Johnson v. The Board of Commissioners of Wells County et al. not only as to the parties named in the action, but as to all creditors who were bound by the adjudication. This court in the case of Fahlor v. Board, etc., supra, held that upon the facts stated by Fahlor in his complaint, he was entitled to an injunction, and reversed the judgment because a demurrer to his complaint had been sustained below. Whether or not Fahlor has prosecuted his action to final judgment, and procured an order perpetually enjoining the collection of the assessment against his land, is not shown by the record before us. Assuming that he has, it may well be said that he will not and can not be affected by the curative statute of 1885. It is well settled that the Legislature can not overthrow judgments by legislative mandate, curative statutes or otherwise. At the time he commenced his action, and at the time his case was passed upon by this court, the assessment against his land could not have been enforced by reason of the infirmities in the proceedings by the county board, as stated in his complaint. Before appellant commenced his action, those infirmities had been healed by the curative act of 1885. Appellant, therefore, is asking that his rights shall be adjudicated, not under the law as it stood when he commenced his action and sought the aid of the courts, but under the law as it stood prior to that time. He seeks protection from the judgment that was, or might have been rendered in favor of Fahlor. He was in no way a party to Fahlor's action, nor was he, as we think, in any way privy thereto. Before the passage of the curative statute of 1885, the proceedings by the county board, by reason of the irregularities already mentioned, were a nullity as to appellant. They were not more so, after the adjudication in the Fahlor case. That Fahlor may escape payment by reason of the ruling and adjudication in his case, will not result in unequal taxation, because the assessments were not imposed as taxes. They were imposed as the equivalent of benefits received from the construction of the gravel road. Neither will the escape of 107 32 125 523 107 32 131 420 107 32 143 686 107 32 150 342 The Ohio and Mississippi Railway Company v. Cosby et al. Fahlor increase appellant's burdens, nor lessen his benefits. We know of no principle or rule of the law that will extend and apply the ruling in Fahlor's case to the case of appellant, commenced subsequent to the passage of the curative act of 1885. It results from the above, that the court below should have sustained appellee's demurrer to the complaint. The case is brought here by appellant, upon the ruling of the court below in overruling his demurrer to appellee's answer. We do not extend this opinion to inquire as to whether or not the answer is good, as in any event, it is good enough for a bad complaint. Ice v. Ball, 102 Ind. 42. Judgment affirmed, at appellant's costs. No. 12,620. THE OHIO AND MISSISSIPPI RAILWAY COMPANY v. COSBY ET AL. HUSBAND AND WIFE.-Action for Personal Injuries to Wife.- Parties.— Plead- SAME.-Measure of Damages.-In an action by a married woman to recover SAME.-Instruction to Jury.-In such an action, an instruction "that in order to justify the assessment of damages for future or permanent disability, it must appear that continued or permanent disability is reasonably certain to result from the injury complained of," correctly states the law. The Ohio and Mississippi Railway Company v. Cosby et al. BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.-Delay of Judge in Signing.-Practice.--If a proper bill of exceptions is prepared and presented to the judge within the time allowed, his delay in signing and causing it to be filed, will not deprive the party of its benefit. From the Dearborn Circuit Court. C. A. Beecher, H. D. McMullen and P. Werner, for appellant. O. F. Roberts, G. M. Roberts and C. W. Stapp, for appellees. MITCHELL, J.-Lizzie Cosby and her husband joined in a complaint against the Ohio and Mississippi Railway Company, to recover damages for an alleged injury to the wife. The complaint charges that Mrs. Cosby, having taken passage on one of the railway company's trains, arrived at Aurora, her place of destination, and having left her scat and stepped upon the first step leading from the rear platform of the car in which she had been seated, while waiting there for the train to stop, the conductor, carelessly and negligently seized her by the arm, and with force, while the train was in motion, without fault on her part, pulled her violently on to the platform of the depot. Damages in the sum of $5,000 are alleged to have accrued to the wife on account of internal injuries sustained by the misconduct of the conductor. A demurrer was overruled to the complaint, after which, upon issues joined, the cause was tried by a jury, with the result that a verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiff. The ruling on the demurrer is complained of. The appellant contends, the husband having joined his wife in suing for a personal injury to the latter, that as the complaint stated no cause of action in favor of both, the demurrer for want of sufficient facts was well taken. The general rule is, as the appellant argues, that a complaint, to withstand a demurrer, must state a cause of action in favor of all the plaintiffs. Holzman v. Hibben, 100 Ind. VOL. 107.-3 The Ohio and Mississippi Railway Company . Cosby et al. 338; Darkies v. Bellows, 94 Ind. 64; Parker v. Small, 58 Ind. 349. An exception occurs, when, as in this case, the plaintiffs are husband and wife, and the action relates to injuries to the person or character of the latter. In such cases, while it is not necessary, it is not improper, to join the husband. Hamm v. Romine, 98 Ind. 77; Roller v. Blair, 96 Ind. 203; Rogers v. Smith, 17 Ind. 323. The complaint was to recover for the personal injuries sustained by the wife. It embraced no cause of action in favor of the husband. It was nevertheless, under the authorities cited, not subject to demurrer on that account. That the wife might have maintained an action in her own name, without joining her husband, as provided in section 5132, R. S. 1881, does not alter the case. That a different rule is held by some of the courts may be conceded. Michigan Central There R. R. Co. v. Coleman, 28 Mich. 440, and cases cited. was no error in overruling the demurrer to the complaint. The correctness of the following instruction, given by the court, is next called in question: "If you find for the plaintiffs, then you will determine from the evidence the amount the plaintiffs are entitled to recover, not exceeding, however, the amount demanded in the complaint; and in estimating the damages, if any are proved, you should take into consideration the injury inflicted upon the plaintiff, Lizzie Cosby, the pain and suffering undergone by her in consequence of her injuries, if any are proved, and also any permanent injury sustained by her, if the jury believe from the evidence that the said plaintiff has sustained permanent injury from the wrongful acts complained of, and also the expense of medical attendance, if any, and for loss of time occasioned by said injuries, if any is shown by the evidence." This instruction proceeded upon the erroneous assumption that the jury were authorized to include in their assessment the damages recoverable by the husband, as well as those The Ohio and Mississippi Railway Company v. Cosby et al. This was which the wife might recover for her separate use. a fatal error. Presumptively, the husband was entitled to maintain a separate action to recover for medical attendance, loss of service and of the society of his wife. He could not recover for these in an action in which his wife was suing for injuries to her person, nor could such damages be recovered. by them jointly. It was equally impossible, as the complaint was framed, for the wife to recover for medical attendance, or loss of time. Her right was limited to recover for the injuries to her person, including pain, anguish of mind, and all such other damages as were not presumptively injuries to the husband. Long v. Morrison, 14 Ind. 595; Fuller v. Naugatuck R. R. Co., 21 Conn. 557; Baltimore, etc., R. W. Co. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 74 (47 Am. R. 381n); Cregin v. Brooklyn, etc., R. R. Co., 75 N. Y. 192 (31 Am. R. 459); 2 Wood's Railway Law, 1245. In Iowa, by statute, in a suit by a husband and wife, for injuries to the wife, the husband may join thereto claims in his own right. McDonald v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 26 Iowa, 124. In support of the charge under consideration, it is plausibly argued that, inasmuch as, under the statute of 1881, a married woman has power to incur liability for medical attendance, and since she has the right to the profits of her own labor, such attendance and loss of time constituted proper elements of damage in her favor. That the situation of a married woman might be such that in an action for an injury to her person she might also recover for medical attendance, and for loss of time, may be conceded, but to warrant such a recovery some special circumstances, rebutting the presumptive right of the husband, must be averred and proved. No claim is made of any such averments or proof. The appellant requested the court to instruct the jury, that in order "to justify the assessment of damages for future or permanent disability, it must appear that continued or per |