or information for larceny may contain a count for obtaining the same goods by burglary, for obtaining the same goods by robbery, and for obtaining the same property by false pretense, a count for embezzlement thereof, and a count for receiving or concealing the same property knowing it to have been stolen, or any of such counts; and the accused may be convicted of either offense, and the court or jury trying the cause may find all or any of the persons accused guilty of either of the offenses charged.

See sections 1903-4.

Larceny and embezzlement may be charged in separate counts in the same indictment. Griffith v. State, 36 Ind. 406.

Larceny of goods, and receiving the same as stolen goods, may be joined in the same indictment in separate counts. Kennegar v. State, 120 Ind. 176.

If the defendant pleads guilty to two inconsistent charges he can not take advantage thereof. Conover v. State, 86 Ind. 99.

If counts are improperly joined and there is a conviction on one only, there is no available error. Myers v. State, 92 Ind. 390.

Larceny of goods of different persons at the same time may be joined in separate counts. Bell v. State, 42 Ind. 335.

Counts for larceny and the obtaining of the goods by burglary may be joined. McCollough v. State, 132 Ind. 427.

1818. (1749.) Averments as to elections.-175. When an offense is committed in relation to any election, an indictment or information as to such offense shall be deemed sufficient if it allege that such election was authorized by law, without stating the names of the officers holding the election or the persons voted for or the offices to be filled at such election.

The indictment must aver for what purpose the election was held. Tipton v. State, 27 Ind. 492.

In an indictment for illegal voting the want of qualifications of the voter must be stated. Quinn v. State, 35 Ind. 485.

When it is apparent that a mistake is made in the date on which an election was held, courts will take notice of the time when the election is required by law to be held. State v. Patterson, 116 Ind. 45.

1819. (1750.) Averment as to money, etc.-176. In every indictment or information for the offenses referred to in this act, in which it is necessary to make an averment as to any money, or bank bills, or notes, United States treasury notes, postal and fractional currency or other bills, or notes issued by any lawful authority and intended to pass and circulate as money, it shall be sufficient to describe such money, bills, notes, or currency simply as money, without specifying any particular coin, note, bill, or currency; and such allegation shall be sustained by proof of any amount of coin or of any such note, bill, or currency, although the particular species of coin of which such amount was composed or the particular nature of such note, bill, or currency be not proved.

This section is constitutional. Riggs v. State, 104 Ind. 261.

It is only necessary to describe all kinds and classes of articles used as money, by

the general term of money. Lewis v. State, 113 Ind. 59; Hammond v. State, 121 Ind. 512; McCarty v. State, 127 Ind. 223; Randall v. State, 132 Ind. 539.

If a specific description of money is given the description must be proven as laid. Lewis v. State, 113 Ind. 59.

It is not necessary to prove the value of money. McCarty v. State, 127 Ind. 223. If money is described as "lawful money of the United States," no greater proof is required than if such words were omitted. Taylor v. State, 130 Ind. 66.

1820. (1751.) Written instrument.-177. In all other cases except forgery, when it is necessary to make an averment in an indictment or information as to any instrument, whether the same consists wholly or in part of writing, printing, or figures, it shall be sufficient to describe such instrument by any name or designation by which the same is usually known, or by the purport thereof.

It may not be necessary in an indictment for sending obscene matter through the mails to set forth the paper or writing; but if it should be set forth omitting illegible portions will not render the indictment bad. Thomas v. State, 103 Ind. 419.

1821. (1752.) Misdescription of forged instrument.-178. When an instrument which is the subject of an indictment or information for forgery or for uttering any forged instrument has been destroyed or withheld by the act or procurement of the defendant, and the fact of the destruction or withholding is alleged in the indictment or information and established on the trial, the misdescription of the instrument is immaterial.

See section 2354.

If it is alleged that the forged instrument is in the hands of the accused, an exact copy of the instrument need not be set forth. Armitage v. State, 13 Ind. 441; State v. Callahan, 124 Ind. 364.

If the forged instrument is lost or destroyed, it may be set forth according to its tenor and effect. Birdg v. State, 31 Ind. 88; Hess v. State, 73 Ind. 537; Munson v. State, 79 Ind. 541; State v. Callahan, 124 Ind. 364.

When loss or destruction of the instrument, or possession thereof by the accused, is not alleged, the proof must correspond to the description given in the indictment. Rooker v. State, 65 Ind. 86; State v. Pease, 74 Ind. 263.

1822. (1753.) Names of partners, joint owners, etc.-179. When any offense is committed upon or in relation to any property belonging to partners or to several joint owners, or which, when the offense was committed, was in possession of a bailee or tenant, the indictment or information for such offense shall be deemed sufficient, if it allege the ownership of such property to be in such partnership by its firm name, or in any one of such partners, owners, bailors or bailees, tenant or tenants, without naming all of them; and in an indictment or information for stealing, destroying or mutilating a will, codicil or other testamentary instrument, it shall not be necessary to allege that the will, codicil, or other instrument is the property of any person or of any value.

It is sufficient if the name of any joint owner of property is given as the owner thereof. Widner v. State, 25 Ind. 234.

Proof that property belongs to one person will not support an allegation of ownership in two. Widner v. State, 25 Ind. 234.

Leased property may be charged to belong to either the landlord or tenant. Kennedy v. State, 81 Ind. 379. See McCrillis v. State, 69 Ind. 159.

Partnership property may be alleged to belong to the firm by giving the firm name. State v. Williams, 103 Ind. 235.

[1879 S., p. 146. In force March 29, 1879.]

1823. (1754.) Foreign express companies.-4. In all criminal cases or prosecutions affecting the rights or property of such copartnerships, associations of persons, joint stock associations, or companies [foreign express companies] it shall be sufficient to aver the ownership of the money, goods or property in and by the name set forth in the statement required to be made, filed, and recorded in section two of this act [§ 2913]; and the record, or a certified copy thereof, of such statement shall be deemed and taken as sufficient proof, on the trial of any criminal case, of the name and legal existence of such copartnerships, associations of persons, joint stock associations, or companies.

[1881 S., p. 114. In force September 19, 1881.]

1824. (1755.) When sufficient.-180. The indictment or information is sufficient, if it can be understood therefrom

First. That the indictment was found by the grand jury of the county or the information presented by the prosecuting attorney of the circuit in which the court was held.

A dismissal of the first count will not prevent the formal parts thereof being applied to the other counts so as to show the return of the indictment. State v. Dufour, 63 Ind. 567.

The records and recitals in the indictment may be considered in determining the regularity of the finding of the indictment. O'Brien v. State, 125 Ind. 38; Mathis v. State, 94 Ind. 562; Powers v. State, 87 Ind. 144.

Second. That the defendant is named or described in an indictment as a person whose name is unknown to the grand jurors, or in an information to the prosecuting attorney.

If it is alleged that the name of the defendant is unknown, the proof must sustain the allegation, and show diligence to learn the name. Stone v. State, 30 Ind. 115; Foster v. State, 106 Ind. 272.

The Christian name of the defendant should be stated unless it is alleged to be unknown. Burton v. State, 75 Ind. 477.

When the name of the criminal is alleged to be unknown, the defendant must be identified as the person who committed the crime. Foster v. State, 106 Ind. 272. This provision is applicable to proceedings before justices of the peace. Ard v. State, 114 Ind. 542.

Third. That an offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court, or is triable therein.

When the name of the state and county are stated in the title of an indictment, references afterwards made to such county will indicate a county in this state. Long ". State, 56 Ind. 133; Anderson v. State, 104 Ind. 467.

Fourth. That the offense charged is clearly set forth in plain and concise language, without unnecessary repetition.

No greater certainty is required in criminal than in civil pleadings. McCool v. State, 23 Ind. 127.

Fifth. That the offense charged is stated with such a degree of certainty that the court may pronounce judgment, upon a conviction, according to the right of the case.

See Schmidt v. State, 78 Ind. 41; Myers v. State, 101 Ind. 379; Woodward v. State, 103 Ind. 127.

An indictment or information should contain all the substantial allegations of an indictment at common law. Dillon v. State, 9 Ind. 408.

1825. (1756.) When not to be quashed.-181. No indictment or information shall be deemed invalid, nor shall the same be set aside or quashed, nor shall the trial, judgment, or other proceeding be stayed, arrested, or in any manner affected, for any of the following defects: First. For a mistake in the name of the court or county, in the title thereof.

Second. For the want of an allegation of the time or place of any material fact, when the venue and time have once been stated in the indictment or information.

When the time and place of an occurrence has been once stated, such time and place may afterwards be referred to by "then and there." State v. Williams, 4 Ind. 234. When time and place has once been alleged, it is not necessary to repeat the same. Turpin v. State, 80 Ind. 148.

Third. That dates and numbers are represented by figures.

This clause changes the rule under prior statutes, and the statement of dates and numbers by figures is proper. Hampton v. State, 8 Ind. 336; Hizer v. State, 12 Ind. 330.

Fourth. For an omission of any of the following allegations, viz.: With force and arms "contrary to the form of the statute"; or "against the peace and dignity of the state of Indiana."

Fifth. For an omission to allege that the grand jurors were impaneled, sworn, or charged.

Each count of an indictment need not recite the facts as to the impaneling of the grand jury. State v. Dufour, 63 Ind. 567.

Sixth. For any surplusage or repugnant allegation, when there is sufficient matter alleged to indicate the crime and person charged. An indictment will not be quashed for surplusage or repugnant allegations when the crime is otherwise sufficiently charged. Wall v. State, 23 Ind. 150; Myers v. State, 101 Ind. 379; State v. White, 129 Ind. 153; Kennedy v. State, 62 Ind. 136; State v. McDonald, 106 Ind. 233; Trout v. State, 111 Ind. 499. If one name appears in the title, and the true name of the defendant is in the body of the indictment it will be sufficient. State v. Boss, 74 Ind. 80.

Seventh. For the omission of the words "as appears by the record." Eighth. For omitting to state the time at which the offense was

committed in any case in which time is not the essence of the offense; nor for stating the time imperfectly, unless time is of the essence of the offense.

Omitting to state the time of the commission of an offense is immaterial unless time is of the essence of the offense. State v. Sammons, 95 Ind. 22; Myers v. State, 121 Ind. 15; State v. Patterson, 116 Ind. 45.

Giving "18184" as the year in which an offense was committed renders the indictment bad. Murphy v. State, 106 Ind. 96.

Ninth. For omitting a statement of the value or price of any matter or thing, or the amount of damages or injury, in any case where the value or price or the amount of damages or injury is not of the essence of the offense.

The value of property unlawfully removed from lands is not of the essence of the offense and need not be stated in the indictment. Dorrell v. State, 80 Ind. 566.

Tenth. For any other defect or imperfection which does not tend to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits.

See Greenley v. State, 60 Ind. 141; Kennedy v. State, 62 Ind. 136; Stout v. State, 96 Ind. 407; O'Connor v. State, 97 Ind. 104; Myers v. State, 101 Ind. 379; State v. Bowman, 103 Ind. 69; State v. Callahan, 124 Ind. 364; Fisher v. State, 2 App. 365.

1826. (1757.) Copy to accused.-182. Whenever requested by the accused or his counsel, the clerk of the proper court shall make and deliver to the accused a copy of the indictment or information, provided the person accused has been arrested.

1827. (1758.) Pleadings by accused.-183. The only pleading necessary on the part of the accused is either a motion to quash or a plea.

When an oral plea is entered it should be entered on the minutes of the court. Tindall v. State, 71 Ind. 314.

Matters in confession and avoidance may be set up by a special plea. Neaderhouser v. State, 28 Ind. 257; Clem v. State, 42 Ind. 420; State v. Barrett, 54 Ind. 434.

The sufficiency of special pleas may be tested by a demurrer. Neaderhouser v. State, 28 Ind. 257; State v. Barrett, 54 Ind. 434.

Pleas in abatement must be disposed of before pleading in bar. Pointer v. State, 89 Ind. 255.

Pleas in abatement should be filed when an appearance is first entered. Cooper v. State, 120 Ind. 377.

Pleas in abatement must be direct and certain, and defects therein can not be cured by intendment. Hardin v. State, 22 Ind. 347; Ward v. State, 48 Ind. 289; Billings v. State, 107 Ind. 54.

1828. (1759.) Motion to quash.-184. The defendant may move to quash the indictment or information when it appears upon the face thereof, either

First. That the grand jury which found the indictment had no legal authority to inquire into the offense charged.