLE AND REVIEW.

SPECULATIVE MOVEMENT IN STOCKS AND BONDS-INVESTMENTS ON FOREIGN ACCOUNT-EFFECT OF EUROPEAN CAPITAL UPON OUR PROSPERITY-ILLUSTRATION OF THE ADVANTAGES OF BORROWING WHEN A PROFITABLE USE CAN BE MADE OF THE MONEY--SPECULATIONS IN REAL ESTATEHISTORY OF THE SPRING TRADE, WITH ITS PRESENT CONDITION AND FUTURE PROSPECTSCHANGE IN THE VALUE OF LAND WARRANTS-GENERAL CONDITION OF THE BANKS-LEGISLA TION IN VARIOUS STATES ON THE SUBJECT OF BANKING-ACTION OF CONGRESS IN REGARD TO CB LNGING THE STANDARD OF VALUE-DEPOSITS AND COINAGE AT THE PHILADELPHIA AND NEW OR. LEANS MINTS FOR FEBRUARY-IMPORTS AT NEW YORK FOR FEBRUARY-DO. FROM JANUARY 1STIMPORTS OF DRY GOODS-DECREASE IN STOCK WAREHOUSED-RECEIPTS FOR DUTIES-EXPORTS FROM NEW YORK FOR FEBRUARY-COMPARATIVE EXPORTS OF DOMESTIC PRODUCE-DECLINE IN PRICE OF BREADSTUFFS ABROAD-INCREASED CONSUMPTION OF CEREALS STIMULATED BY LOW PRICES.

THE last month has witnessed a marked increase in the spirit of speculation, not only in stocks but also in Real Estate, and other investments. In all of our principal cities, the transactions in stocks and bonds for account of private capitalists, have been unusually large, and in a majority of cases, made with the hope of realizing a profit from advanced prices. Few of these purchases were made at the lowest point, and the market has yet to improve materially before great fortunes will be realized. All well secured railroad bonds have improved, and so long as the European demand continues, there can be little fear of any important reaction. Money in Europe has become so plenty, that it is difficult to find safe investments at two-and-a-half per cent per annum. In this state of things it is not to be wondered at that Erie first-class bonds, secured by a mortgage upon property worth eight times the amount, and paying seven per cent interest upon their par value, should have gone up to 115. The second-class bonds of the same company, which for all practical purposes are almost equally secure, but which have less time to run, are also selling considerably above par. Various City and County bonds are inquired for by English capitalists, and will doubtless be more in demand. When Europe finds that we have provided more effectual safeguards against repudiation, than we had previous to our former period of commercial disaster; and that most of the enterprises for which these bonds are now issued, are based upon the actual development of new resources of wealth and prosperity, we may look for a still greater influx of foreign capital. This indebtedness abroad is a constant source of alarm to some who have been accustomed to rcgard the dependence as all on one side; and who are never weary of predicting ruin when "pay day" arrives.

It does not however necessarily follow, that the borrower of capital is less prosperous than the lender. A man who buys a farm which will produce but 5 per