Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

love or prudence, according to which one ought to aim at one's own happiness or pleasure, as a whole; that is, reason dictates "an impartial concern for all parts of our conscious life," an equal regard for the rights of all moments, the future as well as the present, the remote as well as the near. The present pleasure is to be foregone with the view of obtaining greater pleasure or happiness hereafter. "Hereafter is to be regarded neither less nor more than Now."

As

Another such principle, the principle of the duty of benevolence, teaches that the good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view of the universe, than the good of any other. One is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as one's own, except in so far as we judge it to be less, when impartially viewed, or less certainly knowable or attainable. a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally, not merely at a particular part of it. When the egoist puts forward, implicitly or explicitly, the proposition that his happiness or pleasure is good, not only for him, but from the point of the universe as, e.g., by saying that "nature designed him to seek his own happiness," it then becomes relevant to point out to him that his happiness cannot be a more important part of good taken universally, than the equal happiness of any other person. And thus, starting with his own principle, he may be brought to accept universal happiness or pleasure as that which is

absolutely without qualification good or desirable; as an end, therefore, to which the action of a reasonable agent as such ought to be directed.1

Another principle is the principle of justice; whatever action any one of us judges to be right for himself he implicitly judges to be right for all similar persons in similar circumstances. It cannot be right for A to treat B in a manner in which it would be wrong for B to treat A; merely on the ground that they are two different individuals, and without there being any difference between the natures or circumstances of the two which can be stated as a reasonable ground for difference of treatment.2

Other contemporary exponents of the hedonistic school are: Alexander Bain, Alfred Barratt,4 Shadworth Hodgson,5 Herbert Spencer, Georg von Gizycki, and Thomas Fowler.8

[blocks in formation]

8 The Senses and the Intellect, 1856; The Emotions and the Will, 1859; Mental and Moral Science, 1868. See chap. ii, § 6 (7). 4 Physical Ethics, 1869. 5 Theory of Practice, 2 vols., 1870. 6 Principles of Ethics: Part I, "The Data of Ethics," 1879; Part II, "The Inductions of Ethics," 1892; Part III, "The Ethics of Individual Life," 1892; Part IV, "Justice," 1891. "There is no escape, says Spencer, "from the admission that in calling good the conduct which subserves life, and bad the conduct which hinders or destroys it, and in so implying that life is a blessing, and not a curse, we are inevitably asserting that conduct is good or bad according as its total effects are pleasurable or painful.”Data of Ethics, chap. iii, p. 28.

[ocr errors]

7 Grundzüge der Moral, 1883, translated by Stanton Coit; Moralphilosophie, 1889.

8 Progressive Morality, 1884; Fowler and Wilson, Principles of Morality, 1886-1887.

14. General Survey. In conclusion let us briefly survey the history of the theories of hedonism, and note their development. In Greek hedonism the tendency was at first to regard bodily pleasure and the pleasure of the moment as the highest good and motive of action (Aristippus). A closer study of the problem led to the gradual modification of this conception. Instead of the pleasure of the moment, the pleasure of a lifetime; instead of violent pleasure, repose of spirit, a happy frame of mind, came to be regarded as the ideal of conduct (Theodorus, Democritus, Epicurus). The element of prudence or reason was also more strongly emphasized in the course of time. It was pointed out that happiness could not be secured without prudence or forethought; that the desire for pleasure had to be governed by reason (Democritus, Epicurus). Then it was shown that mental pleasures were preferable to bodily pleasures, that the ideal could not be realized through sensuous enjoyment, but only by the exercise of the higher intellectual faculties (Democritus, Epicurus). The commonly accepted virtues were also included among the means of happiness, and a moral life insisted on as necessary to the realization of the highest good. Indeed, the controversy between hedonism and the opposing school finally reduced itself to a dispute concerning the fundamental principle underlying morality; both schools practically recommended the same manner of life, one because it led to

happiness, the other because it tended toward perfection.1

Modern hedonists make the standpoint ultimately reached by the Greeks their starting-point. None of them asserts that pleasure is the highest good, without modifying the statement somewhat. The element of prudence or reason is emphasized by all. Even Bentham, who is the most radical representative of the modern school, makes the pleasure of a lifetime the end, and insists that we cannot reach this goal without exercising prudence. They would all agree, also, that the goal cannot be reached by the pursuit of sensuous pleasure, and that the exercise of the mental faculties procures the greatest happiness.

An important advance, however, is made by the modern advocates of the theory. Locke, Paley, and Bentham still incline toward egoistic hedonism, which was so prominent in the Greek systems; the highest good is the happiness of the individual, though this cannot be realized except through the happiness of the race. Hutcheson, Hume, J. S. Mill, and Sidgwick, on the other hand, recognize the sympathetic impulse in man as a natural endowment; the highest good is the happiness of the race. But this is a difference of principle only, which does not affect the practice of human beings; both systems empha

1 In Anniceris we even get a slight tendency to altruism; he advises us to forego our pleasure and submit to pain for the sake of friends and country.

N

size the necessity of doing good to our fellows, the one because our individual happiness depends upon our regard for our neighbor, the other because man is by nature disposed to care for the good of his fellow-men.

Another important change is made in modern hedonism by J. S. Mill. According to him pleasure is the highest good and the standard of morality. But the experience of the race teaches that some pleasures, as, for example, the pleasures accompanying the exercise of our higher mental faculties, are preferred to others. The race prefers them, however, not because they are the most intense, but because they differ in kind or quality from those accompanying the lower functions. Men evidently prefer these pleasures because they cannot help themselves, they must prefer them, they prefer them absolutely; it is their nature to prefer them. standard, therefore, is not pleasure as such, but a certain quality of pleasure, and man prefers this quality absolutely.1 Not pleasure as such, but the higher pleasures, move us to action. Or, rather, since "it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied," the highest good is really not pleasure so much as the exercise of the higher mental functions. In this form there is no radical difference between hedonism and energism.2

The

1 This view reminds one of Martineau's theory of conscience. See chap. ii, § 5, p. 45.

2 See Paulsen, Ethics, Bk. II, chap. ii, end of § 6.

« AnteriorContinuar »