ness and its obligation without considering any of these effects at all. Now the question arises, How does there arise this feeling of moral obligation in general? It is an abstract sentiment generated in a manner analogous to that in which abstract ideas are generated. "Accumulated experiences have produced the consciousness that guidance by feelings which refer to remote and general results is usually more conducive to welfare than guidance by feelings to be immediately gratified." The idea of authoritativeness has come to be connected with feelings having these traits. This idea of authoritativeness is one element in the abstract consciousness of duty. But there is another element — the element of coerciveness. The sense of coerciveness or compulsion which the consciousness of duty includes, and which the word obligation indicates, has been generated by fears of the political, social, and religious penalties. Now, this sense of coerciveness becomes directly connected with the above-mentioned moral feelings in this way. The political, social, and religious motives are mainly formed of represented future results (of penalties), and so is the moral restraining motive (of the intrinsic effects). Hence it happens "that the representations, having much in common, and often being aroused at the same time, the fear joined with the three sets becomes, by association, joined with the fourth. Thinking of the extrinsic effects of a forbidden act excites a dread which continues present while the intrinsic effects of the act are thought of; and, being thus linked with these intrinsic effects, causes a vague sense of moral compulsion."1 Heredity plays an important part in the process. There have been, and still are, developing in the race certain fundamental moral intuitions. Though these moral intuitions are, the result of accumulated experiences of utility, gradually organized and inherited, they have come to be quite independent of conscious experience. The experiences of utility organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race have been producing corresponding nervous modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition — certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility.2 1 Data of Ethics, §§ 44 ff. 2 Ib., § 45. See Spencer's letter Mill, quoted in § 45 of the Data of Ethics: "To make my position fully understood, it seems needful to add that, corresponding to the fundamental propositions of a developed Moral Science, there have been, and still are, developing in the race, certain fundamental moral intuitions; and that, though these moral intuitions are the results of accumulated experiences of Utility, gradually organized and inherited, they have come to be quite independent of conscious experience. Just in the same way that I believe the intuition of space, possessed by any living individual, to have arisen from organized and consolidated experiences of all antecedent individuals who bequeathed to him their slowly developed nervous organizations—just as I believe that this intuition, requiring only to be made definite and complete by personal experiences, has practically become a form of Here, it seems to me, we get the compromise between extreme intuitionism and extreme empiricism of which I spoke before. Spencer is perfectly conscious of his relationship to the two schools. “It is possible," he says,1 "to agree with moralists of the intuitive school respecting the existence of a moral sense, while differing with them respecting its origin. I have contended in the foregoing division of this work, and elsewhere, that though there exist feelings of the kind alleged, they are not of supernatural origin, but of natural origin; that, being generated by the discipline of the social activities, internal and external, they are not alike in all men, but differ more or less everywhere in proportion as the social activities differ; and that, in virtue of their mode of genesis, they have a coördinate authority with the inductions of utility." "But now, while we are shown that the moral-sense doctrine in its original form is not true, we are also shown. that it adumbrates a truth, and a much higher truth. thought, apparently quite independent of experience; so do I believe that the experiences of utility, organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been producing corresponding nervous modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition - certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility. I also hold that, just as the space-intuition responds to the exact demonstrations of Geometry, and has its rough conclusions interpreted and verified by them; so will moral intuitions respond to the demonstrations of Moral Science, and will have their rough conclusions interpreted and verified by them." 1 The Inductions of Ethics, § 117. For the facts cited, chapter after chapter, unite in proving that the sentiments and ideas current in each society become adjusted to the kinds of activity predominating in it. A life of constant external enmity generates a code in which aggression, conquest, revenge, are inculcated, while peaceful occupations are reprobated. Conversely, a life of settled internal amity generates a code inculcating the virtues conducing to harmonious coöperation — justice, honesty, veracity, regard for others' claims. And the implication is that if the life of internal amity continues unbroken from generation to generation, there must result not only the appropriate code, but the appropriate emotional nature—a moral sense adapted to moral requirements. Men so conditioned will acquire, to the degree needful for complete guidance, that innate conscience which the intuitive moralists erroneously suppose to be possessed by mankind at large. There needs but a continuance of absolute peace externally, and a rigorous insistence of non-aggression internally to ensure the moulding of men into a form naturally characterized by all the virtues."1 (4) With this theory, as worked out by Spencer, the views of M. Guyau,2 Leslie Stephen, B. Car 1 Inductions, § 191. 2 Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction, 2d ed., 1881; English translation, 1899; La morale anglaise contemporaine, 1885, Conclusion, pp. 423 ff. 8 The Science of Ethics, 1882: "Conscience is the utterance of the public spirit of the race, ordering us to obey the primary con 6 neri,1 H. Höffding,2 G. von Gizycki, R. von Jhering, W. Wundt, F. Paulsen, S. Alexander, Hugo Münsterberg, Paul Rée, Georg Simmel, 10 and A. Sutherland 11 practically agree.12 8 ditions of its welfare, and it acts not the less forcibly though we may not understand the source of its authority or the end at which it is aiming." 1 Sittlichkeit und Darwinismus, 1871. 2 Psychology, VI, C, §8; Ethik, 1888. an instinct which has developed in the race. cally, like all instincts. 3 Moralphilosophie, 1889. Conscience, he holds, is 4 Der Zweck im Recht, 1877, 3d ed., 1893. 5 · Ethik, 1886, 2d ed., 1892, English translation, in 3 vols., by Titchener, Washburn, and Gulliver. 6 System der Ethik, 1889, 5th ed., 1899, edited and translated by Thilly, 1899. According to Paulsen, duty at first consists in acting in accordance with custom. I perform certain customary acts because it is the will of my surroundings. The will of the people speaks to the individual in custom. In my feeling of duty, as it now exists, the will of my parents, teachers, ancestors, and race is expressed. The authority of the gods whom I worship is also manifested in the feeling. At first man obeys the law because of external authority; in time he comes to feel an inner obligation to the law, he acknowledges the right of others over him. See Bk. II, chap. v. 7 Moral Order and Progress, 1889. 8 Der Ursprung der Sittlichkeit, 1889. 9 Die Entstehung des Gewissens, 1885. 10 Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft, 2 vols., 1892, 1893. See Vol. I, chap. i. 11 The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct, 2 vols., 1898. 12 For evolutional ethics, see Williams, A Review of Evolutional Ethics. |