Whenever death results from an attempt to procure an abortion, the prosecution should be under this section and not for manslaughter. Montgomery v. State, 80 Ind. 338. The unlawful procurement of miscarriage is the corpus delicti in a prosecution under this section, and such fact must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Traylor v. State, 101 Ind. 65. The dying declarations of the deceased are admissible in evidence. Montgomery v. State, 80 Ind. 338. 1997. (1924.) Woman soliciting medicine for miscarriage.-23. Every woman who shall solicit of any person any medicine, drug, or substance, or thing whatever, and shall take the same, or shall submit to any operation or other means whatever, with intent thereby to procure a miscarriage (except when by a physician for the purpose of saving the life of mother or child), shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars nor less than ten dollars, and imprisoned in the county jail not more than twelve months nor less than thirty days; and any person who, in any manner whatever, unlawfully aids or assists any such woman to a violation of this section shall be liable to the same penalty. 1998. (1925.) Libel.-24. Whoever makes, composes, dictates, prints, or writes a libel to be published, or procures the same to be done, and whoever publishes or knowingly aids in publishing or communicating a libel, is guilty of libel, and shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than one thousand dollars nor less than five dollars, to which may be added imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year nor less than ten days. This section is valid although it does not define a libel, and the common law may be looked to for a definition. Hartford v. State, 96 Ind. 461. Section 1 of the act of 1879 defining libel was repealed by the acts of 1881, but such section merely contained the common law definition of libel. Hartford v. State, 96 Ind. 461. A publication maliciously made, which imputes official dishonesty and corruption in an officer, constitutes a criminal libel. State v. De Long, 88 Ind. 312; Hartford v. State, 96 Ind. 461. The publication need not impute a crime in order to constitute criminal libel. Hartford v. State, 96 Ind. 461. When the publication is true there can not be any criminal liability. State v. Bush, 122 Ind. 42. The defendant may show in mitigation that shortly before the publication, the prosecuting witness libeled the defendant. Hartford v. State, 96 Ind. 461. 1999. (1926.) Blackmailing.-25. Whoever, either verbally or by any letter or writing or any written or printed communication, demands of any person, with menaces of personal injury, any chattel, money, or other valuable security; or whoever accuses or threatens to accuse, or knowingly sends or delivers any letter or writing or any written or printed communication, with or without a name subscribed thereto, or signed with a fictitious name; or with any letter, mark, or designation, accusing or threatening to accuse any person of any crime punishable by law, or of any immoral conduct, which, if true, would tend to degrade and disgrace such person, or in any way to subject him to the ridicule or contempt of society; or to do any injury to the person or property of any one, with intent to extort or gain from such person any chattel, money, or valuable security, or any pecuniary advantage whatsoever; or with any intent to compel the person threatened to do any act against his will, with the intent aforesaid, is guilty of blackmailing, and shall, on conviction thereof, be imprisoned in the state prison for not more than five years nor less than one year, to which may be added a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars. The act of 1873, which first defined this offense, was valid. Peachee v. State, 63 Ind. 399. As to the form and sufficiency of an indictment under this section, see Kistler v. State, 54 Ind. 400; McMillen v. State, 60 Ind. 216; Motsinger v. State, 123 Ind. 498. The indictment should aver to whom the threats were made. Kessler v. State, 50 Ind. 229. The indictment need not aver that the person to whom the threats were made was innocent of the act threatened to be exposed. Kessler v. State, 50 Ind. 229; Motsinger v. State, 123 Ind. 498. As to what is held to be a sufficient threat to fall within the meaning of the statute, see Motsinger v. State, 123 Ind. 498. Threats to prosecute for a crime in order to coerce the payment of a just debt is not within the statute. State v. Hammond, 80 Ind. 80. ARTICLE 3.-AGAINST PROPERTY. SEC. 2000. Arson. 2001. Burning woods, prairies, etc. 2002. Burglary. 2003. Entering house, etc., to commit fel ony. 2004. House-breaking in day-time to steal. 2005. House-breaking, to commit violence. 2006. Grand larceny. 2007. Petit larceny. 2008. Larcency-Goods from other states. 2009. Goods from other states-Petit lar ceny. 2010. Buying or concealing goods from other states. 2011. Former conviction. 2012. Receiving stolen goods, etc. 2013. Secreting a will. 2014. Stealing public records. 2015. Officer stealing or destroying rec ords. 2016. Altering records. 2017. Carrying off fruits, etc. 2018. Trespass. 2019. Embezzlement of public funds. 2020. Embezzlement by officers. SEC. 2021. Embezzlement-County officers. 2024. Embezzlement by railroad em- 2025. Embezzlement by innkeepers and 2026. Embezzlement by bailee. 2032. Selling or secreting state arms 2035. Injuring telegraph or telephone 2036. Attacking public conveyance. killed. 2038. Running hand-car without author ity. [1881 S., p. 174. In force September 19, 1881.] 2000. (1927.) Arson.-26. Whoever willfully and maliciously burns or attempts to burn any dwelling-house or other building, finished or unfinished, occupied or unoccupied, whether the building be used or intended for a dwelling house or any other purpose; or any boat, wharf-boat, water-craft or vessel, finished or unfinished; any reaping machine, mowing machine, threshing machine, separator, clover-huller, wagon, plow, cultivator, or any agricultural or farming implement; or any bridge, whether wholly within this state or not; or any cord wood in a pile; or any rick, stack, or shock of grain, hay or straw; or any grain not severed from the ground; or any fence of whatever constructed; or the material intended for the construction of any such house, building, boat, bridge, fence, reaping machine, mowing machine, threshing machine, separator, clover-huller, wagon, plow, cultivator or any other agricultural or farming implement; or any tan-bark, tree, timber or lumber; or any railroad car or a water tank connected with a railroad, the property so burned or attempted to be burned, being of the value of twenty dollars or upwards, and being the property of another, or being insured against loss or damage by fire; and the burning or attempting to burn being with intent to prejudice or defraud the insurer, is guilty of arson, and upon conviction thereof shall be imprisoned in the state prison not more than twenty-one years, nor less than one year, and fined not exceeding double the value of the property burned, or attempted to be burned, and should the life of any person be lost thereby, such offender shall be deemed guilty of murder in the first degree, and shall suffer death, or be imprisoned in the state's prison for life. (As amended, Acts 1891, p. 402. In force March 9, 1891.) An indictment for arson should show that the building burned, or attempted to be burned, was one of the class mentioned in the statute. State v. O'Connell, 26 Ind. 266. An indictment charging the building as a "mill-house," is not bad for uncertainty. Ford v. State, 112 Ind. 373. Referring to a building as one commonly called a stable, is sufficient. Dugle v. State, 100 Ind. 259. The indictment should state the value of the property burned. Ritchey v. State, 7 Blkf. 168. It need not be alleged in terms that the owner of the property was in the actual possession thereof. Wolf v. State, 53 Ind. 30. When it is alleged that the purpose of the burning was to defraud an insurance com pany, the particular kind or corporate existence of the company need not be averred. Johnson v. State, 65 Ind. 204. An indictment charging an attempt to set fire to and burn a building, does not charge any offense. Kinningham v. State, 119 Ind. 332; Kinningham v. State, 120 Ind. 322. The burning of an unfinished and unoccupied building does not constitute arson. State v. Wolfenberger, 20 Ind. 242. The indictment need not aver who was the occupant of the building. Garrett v. State, 109 Ind. 527. A married man, residing with his wife in her house, may be guilty of arson in burning such house. Garrett v. State, 109 Ind. 527. There must be some property actually destroyed or injured by fire in order to constitute arson. Kinningham v. State, 120 Ind. 322. A married woman may be guilty of arson in burning the property of her husband. Emig v. Daum, 1 App. 146. 2001. (1928.) Burning woods, prairies, etc.-27. Whoever maliciously or wantonly sets fire to any woods, or to any thing growing or being upon any prairie or grounds, not his own property; or maliciously or wantonly permits any fire to pass from his own prairie or grounds, to the injury or destruction of the property of any other person, shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars nor less than five dollars, to which may be added imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding thirty days. 2002. (1929.) Burglary.-28. Whoever, in the night-time, breaks and enters into any dwelling-house, kitchen, smoke-house, out-house, shop, office, storehouse; warehouse, mill, distillery, pottery, factory, barn or stable, school-house, church, meeting-house, or building used for the purpose of religious worship, boat, wharf-boat, or other water craft, car-factory, freight-house, station-house, depot, or railroad-car, with intent to commit a felony, is guilty of burglary, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the state prison not more than fourteen years nor less than two years, and disfranchised and rendered incapable of holding any office of trust or profit for any determinate period. For approved form of indictment, see Edwards v. State, 62 Ind. 34. An indictment for burglary with intent to commit a larceny, need not aver the kind or value of the goods intended to be stolen. Hunter v. State, 29 Ind. 80; Short v. State, 63 Ind. 376. The ownership of the property may be charged to be either in the owner or a tenant in possession. Kennedy v. State, 81 Ind. 379. See McCrillis v. State, 69 Ind. 159. When it is alleged that the burglary was committed with the intent to steal “goods and chattels," the word personal need not precede goods and chattels. Choen v. State, 85 Ind. 209. When it is alleged that the goods intended to be stolen belongs to certain persons as partners, proof of the firm name of the partnership will not support the allegation. Doan v. State, 26 Ind. 495. It is unnecessary to prove the value of the goods stolen, but it is not error to admit such proof. Farley v. State, 127 Ind. 419. 2003. (1930.) Entering house, etc., to commit felony.-29. Whoever, in the day-time or night-time, enters any dwelling-house, kitchen, smoke-house, out-house, shop, office, storehouse, warehouse, mill, dis tillery, pottery, factory, barn, stable, school-house, church, meetinghouse, or building used for the purpose of religious worship, boat, wharf-boat, or other water-craft, car-factory, freight-house, stationhouse, depot, or railroad car, and attempts to commit a felony, shall be imprisoned in the state prison not more than fourteen years nor less than two years, and disfranchised and rendered incapable of holding any office of trust or profit for any determinate period. Persons who make unlawful entries into buildings described in this section, with the intent to commit larceny, are subject to the punishment herein prescribed, and not to that prescribed in the next section. Burrows v. State, 84 Ind. 529; Myers v. State, 92 Ind. 390. 2004. (1931.) House-breaking in day-time, to steal.-30. Whoever, in the day-time, breaks and enters into any dwelling-house, kitchen, smoke-house, out-house, shop, office, storehouse, warehouse, mill, distillery, pottery, factory, barn, stable, school-house, church, meeting-house, or building used for the purpose of religious worship, water-craft, car-factory, freight-house, station-house, depot, or railroad car, with intent to commit the crime of larceny, shall be imprisoned in the county jail not more than six months nor less than ten days, and fined not exceeding two hundred dollars. See Burrows v. State, 84 Ind. 529; Myers v. State, 92 Ind. 390. 2005. (1932.) House-breaking, to commit violence.-31. Whoever, either in the day-time or night-time, unlawfully breaks open and enters into any dwelling-house, shop, store, boat or other water-craft, in which any person resides or dwells, and commits, or attempts to commit, any personal abuse, force, or violence, shall be imprisoned in the county jail not more than six months nor less than ten days, and fined in any sum not exceeding two hundred dollars. 2006. (1933.) Grand larceny.-32. Whoever feloniously steals, takes and carries, leads or drives away the personal goods of another, of the value of twenty-five dollars or upwards, is guilty of grand larceny, and, upon conviction thereof; shall be imprisoned in the state prison not more than fourteen years nor less than one year, fined not exceeding double the value of the goods stolen, and disfranchised and rendered incapable of holding any office of trust or profit for any determinate period. In charging the larceny of coins of the United States, it is a sufficient description to give their denominations and value. Daily v. State, 10 Ind. 536; McKane v. State, 11 Ind. 195; Terry v. State, 13 Ind. 70; Barker v. State, 48 Ind. 163. Under the present statute it is not necessary to give a specific description of bank notes in an indictment charging larceny thereof. Riggs v. State, 104 Ind. 261; Hammond v. State, 121 Ind. 512. An indictment charging the larceny of a specified number of dollars of the paper money of the United States was held bad. State v. Hoke, 84 Ind. 137. The indictment may describe the property as such property is usually designated. Harrington v. State, 76 Ind. 112; Turner v. State, 102 Ind. 425. A defective description of a portion of the property will not render the indictment bad. Shafer v. State, 74 Ind. 90. |