that they originated somewhat similarly in the race. The primitive man, let us say, instinctively resented attacks upon himself, and those near to him, and feared the painful consequences which injury done to others was bound to bring upon him and those for whom he cared. In the course of time, with the development of society, the fear of personal revenge gave way to the fear of the ruler and the State, the fear of the wrath of invisible powers, the fear of losing social recognition, the fear of causing ideal pain to others. Then, perhaps, the feeling of sympathy, which at first included only a few in its scope, was extended, taking in larger numbers, and became a motive. Finally, feelings of respect and reverence for the law as law, the feeling of obligation, arose as in the case of the individual. If it is true that the development of the individual, or ontogenesis, is a repetition

those not thus well bred, the social and even the physical environment tends to establish a similar connection. But this connection implies, in its very possibility, the beginning of a so-called 'moral nature' for the child. All its pleasure-pains may thus come to have for it a quasi-moral import. On the basis of this experience with its own states of affective consciousness, considered as connected with deeds of its own will and voluntary courses of conduct, the intellect of the child generalizes. Here, however, the greater part of the conclusions—such as this is right and that is wrong are accepted as already formed from those older than itself. The 'freeing' of the idea of the right from its concrete and sensuous clothing, as it were, results in a formation of a more and more abstract system of moral principles. Such are statements like the following: Truth-telling is right, and lying is wrong; honesty is right, and stealing is wrong; kindness is right, and cruelty is wrong, etc."

of the development of the race, or phylogenesis, then we must imagine that this feeling of obligation is a late arrival in the race-consciousness, and not an original possession in the sense that it existed in the primitive soul.

9. In what Sense Conscience is Innate. - The individual, then, does not know or feel at birth what is right and what is wrong; nor is the feeling of obligation immediately aroused in him. He possesses, however, many instincts out of which the moral sentiments may be said to evolve. Among these instincts, which must be regarded as innate, may be mentioned: the feeling of resentment, the fear of others' resentment, the regard for others' opinions, the impulse of imitation, the sympathetic regard for others' welfare, the tendency to submit to superior powers, or to obey commands. These instinctive factors of consciousness form the basis of the higher moral feelings; out of them the latter will grow under the proper conditions. If the fact that the higher moral feelings are bound to be developed in consciousness under suitable conditions. means that they are innate, then we must subscribe to the doctrines of intuitionism. In this sense, however, all our feelings, hope, fear, anger, etc., -indeed, everything in consciousness, our capacity for language, our capacity for hearing and seeing, original or innate. But this does not yet prove the moral sentiments are originally connected with the ideas of certain forms of conduct. All that we

are

that

can assert so far is that such feelings may be aroused in consciousness, and may be attached to the ideas of certain acts.

Moreover, if the evolutionistic theory is correct in its doctrine of inheritance, we may suppose that the capacity for feeling approval and obligation is transmitted by its possessors to succeeding generations. Some men seem to be more timid, or cowardly, or cruel, or sympathetic by nature than others, which means that these impulses are more readily produced in them than in others. To say, then, that a man has inherited a great respect or reverence for the law, would signify that, if he were properly trained, he would develop these feelings. In this sense we may speak of conscience as an instinct, as some writers do. And, furthermore, if it is possible for us to inherit a tendency to feel and to think and to act in a certain way, why should it not be possible for us to feel obligation and approval in connection with certain ideas? We inherit not only fear in the abstract, or the capacity for fear, but the fear of particular things, say of dark places, vermin, etc.1 If certain fixed neural relations are formed between the brain processes which stand for particular percepts, and those which stand for particular feelings (of fear, etc.), and are transmitted from generation to gen

1 See James, Psychology, chapter on "Instinct"; Sully, The Human Mind, Vol. II, p. 71; Ziehen, Introduction to Physiological Psychology, pp. 244 ff.; Schneider, Der menschliche Wille, p. 224.

eration, there is no great reason why such connections should not be formed between the paths which represent certain acts, like murder, for example, and those which are the physiological counterparts of the ought-feelings, whatever they may be, and be handed down to offspring. This would not mean that the child is born with these two psychical states together, but it would mean that, under the proper conditions and at the proper time, the connection would be formed more easily than if it had not already existed in a long line of ancestors.1

1 See Darwin, Descent of Man, pp. 123 f. After quoting that part of Spencer's letter to Mill in which Spencer expresses his belief in the transmission of moral intuitions, Darwin says: แ "There is not the least inherent improbability, as it seems to me, in virtuous tendencies being more or less strongly inherited; for, not to mention the various dispositions and habits transmitted by many of our domestic animals to their offspring, I have heard of authentic cases in which a desire to steal and a tendency to lie appeared to run in families of the upper ranks; and as stealing is a rare crime in the wealthy classes, we can hardly account by accidental coincidence for the tendency occurring in two or three members of the same family. If bad tendencies are transmitted, it is probable that good ones are likewise transmitted. That the state of the body, by affecting the brain, has great influence on the moral tendencies is known to most of those who have suffered from chronic derangements of the digestion or liver. The same fact is likewise shown by the 'perversion or destruction of the moral sense being often one of the earliest symptoms of mental derangement' (Maudsley, Body and Mind, 1870, p. 60), and insanity is notoriously often inherited. Except through the principle of the transmission of moral tendencies, we cannot understand the differences believed to exist in this respect between the various races of mankind. Even the partial transmission of virtuous tendencies would be an immense assistance to the primary impulse derived directly and indirectly from the social instincts.

Nor would this mean that the connection has existed forever and will continue to exist forever, that it is inseparable and eternal, or that the same combinations exist in all human beings.

Whether such tendencies to feel bound in the presence of certain acts are really inherited, we cannot tell positively, but there is nothing improbable in the thought. The fact that time and training are required to bring out the moral feelings would be no argument against the belief. There are many instincts in man which do not ripen at once and without the proper excitants, and yet we do not deny to them their instinctive and innate character.

Let us sum up: The moral feelings, as we find them now, are comparatively late arrivals in the history of the individual and the race. They are not the original and inseparable companions of any particular acts, but may become attached to all forms of conduct under suitable conditions. There is nothing impossible in the notion that the tendency to feel them in connection with certain acts may

Admitting for a moment that virtuous tendencies are inherited, it appears probable, at least in such cases as chastity, temperance, humanity to animals, etc., that they become first impressed on the mental organization through habit, instruction, and example, continued during several generations in the same family, and in a quite subordinate degree, or not at all, by the individuals possessing such virtues having succeeded best in the struggle for life." See also Darwin and Spencer in the passages quoted in chap. ii, § 7 (2) and (3); Carneri, Grundzüge der Ethik, pp. 348 f.; Entwickelung und Darwinismus, p. 212; Williams, Ethics, pp. 402 ff., 435 ff., 449 ff.; Sutherland, Moral Instinct, Vol. II, pp. 60 ff.