governing all conduct; pleasure is the only motive of action. Stated in this form the problem is a psychological problem, and must be solved by the science of psychology. We shall therefore have to investigate the psychology of action before we can give a satisfactory answer to the question under discussion.

3. The Antecedents of Action. The first question which we shall ask ourselves here is this, What are the psychical antecedents of action, i.e., the states of consciousness leading to an act or movement? What takes place in consciousness before a man acts or moves, in consequence of which he is said to act?1

(1) Sometimes movements occur without being preceded by any conscious states. The movements governing circulation and metabolism are largely reflex or mechanical; they are not under the control of consciousness, and not even accompanied by consciousness. Other reflex movements, like the contraction of the pupil regulating the amount of light received by the retina, likewise belong to this category.2

(2) In other cases reflex movements are followed or accompanied by conscious states. A strong atmospheric concussion may cause a violent shock in my entire nervous system, producing widespread movements, and arising in consciousness as a loud

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1 See the standard works on psychology.

2 See Jodl, Lehrbuch der Psychologie, p. 416.

sound. Here it is not the sensation of sound that produces the movements; nay, what produces the former at the same time produces the latter.

(3) Sometimes movements follow conscious states immediately. Certain psychical states are accompanied or followed by movements in the body over which we have no control, and movements of the body, which we may learn to control. Let us look at some

of these.

(a) The perception or thought of certain things may be accompanied or followed by intra-organic changes of all kinds (in the vasomotor, circulatory, respiratory systems, in the digestive apparatus, etc.), as well as by more pronounced physical reactions, such as laughing, weeping, screaming, etc., movements of attack and defence, gestures, exclamations, facial movements, etc. Sometimes, especially in children, the mere sight of a movement leads to imitative movements. In all these cases a fixed path seems to have been formed between certain brain parts and certain muscles, which are transmitted from generation to generation. We might call such movements instinctive.

(b) Often the mere perception or thought of a movement or object is followed by a movement which has been learned, without the intervention of any other psychical element. A person may, upon seeing a piano, begin to play in an almost mechanical way, or grasp at an object before him without really intending to do so. Or his thought

may be followed by incipient movements of the vocal organs, without his having the slightest knowledge of what is taking place.1 A strong association seems to have been formed, by practice, between certain ideas and certain movements, so that when the former arise in consciousness, the latter immediately follow. Whenever a movement follows immediately upon an idea, the action is called ideo-motor.2

(c) Again, we may have the idea of a movement plus a feeling of pressure toward it. Here the whole soul seems to thrust itself in the direc

tion of a certain movement. This process is attended with pleasurable feelings, which easily change into pain, when the pressure becomes too great, or when the impulse to perform the movement is balked. The physiological condition of the pressure feeling is most likely the energy stored up in the brain cells (which produces the movement) together with the excitations caused in the brain by muscular movements accompanying attention. The sight of a person who has insulted me may arouse in me a strong desire to strike him. I feel that I have to hold myself back, as it were,

1 Steinthal calls attention to the contagious effect of the movements of the Flagellants, Tarantella dancers, etc., in this connection. Motions become contagious. When thousands cry vive l'Empereur, the Republican and Bourbon cannot resist. We can recall no movements without repeating the respective innervations. This explains actions performed by men who fear them, - hurling oneself from a tower, etc. Steinthal's Ethik, pp. 330 ff.

2 See Carpenter, Mental Physiology, and others.

and the more I restrain myself the more I feel impelled to strike the blow. Here almost any movement will afford relief. We might call these acts

impulsive acts.

(d) At other times a feeling of pleasure or a feeling of pain, or an anticipation of pleasure or pain, seems to push itself in between the idea and the act. This means simply that the idea is suffused with pleasure or pain, and that no movement will take place until these feelings are present. I make a movement; it gives me pleasure and I continue it, or it produces pain, and I stop it or make another. Or I think of a movement to be made, expect it to be pleasurable, and therefore make it.

(e) Most frequently many of these states together, i.e., ideas, feelings of pressure, feelings of pleasure, feelings of aversion, feelings of pain, precede the discharge of a movement.

(4) In all cases mentioned above, the act takes place without the intervention of a so-called decision of the will. Let us now examine states in which this element enters.

The question here is, -What are the elements involved in willing as such, and what are the antecedents leading to an act of will, i.e., what makes men will what they will? What takes place in consciousness when I will something, and what has taken place there before I willed it?

Let us take a typical case of willing, one which everybody would accept as such. I am considering

a certain end or result, be it a specific act, or a whole series of acts, or a train of thought. I have in consciousness the idea of an end or purpose or project or something that has not yet been done, but may be done. The end may be a vague one; I may have nothing but a hazy outline of the result to be achieved, or it may be clearly defined; I may have worked it out carefully, even to the details. I may be said to will this end or result when I assume a certain attitude toward it, when I decide that it shall be done, when I utter the fiat; or decide that it shall not be done, or utter the veto. In the one case I say yes, in the other no. A peculiar state of consciousness surrounds the idea of the result, a state of consciousness to which I give expression in language by saying, I will; my mind is made up. We call this state of consciousness or process in which the ego decides for or against the realization of an idea, an act of will.1 Ziehen calls this state which accompanies the idea of an act in willing, "a positive emotional tone."2 Perhaps we had better speak of it, however, as decision, as an attitude of the ego toward its project. Höffding defines it as follows: "Volition proper is characterized psychologically by

1 By will I do not mean a substantial entity, a metaphysical essence or force that produces the act (Schopenhauer), but simply the process itself which introspection reveals to us.

2 See Introduction to Physiological Psychology, chap. xiv, pp. 265 ff.

3 James speaks of it as the voluntary fiat, the volitional mandate, the mental consent.