be imprisoned in the state prison not more than fourteen years nor less than two years, and be fined not exceeding two thousand dollars.

See section 2037.

Indictments for assaults with intent to commit felonies must aver that the accused had the present ability to commit the crime charged. Adell v. State, 34 Ind. 543; State v. Hubbs, 58 Ind. 415; Howard v. State, 67 Ind. 401.

As to the forms of indictments for assault with intent to commit murder, see McCulley v. State, 62 Ind. 428; Agee v. State, 64 Ind. 340; Shinn v. State, 68 Ind. 423; Freel v. State, 125 Ind. 166.

As to the form and sufficiency of indictments for an assault and battery with intent to commit murder, see Cronkhite v. State, 11 Ind. 307; State v. Farley, 14 Ind. 23; Carder v. State, 17 Ind. 307; Sloan v. State, 42 Ind. 570; Hays v. State, 77 Ind. 450; Keeling v. State, 107 Ind. 563; State v. Jenkins, 120 Ind. 268; Plake v. State, 121 Ind. 433; Vaughan v. State, 128 Ind. 14.

For indictment for assault and battery with intent to commit rape, see Dooley v. State, 28 Ind. 239; Greer v. State, 50 Ind. 267; Skaggs v. State, 108 Ind. 53; McGuire v. State, 50 Ind. 284.

Any touching of a female under twelve years of age, with the intent to have sexual intercourse, even with her consent, is a criminal assault, overruling the case of Stephens v. State, 107 Ind. 185; Murphy v. State, 120 Ind. 115.

An indictment will lie for an assault and battery with the intention to commit robbery or larceny. Corneille v. State, 16 Ind. 232; Buntin v. State, 68 Ind. 38; Dickinson v. State, 70 Ind. 247.

An indictment lies for an assault and battery with the intent to commit voluntary manslaughter, but not of involuntary manslaughter. State v. Throckmorton, 53 Ind. 354; Thetge v. State, 83 Ind. 126.

On a charge of assault and battery with the intention to commit murder, there may be a conviction of an assault and battery with the intention to commit manslaughter. Jarrell v. State, 58 Ind. 293; State v. Throckmorton, 53 Ind. 354.

To justify an assault and battery with intent to commit murder it must appear that an assault and battery was committed under such circumstances that if death had resulted the accused would have been guilty of murder. Kunkle v. State, 32 Ind. 220. A verdict of guilty on a charge for an assault and battery with the intention to commit manslaughter need not state whether the intent was to commit voluntary or invol untary manslaughter. Brown v. State, 111 Ind. 441.

On a charge of an assault and battery with the intent to commit a felony there may be a conviction of an assault and battery only. Gillespie v. State, 9 Ind. 380.

There may be a conviction of assault, or assault and battery with the intent to commit a felony, although the felony is actually committed. Hamilton v. State, 36 Ind. 280.

1983. (1910.) Assault.-9. Whoever, having the present ability to do so, unlawfully attempts to commit a violent injury on the person of another, is guilty of an assault, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined in any sum not exceeding fifty dollars.

In charging an assault it is sufficient to follow the language of the statute. State r. Trulock, 46 Ind. 289; State v. Kinder, 109 Ind. 226; Marshall v. State, 123 Ind. 128; Freel v. State, 125 Ind. 166.

In order to constitute an assault, there must be some movement towards inflicting physicial violence. Cutler v. State, 59 Ind. 300.

1984. (1911.) Assault and battery.-10. Whoever, in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, unlawfully touches another, is guilty of an assault and battery, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not

more than one thousand dollars, to which may be adaed imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months.

An assault and battery must be alleged to have been unlawful, and to have been done in a rude, insolent or angry manner. Cranor v. State, 39 Ind. 64; State v. Wright, 52 Ind. 307; State v. Philley, 67 Ind. 304; Howard v. State, 67 Ind. 401; State v. Smith, 74 Ind. 557.

The exact words of the statute need not be used, but equivalent words may be substituted. Sloan v. State, 42 Ind. 570; State v. Smith, 74 Ind. 557; Hays v. State, 77 Ind. 450; Knight v. State, 84 Ind. 73.

The words of the statute need not be set out in the charge in the order in which they appear in the statute. Parker v. State, 118 Ind. 328.

If an assault and battery is charged as the means of committing another offense, there may be a conviction of the assault and battery. Rose v. State, 33 Ind. 167. There must be an unlawful touching of the person, or some object connected with the person, to constitute an assault and battery. Kirland v. State, 43 Ind. 146.

An assault and battery may be committed, although the touching is with the consent of the person touched. Richie v. State, 58 Ind. 355.

School teachers may inflict reasonable corporal punishment upon pupils without being guilty of an assault and battery. Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind. 290; Gardner v. State, 4 Ind. 632; Danenhoffer v. State, 69 Ind. 295; Vanvactor v. State, 113 Ind. 276. Persons in charge of criminals or paupers may inflict reasonable chastisement when necessary to enforce discipline. State v. Neff, 58 Ind. 516.

Parents may be guilty of an assault and battery in the punishment of their children. Hinkle v. State, 127 Ind. 490.

The act of 1889, Acts 1889, page 363, relating to the cruel treatment of children, does not deprive the circuit courts of jurisdiction of assault and battery when committed upon children. Hinkle v. State, 127 Ind. 490.

On a charge of rape there may be conviction of an assault and battery only. Richie v. State, 58 Ind. 355; Jones v. State, 118 Ind. 39.

1985. (1912.) Malicious mayhem.-11. Whoever purposely and maliciously, with intent to maim or disfigure, cuts, bites, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, cuts out or disables the tongue, puts out or destroys an eye, cuts off or disables a limb or any member of another person, is guilty of malicious mayhem, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the state prison not more than fourteen years nor less than two years, and be fined not more two thousand dollars.

Under an indictment for malicious mayhem, there may be a conviction for simple mayhem, or for an assault and battery. State v. Fisher, 103 Ind. 530.

1986. (1913.) Simple mayhem.-12. Whoever violently and unlawfully deprives another of the use of any bodily member, or unlawfully and willfully disables the tongue or eye, or cuts, bites, or slits the nose, ear, or lip of another, is guilty of simple mayhem, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars nor less than five dollars, and shall be imprisoned in the county jail not more than six months nor less than twenty days.

Persons in defense of their own persons may commit the acts constituting simple mayhem when necessary for self-protection, without being criminally liable therefor. Hayden v. State, 4 Blkf. 546.

There may be a conviction for simple mayhem, or of an assault and battery, under an indictment charging malicious mayhem. State v. Fisher, 103 Ind. 530.

1987. (1914.) Robbery.-13. Whoever forcibly and feloniously takes from the person of another any article of value, by violence or by putting in fear, is guilty of robbery, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the state prison not more than fourteen years nor less than two years, and be fined not exceeding one thousand dollars, and disfranchised and rendered incapable of holding any office. of trust or profit for any determinate period.

As to the form and sufficiency of an indictment for robbery, see Terry v. State, 13 Ind. 70; Anderson v. State, 28 Ind. 22.

An indictment for robbery need not allege a carrying away of the property taken. Terry v. State, 13 Ind. 70.

Robbery consists in the forcible taking of an article of value from the person by violence, or by putting in fear, without regard to the degree of force used. Seymour . State, 15 Ind. 288; Shinn v. State, 64 Ind. 13.

The degree of force used must be more than would be necessary to take possession of the property if no resistance was offered. Brennon v. State, 25 Ind. 403; Shinn . State, 64 Ind. 13.

The snatching of property from the person without violence or putting in fear, is larceny, and not robbery. Bonsall v. State, 35 Ind. 460.

Obtaining money by extortion or false pretenses will not constitute robbery. Perkins v. State, 65 Ind. 317.

The description of the property taken need not be more definite than in cases of larceny. Brennon v. State, 25 Ind. 403; McQueen v. State, 82 Ind. 72; Lewis v. State, 113 Ind. 59.

It is not necessary to prove the value of money, or currency that passes as such. McCarty v. State, 127 Ind. 2

1988. (1915.) Kidnaping.-14. Whoever kidnaps, or forcibly or fraudulently carries off or decoys from his place of residence, or arrests or imprisons any person, with the intention of having such person carried away from his place of residence, unless it be in pursuance of the laws of this state or of the United States, is guilty of kidnaping, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars nor less than one hundred dollars, and be imprisoned in the state prison not more than fourteen years nor less than two years.

See section 1653.

An indictment, charging the offense in the language of the statute is sufficient. State v. McRoberts, 4 Blkf. 178; State v. Sutton, 116 Ind. 527.

An indictment for kidnaping must negative the exceptions contained in the statute, and allege that the acts were not done in pursuance of the laws of this state or of the United States. State v. Kimmerling, 124 Ind. 382.

Two offenses are defined by this section. To constitute the first there must be a carrying or decoying of the person, forcibly or fraudulently, away from his place of residence; but to constitute the second offense the person need not be compelled, or induced, to leave his residence. Boes v. State, 125 Ind. 205; State v. Sutton, 116 Ind. 527.

1989. (1916.) Child-stealing.-15. Whoever takes, leads, carries, decoys or entices away a child under the age of twelve years, with intent unlawfully to detain or conceal such child from its parents, guardian or other person having the unlawful charge or custody thereof; and whoever, with the intent aforesaid, knowingly harbors or conceals

any such child so led, taken, carried, decoyed or enticed away-upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars. nor less than fifty dollars, and be imprisoned in the state prison not more than fourteen years nor less than two years.

1990. (1917.) Rape.-16. Whoever unlawfully has carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly against her will, or a female child under fourteen years of age, is guilty of rape, and upon conviction thereof shall be imprisoned in the state prison not more than twenty-one years nor less than one year.

(As amended, Acts 1893, p. 22. In force May 18, 1893.)

See section 1875.

As to the form and sufficiency of an indictment for rape, see Whitney v. State, 35 Ind. 503; Vance v. State, 65 Ind. 460; Anderson v. State, 104 Ind. 467.

To constitute rape sexual intercourse must be had without the consent and against the will of the female, and she must make such resistance as is within her power and is reasonable to expect under existing circumstances. Eyler v. State, 71 Ind. 49; Anderson v. State, 104 Ind. 467; Huber v. State, 126 Ind. 185.

Consent of the female obtained by fraud, such as that of a physician pretending to make an examination of her person for a proper purpose, will not prevent the sexual act from being rape. Pomeroy v. State, 94 Ind. 96.

When the consent of the female is a material question in controversy evidence as to her previous want of chastity is admissible. Carney v. State, 118 Ind. 525.

It is not admissible to prove sexual intercourse on the part of the female with men other than the accused. Richie v. State, 58 Ind. 355.

Where several persons are charged with rape, and only a portion are upon trial, the female may be required to state if she did not, a short time prior to the commission of the alleged offense, voluntarily have intercourse with one of the persons charged who is not on trial. Bedgood v. State, 115 Ind. 275.

The general moral character of the female may be proven to affect her credibility as a witness. Anderson v. State, 104 Ind. 467.

Complaints made by the female as to the commission of the outrage can only be proven when she is a witness on the part of the state. Weldon v. State, 32 Ind. 81; Thompson v. State, 38 Ind. 39.

It is not permissible for the state to prove the details of the complaint made by the female as to the outrage, but only that the same was committed. Thompson v. State, 38 Ind. 39.

The slightest penetration only need be proven, and the fact may be shown by circumstantial evidence. Taylor v. State, 111 Ind. 279.

The defendant may show that after the alleged commission of the offense the female treated him in a friendly manner. Huber v. State, 126 Ind. 185.

Where the female is under the age of consent it need not be alleged or proven that the intercourse was had forcibly or against her will. Murphy v. State, 120 Ind. 115. A charge of rape upon a woman is not supported by proof of rape upon a child under twelve years of age. Greer v. State, 50 Ind. 267.

On a charge of rape upon a female under the age of consent, acts of indecency and immorality on her part with others may be inquired into on her cross-examination. Bessette v. State, 101 Ind. 85.

On a charge of rape there may be a conviction of an assault and battery only. Richie v. State, 58 Ind. 355; Jones v. State, 118 Ind. 39.

1991. (1918.) Rape of insane woman.-17. Whoever, being seventeen years old and upward, has carnal knowledge of any woman other

than his wife, such woman being insane, and he knowing her to be such, shall, upon conviction thereof, be imprisoned in the state prison not more than twenty-one years nor less than five years.

1992. (1919.) Poisoning, with intent to kill.-18. Whoever administers, or procures to be administered, any poison to any other human being, or mingles poison with any food, drink, or medicine, with intent to kill or injure the person to whom the same shall be administered, if death do not ensue, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the state prison not more than fourteen years nor less than three years.

The name of the medicine administered need not be stated in the indictment, nor need it be described as noxious. State v. Vawter, 7 Blkf. 592: Carter v. State, 2 Ind. 617.

1993. (1920.) Poisoning springs, etc.-19. Whoever poisons any spring, well, cistern, or reservoir of water, with intent to kill or injure any human being, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the state prison not more than fourteen years nor less than three

years.

1994. (1921.) Prescribing medicine when drunk.-20. Whoever, while in a state of intoxication, prescribes or administers any poison, drug, or medicine to another, which endangers the life of such other person, shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars nor less than ten dollars, and imprisoned in the county jail not more than three months nor less than ten days.

1995. (1922.) Prescribing secret medicines.-21. Whoever prescribes any drug or medicine to another, the true nature and composition of which he does not, if inquired of, truly make known, but avows the same a secret medicine or composition, and thereby endangers the life of such other person, shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars nor less than thirty dollars, and imprisoned in the county jail not more than six months nor less than sixty days.

1996. (1923.) Attempting to procure miscarriage.--22. Whoever prescribes or administers to any pregnant woman, or to any woman whom he supposes to be pregnant, any drug, medicine, or substance whatever, with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of such woman; or, with like intent, uses any instrument or means whatever, unless such miscarriage is necessary to preserve her life, shall, if the woman miscarries or dies in consequence thereof, be fined not more than five hundred dollars nor less than fifty dollars, and imprisoned in the state prison not more than fourteen years nor less than three

years.

See section 2084.

For form of indictment for procuring, or attempting to procure miscarriage, see Willey v. State, 52 Ind. 246; State v. Sherwood, 75 Ind. 15; Rhodes v. State, 128 Ind.

189.

An attempt to cause a miscarriage is criminal unless such miscarriage is necessary to save the life of the woman. Bassett v. State, 41 Ind. 303; Willey v. State, 46 Ind. 363.