mon good will be the supreme law." Again, "The
happiness of each individual . . . is derived from the
best state of the whole system, as the nourishment
of each member of an animal depends upon the
nourishment of the whole mass of blood diffused
through the whole." The common good being the
end, "such actions as take the shortest way to this
effect. . . are naturally called 'right,' because of
their natural resemblance to a right line, which is
the shortest that can be drawn between any two
given points,
but the rule itself is called
right, as pointing out the shortest way to the
end."

10. Shaftesbury. - Shaftesbury 1 finds in man two kinds of impulses: "selfish or private affections," and "natural, kind, or social affections." The selfish affections are directed toward the individual welfare or preservation, "private good"; the social affections, toward common welfare, the preservation of the system of which the individual forms a part, "public good." Just as the health or perfection of a bodily organism consists in the harmonious coöperation of all its organs, so the health or perfection of the soul consists in the harmonious coöperation of the selfish and social affections. An individual is good or virtuous when all his inclinations and affections conduce to the welfare of his species or the system of which he is a part. Virtue is the proper balance or harmony between the two impulses.

1 See chap. ii, § 4 (1).

But how can we tell whether our impulses are properly balanced? By means of the moral sense, as we have already seen,1 the sense of right and wrong, the rational affections. The moral sense is original or innate, like the other affections. Just as the contemplation of works of art arouses feelings of disinterested approbation and disapprobation, so the contemplation of human acts and impulses, whether of others or ourselves, arouses feelings of approval and disapproval.

Since man is originally a social being, he derives his greatest happiness from that which makes for the existence of society and the common weal. The necessary concomitant of virtue is happiness, just as pleasure accompanies the right state of the organism.

11. Darwin.2- The modern evolutionists agree with this conception, I quote a passage from Darwin's Descent of Man: "In the case of the lower animals it seems much more appropriate to speak of their social instincts as having been developed for the general good rather than for the general happiness of the species. The term general good may be defined as the rearing of the greatest number of individuals in full vigor and health, with all their faculties perfect, under the conditions to which they are subjected. As the social instincts both of man and the lower animals have no doubt been developed by nearly the same steps, it would be found advis1 Chap. ii, § 4 (1). 2 See chap. ii, § 7 (2).

able, if found practicable, to use the same definition in both cases, and to take as the standard of morality the general good or welfare of the community rather than the general happiness. . . When a

man risks his life to save that of a fellow-creature, it seems also more correct to say that he acts for the general good, rather than for the general happiness of mankind. No doubt the welfare and the happiness of the individual usually coincide; and a contented, happy tribe will flourish better than one that is discontented and unhappy. We have seen that even at an early period in the history of man, the expressed wishes of the community will have naturally influenced, to a large extent, the conduct of each member; and as all wish for happiness, 'the greatest happiness principle' will have become a most important secondary guide and object; the social instinct, however, together with sympathy (which leads to our regarding the approbation and disapprobation of others), having served as the primary impulse and guide. Thus the reproach is removed of laying the foundation of the noblest part of our nature in the base principle of selfishness; unless, indeed, the satisfaction which every animal feels, when it follows its proper instincts, and the dissatisfaction felt when prevented, be called selfish."1 12. Stephen. Leslie Stephen 2 defines the moral law" as a statement of the conditions or of a part of

1 Descent of Man, chap. iv, Part I, Concluding Remarks.
2 The Science of Ethics, 1882.

the conditions essential to the vitality of the social tissue." 1 Our moral judgments must condemn instincts and modes of conduct which are pernicious to the social vitality, and must approve the opposite; but it does not necessarily follow that it must disapprove or approve them because they are perceived to be pernicious or beneficial. It is essential to social vitality that actions result from inner feelings. Hence the moral law has to be expressed in the form, "Be this," not in the form "Do this."

The utilitarian theory, which makes happiness the criterion of morality, coincides approximately with the evolutionistic theory, which makes health of the society the criterion; for health and happiness approximately coincide. We may infer that the typical or ideal character, at any given stage of development, the organization, which, as we say, represents the true line of advance, corresponds to a maximum of vitality. It seems, again, this typical form, as the healthiest, must represent not only the strongest type, that is, the type most capable of resisting unfavorable influences, — but also the happiest type; for every deviation from it affords a strong presumption, not merely of liability to the destructive processes which are distinctly morbid, but also to a diminished efficiency under normal conditions.4

1 The Science of Ethics, 1882, chap. iv, ii, p. 148.

2 Ib.

8 Ib., p. 406.

▲ Ib., p. 407. See chap. ix, pp. 359 ff.; also chap. x, pp. 404 ff.

13. Jhering. - Rudolph von Jhering 1 advances a similar view. All moral laws and customs have as their end the weal and prosperity of society. All moral norms are social imperatives. All these social imperatives owe their existence to social ends. The ends of society depend upon its conditions.2 The purpose of morality is the establishment and prosperity of society. Now, just as a house is not a mere mass of stones, society is not a mere aggregate of individuals, but a whole made up of individual members, and formed into a unity by a community of ends. The part must adapt itself to the whole if the whole is to stand. Hence the postulate of a social norm which prescribes to the individual such conduct as is necessary to the social order in so far as his own inclinations do not serve society, and the necessity of securing compliance with the norm by means of compulsion. But mere mechanical or legal compulsion is not enough. We have also psychological compulsion. The advantage of psychological compulsion lies in the fact that it stops before no relation in life; it presses in everywhere like the atmosphere, into the interior of the home as well as to the steps of the throne - in places where mechanical compulsion can have no effect.

We may say that whatever human conduct is necessary to the existence of society is a constituent of the moral order and falls within the realm of

1 Der Zweck im Recht, 2 vols, 1874. 2 Ib., Vol. II, pp. 95 ff.

8 Ib., Vol. II, pp. 134 ff.