the ideas of the end of the action and the means to its realization, and by a vivid feeling of the worth of that end."1

The drama of willing is closed when this peculiar process enters. It makes no difference whether the thing willed is ever realized or not. I may will to pursue a certain line of conduct, and afterwards change my mind about it. I may will to perform an act and never have an opportunity of doing it, or I may will it and find that I have not the power to carry it out. I have willed it when I have decided that I am going to do it, when it has received my sanction. If the act willed is a possible one, it will follow the act of will, the decision, as soon as the ideas of the movements to be made (the kinæsthetic ideas, as they are called by the psychologists) or the ideas initiating these movements (the remote ideas, as James calls them) arise in consciousness. We are utterly in the dark as to how the process takes place; we simply know, for example, that when we will to move the arm, it moves, and when we will to move the ear, it does not move.2 The essential element in an act of will is this fiat or veto, this volitional man

1 Psychology, pp. 308-356. See Steinthal's Ethik: "Will is the conscious idea whose realization is approved of because its result, the caused alteration in the external world, is also presented and desired."

2 All that we can do is to show how such kinæsthetic ideas are produced, and that when they are present in consciousness they may be accompanied by movements. See the psychologies of Lotze, Bain, Preyer, Baumann, James, which show how we learn to make movements.

1

date, the decision or "cutting short of the process of deliberation," this determination, selective volition, or choice. Unless this element is present, we cannot be said to will in the common sense of that term. Movements may be made, however, without the presence of this factor. Not all the acts performed. by us are willed in the sense in which we have just spoken of willing; not every conscious act, in other words, is a willed act. Instincts, impulses, desires, ideo-motor action, etc., are not acts of the will; they are not necessarily willed, though, of course, they may be. In order to be willed in the real sense of the term, they need the consent or assent we have spoken of. We frequently perform acts impulsively and excuse ourselves by saying that we did not intend them, that we could not help ourselves.2

4. The Antecedents of Volition. We have found thus far that men are prompted to action by their

1 See Ladd's Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, pp. 613 ff.

2 It has become customary in modern psychology to extend the term will so as to make it synonymous with psychic energy. It is held that attention is involved in every state of consciousness, that no state can come to consciousness or be kept in consciousness without an act of attention. Just as a certain amount of physical energy must be present in the brain before an excitation can be produced there, so a certain amount of psychical energy must be present in consciousness before a state of consciousness can arise. This energy, or force, is called by Schopenhauer will, by Wundt and his followers will, attention, apperception, or conation. According to this view, every mental act is an act of will, and every physical movement that is preceded by consciousness is the same. We have preferred to use the term will in a narrower sense.

But

ideas, feelings, instincts, impulses, will, and combinations of these factors. We cannot say that feelings of pleasure are the only motives to action. perhaps feelings of pleasure are the only motives. to willed action, in the sense in which we have been using this term. Let us therefore investigate the antecedents of willing or volition a little more closely.

Let us ask, What causes me to decide for or against a project or end, or, rather, what happens in my consciousness prior to the decision or fiat?

Sometimes the bare idea of an end is sufficient to call forth the decision of the will. When the clock strikes eight I think of meeting my class, and without a moment's hesitation I utter the mental yes. Sometimes the decision is prompted by an instinct, an impulse, a wish, or a desire, by a feeling of pleasure or pain, or by the expectation of a pleasure or pain. I may will a course of conduct because I love or desire it, or because it promises me pleasure or freedom from pain, or because all these elements unite to gain my consent. Sometimes I feel impelled to act in a certain way which promises me pleasure, but feel a moral obligation to say no. It may require a severe effort on my part to say no, to decide against an act which is so charming; I seemingly have to force myself to consent to a course, which I finally do with a heavy heart.1 Sometimes

1 This feeling of effort is frequently spoken of as the will, or soul, in action; here we are supposed to feel the soul working,

the consent is not obtained until a great many reasons for and against a line of conduct have been considered, and until the agent understands the relation of the act to his desires or impulses or hopes or moral aims.1 I may say yes to a line of conduct when I discover by reasoning or otherwise that it agrees with an ideal of mine, an ideal which I have already chosen by an act of will.

5. Conclusions. Our main conclusions here are:(1) Not all human conscious action is willed action.

(2) Man is prompted to action by his instincts, impulses, desires, feelings, thoughts, perceptions, and volitions, i.e., consciousness in every shape and form tends to be followed by action.

(3) Man is determined to will by his instincts, impulses, desires, feelings, thoughts, perceptions, i.e., any state of consciousness may cause the ego to render a decision; and hence,

(4) It cannot be true that pleasure alone determines action or volition.

6. The Hedonistic Psychology of Action. Let us now look at the hedonistic psychology itself, and

"the dull, dead heave of the will" (see James, Psychology, chapter on "The Will"). But this feeling, whatever it may be, is not the fiat, or veto, itself, though it may be necessary to bring about the fiat, or veto. The view which identifies will with mental activity, and regards all psychic energy as will, will look upon the effort-feeling as a most typical case of willing, or soul-action.

1 See James, Psychology, chapter on "The Will," the reasonable type of willing.

subject it to criticism. It asserts that all men are prompted to action either by pleasure or pain. This may mean that all action, both voluntary and nonvoluntary (in our sense), is caused by pleasure and pain; or, that only willed action is determined in that way, i.e., that pleasure and pain are the sole motives of willing.

In either case the sole motive may be :

(1) Some variety of pleasure or pain, present or apprehended; that is, pleasure or pain, or the idea of pleasure or pain;

(2) Always a feeling of present pleasure or pain; (3) A feeling of pain alone; or,

(4) Unconscious pleasure or pain, or an unconscious idea of pleasure or pain.

7. Present or Apprehended Pleasure-Pain as the Motive. Interpreting the theory in the first sense, it means that actions are performed or not performed because they give us or promise us pleasure or pain. To quote Bain,1 a typical hedonistic psychologist : "A few repetitions of the fortuitous concurrence of pleasure and a certain movement will lead to the forging of an acquired connection under the Law of Retentiveness and Contiguity, so that, at an after time, the pleasure or its idea shall evoke the proper movement." 2 "The remembrance, notion, or anticipation of a feeling can operate in essentially the same way as the real presence. Without some antecedent of pleasurable or

1 Emotions and Will, 3d edition, pp. 303-504.

painful feeling,

2 Ib., chap. i, § 8.