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For certifying copies of all proceedings, for each one hundred words, ten cents.

For entering continuances, ten cents.

For every bond of recognizance, twenty-five cents.

For every venire for summoning a jury, twenty-five cents.

For subpoenas for witnesses, to include all called for at one time, twenty-five cents.

For each transfer, assignment, or docket of judgment, twenty-five

cents.

For issuing execution, twenty-five cents.

For each oath not herein otherwise provided, five cents.
For rendering every final judgment, twenty-five cents.
For trial of right of property and judgment, one dollar.
For swearing jury, ten cents.

For making up docket, for every one hundred words, ten cents. For each writ of attachment against property, twenty-five cents. For making return of fines, for each mile necessarily traveled, to be paid out of the county treasury, ten cents.

For transmitting papers in case of appeal, twenty-five cents.
For writing an affidavit, twenty-five cents.

As to jurisdiction of justices of the peace, and practice in criminal actions, see section 1694, et seq.

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[1881 S., p. 114. In force September 19, 1881.]

1642. (1573.) Division of offenses.-1. All crimes and public offenses which may be punished with death or imprisonment in the state prison shall be denominated felonies, and all other offenses against the criminal law shall be denominated misdemeanors.

Crimes punishable by imprisonment in the state prison are felonies. State v. Smith, 8 Blkf. 489.

Felonies and misdemeanors are both included within the word "crime." Morton v. Skinner, 48 Ind. 123.

All criminal offenses must be defined by statute, but if the statute gives no specific definition the common law definition will be adopted. Ardery v. State, 56 Ind. 328; State v. Berdetta, 73 Ind. 185; Stephens v. State, 107 Ind. 185.

As to what is regarded as a sufficient definition, see Hedderick v. State, 101 Ind. 564.

1643. (1574.) Where punished.-2. Every person committing an

offense against the laws of this state is liable to be punished therefor in the county having jurisdiction.

See section 1837.

It must appear from the indictment that the offense was committed in the county having jurisdiction. Hutchinson v. State, 62 Ind. 556.

As to allegations and proof of venue, see Jackson v. State, 19 Ind. 312; Clem v. State, 31 Ind. 480; Wiles v. State, 33 Ind. 206; Deck v. State, 47 Ind. 245; Stazey v. State, 58 Ind. 514; Cluck v. State, 40 Ind. 263; Luck v. State, 96 Ind. 16.

The presumption arises that a murder was committed in the county where the body is found. Beavers v. State, 58 Ind. 530.

1644. (1575.) Non-residents, by agent.-3. Every person being without this state, committing or consummating an offense by an agent or means within the State, is liable to be punished by the laws thereof, in the same manner as if he were present, and had commenced and consummated the offense within the state.

Persons outside of this state who become accessories before the fact to a felony committed within this state, are not punishable in this state. This section only applies where persons outside of this state commit a crime which is deemed committed within this state. Johns v. State, 19 Ind. 421.

The stealing of goods without this state and bringing the same into this state, is not covered by this section. Beal v. State, 15 Ind. 378.

This has no application to an offense committed and consummated without this state by means used within it. Stewart v. Jessup, 51 Ind. 413.

1645. (1576.) Aiding felony in another state.-4. Every person who shall, while in this state, aid in and abet the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate, an offense in another state which by the laws of this state is a felony, shall be deemed guilty of a felony; and upon conviction thereof shall be punished in the same manner and to the same extent as accessories before the fact to the commission of such a felony are prosecuted and punished by the criminal laws of the state; and it shall not be essential to the conviction of such person of said felony that the principal be prosecuted for the crime charged.

1646. (1577.) Dueling.-5. Any person leaving this state to fight a duel, or to be concerned as a second therein or in any other capacity out of this state, may be punished in the county of his residence in the state, in the same manner as if the duel had been contemplated and fought, and the result thereof had terminated therein. And when any person, by previous appointment made within this state, fights a duel without this state, and, in so doing, inflicts a mortal wound upon any person who dies from the effects thereof in this state, the jurisdiction is in the county where such death shall happen.

1647. (1578.) On water-craft.-6. When an offense is committed in this state or on the boundary thereof, on board a boat or vessel navigating a river, lake, or canal, or lying therein, the jurisdiction is in any county within or opposite to which the offense was committed.

[1 R. S. 1852, p. 168. In force May 6, 1853.]

1648. (1579.) On Ohio and Wabash rivers.-93. The proper courts of the several counties in this state bordering on the Ohio river, and

on the Wabash river as far up as said river forms the boundary line between this state and the state of Illinois, shall have jurisdiction of all offenses committed against the penal laws of this state on said rivers opposite to said counties respectively. Whenever any violation of the penal laws of this state shall be committed on either of the above-named rivers opposite to the line dividing any two counties. bordering thereon, or so near to said line that it may be doubtful on which side of said line the offense was committed, the proper courts of either of the counties adjoining said line may take cognizance of said

offense.

The courts in counties bordering on the Ohio river have jurisdiction to punish persons violating the laws of this state on such river, and opposite to such counties. Carlisle v. State, 32 Ind. 55; Sherlock v. Alling, 44 Ind. 184; Welsh v. State, 126 Ind. 71; Dugan v. State, 125 Ind. 130.

[1881 S., p. 114. In force September 19, 1881.]

1649. (1580.) In two or more counties.-7. When a public offense has been committed partly in one county and partly in another, or the act or effects constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense occur in two or more counties, the jurisdiction is in either county.

This statute is constitutional. Archer v. State, 106 Ind. 426.

When a conspiracy to commit murder was formed in one county, and the victim was seized in such county and taken into another and killed, it was held that the jurisdiction was in either county. Archer v. State, 106 Ind. 426.

1650. (1581.) Property brought from another county.-8. When property taken in one county by burglary, robbery, larceny, or embezlement, has been brought into another county, the jurisdiction is in either county.

If the prosecution is in the county into which the property is taken, it must appear that the property was brought into such county after the property was originally taken. Hutchinson v. State, 62 Ind. 556.

As to the sufficiency of an indictment under this section, see Jones v. State, 53 Ind. 235.

If property is embezzled in one county and taken into another, jurisdiction is in either county. Beaty v. State, 82 Ind. 228.

1651. (1582.) Accessory.-9. An accessory before or after the fact may be punished in the county where he committed the offense or in the county where the principal offense was committed.

This section does not apply to persons who while outside of this state become mere accessories before the fact to the commission of a crime within this state. Johns v. State, 19 Ind. 421.

1652. (1583.) Mortal wound or poison.-10. If any mortal wound. be given or poison administered in one county, and death, by means thereof, ensue in another, the jurisdiction is in either county.

1653. (1584.) Kidnapping, enticing females and concealing children.-11. The jurisdiction of the following cases is in any county in

which the offense was committed, or into or out of which the person upon whom the offense was committed has been brought:

First. For unlawfully and forcibly or fraudulently taking, inveigling, or kidnapping any person, with intent to take such person to parts without this state, or for aiding or abetting therein.

Second. For taking or enticing away any female, for the purpose of prostitution.

Third. For taking, decoying, or enticing away a child under the age of fifteen years, with intent to detain and conceal it from its parents, guardian, or other person having lawful charge of the child.

See sections 1988-9.

1654. (1585.) County line.-12. When a public offense has been committed on the boundary of two or more counties, or so near to the line that it is uncertain on which side thereof the offense was committed, the jurisdiction is in either county.

Section 13, of Art. I, of the constitution of this state provides that the accused shall be entitled to a trial in the county in which the offense shall have been committed. If it is provided by the constitution of a state that an accused shall be tried in the county where the crime was committed, the legislature can not provide for a trial in any other county without the consent of the accused. State v. Lowe, 21 West Va. 782 (45 Am. Rep. 570); Ex parte Slater, 72 Mo. 102; State v. McGraw, 87 Mo. 161. See People v. Davis, 56 N. Y. 95; State v. Robinson, 14 Minn. 447.

1655. (1586.) Transporting game.-13. Prosecutions against any railroad company, express company, common carrier, or person, for transporting game or birds in violation of law, may be had in any county where such game or birds shall have been received for transportation, or into which they may come for the purpose of or during the course of such transportation.

1656. (1587.) Libel.-14. When the offense of libel is committed, by publication, in this state, against any person, the jurisdiction is in any county where the libel is published or circulated by the accused. In no case, however, can the accused be prosecuted for the publication of the same libel in more than one county of this state.

1657. (1588.) Judgment in another state.-15. When an act charged as a public offense is within the jurisdiction of another state, territory, or country, as well as within the jurisdiction of this state, a conviction or acquittal thereof in the former is a bar to a prosecution or indictment therefor in this state.

1658. (1589.) Property brought from another state.-16. When any person is liable to prosecution as the buyer, receiver, concealer, or aider in the concealment, of personal property that has been feloniously stolen, taken, obtained by false pretense, or embezzled in any other county, or state or territory of the United States, or foreign country, he may be prosecuted or indicted in any county where he bought, received, concealed, aided in concealing, or had such property, notwithstanding the theft, false pretense, or embezzlement was committed in another county, or state or territory of the United States, or foreign country.

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