one constantly pursues happiness, and desires what makes any part of it.1 "Virtue," he says, "as in its obligation it is the will of God, discovered by natural reason, and thus has the force of law, so in the matter of it, it is nothing else but doing of good, either to oneself or others; and the contrary hereunto, vice, is nothing else but doing of harm."2 "Thus, I think-It is man's proper business to seek happiness and avoid misery. Happiness consists in what delights and contents the mind; misery in what disturbs, discomposes, or torments it. I will therefore make it my business to seek satisfaction and delight, and avoid uneasiness and disquiet; to have as much of the one, and as little of the other, as may be. But here I must have a care I mistake not, for if I prefer a short pleasure to a lasting one, it is plain I cross my own happiness." The most lasting pleasures in life consist in (1) health, (2) reputation, (3) knowledge, (4) doing good, (5) the expectation of eternal and incomprehensible happiness in another world.3 7. Butler.-Bishop Butler, too, has hedonistic tendencies, as may be seen from certain significant passages in his sermons. "Conscience and self-love,"

1 Essay, Bk. II, chap. xx, §§ 1 ff.; chap. xxi, §§ 42 ff.; Bk. I, chap. iii, § 3; Bk. II, chap. xxviii, §§ 5 ff.

2 See passage in Locke's Common-Place Book, first published by Lord King, The Life of John Locke, pp. 292–293.

Lord King, p. 304; Fox Bourne's Life of Locke, Vol. I, pp. 163-165. With this view, Leibniz (1646-1716) practically agrees. See his New Essays, translated by Langley, Bk. I, chap. ii, §§ 1, 3; Bk. II, chap. xx, § 2; chap. xxi, § 42; also some notes published in Erdmann's edition of his works (Duncan's translation, p. 130).

he says, "if we understand our true happiness, always lead us the same way. Duty and interest are perfectly coincident; for the most part in this world, but entirely and in every instance if we take in the future and in the whole; this being implied in the notion of a good and perfect administration of things." "It may be allowed without any prejudice to the cause of virtue and religion, that our ideas of happiness and misery are of all our ideas the nearest and most important to us. ... Let it be allowed, though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right and good, as such, yet, that when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it." 2

8. Hutcheson. - Francis Hutcheson calls an action "materially good when in fact it tends to the interest of the system, so far as we can judge of its tendency, or to the good of some part consistent with that of the system, whatever were the affections of the agent." "An action is formally good when it flowed from good affection in a just proportion." But what is the good? "That action is best which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers, and worst which in like manner occasions misery."3

1 Sermon iii, end.

2 Sermon xi.

8 See Martineau, Types, Vol. II, pp. 514 ff.; Albee, "Shaftesbury and Hutcheson," Phil. Review, Vol. V, number 1.

9. Hume. We have already examined David Hume's doctrine of the moral sense. We feel or per

ceive the rightness or wrongness of an act,1 we feel a peculiar kind of pleasure or pain in the contemplation of characters and actions, in consequence of which we call them right or wrong. Now the question behind this is, Why does any action or sentiment, "upon the general view or survey," give this satisfaction or uneasiness? 2 In other words, what is the ultimate ground of moral distinctions? "Qualities," Hume answers, "acquire our approbation because of their tendency to the good of mankind." We find that most of those qualities which we naturally approve of, have actually that tendency, and render a man a proper member of society; while the qualities which we naturally disapprove of, have a contrary tendency and render any intercourse with the person dangerous or disagreeable. Moral distinctions arise, in a great measure, from the tendency of the qualities. and characters to the interests of society, and it is our concern for that interest which makes us approve or disapprove of them. Now we have no such extensive concern for society but from sympathy; and consequently it is that principle which takes us so far out of ourselves as to give us the same pleasure or uneasiness in the characters of others, as if they had a tendency to our own advantage or

1 Treatise on Human Nature, Bk. III, Section II.

2 Ib., Bk. III, Section III, end.

8 Ib., Bk. III, Part III, Section I; Hyslop's Selections, p. 226.

loss.1 We have a feeling for the happiness of mankind, and a resentment of their misery,2 and everything which contributes to the happiness of society recommends itself directly to our approbation and good will.3 10. Paley. According to William Paley, "actions are to be estimated according to their tendency. Whatever is expedient is right. It is the utility of any moral rule which constitutes the obligation of it."4 "Virtue is the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness." 5 God wills and wishes the happiness of

His creatures. The method of coming at the will of God concerning any action, by the light of nature, is to inquire into the tendency of that action to promote or diminish the general happiness. Happiness does not consist in the pleasures of sense, for these pleasures continue but a little while at a time, lose their relish by repetition, and are really never enjoyed because we are always eager for higher and more intense delights. Nor does happiness con

1 See Hyslop, p. 227; also Treatise, Conclusion, Section VI; also Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, especially Section V.

2 Inquiry, Appendix I.

3 Ib., Part II, Section V. See also Appendix I, v, and Treatise on Human Nature, Bk. II, Part III, Section I: "The chief spring or actuating principle of the human mind is pleasure or pain; and when these sensations are removed, both from our thought and feeling, we are, in a great measure, incapable of passion or action, of desire or volition."

4 Moral Philosophy, p. 38.

5 Ib., p. 26. • Ib., pp. 36 ff.

sist in an exemption from pain, care, business, suspense, etc., nor in greatness or rank. It consists in the exercise of social affections, exercise of our faculties, either of body or mind, in the pursuit of some engaging end, in the prudent constitution of the habits, in health. Pleasures differ in nothing but continuance and intensity.1

11. Bentham.-Jeremy Bentham also makes pleasure the end of action. "Pleasure is in itself a good, nay the only good; pain is in itself an evil, the only evil."2 Everything else is good only in so far as it conduces to pleasure. All actions are determined by pleasures and pains, and. are to be judged by the same standard. "The constantly proper end of action on the part of every individual at the moment of action is his real greatest happiness from that moment to the end of his life." What kind of pleasure shall we choose? Choose those pleasures which last the longest and are the most intense, regardless of their quality. "The quantity of pleasure being equal, push-pin is as good as poetry." In estimating the value of a pleasure or a pain, we must also consider, besides the intensity and duration, its certainty or uncertainty, its propinquity or remoteness, its fecundity ("or the chance it has of being followed by sensations of the same kind "),

1 Moral Philosophy, pp. 19 ff.

2 Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. x, Bowring's edition, p. 102; Springs of Action, ii, § 4; Deontology, Vol. I, p. 126.