energists regarded as the highest good, the exercise of reason, or the development of knowledge, and tended to ignore the emotional and impulsive factors of the soul-life. Modern energists generally take a broader view of the highest good, defining it not merely as the exercise of. the intellectual functions, but as the preservation and development of life as a whole. Happiness as a phase of soul-life receives its appropriate place as a part of the end or highest good, and the theory of energism more closely approximates hedonism. Pleasure is a means to the end of perfection, an accompaniment of virtuous action, a sign that the goal is being realized. The altruistic element is also gradually introduced into the modern conception of energism. The preservation and development of the race is looked upon as the ideal of life and the standard of morality. Man is no longer conceived as striving merely for his own individual perfection and happiness, but for the good of the whole. Sympathy takes its place by the side of self-love as a natural endowment of the soul.1 In the evolutionistic school we also get a closer approximation to intuitionism. Man strives after the preservation and perfection of himself and his fellows; and conscience is largely an inherited instrument in the service of this ideal or goal. It demands what is good for man as a member of society; it is the expression of the general will in the individual heart.

1 Compare chap. vi, § 14.

CHAPTER VIII

CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM1

1. The Conception of the Highest Good. Our historical review has shown us that there are different answers to the question, What is the end of life and the standard of morality? One school holds that pleasure — all the way from sensuous pleasure to intellectual pleasure, and all the way from the pleasure of the individual to the pleasure or happiness of humanity is the highest good. Another combats this notion, and sets up as the end, not pleasure, but virtue, knowledge, perfection, self-preservation, or the preservation of society. We pointed out the fact that the Greeks concerned themselves with the question of the highest good, while the modern thinkers formulate the problem in a somewhat different manner, asking, What is the ground of moral distinctions; what makes an

1 For criticism of hedonism, see Plato, Philebus and Republic, Bk. IX; Aristotle, Ethics; Kant, Abbott's translation; Darwin, Descent of Man, chap. iv; Lecky, European Morals, chap. i; Sidgwick, Methods, Bk. I, chap. iv; Bradley, Ethical Studies, III, VII; Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, Bk. II, chap. ii; Bk. III, chaps. i, iv; Bk. IV, chaps. iii, iv; Martineau, Types, Vol. II; Murray, Handbook of Ethics, Bk. II, Part. I, chap. i; Simmel, Einleitung, Vol. I, chap. iv; Hyslop, Elements, pp. 349–385; Paulsen, Ethics, pp. 250 ff.

act right or wrong; what is the criterion, or standard, or ideal of conduct, called moral?

Let us now examine the answers which have been given to the question as the ancient Greeks asked it, and try to reach some conclusion with respect to it. And first, let us inquire, What do we mean by the summum bonum or the highest good?

We may mean by the summum bonum: (1) something which humanity prizes as the most valuable thing in the world, something of absolute worth, for the sake of which everything else that is desired is desired. We may say: (a) that humanity consciously and deliberately sets up this good as its goal or ideal; or (b) that men are urged to action by this good, that this good is the motive of all action without being clearly and distinctly conceived as an ideal.

Or we may mean, not that men consciously or unconsciously strive after a certain end, but (2) that a certain end or result is realized in human conduct. This end or result may be desired by some intelligence outside of man, or it may be a purely mechanical consequence of the laws of nature. Thus we may find that a certain organ in the body realizes a certain end, that it serves a certain purpose, without desiring that purpose, or, in fact, knowing anything about it. We may attempt to explain this by saying that the purpose was desired by an intelligence outside or inside of the organ, which would lead us into metaphysics, or, that it was simply the effect of certain natural conditions.

Or the proposition may mean, not that a certain end or ideal is desired by humanity, nor that it is realized by humanity, but (3) that humanity ought to desire it.

Let us turn to the hedonistic theory and examine it in the light of the preceding reflections.

2. Pleasure as the Highest Good. According to the hedonistic theory, pleasure is the highest good or end. Let us take this to mean that all human beings strive after pleasure. By pleasure we may mean positive or active pleasure, or freedom from pain, repose of spirit, peace of mind; sensuous pleasure, or intellectual pleasure; the pleasure of self, or the pleasure of others; momentary pleasure, or the pleasure of a lifetime. Now if the theory maintains that all men strive after pleasures of sense, that these are the highest good, it cannot be upheld. Men do not desire sensuous pleasures in preference to all others. We may say that they desire both kinds of pleasure, and that if any are preferred, it is the so-called higher pleasures rather than the others. With the progress of civilization, the race comes to care more for intellectual and moral pleasures than for the so-called bodily enjoyments. This truth has been recognized by such hedonists as Democritus, Epicurus, Mill, Sidgwick, and others. Again, if the theory means by pleasure the pleasure of the moment, it can be easily refuted. Indeed, perhaps no hedonist, not even Aristippus, ever recommended that we sacrifice the future to the present. It does not require much

experience to discover that certain pleasures are followed by pain, and that a whole life may be wrecked by the pleasure of a moment. "Der Wahn ist kurz, die Reu' ist lang." Rational creatures are able to judge of the future by the past, and will, therefore, be willing to forego a present pleasure and even to accept a present pain for the sake of a more enduring future pleasure.

(1) Let us interpret the theory to mean that men universally strive after pleasure, using the term pleasure in the widest and most favorable sense. Now, if we are to understand by this that every human being consciously sets up as the ideal of his conduct, pleasure or happiness, or freedom from pain, and systematically compares all his acts with this standard, selecting such as tend to produce pleasure and rejecting the opposites, the theory cannot stand. It cannot be proved that all men have clear ideals of life, and that they govern their lives in consistent harmony with them. Much less can it be proved that this ideal is pleasure. We cannot imagine the average man as saying to himself, Does this act agree with my ideal of life; will this mode of conduct be in harmony with my ideal of pleasure?

(2) But perhaps his acts are determined by pleasure after all, though he may not know it until he begins to reflect upon his states of consciousness. That is to say, the hedonistic theory may teach, All human acts are prompted by pleasure; the desire to get pleasure and to avoid pain is the principle