ing of a dog. Aristotle justifies slavery on the ground of its necessity, and jestingly declares that slavery will be abolished as soon as the shuttlecocks in the looms begin to move themselves. (5) When we investigate the subject-matter of the moral law, we notice certain discrepancies which cannot be explained except on the theory that the effect of the act is the important thing. The law says, Thou shalt not kill either thyself or other human beings. It is wrong to take human life. And yet according to the popular conscience the State has the right to execute criminals, and an individual may kill a fellow in self-defence. Nor is killing in war regarded as reprehensible. It is right for a nation to defend itself when attacked, or to attack another nation that is meditating its destruction. Suicide is generally condemned as wrong, and yet we do not blame Arnold von Winkelried, who gathered to his breast the spear-points of the enemy in order to open a path for his followers. The law says, Thou shalt not lie. But we do not find fault with the physician for deceiving his patients for their own good, nor with the general for deluding the enemy, nor with the officer of the law for not always telling the truth to the murderer whom he wishes to entrap. In all these cases modes of conduct are prohibited which have certain harmful effects. They all represent forms of action which endanger life. And yet these same modes of conduct are allowed in certain instances; apparently because the usual results attendant upon them do not appear, or because an insistence upon their performance would have still more serious consequences than the abrogation of the law. From the above, it seems to me, we may safely infer that the ultimate ground of moral distinctions lies in the effects which acts tend to produce. Such acts as actually tend or are believed to produce consequences desired by mankind come to be regarded as good or right, and are enjoined as duties, while their opposites are condemned and prohibited. The effect or end or purpose which an act tends to realize must, in the last analysis, be what gives to it its moral worth. It must be this end or purpose which, in some way or another, has prompted man to evaluate as he does. This it must be which constitutes the ground or principle or standard or criterion of moral codes. In other words, morality is a means to an end; its utility or purposiveness is its standard. 6. Teleological Schools. Let us call this view, which regards the utility or purposiveness or teleology (from the Greek word, téλos, tělõs, end, purpose) of morality as its ground, the teleological view.1 According to it such acts are good or right 1 The Latin word for useful is utilis. We might therefore call the school which regards the utility of conduct as the criterion of its moral worth, the utilitarian school. But, as we shall see later on, this term has been appropriated by a particular branch or phase of the school. To avoid confusion, therefore, we shall follow the usage introduced by Paulsen, and employ the term teleological. as tend to produce certain results or effects, or to realize a certain end. Here the question naturally arises, What is the end or purpose which morality realizes or seeks to realize? Different answers have been given: (1) Morality conduces to pleasure or happiness; it is the pleasure-giving quality of an act that makes it good. The Greek word for pleasure is dový (hěděně). Hence we may call this view the pleasure-theory, or hedonism. It declares that acts are good or bad according as they tend to produce pleasure or pain. But, we ask, Pleasure for whom? My pleasure or your pleasure? (a) Mine, say some. Acts are good or bad because they tend to make me happy or unhappy. This is egoistic (from Greek eyú, Latin ego=1), or individualistic hedonism. This (b) No, say others, acts are good or bad according as they tend to give pleasure or pain to others. is heteristic (érepos, heteros, other) or altruistic (Latin alter, other), or universalistic hedonism.2 (2) According to other teleologists, the principle 1 The Greek word for happiness is evdarovla (eudæmonia). Hence the theory is often called eudæmonism. 2 Called by John Stuart Mill utilitarianism. Mill's utilitarianism is universalistic hedonism. He applies the general, or generic, term to a particular species, and identifies utilitarianism with a particular phase of it. It is for this reason, as we stated before, that we prefer to use the term teleology. The term utilitarianism, owing to Mill's use of it, means, in most persons' minds, universalistic hedonism, which, of course, is not the only possible teleological school. of morality is not pleasure or happiness, but the preservation of life, "virtuous activity," welfare, development, progress, perfection, realization. We might call the adherents of this school anti-hedonists, or according to their more positive tenets, vitalists (vita, life), perfectionists, realizationists, or energists.1 The energists or perfectionists hold that acts are good which tend to preserve and develop human life. We may have here, as above: (a) egoistic or individualistic energism; and (b) altruistic or universalistic energism. According to the former, the end of morality is the preservation and development of individual life; according to the latter, of the life of the species. 7. Summary. The following table attempts to summarize the views mentioned in this chapter 2: 1 A term employed by Paulsen, derived from the Greek évépyeιa (energeia), energy, work, action. The advocates of this view are also called eudæmonists by some. The word eudæmonia means happiness, but for Aristotle and others happiness is identical with virtuous activity. The different senses in which this word eudomonia is used by different writers often causes confusion. 2 These views are by no means, as is usually supposed, necessarily antagonistic to each other. The statements, An act is right or wrong because conscience tells me so, and An act is right or wrong because of the effects it tends to produce, do not necessarily exclude each other. They can both be true. Similarly, the statements, An act is right or wrong because God wills it to be so, and An act is right or wrong because conscience tells me so, and An act is right or wrong because its effects make it so, can be easily harmonized. See chap. v, §§ 1, 11, 12. |